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The study explores the puzzle that despite the growing corporate representation 
at EU level, large firms from Eastern Europe are under-represented in Brussels. It 
investigates the Europeanization process of corporate lobbying from a comparative 
capitalism perspective, through the case study of Hungary and the shadow case of the 
UK. I argue that the theorisation of EU lobbying requires a firm-centred approach and 
the integration of managerial choice into the framework of analysis. Findings show that 
firms in Hungary develop top-level, network-based lobbying strategies that are not 
professionalized. As this type of strategy is non-transposable to the EU level, it creates a 
‘golden cage’ for domestic businesses. I find indeed that the ‘door’ of the golden cage is 
open to foreign firms, but creates a barrier of entry, whereas networks ‘lock in’ local 
firms and thus create a ‘barrier to exit’.  
Besides I argue that the organizational arrangement of lobbying also has a direct 
impact on firms’ Europeanization ability. The findings suggest that firms rely on their 
domestic lobbying strategies in their Europeanization process and try to transpose their 
domestic lobbying structures to the EU level. Consequently, those firms that originate 
from institutional contexts, where the domestic environment supports the 
professionalization of lobbying, will find it easier to Europeanize than those, which 
come from states where networks and informal relationships dominate interest 
representation. Hence I argue that the institutional environment in Hungary has a direct 
impact on domestic firms’ EU level lobbying engagement. This study suggests that if 
we were to consider the absence of Eastern European firms from Brussels and hence the 
unequal representation of Eastern and Western firms as a problem in terms of 
'democratic' deficit, the solution to this problem would have to look beyond Brussels, 
because the reasons for the absence may lay in the domestic system. 
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By 2013 the European Union has grew into an almost continent-wide political 
and economic partnership of European countries. It is the largest internal market in the 
world, allowing free movement of goods, services, money and people between national 
borders. The EU went through a major change in the last 10 years, extending its 
membership from 15 to 28 countries. Out of the 13 new member states, 11 lived under 
communist rule until 1989. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Europe 
was a common goal of the Eastern and Western part of the continent. In the short period 
between the political change and the first EU enlargement in 2004, states in the Eastern 
block had to transform themselves from state-socialism to liberal capitalism, going 
through the process of political and economic transition. The accession of the Eastern 
European states ended the division of Europe, and created an economy that is larger 
than the US’s (European Commission 2013). Besides getting wider geographically, the 
EU also deepened it political and economic role at the domestic level, as a result of the 
extending scope of policies under EU competence and the introduction of the Euro in 17 
countries since 2002. Today, companies in EU member states operate in a common 
market, where Brussels-based economic legislation defines the basic parameters of their 
activities. As eighty percent of domestic industry-related legislation originates in 
Brussels (Greenwood 2003), firms are increasingly forced to extend their lobbying 
activities to the European level. Business interests exert influence along the EU’s policy 
process from agenda-setting to national implementation (Coen 2009). In this multi-level 
system local, regional, national, intergovernmental, supranational and European forces 
interact and influence each other continuously (Taminiau and Wilts 2006 p: 125). Firms 
supply information to the supranational institutions for the development of public policy 
and hence are a potential “source of legitimacy to policy-makers” (Coen 2009: 145). 
Interest group activity has exploded in the 1990s, whereas in the following 20 years 
large firm lobbying turned from collective action strategies to individual direct lobbying 
(Coen 2009:164). By the time the former socialist countries joined the EU, business-
government relations shifted from national institutions towards European institutional 
channels (Coen, 2010). Almost ten years after the first eastern enlargements, it is now 
time to take stock of corporate lobbying in the EU-28. Studies of EU level corporate 
lobbying have so far not conceptualized Eastern European states as being different from 
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their western counterparts and hence have not explored business lobbying from the 
perspective of the east-west divide. It is argued in this thesis that the investigation of 
Eastern European businesses in the EU lobby market provides a theoretically and 
empirically rich area to be explored. The impacts of the structurally different post-
socialist capitalist coordination on the Europeanization of corporate lobbying have not 
been investigated so far. This thesis investigates how firms from post-socialist countries 
– that constitute almost half of the overall EU membership – are able to adapt to the 
EU’s multi-level interest representation. Following on studies that investigate corporate 
lobbying from a Western European perspective (Coen 1998), this research takes a firm 
level approach and provides a comprehensive account of large firm lobbying from a 
comparative angle. By comparing western and eastern lobbying practices in different 
capitalist contexts, it also extends the theoretical scope of the corporate lobbying 
literature.  
The introductory quote above by Bonaparte Napoleon reveals the importance of 
being politically represented, independently from the fact whether this representation is 
influential or not. Whatever impacts lobbying has on public policy-making, direct 
corporate lobbying is an important1 reality in Western capitalist systems and its 
importance is growing in the multi-level decision-making structure of the European 
Union. At EU level, business-government relations are “generally well established and 
institutionally organized” (Wilts and Quittkat 2003: 385). The last wave of increase in 
EU level lobbying can be mostly attributed to individual actors like firms, and their 
“increasing desire to become insider” in Brussels (Coen 1997_b: 99), rather than to the 
increase of traditional interest groups. However due to the large differences among 
organizations in their ability to engage in EU level lobbying; there is an ongoing 
discussion about how businesses can access EU institutions (Coen 1998; Bouwen 2004; 
Eising 2007; Klüver 2012), and what factors determine the Europeanization of lobbying 
activities (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010; Bernhagen and 
Mitchell 2009). Most scholars agree that the importance of direct EU level 
representation is growing (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Bennett 1999; van Schendelen 
2012). It is also generally acknowledged that Eastern European interest groups are 
under-represented in Brussels (Charrad and Eisele 2005; Obradovic and Damsma 2007; 
Pleines 2007; Charrad 2010; Pleines 2010), and predominantly lobby through their 
                                                 
1
 Although the work of authors in political science - who highlight the negative impacts of corporate 
lobbying - arguing that business interests may lead to suboptimal public policy (Olson 1965) is 
acknowledged, as this dissertation does not deal with the impact of corporate lobbying, further links to 
these theories will not be made. 
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national capitals (van Schendelen 2012). The literature shows that the ‘voices’ of EE 
interest groups are not heard in Brussels, mostly because their lobbying is not effective 
(Cianciara 2013), and because they concentrate on information channelling instead of 
making an impact on policy-making (Borragán 2004).  
This study is designed to examine the reasons behind this marginal 
representation and the empirically confirmed limited influence of Eastern European 
corporate interests in EU level policy-making (Cianciara 2013). By so doing, this thesis 
intends to extend the EU lobbying literature with the analysis of the Europeanization of 
corporate lobbying in a comparative perspective, conceptualizing Eastern European 
lobbying as being different from western practices. In the study I argue that the 
structurally different post-socialist capitalist coordination leads firms to develop a 
systematically different lobbying style that is not transposable to the supranational level. 
Linking the management literature with political science theories on corporate lobbying, 
in the framework of comparative capitalism, the study attempts to find the ‘missing 
link’ in the debate about the Europeanization of corporate lobbying. This study is based 
primarily on semi-structured interviews with professional lobbyists and corporate 
leaders, who have lobbying experience. The thesis offers rich empirical evidence, while 
revealing the differences in lobbying practices, exploring the antecedents and processes 
of Europeanization, and the links between the impact of the domestic institutional 
environment and corporate Europeanization. In the following paragraphs, this chapter 
will provide an overview of the practical and theoretical concerns of the thesis, the 
research question, the intended contributions and the structure of the empirical chapters.  
 
1.1 Practical context 
Each year hundreds of regulations are formulated both at the national and at EU 
level. This great influx of legislation causes uncertainty for firms, since new laws may 
alter the size, as well as the structure of the market in which businesses operate, and 
hence may substantially impact firms’ cost structure (Hillman and Hitt 1999: 826). 
Public policies have a direct impact on corporate activities, as well as on corporate 
profitability (Vining, Daniel et al. 2005), since the state controls those resources that 
shape firms’ competitive environments (Hillman and Hitt 1999: 826). For EU member 
countries, this is true not only at the national level, but at the European as well. Firms 
try to shape policies and consequently influence their institutional environment by 
engaging in political activities. They develop different organizational capabilities to 
manage their public affairs activities. Direct EU level lobbying in the last twenty years 
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has gradually become crucial for business interests, in their struggle to secure a ‘friendly 
regulatory environment’ (Bouwen 2004_b: 474). Studies found that large firms 
increasingly manage their lobbying activities directly from Brussels, instead of taking 
the national route through domestic industrial associations or national governments (van 
Schendelen 2012).  
Although many studies raised attention to the increasing political activities of 
large companies in the EU (McLaughlin, Jordan et al. 1993) and the fact that they are 
becoming influential political actors (Grant, Martinelly et al. 1989; Coen 1997), only a 
few scholars investigated how firms organized their political affairs functions in 
Brussels, and developed direct engagement strategies with EU institutions (Coen 1997; 
Coen 2009; Coen 2010). Coen (1997) argues that large firms, which lobbied mostly 
through national governments in the 1970s and 1980s, gradually reallocated their 
resources onto the supranational level, as national channels were diminishing in 
importance. As a consequence the number of direct EU-level offices of large companies 
has been steadily increasing since the 1990s (Broscheid and Coen 2007). Empirical data 
specifically confirms the growing participation of Western-European, US and Japanese 
companies (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009) in European Union lobbying. Although 
compared to US lobbying, relatively little data is available about the representation of 
corporate interests in the EU lobbying game, from some empirical studies drastic 
differences seem to occur in the representation of large firms from different member 
states (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009) and corporate types (Coen and Dannreuther 
2003). Differences are apparent, not only among the corporations of old member states2 
of developed market economies, but also between Western and Eastern European states. 
Among the ‘Forbes 2000’ list of companies, out of the 479 large firms headquartered in 
the EU, 22 percent had a European Affairs representative and 16 percent a Brussels 
office in 2009 (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 166). Among the Brussels-based 
lobbyists, one-third is from the US, while the rest comes from France, Germany, UK, 
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Spain and Japan. Outside these countries the 
number of firms with direct EU lobbying capacity drops drastically (Bernhagen and 
Mitchell 2009 p: 166).  
Interest groups from Eastern Europe are regionally under-represented in 
Brussels; their participation in EU-level policy-making is marginal (Borragán 2004). 
Although there is very little data on the representation of EE companies in Brussels, it 
has been shown that the general interest representation of EE stakeholders is scarce and 
                                                 
2
 EU 15, before the Eastern European enlargement in 2010.  
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not influential (Charrad and Eisele 2005; Charrad 2010; Pleines 2011; van Schendelen 
2012; Cianciara 2013). Empirical evidence shows that even the “strongest interest 
groups” from Eastern Europe have difficulties getting direct access to EU institutions 
(Pleines 2011: 512). While the experienced interest groups from the old member states 
“increasingly act self-reliantly”, and lobby through direct public affairs management 
units, most organizations from the new member states still take the “national route” to 
Brussels, exclusively relying on their national associations or the national government 
(van Schendelen 2012: 41). Based on the above discussed data, the question arises what 
causes this variation in representation? How can we explain that despite the increasing 
importance, and intensity of direct EU-level representation, Eastern European 
organizations continue to prefer the national route? The puzzle of increasing importance 
of large firm’s direct EU-level representation, but the overall marginalisation of Eastern 
European businesses, is an issue that has rarely been addressed in existing literature. 
The rapid growth of the European Union and the drastic increase of post-socialist 
countries among EU member states, calls for the investigation of corporate lobbying 
from a comparative capitalist perspective.  
The expanding role of business-related EU legislation and the parallel 
marginalisation of eastern business interests in supranational interest politics may lead 
to many unforeseen challenges in EU governance. The democratic deficit of EU level 
policy-making has long been noted in different contexts (Michalowitz 2004; 
Michalowitz 2007; Saurugger 2008), since differences in how interest groups can access 
EU institutions, may result in “biased politics” (Eising 2007_a: 384) or lead to a form of 
“elite pluralism” (Coen 1997_b: 106), where the “shift of authority from the national to 
the supranational level is unlikely to empower the weak” (Dür and Mateo 2012: 971). 
However the same question has rarely been raised in relation to Eastern European 
business interests, despite that democracy at EU level may require the representation of 
different geographical macro-regions like Eastern Europe (Pleines 2010: 230). The need 
for research in this area is especially pertinent now that economic recession has been 
sweeping across Europe, drastically affecting Eastern European economies. Besides the 
economic hardships, political tensions are also increasing in some of the new member 
states, allowing the radicalisation of political parlance. The choice of the UK and 
Hungary for analysis is significant in this respect. Among the Eastern European member 
states, Hungary – having been among the most developed post-socialist states - presents 
a ‘critical case’ due to the drastic shift in the direction of political and economic 
governance since 2010. Based on its economic parameters, Hungary has been one of the 
 13 
most developed Eastern European states, where the integration of businesses into EU 
lobbying was naturally expected. The UK on the other hand is one of the old EU 
member states, where direct corporate lobbying is one of the most developed and 
professionalized compared to the EU-28. Answering the call of Borragán for more 
conclusive studies on Eastern European interest politics and the “incorporation of post-
Communist interest politics into the general studies on interest politics” (2006: 151) – it 
is hoped that this study will extend our knowledge by exploring the Europeanization of 
corporate lobbying in a comparative perspective.  
1.2 Theoretical context 
Europeanization is investigated in the literature from two different perspectives. 
On the one hand, it is referred to as the top-down process of member state adaptation to 
the EU (Schmidt 2006: 673), capturing the impacts of European integration on the 
lobbying activities of domestic actors (Klüver 2010: 188). In this sense, it is the process 
through which European Union (EU) institutions and policies affect policies, decision-
making and organizations in member states (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). On the other 
hand Europeanization may also be understood as the bottom-up process (Schmidt 2006: 
673) through which political actors adapt to the impact of European integration (Beyers 
and Kerremans 2007) and engage in EU level lobbying. In this case, interest groups 
need to adapt their lobbying strategies to the EU’s institutional environment, and 
develop new strategies if necessary (Klüver 2010: 177).  
Klüver’s definition that Europeanization is the “extension of lobbying activities 
to the European level” (2010: 188) stresses that organizations are forced to engage in 
EU level representation, in order to make their voices heard by the European 
institutions. Following on from this perspective, I define ‘corporate Europeanization’ as 
the bottom-up process, through which firms extend their lobbying activities and 
political capabilities to the EU level and engage in direct EU level representation. I 
argue that at firm-level, Europeanization need to be explored as an internal 
organizational process, in which corporate resources, capabilities and the organizational 
arrangement of lobbying activities become internationalised and re-arranged in order to 
access the supranational institutions. Those firms that successfully meet the access 
criteria of EU bodies will presumably find it easier to Europeanize than those, which do 
not. In this thesis, I will explore the corporate Europeanization process from two 
perspectives. First, I will investigate firms from Western European institutional 
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environments and then find out how companies from post-socialist Hungary are able to 
transpose their lobbying strategies to the EU level.  
However, as the above discussion indicates, Europeanization may refer to “both 
‘the process of Europeanizing’ as well as the result, ‘being Europeanized’. Therefore, it 
is difficult to distinguish dependent from independent variables or domestic from 
European factors” (Beyers and Kerremans: 2007: 461). Based on Saurugger’s (2006) 
methodological approach towards Europeanization – arguing that first the relationships 
between interest groups and political actors at the national level should be explored – 
this thesis investigates both the lobbying activities of firms at the domestic level, and 
the EU-level lobbying strategies of Eastern and Western European firms in Brussels. 
Europeanization may be viewed as a push factor, or a necessity that drives firms at the 
domestic level to engage at EU level, as well as a pull factor when the actions of 
international competitors or EU institutions encourage and facilitate the 
internationalisation of lobbying activities. The causal mechanisms behind 
Europeanization may be different in the case of Western and EE firms. While some 
firms extend their lobbying activities to the EU level in order to fight international 
competition and meet the requirements of EU institutions (Coen 1997), others may be 
pushed into supranational lobbying by the constraints of the domestic environment.  
 
Europeanization in this thesis will be operationalised with a focus on direct firm-
level engagement strategies and the firm-level process of the Europeanization of 
lobbying activities. Hence, collective action strategies and Europeanization through 
associational membership falls outside the scope of this thesis. Despite the fact that the 
accession of the first and at the same time largest wave of Eastern European countries 
already happened ten years ago, most EU studies investigate supranational lobbying 
from a Western European perspective. The review of EU lobbying studies in the 
following chapter draws our attention to the one-sidedness of the Europeanization and 
corporate lobbying literature. Studies that investigate Europeanization predominantly 
place the focus of their analysis in Western European contextual settings, and scholarly 
work has so far had a limited interest in the mobilization of Eastern European 
stakeholders at EU level (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008). Most studies on 
‘Europeanization’ are concerned with interest group representation (Eising 2004; 
Einbock, Fuchs et al. 2006; Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Klüver 2010; Pleines 2011), 
while relatively few studies investigate the Europeanization of large firms (Coen 1997; 
Bouwen 2002; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Barron 2011). The issue of business 
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lobbying has been addressed from many different theoretical and disciplinary 
perspectives. Political scientists under the scope of EU lobbying investigate how size 
and financial resources (Bouwen 2002; Coen and Dannreuther 2003; Bouwen 2004; 
Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009), the domestic institutional context (Beyers 
and Kerremans 2006; Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Coen 2009; Klüver 
2010) and access to EU institutions (Beyers 2002; Bouwen 2004; Eising 2007) impact 
firms’ lobbying strategies and Europeanization. Besides EU scholars, political scientists 
also investigate the determinants of lobbying through the perspective of public affairs 
management (PAM). Scholars in PAM investigate how financial resources impact the 
development of public affairs management (Griffin and Dunn 2004) and explore the 
role and structural characteristics of public affairs functions at firms (Post, Murray et al. 
1982; Meznar and Nigh 1995; Hillman, Keim et al. 2004; McGrath, Moss et al. 2010; 
van Schendelen 2012). However, only a few PAM studies link the discipline of public 
affairs to the conceptualisation of EU public affairs management or more specifically 
EU level engagement practices (for an exception see:van Schendelen 2012).  
As the analysis of the literature will show, EU lobbying scholarship is 
predominantly based on a political science approach that looks at the determinants of 
interest representation from an institutional perspective and generally adopts a “profit-
maximizing” approach, assuming that the firm is “a ‘black-box’ value maximizer and 
will automatically engage” in lobbying “given certain firm characteristics” (Hillman, 
Keim et al. 2004: 839 italics in original). In contrast, management literature on 
corporate political activity (CPA) emphasizes strategic choice and assumes that 
“managers choose to engage in political activity” (Hillman, Keim et al. 2004: 839, 
italics in original). Although a handful of management scholars link the issue of large 
firm lobbying in the European Union to firm level strategy making and the decision of 
individual managers (Barron 2011; Lawton and Rajwani 2011; Lawton, Rajwani et al. 
2013), political scientists tend to focus on institutional level variables. Hence, EU 
studies rarely investigate the interaction between institutions and corporate level 
strategies, leaving the actual link between institutions and corporate strategies 
unexplored.  
In this thesis I argue that the understanding of EU level corporate lobbying 
requires a change in perspective, since EU level engagement is essentially a decision 
that is made inside the firm. Hence the process of how firms Europeanize their 
corporate lobbying practices needs to be explored at the level of the firm, through the 
perspective of managerial decisions. In order to understand the determinants of 
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corporate Europeanization, instead of investigating Europeanization from purely 
institutionalist perspectives, the determinants of managerial choice in relation to 
lobbying strategies need to be explored. In this study, lobbying is seen as a corporate 
activity, like marketing or sales. As political science studies rarely acknowledge this 
view, in the thesis management theories will be applied to the context of corporate EU 
lobbying. Such a focus allows us to unpack the process of EU level corporate 
engagement and examine Europeanization at a deeper, more complex level. This study 
contributes to existing literature by connecting the political science literature with 
management studies, and creating a conceptual model for the investigation of corporate 
Europeanization and its determinants. When investigating corporate lobbying, CPA 
studies focus on the “conceptual lenses of resources and capabilities, institutions and the 
political environment” (Lawton, McGuire et al. 2012: 3). Similarly, studies that 
investigate the antecedents of corporate political activities, explore firm level political 
capabilities - identifying firm size, formalised firm structures and institutional 
differences among the most crucial determinants of corporate public affairs (Hillman, 
Keim et al. 2004). However, neither management literature, nor EU studies apply the 
capabilities argument to the investigation of corporate Europeanization, nor do they link 
managerial choice and EU level engagement strategies. Hence, despite the fact that both 
disciplinary approaches investigate corporate lobbying, as well as the determinants of 
corporate political activities, their findings and contributions are not connected.  
In relation to resources, some EU scholars argue that size is one of the most 
important variables that impacts firms’ EU level engagement and access to decision-
making (Bouwen 2002; Sadrieh and Annavarjula 2005; Eising 2007_b; Bernhagen and 
Mitchell 2009), while others acknowledge the importance of resources, but question 
their determining impact on policy outcome (Baumgartner, Berry et al. 2007), lobbying 
success (Mahoney 2008), or Europeanization (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). However 
EU studies have not answered the question of how resources impact Europeanization, 
other than arguing that they affect whether firms “afford’ or “cannot afford” to develop 
a public affairs function or set up an EU office. In contrast, management studies 
investigate the process of how resources are transformed into capabilities by managerial 
actions (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Teece, Pisano et al. 1997; Helfat, Finkelstein et al. 
2009) and consequently how these capabilities affect corporate strategy formation 
(Grant 1991; Teece, Pisano et al. 1997; Helfat, Finkelstein et al. 2009; Holburn and 
Zelner 2010). Although the dynamic capabilities literature has not created a direct link 
between lobbying capabilities and firms’ Europeanization, general models of how firms 
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organize and design their political capabilities have been developed (Lawton and 
Rajwani 2011; Lawton, Rajwani et al. 2013). These theories show that resources and 
capabilities are considered to have a crucial impact on how firms Europeanize and 
develop their lobbying strategies. However scholars have not created a link between the 
two disciplinary approaches and hence have not explained how resources and 
capabilities influence firm level decisions on Europeanization strategies. It is hoped that 
this thesis will fill this gap in the literature, by applying the theory of dynamic 
capabilities to the empirical analysis of the Europeanization process of corporate 
lobbying.  
The second theoretical issue, which will be addressed in this thesis, is the 
influence of the domestic institutional environment on corporate lobbying and 
Europeanization. The theoretical debate concerning domestic institutions is similarly 
heated than that of resources. Some scholars focus their attention to the ‘degree of fit’ 
between domestic and EU level modes of interest representation and contrast the 
adaptation abilities of organization from different member states into the supranational 
system (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Burns and Carson 2002; Schmidt 2006). Others focus 
only on the access to decision-making and contrast access at the domestic level to EU 
level engagement abilities (Beyers 2002; Eising 2007; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010). 
Scholars have contrasting views on how domestic institutions affect Europeanization. 
Beyers and Kerremans argue that the domestic environment have a crucial impact on 
how organizations transpose their lobbying activities to EU level, since domestic 
institutions - through environmental resource dependencies – constrain the 
Europeanization of interest groups (2007). In contrast some studies argue that the 
impact of domestic institutions on Europeanization is overrated (Eising 2007) or 
downright “irrelevant” to corporate lobbying (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 171). This 
thesis takes this issue to heart, exploring not only the question of whether domestic 
institutions affect Europeanization abilities of large firms or not, but how and through 
what processes domestic capitalist characteristics affect the abilities of firms to 
transpose their domestic lobbying strategies to EU level.  
As the discussion above shows, existing EU studies predominantly investigate 
how institutional level variables impact Europeanization and even when scholars 
explore firm level variables, they approach EU level lobbying from the perspective of 
resources. Only a few studies call for the investigation of organizational level variables, 
especially the relevance of the organizational structures (Klüver 2012). Most EU studies 
explore corporate lobbying with a limited focus on those firms that already have EU 
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offices or which already actively engage with EU institutions. In this thesis I argue that 
the investigation of the process of Europeanization requires lobbying to be explored as a 
corporate activity, irrespective of how it is arranged in the corporate organizational 
structure. By exploring lobbying this way, the scope of the research may be extended to 
those firms that do not have dedicated EU offices. Combining studies on corporate 
political activity and EU lobbying, this research explores whether and how the 
organizational arrangement of lobbying impacts EU level engagement patterns.  
1.3 The research question 
In the light of the above detailed theoretical issues, the dissertation argues that 
there is not only an empirical and practical need for an improved understanding of how 
firms Europeanize their lobbying in the enlarged EU, but also a theoretical one for two 
reasons. First to address the gap in knowledge in relation to the question of how large 
firms Europeanize their lobbying strategies and second to understand how stakeholders 
from different capitalist environments can integrate into the ‘distinct European 
business-government model” (Coen 2009: 163). Moreover, studies on interest politics 
need to take an ‘inclusive’ approach when exploring post-communist lobbying 
(Borragán 2006: 151). This is exactly what this study is set out to do, by investigating 
corporate Europeanization from an east-west perspective. To address the puzzle of 
increasing direct firm lobbying at EU level and the parallel marginalisation of Eastern 
European business interests, this thesis aims to investigate the following research 
question: What determines how large firms develop their lobbying at the domestic and 
EU level in developed and developing capitalist systems?  
As it becomes clear from the question the background of the problem is twofold. First it 
concerns the determinants of large firms’ lobbying and second it relates to the 
contextual differences in developed and developing capitalist systems. Hence, due to the 
complexity of the research question, this study takes a dual-level and multi-context 
approach. The objective is to explore the key determinants of corporate lobbying at the 
domestic and the EU level, while contrasting empirical evidence in the light of 
previously identified theoretical themes in the Western and Eastern European politico-
economic contexts.  
Based on the research question, the dependent variable of the current study will be the 
presence or absence of Hungarian firms’ lobbying activities in Brussels, whereas the 
independent variables will be factors that constitute to this absence, such as resources, 
the domestic institutional environment, and the organizational position of lobbying.  
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Based on this logic, in the next section the intended contributions are described, in 
relation to gaps of knowledge that have been identified first in relation to the key 
determinants of corporate lobbying at the domestic and EU level, and second in relation 
to the contextual issue of Europeanization from a post-socialist capitalist perspective. 
1.4 Contributions of the research: the missing link 
As it will become clear from the detailed analysis of the literature in chapter 2, 
studies on lobbying and interest representation generally ignore the emerging capitalist 
context and base their analysis in the contextual framework of developed market 
economies, mostly the US, and Western European states. Even those studies that 
investigate the impact of domestic institutions on the development of lobbying 
capabilities or Europeanization have rarely conceptualised domestic institutions in 
developing capitalist systems (such as Eastern European member states) as being 
different from Western capitalist ones. Similarly, literature related to post-socialist 
countries ignores the management and the political science literature on public affairs 
management and corporate political activity as well as the EU lobbying literature on 
firm level lobbying. Studies that investigate lobbying from an Eastern European 
perspective either try to understand lobbying at the domestic level (Kalnins 2005; 
Evanson 2008; Hrebenar, McBeth et al. 2008; McGrath 2008), focus on the 
documentation of EU level participation patterns (Wonka, Baumgartner et al. 2010) or 
investigate the involvement and impact of eastern interest groups in supranational 
decision-making (Charrad and Eisele 2005; Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008). Studies 
suggest that Eastern European stakeholders are marginally represented and have limited 
political influence at EU level. However, the investigation of the reasons behind these 
phenomena is largely missing. Only a couple of studies mention the domestic 
institutional environment as a determinant of marginal Europeanization (Borragán 2004; 
McGrath 2008; Pleines 2011), but even these studies seem to settle for the argument 
that the characteristics and legacy of socialism is to be blamed for the lack of 
Europeanization. Only a few studies called for the investigation of the “incompatibility 
of opportunity structures between the national and European level” in the post-socialist 
context, investigating Polish business interests at EU level (Cianciara 2013: 1). 
Cianciara argued that the “informal institutions create a hybrid and patchy environment 
that hampers the development of Polish interest representation at the EU level” (: 13). 
Cianciara (2013) explores the importance of informal institutions, the lack of legislative 
planning in the law-making process or the deficiencies to the granting of access to 
documents. However her study focuses on EU level processes instead of investigating 
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the structural issues in detail that determine post-socialist Europeanization strategies at 
the domestic level.  
As it becomes clear from chapter 2, studies of political science and management 
on the one hand and Eastern European studies on the other hand do not seem to 
‘communicate’. In the context of the research question of this thesis, a link needs to be 
created between these ‘non-communicating’ studies in order to understand large firms’ 
Europeanization in the enlarged European Union, where almost half of the members are 
post-socialist states. This thesis aims to fill this gap in knowledge by specifically 
investigating strategic parameters of Eastern European capitalism that may impact the 
Europeanization of large Eastern European firms. Following the assumption of the 
comparative capitalism literature that the institutional context influences the “identity 
and interests of economic actors, and hence the development of firm resources and 
capabilities” (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 549), the determinants of lobbying are 
investigated from an institutional perspective in the post-socialist context. It is argued 
that domestic institutional structures determine corporate lobbying in two crucial ways. 
First at the firm level through managerial choice in relation to how managers design and 
construct corporate lobbying capabilities at the domestic and EU level and second at the 
institutional level by the provision of institutional structures for interest representation, 
such as channels for interest intermediation and the characteristics of state-firm and 
state-society relations.  
The key theoretical themes that are covered in this thesis may be identified from 
three different perspectives. First the antecedents of managerial choice are explored in 
order to shed light on the question: how do firms develop their lobbying capabilities at 
the domestic and EU level? To investigate the antecedents of managerial choice a 
theoretical link is constructed between firm level public affairs structures, managerial 
choice and direct EU lobbying strategies. Second, due to the central role of the state in 
Eastern European coordination, the post-socialist institutional environment is explored 
through the role of the state in relation to three areas: interest representation, state-
society and state-business relations. The emerging interest intermediation system of 
post-socialist Hungary is analysed from the theoretical perspective of new 
institutionalism. State-society and state-business relations are investigated through the 
comparative capitalism literature and Evans’s theory of ‘embedded autonomy’. Through 
exploring these theoretical themes in light of empirical data, the impact of the post-
socialist environment on firm level Europeanization is contextualised in the framework 
of the EU literature on Europeanization (Schmidt 1999; Eising 2004; Coen 1998) and 
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access to EU level decision-making (Klüver 2010; Beyers 2002, Eising 2007_a). The 
analysis is based on semi-structured interviews, exploring the question of how the post-
socialist environment affects firm level decisions concerning engagement in EU level 
lobbying. The third perspective focuses on the impacts of the post-socialist capitalist 
institutional environment on the development of large firms’ lobbying strategies. The 
thesis posits that in emerging post-socialist capitalism informal networks have a more 
crucial role in economic coordination than in developed market economies. Firms adapt 
to their domestic environment by developing an Eastern European lobbying style that is 
managed dominantly through informal top-level networks. It is argued that the unique, 
third type of coordination is more strongly embedded in the national context than 
lobbying or corporatism in Western democracies. Furthermore it relies so much on the 
national context that it cannot be transposed to Brussels. Empirical analysis draws on 
the literature on networks and transition, as well as the theory of ‘network capitalism’.  
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis consists of two main parts. The first part is a comprehensive analysis 
of associated theoretical concepts, existing literature and methodological details of the 
empirical research design. These chapters (chapters 2 and 3) provide the framework for 
the empirical part of the study.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a critical analysis of a broad range of literature 
along the objective to set the dissertation into a theoretical framework. The key 
theoretical discussions of the chapter can be summarized in relation to the determinants 
of corporate political activities along the theoretical themes of resources, institutions, 
firm-specific factors such as the organizational structure, and the investigation of the 
literature on post-socialist capitalism. The role of resources is evaluated through the 
analysis of two key themes: the resource-based view (Barney 2001) and the dynamic 
capabilities literature (Teece, Pisano et al. 1997). The impact of institutions on 
Europeanization is explored through the analysis of the EU literature on how domestic 
modes of intermediation affect EU level engagement (Schmidt 1999; Eising 2004; Coen 
1998) as well as how organizations are able to access EU level decision-making (Klüver 
2010; Beyers 2002, Eising 2007_a). The impact of domestic institutions in the post-
socialist context is explored through the varieties of capitalism framework (Hall and 
Soskice 2001) and its critiques (Schmidt 2003; Puffer and McCarthy 2007; Hancke, 
Rhodes et al. 2008; Schneider 2008; Bohle and Greskovits 2009; Nölke and 
Vliegenthart 2009; Ross Schneider 2009; Myant and Drahokoupil 2010; Nölke 2011). 
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In the analysis it is found that in post-socialist countries, multinationals and the state 
have determining impacts on economic coordination. In the last part of the chapter an 
analytical framework is developed for the investigation of empirical data. The 
framework sets out five guiding questions for the empirical examination.  
Chapter 3 provides details on methods and the research design. In this chapter 
we discuss ethical considerations, the process of data analysis as well as the study’s 
methodological limitations.  
Chapter 4 investigates the process through which firms develop lobbying 
capabilities and construct their EU level engagement strategy. It is explored how the 
domestic characteristics of policy-making affect the way firms engage in lobbying. In 
the chapter policy-making structures are contrasted in the different institutional 
environments of developed and developing capitalist societies. Through the empirical 
analysis it is examined how companies in the UK and at EU level engage with the 
public sector and adapt their lobbying strategies to the requirements of legislative 
institutions. Firms’ approaches are then contrasted to Hungarian firms’ practices. It is 
investigated how the different institutional characteristics of policy-making impact the 
development of corporate engagement strategies and the arrangement of lobbying 
activities in relation to the organizational structure. It is explored how firms develop 
their lobbying capabilities at the domestic level and how these domestic ‘assets’ 
influence their Europeanization strategies. In the chapter a conceptual framework is 
developed for the typology of firm’s domestic lobbying strategies, in relation to 
capabilities and the organizational arrangement of lobbying activities. The chapter 
explores how the different organizational arrangements of corporate political activities 
influence the way firms engage at EU level. Through the analysis of interview data and 
deductive theorizing the chapter aims to explain the process of Europeanization and find 
out what factors impact this process most fundamentally.  
Chapter 5 contributes to EU scholarship by creating a link between domestic 
institutional structures and firms’ Europeanization. It investigates the evolution and 
characteristics of interest politics in Hungary. The chapter is divided into two main 
parts. The first part investigates the development of interest intermediation structures 
between the years of 1989 to 2010, from the year of political transformation from 
socialism to capitalism till the year when the second Orbán government entered into 
power. Through the in-depth analysis of interest politics the chapter aims to find out 
how the characteristics of post-socialist capitalism and the emerging interest 
representation structure affect firm level decisions on EU level lobbying engagement. 
 23 
The chapter investigates the evolution of tripartism, and current characteristics of state-
society and state-business relations. It is explored how the prominent role of the state 
directly influences the development of tripartite institutional and bargaining structures, 
and the access of interest groups to political decision-making. The section on state-
business relations explores how the increasing role of the state in economic 
coordination, as well as the colonisation of businesses in the post-2010 period influence 
managerial decisions and their approach towards political activities. This chapter takes a 
more institutional perspective compared to the previous one and investigates how the 
opportunity structures that are created in post-socialist capitalism affect firm level 
decisions. In this respect, Hungarian firms’ Europeanization decision is investigated in 
relation to two contrasting political science theories: the theory of positive persistence 
and the compensation hypothesis. The first theory posits that domestic access affect 
Europeanization positively, so good access to decision-making at the domestic level 
leads to active EU level engagement, while weak domestic access leads to weak 
Europeanization. In contrast, the compensation theory argues that weak access to 
decision-making at the domestic level makes organizations ‘bypass’ domestic 
institutions and compensate their lack of access by seeking EU level access. By 
analysing empirical data in relation to these theories the chapter attempts to unpack how 
the characteristics of the emerging capitalist system impact corporations’ decision 
whether to Europeanize or not.  
Chapter 6 – similarly to chapter 4 – applies a firm level perspective. It 
investigates how large firms in Hungary (both domestic and subsidiaries of 
multinationals) design and construct their lobbying strategy. It is explored how firms 
adapt their organizational structure to the institutional framework and what type of 
lobbying style they develop for the representation of their interests. The chapter 
develops a typology for Eastern European lobbying and adapts Bouwen’s (2002) theory 
of ‘access goods’ in the post-socialist context. Besides the investigation of domestic 
firms’ lobbying practices, the chapter explores how subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations adapt to the post-socialist institutional environment and investigates the 
type of strategies they develop. By contrasting domestic and multinational lobbying 
strategies the chapter presents insightful findings that extends our understanding of how 
multinationals adapt their strategies internationally. Besides multinationals, the chapter 
explores the use of contract lobbyists in Hungary and contrasts these findings to 
evidence that was presented in chapter 4 in the UK and EU contexts. It is argued that 
due to the characteristics of their domestic environments western and eastern firms view 
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contract agencies differently and hence their contracting ‘habits’ differ as well. In the 
last part of the chapter Eastern European firms’ lobbying strategies are investigated, 
based on the conceptual framework of lobbying strategies that has been developed in 
chapter 4.  
Finally, chapter 7 discusses the arguments that have been presented in this 
thesis. It reviews and synthesises the findings that aim to provide answers to the 
research question. In so doing, the chapter addresses the empirical and theoretical 
findings in view of the study’s theoretical foundations. In the following section the 
individual chapters are summarized. Finally, the chapter positions the study within the 
current political science and management literature, suggesting further avenues of 
research and revisiting the methods used.  
In the next chapter key theoretical themes will be explored through the critical 
analysis of literature.  
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2. Europeanization of large firms – the missing link 
 Recent research on the Europeanization of business lobbying has explored many 
different aspects of firms’ EU level engagement. Some researchers have specifically 
investigated the evolution of large firms as political actors (Coen 1997), the 
determinants of corporate lobbying - such as domestic institutions and financial 
resources (Bennett 1999; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009), or the sector in which a firm is 
operating in (Bennett 1999) – or the role of business in the EU’s decision-making 
system (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Eising 2007; Coen 2009). Others focused on the 
question of how national cultures affect large firms’ lobbying strategies (Barron 2011) 
or how domestic institutions affect EU level engagement patterns (Coen 1998; Bouwen 
2002; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010; Dür and Mateo 2012). As most of these studies 
approached Europeanization from a political science perspective, firm or organizational 
level variables have been often left out of the analytical framework, since scholars 
predominantly focused on institutional level variables. Only a few scholars explored 
how firms adapt their existing national systems to maximize influence within the EU 
context (Coen 1998, 1999) and investigated what kind of lobbying strategies firms 
adopt in their engagement with EU institutions (Coen 1998).  
The thesis seeks to connect the literature of political science and strategic 
management by applying theoretical insights from the research in the field of corporate 
political activity (CPA) and public affairs management (PAM) to the Europeanization 
and EU lobbying contexts. It is argued that in the Europeanization literature of corporate 
lobbying the ‘missing link’ is the firm level analysis. More specifically the 
acknowledgement that lobbying is a functional corporate activity, such as marketing or 
sales. As a result the Europeanization of this activity depends essentially on how 
managers choose to engage in political activities and how they design and construct the 
functional activity of public affairs management. Consequently, this thesis posits that 
the Europeanization of business lobbying depends on the decisions of managers and that 
this decision-making process is influenced by firm level and institutional level factors. 
Hence the central concern of the research undertaken is to unpack the Europeanization 
process of corporate lobbying, and specifically explore the firm level and institutional 
level factors that impact this process through managerial choice. In so doing, this 
chapter explores theoretical and empirical studies in political science and management, 
with the aim to explore how Eastern European large firms Europeanize or more 
specifically fail to Europeanize their lobbying activities. The chapter is structured as 
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follows. First it gives an overview of the problem by exploring the representation of 
Eastern European interests in Brussels. Secondly it will explore the factors that are 
considered to have a determining impact on corporate lobbying, namely resources, 
domestic institutions and organizational structures. The chapter then goes on to explore 
Eastern European capitalism and state-business relations. Finally it will end by 
reflecting on these theories to set out the analytical framework for the study.  
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2.1 The representation of EE interests in Brussels 
Due to the limited amount of reliable data, most existing studies that investigate 
Eastern European (EE) participation at the EU level, focus on the documentation of 
interest group participation patterns. Studies find that marginal representation is often 
coupled with a passive role in EU level policy-making (Wonka, Baumgartner et al. 
2010; Pleines 2011). Some studies for instance claim that at the time of the 2004 
accessions, EE NGOs accounted for only 2 percent of the Brussels-based lobbying 
community (Pleines 2007: 1). Furthermore, using the Commission’s registry of civil 
society organizations CONECS, as well as the registry of the European Parliament, 
Charrad and Eisele (2005) showed that in June 2005, among the 734 registered 
organizations in the CONECS database only two, and in the EP register only 12 were 
from Visegrád countries3. The comparison of participation between eastern and Western 
European NGOs showed that the contrast between them is very large and even bigger 
when the numbers of inhabitants are taken into account. Scandinavian countries are 
smaller than Poland and Hungary, yet in 2005, they had twice as many actors registered 
(Charrad and Eisele 2005 p: 11). Although the number of groups have increased 
somewhat over time, most recent studies indicate that by 2007-2008, organizations from 
Eastern Europe “had not made the transition to sustained activity in the EU capital” 
(Wonka, Baumgartner et al. 2010: 469). Studies also note that besides the limited 
representation, only a minority of Eastern European organizations has a permanent 
Brussels address, indicating that most interest groups from the new member states rely 
on indirect lobbying through umbrella organizations (Charrad and Eisele 2005; Charrad 
and Eisele 2007; Charrad 2010; Pleines 2011). Although by 2010 civil society 
organizations became “adequately represented” in European umbrella organizations in 
quantitative terms, this means “only a symbolic participation in decisions-making 
processes at the EU level” (Pleines 2010: 240). Some studies conclude that Eastern 
European interest groups “seem to be hesitant to enter the Brussels scene” (Wonka, 
Baumgartner et al. 2010: 469) and even if they are represented through European 
umbrella organizations, their membership is more about information gathering than 
political interest representation (Pleines 2011). Consequently, EE business groups in 
Brussels create a “model of interest representation, where the exchange and ownership 
of information are more important than the actual impact on decision-making” 
(Borragán 2004: 262), since most interest groups consider access to information as the 
                                                 
3
 Visegrád countries are: Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
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main aim of memberships in EU level umbrella organizations (Pleines 2011: 515). What 
holds for the civil sector, also holds for businesses. Although business interests from the 
new member states are more likely to represent their interests directly at EU level 
compared to other types of interest organizations, they do not form extensive networks. 
Instead businesses tend to act alone or in small teams with similar interest groups 
(Pleines 2011: 515). Specifically focusing on the effectiveness of Polish business 
lobbying, in the period of 2004-2009, Cianciara showed that the impact of Polish 
businesses on EU level policy-making was “limited” (Cianciara 2013: 13). This limited 
impact also affects the relationships between EE interest groups and Eurogroups, 
making EE organizations dependent on the expertise, know-how and networks of 
European level umbrella organizations (Pleines 2011). Participation in EU level 
decision-making procedures was further investigated by Charrad (2010). Focusing on 
the Services Directive, she concludes that actors from CEE states are less well 
connected in issue networks than their Western European counterparts, and do not 
create coalitions among themselves (Charrad 2010). Charrad highlights that CEE states 
have marginal positions and a passive role in EU level policy-making (see: Maya-
Jariego 2010). Marginal political influence was also confirmed in relation to the input of 
EE civil groups in the Commission’s civil consultations. Disproportionately low level of 
input was shown from EE organizations compared to their counterparts from other 
member states. Furthermore all of the investigated Eastern European nations4 - with the 
exception of Poland – were argued to belong to the list of the 10 least active 
contributors5 (Obradovic and Damsma 2007: 133). Even at state-level - when member 
states engage in EU lobbying - EE countries were found to have half as many contacts 
with supranational institutions than their Western counterparts (Panke 2012). As the 
above cited studies suggest, the marginal representation and limited political influence 
of EE interest groups is well documented and not contested.  
However, the investigation of the reasons behind these phenomena seems to be 
neglected in the literature. Only a couple of studies mention the domestic institutional 
environment as a possible determinant of marginal Europeanization (Borragán 2006; 
McGrath 2008), but even these studies seem to settle for the argument that the 
characteristics and legacy of socialism, where interest representation was suppressed, is 
to be blamed for the lack of Europeanization. Among the few Cianciara carried out an 
empirical research, in which she called for the investigation of the opportunity 
                                                 
4
 Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia 
5
 Based on the assessment of the contributions submitted by NGOs to the Commission’s Impact 
Assessment Consultations between 2003-2006 
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structures between the national and European level (2013). Cianciara explored the 
influence of Polish business interest groups through case studies and found that the 
characteristics of the EU’s interest representation model makes Polish interest 
representation in the EU – which is characterised by interest group politicization, close 
ties with political parties and low levels of elites’ autonomy – less effective (Cianciara 
2013: 14). Although Cianciara’s study enriches our knowledge as to the incompatibility 
of opportunity structures between the national and EU level, and provides us with 
insights on the limited influence of Polish interest groups, it does not explicitly and 
systematically investigate firm or organizational level variables that may impact the 
Europeanization decision of EE businesses. Hence, this thesis will go further and 
explore those structural characteristics of the post-socialist capitalist environment that 
may have a determining impact on corporate lobbying practices at the domestic level 
and may affect the Europeanization process of lobbying at EE firms, through 
managerial choice. However, before we explore the characteristics of post-socialist 
capitalism, we need to investigate what factors determine how firms develop their 
lobbying activities in general.  
 
As it was mentioned earlier in this chapter, in contrast to the literature on Eastern 
Europe, recent studies on corporate lobbying (Sadrieh and Annavarjula 2005; Taminiau 
and Wilts 2006) and the Europeanization of interest groups in general (Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007; Eising 2009; Klüver 2010), have investigated the determinants of 
lobbying and Europeanization predominantly in the Western European context. Due to 
the structural differences between the western and post-socialist institutional 
environments, the findings of these studies are not entirely applicable to the 
investigation of Eastern European corporate lobbying patterns. To date, the number of 
EU studies that have incorporated the investigation of EE stakeholders into their 
analysis, is rather limited (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Barron 2011; van Schendelen 
2012). Besides, existing studies explore wider issues - such as the determinants of 
corporate lobbying, the impact of national business cultures on lobbying or trends in EU 
public affairs management - and hence do not specifically investigate the question and 
determinants of Eastern European interest representation in supranational policy-
making. Following on from these studies, this thesis will specifically investigate 
Europeanization from two different perspectives. First, it will explore the determinants 
of corporate lobbying in the Europeanization context and second it will examine the 
specific institutional characteristics of EE capitalism that may impact the 
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Europeanization of corporate interest politics. In the following section, the focus will be 
on the theoretical approaches concerning the determinants of corporate lobbying. 
 
2.2 Determinants of political activities and EU level lobbying 
To understand how firms from Eastern European countries Europeanize their 
lobbying activities, we first need to explore what factors determine how firms design 
and develop their corporate political activities generally and what motivates firms to 
engage in direct lobbying at EU level. Business-government relations have been 
investigated both by political scientists and by business management scholars. Business 
scholars explored how companies respond to the changes in their political environment 
by investigating how businesses manage their external environment (Vogel 1996). In 
contrast political scientists explored the role of businesses in political decision-making 
as well as and the importance of firms to government, concentrating on how 
governmental decisions are made (Vogel 1996: 159). Most of the literature however 
originates from the US and only a few scholars investigate the role of businesses in the 
institutional setting of the European Union (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Eising 2007; Coen 
2009; Coen 2010).  
The political activity of firms has also been investigated from different 
perspectives by political scientists and management scholars. Studies on corporate 
‘public affairs management’ (PAM) – which is usually undertaken by political scientists 
- focus on the internal processes within the firm and perceptions of external 
effectiveness (McGrath, Moss et al. 2010). Research on ‘corporate political activity’ 
(CPA) is mostly carried out by business/management scholars (McGrath, Moss et al. 
2010) and tend to investigate issues that determine political activity, the policy 
outcomes of political actions as well as the effects of public policies on firm 
performance (Schuler 2001: 337). Both of these schools have crucial relevance for this 
thesis, since they investigate corporate political activities from the perspective of the 
firm. Despite their different focus areas however, both PAM and CPA scholars have to 
investigate and model processes on two levels in parallel: the firm level and the 
institutional level (Schuler 2001: 337). More specifically, on the one hand studies need 
to consider the firm level managerial decisions related to the development of public 
affairs activities, and on the other hand scholars have to evaluate how the institutional 
environment affects firm decisions about “whether and how to participate” in political 
processes (Schuler 2001: 337). For this thesis both PAM and CPA studies provide a rich 
theoretical framework through which firm level and institutional level determinants of 
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Europeanization can be explored. According to Getz (1997: 32) the term ‘corporate 
political action’ refers to “any deliberate firm action intended to influence governmental 
policy or process”. It generally includes lobbying, media relations, issues management 
and community relations (McGrath, Moss et al. 2010), while public affairs 
“encompasses all corporate functions related to the management of an organization’s 
reputation with external audiences – usually including lobbying or government 
relations, issues management and community relations” (McGrath, Moss et al. 2010: 
337). As it becomes clear from the definitions, lobbying may be considered as part of 
both CPA and PAM, since it is one of the “several political activities pursued by firms” 
(Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 157).  
In relation to the determinants of corporate political action, management 
research provides rich insights into how managers choose to engage in political actions 
(Hillman and Hitt 1999) and how specific firm and institutional level factors impact this 
decision (Hillman, Keim et al. 2004). According to some scholars the antecedents of 
CPA may be grouped in four categories, incorporating firm, industry, issue and 
institutional factors (Hillman, Keim et al. 2004: 839). Some scholars limit their focus on 
the determining impact of resources and the domestic institutional environment 
(Hillman 2003), whereas others investigate firm-specific characteristics, such as 
corporate structure, resources, political experience or stakeholder dependence (Schuler 
and Rehbein 1997). 
In the following sections, studies of management, political science and EU 
lobbying will be discussed along those three key themes that have been identified to 
have crucial relevance in determining corporate political activities. The three themes are 
resources, the domestic institutional environment and corporate structure. We will 
investigate these themes in relation to their impact on the Europeanization of firms’ 
lobbying activities in general, and large EE firms, in the post-socialist context in 
particular. In the following sections, first we will explore theoretical models in relation 
to the impact of resources on corporate political strategy development and EU level 
engagement, then focus on theories in relation to the institutional environment and last 
we will discuss the relevance of corporate structures.  
2.2.1 Resources or capabilities? 
Political science has for long considered economic power to be an important 
source of political influence. On the one hand, through the purchase of expertise and 
hence the ability of building direct links to decision-makers, and on the other hand, 
because it is acknowledged that public policies deliver benefits proportional to the size 
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of the firm (Salamon and Siegfried 1977: 1031). Hence the larger the firm, the greater 
the incentives will be to participate in politics (Olson 1965) in order to obtain benefits 
and avoid costs (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 157). The management theory of the 
resource-based view (Barney 2001) emphasises the importance of specific financial 
resources and assets at firm level, arguing that by manipulating resources managers can 
generate strategic advantages in their competitive performance (Hillman, Keim et al. 
2004). In this context, resources are one of the most fundamental determinants of firm 
performance (Teece, Pisano et al. 1997) and also political strategy formation (Meznar 
and Nigh 1995). Consequently, heterogeneous resources lead to heterogeneous 
strategies (Hillman 2003: 460). Similarly, much of the literature on European interest 
groups and Europeanization highlights the importance of resources (Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007: 462). Due to the ‘costly’ nature of direct EU level representation, 
financial resources and consequently size is considered one of the most important 
variables that impacts corporation’s lobbying activities, especially at the EU-level 
(Bennett 1999; Bouwen 2002; Sadrieh and Annavarjula 2005; Eising 2007; Bernhagen 
and Mitchell 2009). Scholars argue that larger firms are more likely to engage in direct 
individual corporate political activity (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman, Keim et al. 
2004) and establish an EU office that engages in political action both at the national and 
at the EU-level (Bouwen 2002: 374), than smaller firms. Some scholars even argue that 
an increase in firm size substantially increases the probability of having a Brussels 
office (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009 p: 170), while others posit that small- and 
medium-sized enterprises find it harder to get access to EU institutions and build 
European level credentials (Coen and Dannreuther 2003).  
The overall determining impact of resources on the Europeanization of direct 
corporate lobbying may also be questioned, since many studies investigate the influence 
of resources in relation to other impact variables - such as regulatory exposure, the 
organizational structure of interest groups or the institutional opportunities created by 
EU institutions. These studies generally present complex findings that prove the 
complicated nature of European Union lobbying. Eising, for instance, investigates the 
access patterns of associations to EU level decision-making and concludes that “those 
organizations that find the EU institutions important to the representation of their 
interests, command sufficient financial resources, can bring in policy information and 
have economic clout tend to have better access than other groups” (Eising 2007_b: 
357). Building on his argument, Bernhagen and Mitchell goes on and claims that firm 
size and regulatory exposure are the most important variables that affect supranational 
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political action (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). Investigating the impact of domestic 
institutional context together with resources, Klüver highlights that “very high 
resources”6 are sufficient for Europeanization, whereas “high resources” only trigger 
Europeanization if interest groups are embedded in centralised institutional contexts 
(2010: 187). Other scholars investigate resources from the perspective of policy 
outcomes and claim that although access is an important factor of influence, but in 
itself, it does not necessarily lead to lobbying success or effective interest representation 
(Klüver 2012). Mahoney, for instance argues that “resources of an advocate, both 
financial and membership, exhibit no clear relationship to lobbying success (2008: 198). 
Hence “while no one doubts that money matters, and while there is no question that the 
wealthy enjoy greater access to policymakers and political leaders than other groups in 
society” (Baumgartner, Berry et al. 2007: 226), evidence suggests that even substantial 
resources “do not guarantee a policy outcome” (Baumgartner, Berry et al. 2007: 222) or 
lead to legislative change.  
The availability of resources therefore do not seem to explain the complex 
nature of Europeanization, since not all interest groups and firms engage in 
supranational lobbying even if resources are available (Klüver 2010). Domestic interest 
representation activities do not automatically shift to the European level (Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007: 460). Consequently, the major criticism of the resource-based view is 
that it assumes that the availability of resources automatically encourages organizations 
to Europeanize (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). Even empirical data suggests that 
resources alone, do not lead to Europeanization. Data on firms’ EU representation 
suggests that the availability of resources cannot sufficiently explain how firms organize 
their lobbying structures. Among the world’s largest 2000 companies only a minority, 
less than ten percent, have a European Affairs (EA) representative or registered lobbyist 
at the European Parliament (EP), while only 7.5 percent have a dedicated Brussels 
office (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 166). Although these numbers increase among 
firms that are headquartered in the EU7, this research suggests that even when resources 
are available, only a fraction of European firms engage in direct EU lobbying. Among 
the largest 2000 companies, only 8 percent of the British, while 29 percent of the Italian 
firms have a dedicated EU-office (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 167). Hence the 
                                                 
6
 Klüver measured resources based on financial resources (by the annual budget) and personnel resources 
measured separately (number of employees). With the combination of the two data a four class scale was 
created, according to very high, high, low and very low resources.  
7
 22 percent have EA representatives, 23 percent have registered EP lobbyists and 16 percent have an 
office in Brussels (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). 
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question remains unanswered: what determines how large firms develop their lobbying 
at EU level?  
 
Building on this ongoing debate, in this study it is argued that resources alone do 
not necessarily lead to EU level engagement or are not enough to make firms able to 
participate in EU level interest representation. Instead, it is suggested that in order to 
engage in political activities, firms need to make strategic decisions concerning their 
corporate political strategy (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Taminiau and Wilts 2006) and 
hence need to turn their available resources into lobbying capabilities (Lawton and 
Rajwani 2011; Lawton, Rajwani et al. 2013). In contrast to EU studies, management 
scholars make a direct link between financial resources and firm level strategy 
development, by identifying different types of corporate political resources (Dahan 
2005) and investigating how resources may be turned into capabilities by managerial 
actions. By definition, capabilities refer to a “firm’s capacity to deploy resources” (Amit 
and Schoemaker 1993: 35) as well as its “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, 
Pisano et al. 1997: 516). Hence, it is not “sufficient for firms to simply possess 
resources”, they must be able to turn them into firm-specific dynamic capabilities in 
order to “effectively develop strategies to manage the political environment” (Oliver 
and Holzinger 2008 : 15, 16). In essence, firm capabilities can be understood in terms of 
organizational structures and managerial processes (Teece, Pisano et al. 1997: 517) 
through which managers “design and construct organizational systems to comprise the 
productivity of whatever resources the firm acquires” (Makadok 2001: 387). In this 
respect capabilities constitute “a routine or a number of interacting routines” within the 
firm (Grant 1991: 122). In contrast to the resource-based view, the capabilities theory is 
a more dynamic framework that is able to capture change in the environment (Helfat, 
Finkelstein et al. 2009) and therefore may be more suitable for explaining the 
Europeanization process of large firm lobbying. Applying the theory of dynamic 
capabilities to the process of Europeanization, it becomes clear that firms cannot only 
rely on their available resources and size, but must use their managers’ abilities, time 
and expertise in designing and constructing competences for corporate lobbying at the 
domestic and EU levels. Consequently, the dynamic framework of capabilities provides 
a theoretically more suitable grounding for the study of the Europeanization of 
corporate lobbying than the resource-based view, since it allows us to concentrate on 
managerial choice in relation to firm’s lobbying activities and strategy development. In 
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contrast to political science approaches, the capabilities perspective provides a 
theoretical novelty in the investigation of Europeanization. Although a few political 
scientists has focused on how large firms change their strategies and develop direct EU 
level credentials (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Coen 2009), surprisingly, firms have so far 
been largely treated as ‘black boxes’, without much attention to their internal 
Europeanization processes. Scholars have not yet created a direct link between lobbying 
capabilities and the Europeanization process of lobbying activities. The two studies that 
come closest to the analytical focus of this thesis, investigate a specific sector – the 
airline industry – and explore firm strategies in the developed market economies of 
western Europe (Lawton and Rajwani 2011; Lawton, Rajwani et al. 2013). More 
specifically, Lawton et al. (2013) developed a model of how firms organize their 
political capabilities, by investigating the antecedents of managerial choice. The study 
explored the strategies of EU flag carrier airlines with differing ownership structures in 
the changing policy context of the air transport liberalization between the periods of 
1987-1997. In this research, human, network and structural resources were argued to 
collectively explain how managers in state and non-state airlines shape political 
capabilities (Lawton, Rajwani et al. 2013: 238). Another account on lobbying 
capabilities was presented in Lawton and Rajwani’s (2011) study on the design process 
of lobbying capabilities in unpredictable policy contexts. In this paper, it was argued 
that managerial choices have a crucial role in the design of lobbying capabilities. The 
study investigated how an external policy stimulus (the 9/11 terrorist attacks) impacted 
on management choices for lobbying design in the European airline industry (Lawton 
and Rajwani 2011: 3). Hence, even though it has been established in existing literature 
that resources and capabilities have a crucial impact on how firms develop their 
lobbying activities, scholars have not explained how resources and capabilities 
influence firm level decisions on Europeanization strategies. Consequently, in relation 
to corporate lobbying and the Europeanization of direct firm lobbying, this thesis 
complements previous research in political science as well as management studies by 
focusing on the Europeanization process of lobbying activities at large firms from EE 
countries. Based on the discussion above, in the empirical chapters the following 
proposition will be investigated: 
 Firms build on their domestic lobbying capabilities when they design and 
construct their EU-level lobbying activities.  
In the empirical investigation, domestic lobbying capabilities will be operationalised 
and measured in relation to different quantifiable criteria, such as the number of 
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employees employed or contracted specifically for public affairs activities, the number 
and type of lobbying cases in a given period, the fact whether the company has a 
separate budget for public affairs or whether it has a political strategy or not.  
 
Now that we have explored the relevance and importance of resources and capabilities 
in corporate political strategy building, we have to see how the institutional 
environment affects firm level decisions on Europeanization. The Resource Dependence 
Model (RDM) may present the missing link between the institutional environment and 
lobbying capabilities. According to resource dependence theory organizations are not 
self-sufficient; they need to acquire resources from their environments (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003). The environment provides uncertainties, constraints and contingencies 
that affect the distribution of power and influence within the organization (Aldrich and 
Pfeffer 1976: 89). Consequently, organizational environments come to affect firm’s 
structure and managerial decisions (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). RDM “posits that 
organizations attempt to manage their environments” through “conscious, planned 
responses to environmental contingencies” (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976: 86). Therefore 
what happens in an organization is a “consequence of the environment and the 
particular contingencies and constraints deriving from that environment” (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 3). Applying the RDM to Europeanization, 
Beyers and Kerremans (2007) claim that EU-level engagement is fundamentally 
determined by the organization’s immediate domestic environment and their critical 
resource dependencies in the context of this home environment. Their study investigates 
the Europeanization of domestic interest groups and concludes that “Europeanization is 
not necessarily a privilege for large and resourceful organizations”, but more dependent 
on interest group’s dependency on government subsidies and the regulatory pressure of 
policy sectors (Beyers and Kerremans 2007: 476, 477). Groups in those policy fields 
where EU competencies are weak may be less motivated to Europeanize, even if 
resources are available to them. This view further strengthens the earlier formulated 
proposition of this thesis that the availability of resources – although important – cannot 
sufficiently explain how firms Europeanize.  
The resource dependence model however, was not only used in relation to 
domestic institutions, but also in relation to EU level, supranational institutions. 
Following on the theory of exchange (Salisbury 1969) and applying the resource 
dependence model, Bouwen investigates how organizations can access EU level 
decision-making (Bouwen 2004). It is generally accepted that EU legislation is 
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formulated through a complex decision-making process that involves the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council, and different supranational 
consultative bodies. Direct lobbying at the European Commission - which is a key actor 
in the legislative process by its sole right of legislative initiative - is considered by firms 
as the “best means of influencing the European policy process” (Coen 1997: 21). The 
drafting of proposals sometimes requires detailed technical information (Bouwen 2002) 
especially in product and market-creating policy fields, but sometimes in redistributive 
policy fields the Commission requires wider consultations as well (Coen 2009). As 
Commission officers – working on the draft legislations - do not have the market 
expertise in all the sectors they propose legislation in; they seek professional input from 
economic actors. Hence companies offer their expertise and market knowledge in their 
given policy fields to EU institutions and in exchange they expect access to decision-
making. In his ‘Theory of Access’ Bouwen (2002) argues that the main exchange 
‘currency’ of lobbying in Brussels, is information. As a consequence, interest 
organizations provide different types of information – or as Bouwen classifies ‘access 
goods’ - to EU institutions, in exchange for access to decision-making procedures. 
Bouwen (2004_a) compares firms, national associations and EU-level umbrella 
organizations, and concludes that they all provide different, but valuable types of 
information - “Expert knowledge, Domestic and European Encompassing Interest” - to 
EU institutions, for which, in exchange, they can gain access to decision-making 
(Bouwen 2004 p: 340). Bouwen’s model indicates that depending on the institutional 
context, resources that are appreciated in the process of lobbying may be very diverse.  
As the analysis shows, scholars of EU studies apply the RDM in different ways, 
to investigate the impact of the domestic environment on Europeanization and the 
access of organizations to EU level decision-making. The approach of these studies are 
crucial for our study, because they view resources in relation to institutional contexts 
and argue that the Europeanization of domestic organizations is critically influenced by 
the interaction of these two variables. Hence, by applying the theoretical link between 
resources and institutions on the investigation of EE firms, it may become possible to 
explore the mechanisms that determine post-socialist Europeanization. In the following 
section institutional theories will be explored with the aim to shed light on the question, 
how the domestic environment impacts the Europeanization processes of firms’ 
lobbying activities.   
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2.2.2 Institutions 
Similarly to resources, the institutional context has also been investigated from many 
different theoretical perspectives. However, before discussing these in detail, here we 
need to define the term ‘institutions’ and the different meanings ‘institutions’ might 
have. By definition, an institution “can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of 
practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in 
specific situations” (March and Olsen 1998: 948). In other terms, institutions provide 
the rules of the game (North 1990), which can be enforced by authority or obligation, 
and to which “actors are expected to conform to” (Streeck and Thelen 2009 p: 106). In 
political science, institutional perspectives may be divided into different approaches, 
such as historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). In the different institutional perspectives, 
institutions are understood differently. In institutional economics institutions are 
understood as a set of formal and informal rules, followed by market actors (North 
1990p: 3), whereas for instance in sociology-based institutional theory (Scott 1995) they 
are conceptualized as the rules and norms that define legitimate behaviour. In the latter 
sense, social norms and expectations determine the organizational behaviour of business 
actors too (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 2000). Both schools of 
thought emphasise the importance of ‘formal rules’ (such as laws and regulations) in 
regulating and influencing organizational behaviour (Gelbuda, Meyer et al. 2008), and 
the importance of informal institutions. Informal institutions - unlike formal, legal rules 
- can be defined as unwritten social norms that may be based on a common 
understanding or more simply a “part of culture” (North 1990 p: 37). North highlights 
that while “changes in formal rules are made by polity, informal constraints are linked 
to cultural heritance” (1994 p: 59). Actors learn to use a set of informal rules with each 
other and create a shared understanding or a common culture. The investigation of 
lobbying in the post-socialist context requires a thorough understanding of formal and 
informal institutions, since informal institutions have a much more dominant role than 
in western capitalist societies. Dimitrova’s definition makes the distinction between 
formal and informal institutions very clear: formal rules are “written down and subject 
to third party resolution, while informal rules are neither written down nor subject to 
outside enforcement” (Dimitrova 2010: 138, italics in original). Based on this 
definition, informal institutions can be understood as consciously followed rules of 
political behaviour that can manifest in personal loyalties and networks, reputations, or 
personalistic resource distributions (Grzymala-Busse 2004).  
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 Now that institutions have been defined we may turn back to explore the 
question of how these institutions impact corporate lobbying. The institutional theory of 
organizations focuses on how the institutional environment influences firm’s 
organizational structures, activities and strategies (Hillman 2003: 459) and how firms 
try to conform to the social expectations of this context (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 
1995; DiMaggio and Powell 2000). In relation to corporate political activity, 
institutional theory has two major contributions that may help us understand corporate 
lobbying patterns. First it addresses the question of why and how firms engage in 
lobbying and second it investigates how organizational structures and processes become 
‘institutionalised’ within firms (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987), and become 
enduring, socially accepted and resistant to change (Oliver 1997: 699). According to the 
latter theory, ‘internal institutions’ within an organization are considered to “limit the 
range of acceptable behaviours to those that have been used previously, and thus have 
become institutionalized” (Getz 1997: 48). In the process of decision-making for 
instance, managers are likely to rely on these ‘institutionalised’ patterns of response or 
behaviour (Getz 1997). Furthermore, institutional studies also suggest that firms with 
existing CPA structures and experience in political engagement are more likely to 
engage in corporate political actions again (Getz 1997; Getz 2001). This view has 
crucial relevance for this thesis, since it provides a theoretical underpinning for the 
understanding of the Europeanization patterns of large corporations. If we accept that 
firms that have used CPA in the past and have established formal political involvement 
structures are more likely to use CPA again (Getz 1997: 48) than we can expect that 
those firms that have internally formalised organizational structures for public affairs in 
their home country, may find it easier to develop EU level lobbying strategies. 
Consequently, empirical research should test whether firms ‘build’ on their domestic 
level lobbying capabilities and if they do how.  
However, in order to understand political behaviour in a cross-national or in our 
case multi-level context, we first need to focus on how political institutions vary across 
countries and how this variation affects lobbying and Europeanization approaches and 
activities. Different regimes encourage different patterns of corporate governance and 
hence the organizational capabilities that companies develop will also differ (Whitley 
2007: 40). Many of the institutional factors that influence economic activity are nation-
specific (Hall and Soskice 2001: 16), therefore in the different domestic systems the 
strategic choices that are available for managers in the process of lobbying will also be 
different (Burns and Carson 2002: 135). According to institutional theory, “variations in 
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formal rules and informal norms and expectations” affect how firms choose their 
lobbying strategies and constrain their selection of political tactics (Getz 1997: 50).  
The research question of this thesis requires a comparative theoretical model that 
allows Eastern and Western European lobbying practices to be contrasted and analysed. 
The comparative capitalism literature provides a structure, through which the 
characteristics of Western and Eastern European capitalist regimes may be explored. 
According to the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC) thesis, national institutional factors 
condition the corporate strategy of firms (Hall and Soskice 2001). The VoC theory 
centres around the work of Hall and Soskice (2001) and investigates capitalist systems 
as “production regimes”, which may be defined as the “strategic interaction among 
firms, employees and shareholders”(Jackson and Deeg 2008: 684). Hall and Soskice 
(2001) distinguish two ideal types of production regimes: liberal market economies 
(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). In LMEs firms coordinate in a 
competitive environment and market relations are characterised by the arm’s-length 
exchange of goods and services through competition and formal contracting (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: p 8). In liberal economies – as for instance the UK, US or Canada – the 
market or market institutions have a dominant role in coordinating economic behaviour 
(Hall and Soskice 2001: 8), while the state has a more restricted role, acting mainly as 
the enforcer of contracts (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 546). On the other hand, in CMEs, 
non-market relations have a crucial importance for firms, as they depend more heavily 
on networks, and collaborative, as opposed to competitive relationships (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: 8). Based on these two ideal typical business systems, the VoC 
framework emphasizes the importance of institutions that provide capacities for the 
exchange of information, monitoring, and the sanctioning mechanisms when 
cooperation among firms and other actors is hindered (Hall and Soskice 2001: 10). 
From this perspective “markets are institutions that support particular types of 
relationships between the different actors” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 9). Hence, firms in 
different political economies face different coordinating institutions and consequently 
will develop different corporate strategies across nations (Hall and Soskice 2001: 15). 
Hall and Soskice posit that “differences in the institutional framework of the political 
economy generate systematic differences in corporate strategy across LMEs and CMEs” 
(2001: 16). This way, Hall and Soskice (2001: 15) argue that the institutional structure 
conditions corporate strategy, although it does not “fully” determine it. Theorizing the 
firm as the centre of political economy, the VoC framework argues that firms seek to 
develop and exploit dynamic capabilities through relations with other actors in their 
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environment (Hall and Soskice 2001). However as capabilities are relational, firms 
encounter coordination problems and can only overcome them if they coordinate 
relations effectively. Hall and Soskice argue that firms must develop relationships in 
five spheres in order to resolve their coordination problems - in industrial relations, 
vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and firm’s 
relations towards their employees (Hall and Soskice 2001 p: 6, 26). The way firms 
operate in these five spheres condition their “competencies and the character of an 
economy’s production regime” (Hall and Soskice 2001 p: 7). Based on how firms 
resolve their coordination problems in these five spheres, national economies can be 
compared. Hence, Hall and Soskice create a link between the competitiveness of the 
firm and the ‘comparative institutional advantage’ of national economies (Hancké, 
Rhodes et al. 2009). Consequently, the VoC theory focuses on firms mainly as 
economic players.  
Yet, companies are political actors as well, both at the national and at the EU-
level. The form of their engagement with politics is crucial in understanding the 
coordination mechanisms that determine the capitalist structure. The VoC framework 
lacks a political focus and does not extend its analysis onto the theoretically rich area of 
state-firm relations. Some of its critiques argue that the state should be included into the 
framework for at least two reasons (Schmidt 2002; Schmidt 2003; Hancké, Rhodes et al. 
2009; Schmidt 2009). First because countries where the state has a larger role than in 
traditional LMEs and CMEs, a different type of coordination evolves (Schmidt 2002). 
And second because the state does not only provide the political and economic context 
that impacts the actions of economic actors but it also actively “constitutes the political 
institutional setting” for firms (Schmidt 2009: 517). The state has an important role in 
all forms of capitalism (Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2009: 297) and while some argue for the 
state’s inclusion into the traditional VoC framework, as an independent element of 
coordination (Hancké 2010: 133); others classify different capitalist systems as a 
consequence of state action (Schmidt 2002; Amable 2003). In relation to the state’s 
organizing role, Schmidt (2002) for instance classifies different capitalist systems, such 
as state capitalism (France), managed capitalism (Germany) and market capitalism 
(UK). Since states vary in their internal structures as well as in their relations to society, 
different state structures will lead to different capacities for action (Evans 1995: 11). 
Following on from this logic, it becomes evident that states differ greatly in how much 
they encourage and structure interest groups that become involved in policy formulation 
(Whitley 2007). While some states allow individual firms and interest groups to 
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organize as they wish, others standardize interest groups representation in order to 
facilitate the state’s coordinating role (Whitley 2007: 38). Applying this analogy to the 
field of corporate lobbying, instead of production regimes and economic markets, in our 
analysis we need to investigate the ‘nonmarket’ environment in which firms engage. 
The nonmarket environment includes “those interactions that are intermediated by the 
public, stakeholders, government, the media, and public institutions” (Baron 1995: 47). 
Hence, while firms need to manage their coordination problems in the market 
environment, in lobbying they manage their relationships in the nonmarket 
environment, in different interest representation structures. Following the logic of the 
VoC theory, if the institutional structure conditions corporate strategy, then one would 
expect that the domestic institutional framework or more specifically the structure of 
interest representation should also condition or at least have an impact on firms’ 
corporate lobbying strategies and EU-level political activities. In the following sections 
we will explore this question through the analysis of the political science literature on 
interest representation and the Europeanization of lobbying strategies.  
If we accept that the state has a crucial role in economic coordination and that 
firms are important political actors in policy-making, then our institutional analysis 
needs to be extended onto the field of interest politics. Interest representation falls 
somewhere into the sphere of ‘inter-corporate relationships’ in Hall and Soskice’s 
parlance, but also relates to the ‘intermediation’ function between state and economy, 
which is not addressed in the theory, due to the above noted absence of the state from 
the model. In the comparison of economic systems, Hall and Soskice neglect the issue 
of interest representation, although it can lead to the further understanding of 
comparative advantages in international and/or supranational contexts. If this lack is 
corrected then the VoC framework provides a useful theoretical framework for 
understanding the impact of contextual and institutional factors on lobbying. Hence, in 
this study it is argued that the VoC framework may help us to explain the interaction 
between the impact of the domestic institutional environment on firms lobbying 
strategies, the development of lobbying capabilities and ultimately the Europeanization 
process of corporate lobbying. Besides, it provides an analytical tool through which 
firm strategies and Europeanization processes in the different western and post-socialist 
coordination regimes may be contrasted and compared.  
Investigating the sphere of interest representation in the two ideal typical 
business systems, pluralism is commonly associated with LMEs - through the political 
activity of lobbying – whereas corporatism is mostly used to describe interest 
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representation in CMEs. New institutionalism describes the system of interest 
representation generally in term of these two end poles of the continuum in liberal 
democracies (Schmitter 1974; Streeck and Kenworthy 2005: 448). I highlighted the 
term ‘liberal democracies’, as this part of the definition has crucial relevance for our 
analysis. As it was noted earlier in this section, scholars of political science have 
investigated the impact of domestic institutional structures on Europeanization 
predominantly in a western capitalist context. In this context, most countries can be 
placed along the LME/CME continuum and if we extend the model with the ideal 
typical type of ‘statism’, then almost all Western European states can be identified, as 
having most of the characteristics of one or the other type of coordination system.  
Consequently as the “EU lobbying system is no different” to Western and 
Northern European lobbying systems (Coen and Richardson 2009: 341), firms from 
Western European EU member states adapt well to the supranational style of lobbying 
(Coen 1997; Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). However Eastern European 
interest representation structures differ greatly from Western European ones and hence 
firms from EE states may have greater difficulties adapting to the EU’s interest 
representation system. To examine the different characteristics of interest politics in 
western and post-socialist states we need to explore how the ‘corporatization’ of interest 
representation is linked to the nature of capitalism in a given country (Schmitter 1974: 
107). As the political, social and economic processes lead to different power and 
influence relations (Schmitter 1974), in emerging capitalist environments, interest 
representation structures may evolve differently from those of western capitalist 
democracies. In advanced capitalist and democratic welfare states a type of ‘societal 
corporatism’ has evolved over the years, through a long process of capitalist 
development and collaborative class relations (Schmitter 1974). In contrast, the 
“delayed, dependent capitalist development and non-hegemonic class relations” that 
have been experienced in post-socialist contexts, may lead to the development of a 
certain type of “state corporatism” (Schmitter 1974: 108). This type of regime may be 
characterised by a central state authority, which enforces social peace by repressing and 
excluding class demands (Schmitter 1974: 108). In a ‘state corporatist’ system, the 
government can create and maintain: 
“all of the corporatist organizations and may grant itself the power to assign and 
remove their leaders at will. Often such 'representative organizations' serve a 
function of pre-empting the emergence of autonomous organizations” (Unger 
and Chan 1995: 31).  
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Whereas neo-corporatism was developed by organized groups with the aim to limit the 
power of the modern state, ‘state corporatism’ uses “corporatist organization as an 
instrument of state rule” (Streeck and Kenworthy 2005: 444). According to Schmitter, 
the transition from state corporatism to societal corporatism requires a number of 
different “assumptions” or in other words preconditions (1974: 96). Pluralism and 
corporatism may develop only if these preconditions are available. Among others these 
preconditions according to Schmitter (1974: 96) include, the growing importance of 
formal interest representation units, the different and often conflicting interest, the 
burgeoning role of administration that relies on specialized information and on technical 
expertise, and finally a trend towards the expansion in the scope of public policy and the 
interpenetration of private and public decision arenas. Once these preconditions are 
available in a given capitalist system, pluralism or corporatism may evolve, offering 
“opposing political remedies” and institutional forms for interest representation 
(Schmitter 1974: 96). However as we will see in the following sections on EE 
capitalism, if these preconditions are not met, then interest politics might develop along 
different patterns.  
Turning back to the characteristics of the ideal typical interest intermediation 
systems, pluralism may be characterised by the competition among interest 
organizations, corporatism highlights the negotiation among state institutions and peak 
associations, while statism refers to hierarchy among state and interest organizations 
(Eising 2008: 1169). In the ‘liberal democratic’ context, pluralism represents a 
decentralised way of interest representation, where many interest groups and individual 
firms compete for influence voluntarily, in non-hierarchically ordered and “self-
determined categories” and not “licensed, recognized or controlled by the state” 
(Schmitter 1974 p: 96). In pluralism, the state and society are separated and 
participation in public policy-making is highly legitimate (Eising 2008: 1169). Interest 
politics is based on free competition (Streeck and Kenworthy 2005: 448) and coalition 
formation (Eising 2008) among fragmented interest groups. In this type of regime, 
organized interests are led by public legislation and competition, whereas in corporatist 
systems political sanctions and incentives make interest groups cooperate with public 
purposes (Streeck and Kenworhy 2005: 448). In corporatism, associational organized 
interests of civil society are institutionally linked with the state (Schmitter 1974) and 
intermediary organizations mediate between the state and groups of individuals or firms 
(Streeck and Kenworthy 2005). While in pluralist societies individual interests compete 
with each other, in corporatist a few, selected organizations enjoy a representational 
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monopoly, and participate in the making and implementation of political decisions 
(Streeck and Kenworthy 2005 p: 448). Pluralism represents a decentralised system of 
industrial relations, where bargaining is done at workplace level, in contrast, in 
corporatist systems the relationship between government and an interest organization is 
structural in the society (Peters 2005). The lobbying and negotiation processes in both 
of these institutional arrangements allow groups that are affected by public policy to 
make their voices heard and participate in policy processes legitimately (Burns and 
Carson 2002: 135).  
Now that the different patterns of interest politics have been defined, we may 
turn to how these institutional structures relate to firms’ European representation. As 
firms try to adapt their strategies to their environments they use different strategies 
when engaging in political interest representation, however the ability of organizations 
to adapt to the conditions of EU policy-making is determined by the structural features 
of national interest politics (Wilts and Quittkat 2003). Businesses that represent their 
interests at EU level, may maintain their national lobbying styles in different ways, for 
instance in the form of relying on their national level alliances at the EU level or by 
replicating specific forms of access at the national level and the EU level (Coen and 
Dannreuther 2002: 119).  
 
Scholars of EU studies explain the impact of domestic institutional structures on 
Europeanization from two different perspectives. The first approach focuses on the 
importance of the ‘institutional fit’ between modes of interest intermediation at the 
national and European level (Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001; Eising 2004; Coen 1998), 
while the second investigates the relation between the ‘degree of access’ of interest 
groups to decision-making at the national and EU-level (Beyers 2002; Eising 2007; 
Klüver 2010). The ‘institutional’ or ‘degree of fit’ perspective builds on the notion that 
organizations, that operate in national systems that “closely resemble the patterns of 
interest intermediation at the EU level” may find it easier to adapt to EU-lobbying than 
those who come from a different domestic environment (Klüver 2010: 176). Hence the 
closer the ‘degree of fit’ the easier it is for firms to Europeanize. The literature 
highlights the different patterns of Europeanization between pluralist, corporatist and 
statist countries (Coen 1998; Cowles 2001; Eising 2007). Scholars argue that firms 
learn how to behave in a given system of interest representation, with specific 
institutional forms of interest intermediation, and then these domestic experiences 
influence the degree and speed of their Europeanization (Coen 1998). In France, where 
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policy-making resembles most a statist structure, in which traditionally the “state acts 
and society reacts” – lobbying “has traditionally been seen as illegitimate, with only 
lobbying ‘a la francaise’ acceptable, which entailed relying on political arbitration” 
(Schmidt 2006: 682, 683). As a consequence, although it is today one of the best 
represented countries in Brussels, it was harder for French firms to adapt to the ‘semi-
pluralist’ (Schmidt 2006: 672) or ‘elite-pluralist’ (Coen 1997) policy-making process of 
the EU than those that came from corporatist or pluralist environments. Investigating 
states on the corporatist-pluralist continuum, scholars argue that UK businesses - which 
had a long tradition of competition for government attention - adapted quickly and 
easily to the supranational lobbying style (Coen 1998) and had “much less to learn” 
(Schmidt 2006: 684) compared to the French for instance. It has been hypothesised that 
due to their domestic institutional traditions, firms from corporatist systems (like 
Austria, Germany, or Sweden) rely more on interest groups to represent their positions 
in the EU and are less likely to have the institutionalized capacity to lobby on their own 
(Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 158). Consequently, firms from these states “were 
slower to recognise the strategic advantages of competitive direct lobbying of Brussels” 
(Coen 1998: 93) than their counterparts in pluralist countries. When, however they 
eventually established their Anglo-Saxon type direct representations, the corporatist 
traditions, gave them an advantage in building effective European alliances with societal 
interests and establish ad-hoc business and sector alliances (Coen 1998). As these 
findings show, national political traditions continue to matter in EU policy-making 
(Woll 2006).  
Differences remain however not only between the speed of Europeanization, but 
also how advocates with different domestic backgrounds can access EU institutions. 
Contrary to those who focus on the degree of fit, some researchers investigate 
Europeanization from the perspective of access to decision-making. The ‘degree of 
access’ theory approaches the access of organizations to decision-making both at the 
national and the EU-level and can be divided into two opposing hypotheses (Klüver 
2010). On the one hand, according to the positive persistence theory, access to decision-
making on the domestic level is positively linked to EU-level engagement (Beyers 
2002; Eising 2007), so when organizations have good access at home - that will 
stimulate European engagement. On the other hand, the compensation thesis argues that 
those organizations, which have limited access to domestic decision-making, try to 
compensate this shortcoming by pursuing lobbying at the EU-level (Beyers 2002; 
Klüver 2010). Klüver (2010) declares that interest groups in highly centralised and 
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statist national institutional frameworks – where they are largely excluded from the 
decision-making processes at national level - have a stronger incentive to Europeanize 
their lobbying activities than those from decentralised corporatist or pluralist 
backgrounds. Other studies investigate access in relation to different EU institutions and 
find that UK pluralism supports a bit better access than French statism to the Council 
and the European Parliament (EP), but not to the Commission; while corporatism 
enables German organizations to establish more contacts with the Commission than 
French associations, but not with the other two institutions (Eising 2007_b: 351).  
On the other hand, domestic institutional structures have also been contested as 
being the major determinant of Europeanization; some scholars argue that the 
importance of domestic institutions in the European interest representation literature is 
exaggerated. Eising (2007_b) for instance claims that the multi-level structure of the 
EU’s institutional setting has a larger impact on interest groups’ ability to access EU 
institutions than the domestic modes of interest intermediation. Investigating business 
associations, he shows that the institutional context at EU-level, resource dependencies, 
organizational structures and strategic choices have a stronger impact on 
Europeanization than domestic modes of interest intermediation. Moreover, 
investigating large firms as corporate players and business associations as collective 
actors, he concludes that differences in access patterns are “less pronounced than the 
literature on national modes of interest intermediation would condition them to be” 
(Eising 2007_a: 399). Extending Eising’s argument to large firm lobbying, Bernhagen 
and Mitchell claims that national modes of interest intermediation “turn out to be 
largely irrelevant to corporate lobbying in the EU” (2009: 171). Considering the 
domestic institutional factors, they argue that only the strength of national associational 
representation (or the domestic corporatist arrangement) has a significant negative effect 
on direct firm lobbying. So in those countries, where strong corporatist arrangements 
are in place, firms will rely on these structures at the supranational level as well, 
whereas firms from more pluralist states will compensate the weak associational 
representation by more direct political action in Brussels (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 
169).  
As it was noted earlier, it may be that EU scholars could not find variation in the 
Europeanization patterns of Western European organizations, since these “domestic 
modes” may differ less from each other in practice than it was previously expected 
(Eising 2007: 357). It is possible that the impact of domestic institutional factors is less 
relevant in the context of the corporatist/pluralist divide, but may become more ‘visible’ 
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when comparing advanced capitalist systems with emerging or developing market 
economies. Studies so far have omitted the conceptualisation of domestic institutions in 
developing capitalist systems (such as EE member states), as being structurally different 
from Western capitalist ones. In sum, EU scholarship has not constructed a link between 
domestic institutional structures in the post-socialist context and Europeanization of 
business lobbying, nor has it investigated the impact of domestic institutions on EU 
level engagement from the perspective of comparative capitalism. Based on the 
discussion in this chapter, in the empirical study the following propositions will be 
explored: 
 Environmental resource dependencies both at the domestic and EU level 
determine how firms design the organizational arrangement of lobbying 
and how they internationalise their lobbying structures.   
 The domestic institutional structure of post-socialist capitalism impacts 
Hungarian firms’ Europeanization by affecting managers’ opportunity 
structures.  
These two propositions may be viewed both as alternative and complementary 
explanations. As it was discussed earlier, existing studies so far have investigated 
Europeanization primarily from the first perspective, in relation to domestic 
environmental resource dependencies. The opportunity structures originating from post-
socialist capitalism have been rarely addressed. Yet, as it will become clear from the 
empirical chapters, both resource dependencies and opportunity structures have a 
crucial role in the process of Europeanization. Consequently, in this thesis, these two 
propositions will be viewed as complementary explanations. Political opportunity 
structure may be defined as “a set of features of a given institution that determines the 
relative ability of an interest group to influence decision-making” (Princen and 
Kerremans, 2008: 1130). Opportunity structures in this thesis will be understood as the 
possibilities of engaging in interest representation at the domestic level.  
 
Turning back to the literature, it needs to be highlighted that besides ignoring the 
different institutional context of Eastern and Western European capitalisms, the 
literature has not investigated the process of Europeanization further at the level of the 
firm and hence have not explained how domestic environmental factors affect the firm 
level process of developing domestic lobbying capabilities and EU level interest 
representation strategies. In the following section we will explore theories that 
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investigate firm level variables in relation to corporate political activities and 
Europeanization.  
 
2.2.3 Firm-specific factors 
We have explored in the previous section how external factors, such as the 
domestic institutional environment affect corporate political activities and EU level 
lobbying. Acknowledging the importance of external environmental determinants, some 
management scholars (Schuler and Rehbein 1997) argue that the internal characteristics 
of he firm, such as structure or resources, mediate how the firm responds and adapts 
environmental influences in the development of its political strategy. Thus, according to 
Schuler and Rehbein (1997) environmental pressures do not influence political activities 
directly. Instead firm-specific characteristics, such as the organizational structure, 
resources, political experience and stakeholder dependence, mediate between 
environmental pressures and the firm’s political response, and affect a firm’s 
willingness and ability to become politically involved (Schuler and Rehbein 1997: 134). 
Furthermore, subsequent studies found that firms-specific constraints “critically affect a 
firm’s decision to shape its political environment” (Rehbein and Schuler 1999: 159). 
These findings suggest that firm-specific variables have crucial relevance in the study of 
corporate political activities. Yet, in EU scholarship only a few scholars investigate 
organizational level factors, other than resources that have been discussed earlier. Very 
few EU scholars explore the importance of the organizational characteristics of 
lobbying. Coen (2010: 297) for instance argues that multinationals that want to lobby 
the EU level policy process directly, have to establish a distinct and centralized 
government affairs function, in order to become able to provide political accountability 
within the firm, and credibility with EU officials. He argues that this type of 
centralisation is necessary for successful EU level engagement to meet the requirements 
of EU institutions, but does not explore the question further, concerning how the firm-
specific characteristics of the organizational arrangement of lobbying affect the firm’s 
ability to transpose its lobbying activities to the EU level. 
Following Coen, most EU scholars take PA departments for granted, and focus 
on them as a unit of analysis in empirical studies (Barron 2011; Moss, McGrath et al. 
2012; Schendelen 2012). These studies extend our knowledge substantially on issues 
such as how national business cultures affect lobbying (Barron 2011) or what are the 
current trends in public affairs management globally (Moss, McGrath et al. 2012) and at 
EU level (van Schendelen 2012). However the mechanisms, through which firms 
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Europeanize their lobbying activities, remain rather unclear. The literature has so far not 
explored the internal firm-level process, through which domestic lobbying activities are 
converted and transposed to the EU level, nor has it investigated how the organizational 
arrangement of lobbying activities may affect this process. This observation is true not 
just for the lobbying literature, but also for the interest group literature. The role of 
internal organizational structures has “largely been neglected so far” in interest group 
research (Klüver 2012: 493). Only a few scholars raise attention to the importance of 
the fit between the organizational structure of interest groups and the institutional 
environment (Klüver 2012). Klüver (2012: 505), for instance, demonstrates that the 
internal organizational structure of interest groups plays an important role in how 
effectively they can engage at EU level. Her study identifies functional differentiation, 
professionalization and decentralisation, as the three key areas that play an important 
role in how effectively organizations are able to supply information to the European 
Commission (Klüver 2012: 495). Furthermore, Klüver concludes that successful EU 
level lobbying requires sufficient resources and an “organizational structure that 
matches the complex institutional environment” of the European Union (2012: 506). 
Klüver’s findings suggest that the devil is in the details. She explores organizational 
structure in a relatively narrow sense, focusing on how it affects interest groups’ ability 
to deliver information to EU level decision-makers. Nevertheless her study raises 
attention to the importance of another firm level variable that may impact 
Europeanization and which has not been considered previously.  
Similarly, studies of public affairs management predominantly investigate the 
political activities of those firms that already have functional PA units. As it was noted 
earlier, the formal organizational structure designed for the management of political 
strategies is often called public affairs or government affairs departments. Studies on 
public affairs management refer to these formalised, functional units as ‘organizational 
functions’ (Baysinger and Woodman 1982; Post, Murray et al. 1982; Meznar and Nigh 
1995; Harris, Moss et al. 1998; Griffin and Dunn 2004; Moss, McGrath et al. 2012; van 
Schendelen 2012). This dedicated ‘functional unit’ is considered to be responsible to 
channel messages between the firm and its political environment and hence maintain 
“external legitimacy by managing the interface between an organization and its socio-
political environment” (Meznar and Nigh 1995: 975). Relating to this view, depending 
on the firm’s approach towards its environment, some scholars sort activities into 
different types, such as those that “buffer” from the environment and those that “bridge” 
with the surrounding context (Meznar and Nigh 1995: 975). Hence, studies in public 
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affairs management explore how public affairs activities are managed within the 
organizational structure of firms, by investigating issues such as the commitment of 
senior management to PA, resource allocations, or for instance the structure of PA 
departments (Baysinger and Woodman 1982; Post, Murray et al. 1982; Harris, Moss et 
al. 1998; Griffin and Dunn 2004; Moss, McGrath et al. 2012).  
The literature tend to focus on the investigation of those firms that already have 
a functional organizational unit for political activities and ignores those that do not have 
dedicated public affairs departments or engage in political activities directly, but 
through contracted agencies. Furthermore, both management and political science 
studies ignore the investigation of how the firm-specific organizational arrangement of 
corporate lobbying impacts the Europeanization of direct firm level interest 
representation strategies.  
Applying a management perspective to the question of Europeanization, I argue 
that corporate lobbying should be explored as a functional activity within a firm, 
regardless of the fact whether the firm has a specialised public affairs unit or not. 
However, if lobbying is acknowledged as a functional activity, then the question arises 
how this functional activity is designed and positioned within the organizational 
structure. Is it always formalised as most studies suggest? Is it managed internally or 
externally? Moreover, in relation to the Europeanization of corporate lobbying two 
important questions arise. First, whether the internal organizational positioning and 
structure of lobbying, as a functional corporate activity, affects the process of 
Europeanization and second, if it does, then how does it impact the process through 
which firms transpose their lobbying activities to the EU level? By exploring lobbying 
as an activity, rather than a formalised corporate unit, this thesis aims to extend our 
understanding of how lobbying may be organized and managed at different firms, in 
different institutional contexts. Moreover, this unique perspective, not only allows us to 
explore the link between the organizational design of lobbying and Europeanization, but 
also helps us to unpack the mechanisms through which institutional and firm level 
variables, such as the domestic context, resources or organizational structures impact 
the transposition of corporate lobbying activities to the EU level. Answering the call of 
Rehbein and Schuler (1999: 160) to gather more detailed information from firms on the 
organizational factors that influence their political activities, I suggest that in the 
investigation of EU level lobbying, the organizational structure of lobbying should be 
added as a variable. Following on from this theoretical reasoning, the following 
proposition will be investigated in the empirical chapters: 
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 Firms build on their domestic organizational design of lobbying in their 
Europeanization process.  
By exploring this proposition, I aim to investigate the question of how the arrangement 
of lobbying within the organizational structure may impact firms’ ability to set up direct 
EU level lobbying capabilities. The empirical analysis will explore the domestic 
organizational design of lobbying at interviewed firms and compare and contrast their 
domestic arrangements with their EU-level structures or if they do not have an EU 
office, then their existing or planned EU-level lobbying activities. The proposition is 
aimed to test whether there is a link between how firms manage their lobbying activities 
at the domestic level and how they engage at EU-level. If empirical data supports this 
proposition then it may be argued that corporate Europeanization needs to be explored 
at the level of the firm, with a specific focus on the internal characteristics of 
organizational structures, and how these structures affect managerial decisions in the 
process of internationalisation. Besides giving information about organizational 
capabilities, the investigation of the organizational arrangement of lobbying will give us 
insights into a firm’s reporting relationships, decision-making procedures as well as the 
internal, functional sophistication of public affairs activities.  
 
However, before we begin the empirical investigation of the above claims, we 
need to explore further what determines firms’ political activities in the eastern side of 
the continent. As most studies that we have discussed so far, investigate firms in 
Western European states or the US, in the following sections, we will discuss the 
literature on the institutional characteristics of the emerging capitalist systems in EE and 
analyse their influence on corporate lobbying.  
 
2.3 Capitalism in Eastern Europe 
State building processes determine the political institutions and decision-making 
mechanisms, in which corporations manage their activities. In the transition process the 
most important task was institutional reform. The promise of EU and NATO 
memberships not only required the introduction of several new, formal institutions, but 
also the implementation of the entire EU legislation, the aquis communataire. In the 
institutional reform processs, most of the former communist countries quickly set up 
structures to meet the conditions for membership, despite the fact that the modernization 
and democratisation processes had not supported these (Dimitrova 2002). The 
democratic institution building process - which went hand in hand with social changes 
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and the strengthening of public control in the West – was done from top to bottom and 
detached from social maturing in the East (Dimitrova 2002). EE states had to face the 
‘triple transformation’ to nation state, capitalism and democracy simultaneously (Bohle 
and Greskovits 2007: 450). Or as Centeno puts it they had to achieve a ‘double 
transition’ to democracy and market, only through a few years time (Centeno 1994). 
The transition literature has investigated this process from many different perspectives, 
analysing social change (Stark 1992), the Leninist legacy on institutional change 
(Hanson 1997) or more specifically legacies that affect the post-communist environment 
(Crawford and Lijphart 1997); state building (Comisso 1997), the detailed process of 
transition (Kornai 2000) as well as its unique characteristics (Kornai 2006). The second 
phase of transition studies investigated the ‘results’ of transitions (Lavigne 2000), and 
focused on the outcomes of transition in relation to regional differences (Sokol 2001). 
After the turn of the century, scholars turned their attention more and more to the 
investigation of institution-building in relation to EU enlargement, the accession process 
of post-socialist states to the European Union (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Dimitrova 
2010) and the impacts of the EU’s regulatory governance on Europeanization (Bauer, 
Knill et al. 2007). To understand the nature and characteristics of post-socialism, the 
scholarly focus has increasingly shifted from transition studies that understand 
transition countries as sui generis, towards a more comparative institutional perspective 
-classifying the emerging EE systems according to the already existing institutional 
framework of classical macro-level comparative institutional analysis. Contradicting 
views emerged from scholars that placed EE states at different places along the 
continuum of pluralism / corporatism or LME / CME divide. Some referred to Central 
European countries8 as a distinctive economic cluster that have much in common with 
Greece, Iberia and Ireland, and are closer to the continental European type of market 
capitalism than the liberal one (McMenamin 2004). Others argued that, although the 
richest central European countries9 resemble most to CME economies, they are more 
“‘state led” than ideal typical coordinated systems (Lane 2005: 245). In contrast, due to 
weak industrial relations and low levels of labour force participation the Hungarian and 
Polish economies were described by others as ‘fake corporatisms’ (King 2007 p: 309). 
They were hence found to be “much closer” to the LME than the coordinated model of 
economic coordination (Cernat 2002; Crowley 2005: 3). Be that as it may, the Varieties 
of Capitalism framework provided a comparative alternative for the debate, in the 
                                                 
8
 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
9
 Among them Poland and Hungary  
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political economic research on Central and Eastern Europe (Drahokoupil 2009: 294) as 
neither the “neoclassical economics nor the transition-path dependency argument” was 
able to explain the “specific capitalist formation” of EE states (Nölke 2011: 4). Studies, 
as early as in 1999, have identified the differences in the nature of the emerging 
business systems (Whitley 1999). Subsequent work raised attention to the 
distinctiveness of the emerging post-socialist coordination, classifying it as ‘politicized 
managerial capitalism’ (Martin 2002) or ‘patrimonial post-communist capitalism’ (King 
2007). Due to the transitional nature of Eastern European coordination, some scholars 
argue that these ‘Emerging Market Economies’ (EMEs) should not be classified as a 
separate variety of capitalism, since they are still in the process of transformation 
(Hancke, Rhodes et al. 2008; Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2009) Others however posit, that 
transition economies may not evolve into a fully developed market economy (Schneider 
2008) and therefore a sui generis classification of post-socialist states - as a distinct 
variety of capitalism - is required (Myant and Drahokoupil 2010; Vliegenthart 2010; 
Cerami and Stubbs 2011; Nölke 2011). Following this reasoning, Nölke and 
Vliegenthart identify a third variety of capitalism for post-socialist states, the 
‘Dependent Market Economy’ (DME) (2009). The key feature of the DME model is the 
fundamental dependence of Eastern European economies on foreign FDI, which leads to 
a hierarchical relationship within multinational companies, which constitute “the central 
coordination mechanism” (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2010: 677) in these economies. 
Hence instead of domestic institutions, in the DME framework, multinational 
corporations provide the central coordination mechanisms (Drahokoupil 2009). 
Building on these findings, Myant and Drahokoupil (2010) developed a separate 
typology of capitalist varieties and identified five different varieties among post-
socialist states, based on the level of international integration and other political-
economic characteristics – such as the rule of law, relations between politics and 
business, the economic role of the state, the structure of businesses and the finance 
systems. According to this classification, Hungary and other central European states, 
fall into the category of ‘FDI-based market economies’ that are characterised by 
democratic political systems, EU integration and the dominance of foreign-owned 
MNCs in their economies (Myant and Drahokoupil 2010: 21).  
While transnational companies and the role of FDI constituted a crucial role in 
the above discussed models, Cerami and Stubbs investigates post-socialist capitalism 
from a different perspective, based on the role of the state in the economy, arguing that 
both “institutions and politics matter” (2011: 24, italics in original). In this theory, 
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central and Eastern European states and the Baltic countries are identified as ‘state-
enabled market economies’, whereas the other less developed states in the region are 
classified as ‘state-influenced’ or ‘state-interfered’ market economies (Cerami and 
Stubbs 2011: 14, 15). Similarly to Cerami and Stubbs, others also raise attention to the 
role of the state in specific areas of the ‘EE-adapted’ VoC framework: the relations 
between politics and business, the rule of law, and the economic role of the state (Myant 
and Drahokoupil 2010).  
 
As these studies show, two major issues seem to dominate the analysis of 
emerging capitalist systems, the determining role of transnational capital (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2007; Drahokoupil 2009; Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Myant and 
Drahokoupil 2010; Vliegenthart 2010; Nölke 2011) and the dominant role of the state in 
economic coordination (Cerami and Stubbs 2011; King 2007; Myant and Drahokoupil 
2010). The latter is especially fundamental in respect to this thesis, since an important 
feature of the state is the extent to which it influences the development and operations 
of economic actors (Whitley 2007), the institutional environment for interest politics 
and consequently the structure of interest groups (Coen, Grant et al. 2010). In relation to 
emerging economies, it is argued that the state has played a far more directive role in 
the industrialization process than the “Western concept of the state in the process of 
modernization has envisaged” (Boisot and Child 1996: 621). It is generally accepted 
that in the post-socialist context, the “state retains significant involvement with business 
organizations, beyond ‘establishing the rules of the game’ (Martin 2002: 825). As it was 
noted earlier in this chapter, the VoC framework neglects the autonomous role of the 
state and consequently leaves political impact factors out of the theory (Schmidt 2002; 
Watson 2003). Hall and Soskice (2001) do not see firms as political players and 
therefore neglect the sphere of state-business relations in economic coordination. 
However the role of the state cannot be left out of the analysis of post-socialist 
capitalism, since as it was noted earlier, in this institutional context, politics matter 
substantially too (Cerami and Stubbs 2011). Referring to transition countries, scholars 
note that these are “laboratory cases of how the state and business interact to create 
different forms of economic coordination” (Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2009: 297). These 
‘interactions’ may also be very different from those known in western capitalist 
contexts, simply because the state has a much more direct influence over the interest 
representation system, through its power to restrict or enable access to decision-making 
(Borragán 2006) than in liberal democratic systems. Hence the channels for interest 
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representation and access to decision-making in EE countries are often limited by the 
state and the dominant political parties (Borragán 2004). The rules of the game for 
interest intermediation and lobbying that have developed in western Europe over long 
periods of institutional stability are “neither clearly defined nor properly understood” in 
EE countries (Borragán 2006: 140). The involvement of organized interests into 
political decision-making “has either been neglected entirely in post-communist 
countries or done in a superficial, perfunctory fashion” (Kornai 2003: 5). Due to the 
lack of specific laws in post-communist countries for “governing participation” in 
legislative decision-making, there is no breach of the law if the process of social 
dialogue or the inclusion of interest groups into decision-making is completely avoided 
(Kornai 2003: 1). Following on from this argument, in the following section the state’s 
role and state-firm relations will be investigated in more detail, in order to shed light on 
the nature and characteristics of the institutional environment in the post-socialist 
context.  
 
2.4 State-business relations and informal networks in EE 
capitalism 
To further investigate the characteristics of state-society relations, we need to 
rely on a conceptual framework that is more easily applicable to the post-socialist 
context than the VoC model or the two ideal typical interest intermediation structures, 
pluralism and corporatism. State-business relations have been investigated from many 
different theoretical perspectives in the EE context. The transition literature highlights 
property ownership and the impact of FDI on EE economies, whereas the literature on 
interest representation focuses on the investigation of informal institutions (Wedel 
2003), informal networks in state-firm relations (Schoenman 2005) and corruption and 
clientelism (Sajo 1998; Rose-Ackerman 2001; Rose-Ackerman 2008). In the post-
socialist institutionalisation process, formal and informal legacies of socialism had a 
great impact on state formation, since these legacies “constituted the primary resources 
available to elites competing for authority”(Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002: 536). 
Consequently, in the literature of post-socialist transformation, the role of informal rules 
has been recognized as an important dimension of organizational and institutional 
change (Chavance 2008: 58). The sociology literature has shown that external reforms 
can create parallel formal and informal rule structures, in which organizations could 
operate according to the informal rules, while keeping the formal rules for showing 
compliance (Brunsson and Olsen 1997). Hence, besides informal institutions, the 
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variation in the institutional strength of formal institutions, contributes an additional 
variable that has relevance in the understanding of emerging capitalist systems. Whereas 
formal institutions in western capitalist countries provide a sense of ‘security’, a stable 
institutional environment, and universal rights to economic actors, in post-communist 
countries formal institutions may vary along the dimensions of enforcement and 
stability (Levitsky and Murillo 2009). As rules are not always enforced, and institutions, 
that are frequently modified, may often be unstable (Levitsky and Murillo 2009), formal 
structures may be used or misused for particular interests (Stark 1996). In the context of 
the institutional reform in EE states, Dimitrova has shown that due to the informal rules 
and practices in place, during the accession negotiations of the EU’s enlargement 
process, new formal institutional structures might remain ‘empty shells’, since actors 
may ignore or challenge formal rules and use informal rules instead (Dimitrova 2010: 
146). Consequently, formal rules remain “rules-on-the-books rather than rules-in-use 
and will not affect the behaviour of actors” (Dimitrova 2010: 138). In the haze of formal 
and informal institutional rules elite competition for available state resources, during the 
first 20 years of transition, has created an institutional environment, in which political 
and economic relationships are strongly interlinked and status and personal ties are 
superseding the authority of independent formal institutions (Grzymala-Busse and 
Luong 2002). Even today, the interactions, cooperation and competition between parties 
influence both the characteristics of formal institutions that emerge, and the structure of 
politics itself (Grzymala-Busse 2012). Hence, informal institutions in transitional 
regimes can “replace, undermine, and reinforce formal institutions irrespective of the 
latter’s strength” (Grzymala-Busse 2012: 311 italics in original). From the analysis 
above, it becomes evident that the distinct institutionalisation process of post-socialist 
capitalism created an institutional environment that differs greatly from western 
capitalist systems because in these systems informal institutions and interpersonal 
networks have a much more crucial role than in advanced capitalist societies. 
In this environmental context, state-business relations as well as interest politics 
as a whole may evolve on a different path, compared to developed capitalist systems. 
The ‘weak’ nature of formal institutions, the dominance of informal institutions, and the 
importance of interpersonal networks shape many areas of social organization, 
including corporate ownership structures, the distribution of resources, the structure of 
influence as well as the nature of governance and the state (Wedel 2003: 428). Due to 
these overlaps between state and businesses, the analysis of this chapter needs to cover 
theoretical models that originate in emerging market economies.  
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Evans’s ‘embedded autonomy’ (1995) concept provides a rich contextual 
structure, in which EE interest politics and the post-socialist institutional system may be 
investigated. In the analysis of the state and businesses, Evans’s theory demonstrates 
that “state bureaucracies that are both coherent and embedded” can contribute to 
economic development and illustrates that network ties in which state bureaucrats are 
embedded, can have a positive effect on industrial transformation (Stark and Bruszt 
1998: 124). States vary according to their internal structures as well as their relations to 
society (Evans 1995). In the process of industrial transformation, Evans has identified 
two ideal typical developing states: the ‘predatory’ and the ‘developmental’ state (Evans 
1995: 12). While the first is an authoritarian system that is based on the despotic power 
and particularistic ties of the governing elite, the second relies on institutionalised 
networks between the state and civil society. Evans argues that most developing states 
can be placed somewhere between these two extremes.  
In a predatory type of state, personal ties dominate and the state cannot prevent 
individuals from pursuing their own goals. Instead of institutionalised and organized 
forms of social dialogue, the state connects to society through personal ties to certain 
individuals. In this type of coordination, the state is threatened by social agendas and 
therefore “deliberately tries to produce a kind of loose-knit society”, because the 
“stagnation and disarray that follow from the state’s active disorganization of civil 
society” is an advantage for the regime (Evans 1995: 47). In predatory regimes 
personalism dominates instead of predictable, rule-based behaviour. Therefore the state 
actively tries to prevent the emergence of social groups that may fight for 
transformation (Evans 1995: 47). The state’s internal structures remain “undisciplined”, 
based on clientelistic exchange relations (Evans 1995: 72). Consequently, long-term 
investment becomes almost impossible, since the main objective of bureaucracy is to 
use power for personal economic gains (Evans 1995). On the other hand, a 
developmental state, such as Japan for instance, is characterised by the “embedded 
autonomy” of its internally coherent and prestige-laden bureaucracy, which is directly 
linked to private businesses, industry associations and NGOs. In this system, informal 
networks are crucial, but depend on formal competence, instead of clientelistic ties or 
loyalties (Evans 1995). In this type of regime, bureaucracy is autonomous and 
professional and less influenced by personal agendas. It has a certain kind of 
“autonomy”, but at the same time it is embedded “in a concrete set of social ties that 
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binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual 
negotiations and renegotiation of goals and policies” (Evans 1995: 12).  
 
Although Evans’s concept provides a suitable analytical framework for the 
investigation of state-business relations and interest politics, in the EE context, it also 
has been criticized by scholars for neglecting politics, the role of political parties, as 
well as the importance of business networks in the process of economic restructuring 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998: 124; Schoenman 2005). Due to the importance of inter-firm and 
state-business relations in EE economic and political transformations, many studies 
explored EE transitions through the investigation of state-firm ties. Some focused more 
specifically on the conversion of state power into economic power (Eyal, Szelényi et al. 
1998), and the transformation of politics and property (Stark and Bruszt 1998). An 
important aspect in this line of research is the question of ownership of companies. 
Some studies investigated state-firm and inter-firm relations through corporate 
ownership structures. Stark’s ‘recombinant property’ thesis argues that Hungarian firms 
have created new forms of property structures, in which private and public ownerships 
became “dissolved, interwoven and recombined”(Stark 1996: 1016). Stark (1996: 998) 
claims that although firms diversified their assets and recombined their resources, the 
majority of firms remained in state ownership.  
 
Stark’s thesis later became contested in the literature, in relation to Hungary, on 
the basis of the claim that it lacks sufficient empirical data (King 2007) and on the other 
hand in relation to Poland, where scholars noted only an “insignificant” blurring of 
public and private property (King and Sznajder 2006). Nevertheless the ‘recombinant 
property’ theory remains important in the analysis of Eastern European transformation 
as it shows how networks become transposed into the structure of the economy through 
ownership. More recent studies illustrate that - similarly to how the inter-firm networks 
that blurred the boundary between state and private ownership in the early nineties - 
from the late 1990s “globally linked and domestically integrated business networks blur 
the boundary between foreign and domestic ownership structures” (Stark and Vedres 
2006: 1398). Hence, inter-organizational property networks remained important in 
Hungary’s transformation from state socialism to an emerging market economy (Stark 
and Vedres 2006).  
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2.4.1 Party-business relations 
Besides ownership structures the debate on post-socialist transformation has also 
focused on political power or the role of political parties in this process. The regime 
change brought about fierce political competition for the control of economic resources 
(Schoenman 2005). Under communism, the ability to access economic advantages 
depended on political connections, and even though the collapse of socialism led to the 
end of the state’s monopoly over resources, access to economic advantages remained 
dependent on political connections (Wedel 2003 p: 431). In his study on Polish state-
firm relations, Schoenman (2005: 69) found that the state has retained a strong influence 
in the economy, not only through ownership ties, but also through new bureaucratic 
structures. As a result, successive governments have created “economic empires (groups 
of firms)” that were politically linked through the alliances of owners / managers and 
political parties (Schoenman 2005: 69). This new class of economic owners was argued 
to be embedded in state structures of economic decision making, through company 
boards (Schoenman 2005). Other studies approach state-business networks through the 
analysis of the interactions between firms and political parties (McMenamin and 
Schoenman 2007; Stark and Vedres 2012). These studies see the political polarization 
of the economy as a function of the development of the new electoral party competition, 
and argue that, in Hungary for instance, parties and firms are linked through the 
exchange of political support for government contracts, and are “organizationally 
entangled” through corporate boards (Stark and Vedres 2012: 700). These overlaps 
between parties and businesses differentiate east European capitalism from its western 
counterpart and substantially affect the domestic institutional environment in which 
firms operate. Through their informal networks with corporate owners and managers, 
political parties have a decisive role and influence in post-socialist economies 
(Schoenman 2005; McMenamin and Schoenman 2007; Stark and Vedres 2012). 
Conversely, instead of ‘straightforward’ corruption, large firms tend to establish close 
networks to top political leaders “so that mutually beneficial deals are possible” (Rose-
Ackerman 2001: 566).  
 
The phenomenon of business networks through party-firm relations is one of the 
unique features of Eastern European capitalism that has substantial consequences for 
business lobbying. Some studies have shown that political relationships have an 
important role in successful lobbying, since those firms that do not engage in political 
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relationships often fail in their lobbying efforts (McMenamin and Schoenman 2007: 
167).  
 
Here a distinction has to be made between the two rent-seeking activities of 
lobbying and corruption. Evidence shows that they can either be substitutes (Harstad 
and Svensson 2011), or complements (Damania, Fredriksson et al. 2004) especially in 
developing and transition countries. Lobbying is generally referred to as an effort to 
influence the policy process (Baumgartner 1998), or public policy (Mahoney 2008), or 
to affect what the government does (Nownes 2006), but most of all it is ‘the art of 
political persuasion’ (Zetter 2008). It can encompass temporary and permanent actions 
in order to change legislation or keep the status quo (Sadrieh and Annavarjula 2005), 
but does not involve direct monetary exchange. Corruption or bribery on the other hand 
is an attempt to “bend or get around” existing rules (Harstad and Svensson 2011: 46). 
Corruption may be defined as the “behaviour by a public servant, whether elected or 
appointed, which involves a deviation from his or her formal duties because of reasons 
of personal gain to himself or herself or to other private persons with whom the public 
servant is associated” (Lapalombara 1994: 328). In simple terms corruption refers to the 
use of public office for personal benefit. It is a short-term, one-off and in most countries 
illegal activity that includes monetary exchange between firms and public officials. 
Lobbying is considered unethical if it includes “illegal payments or provision of other 
prohibited benefits” (Kalnins 2005: 36). Ethical lobbying in EE states is not considered 
very effective, but instead “complicated, time consuming and expensive” without even 
guaranteeing results (Kalnins 2005: 40). Evidence shows that in transition countries, 
informal personal networks give the basis of social organization, which may or may not 
go hand in hand with various levels and forms of corruption (Sajo 1998). Hence instead 
of focusing on corruption, the investigation of links between economic and political 
elites may lead to the deeper understanding of post-socialist interest representation 
(Schoenman 2005; McMenamin and Schoenman 2007).  
 
Some studies found that political institutions have a crucial effect on lobbying 
and that “lobbying is more likely to occur in parliamentary systems that enjoy high 
levels of political stability” (Campos and Giovannoni 2007: 2). However, explicitly 
comparing corruption and lobbying, Campos and Giovannoni (2007) found that 
lobbying presents a more effective avenue for firms to exert influence than corruption, 
even in transition countries. In contrast, other studies illustrate that corruption and 
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lobbying are not so clearly distinguishable in the EE context, since in “developing 
democracies, corruption is democratic” (Sajo 1998: 39). This is of course not true in a 
legal sense, but corruption in post-socialist countries, belong to a “family of social 
interactions”, called clientelism (Sajo 1998: 38). ‘Clientelism’ refers to the informal 
relationships between individuals and groups of unequal status, based on the mutual 
exchange of benefits (Kalnins 2005). In clientelist regimes, or as Wedel defined in 
‘partially appropriated states’, elites “use state actors, who are corruptible or ‘bought’”, 
for their own private interests (Wedel 2003: 437). Clientelist corruption, as Sajo (1998) 
calls it, is a type of structural corruption that pervades all areas of public life in post-
communist countries, which does not necessarily involve direct monetary exchange, but 
may only be based on favouritism. In this institutional environment, where personal 
networks dominate public and private life, the symbiotic relationship between the 
political and business elites may lead to lobbying practices that differ substantially from 
those that are know in western capitalist contexts.  
The process, through which business interests influence public decision-making 
directly through the state’s institutions, or more specifically shape the formation of the 
legal environment to their own advantage, is often referred to as state capture (Hellman, 
Jones et al. 2000). In a captured state, the state becomes colonised or captured by 
private interests and hence state resources are used by elites for private means or 
political benefits (Grzymala-Busse 2008). In these systems, instead of formalised ways 
of interest politics, firms shape the formation of the “basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, 
decrees and regulations)” (Hellman, Jones et al. 2003: 756), by making private 
payments to public officials or influence legislative processes without direct payments. 
In these interactions economic rents are created that are then shared between politicians 
and firms. Referring back to Evans’s concept of embedded autonomy, in cases when the 
state is only embedded, but at the same time not autonomous from private interests, the 
chance for state capture considerably increases (Schneider 1998). In post-socialist states 
– where the state is weak and the civil society is underdeveloped - the influence of 
individual firms through state capture may have a large impact on the design of 
economic and political institutions (Hellman, Jones et al. 2003: 752). 
 
Some studies claim that firms may choose between different forms of state 
capture strategies depending on the degree of rent distribution and compatibility with 
competition (Grzymala-Busse 2008). Among these strategies, the two most studied are 
clientelism and predation. In clientelism, rents are distributed to supporters of the 
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regime in exchange for their loyalty (Grzymala-Busse 2008: 639). This may happen 
when the state is too weak and fragmented (Kang 2002: 183), allowing powerful 
businesses to become able to capture control of the state and use the power of the state 
for their own ends. In contrast, in ‘predatory regimes’ resources are extracted without 
the systematic redistribution to political opposition and citizens (Grzymala-Busse 
2008). In these regimes, rulers “steal government funds and expropriate both state 
property and private assets” (Grzymala-Busse 2008: 644). The top-down rent seeking of 
the predatory state is characterised by a coherent state, where political elites can take 
advantage over the fractured business sector. The state has a strong influence over the 
economy, and some privileged groups benefit at the expense of others. Hence, political 
elites in these regimes “expropriate” businesses (Kang 2002: 182). Some studies also 
found that while state capture is a deliberate decision of a firm to influence the state, 
most other forms of corruption may be rather considered extortion by public officials, 
since those are often not initiated by the firms themselves (Hellman et al 2003: 769).  
 
These nuanced differences among rent distribution strategies may make a big 
difference, when it comes to lobbying. So the question arises, besides state capture and 
corruption, what kind of strategies EE firms use in the newly developing capitalist 
environment? One answer may come from Mike Peng’s (2003) work. Investigating 
institutional transitions from the perspective of efficiency and rational choice, Peng 
(2003) described the strategic choices that firms make during such turbulent times. Peng 
developed a model of institutional transitions, in which he explained that firms in 
emerging economies - where relationship-based, personalized transaction structures are 
prevalent - engage in a so-called network-centred strategy; whereas in established 
market economies – where rule-based, impersonal exchanges are a norm – engage in a 
market-based strategy. While the network-based strategy centres around the 
interpersonal relationships of corporate managers and firms’ interorganizational 
networks with other stakeholders in the economy, the market-based strategy is based on 
competitive resources and capabilities independently from networks and connections 
(Peng 2003). Peng argues that in between the starting point of economic and political 
transitional change and its end point of full implementation of capitalism, corporate 
strategies are changing in character, from the personal networking type to the rule-
based, impersonal type (Peng 2003: 276). He identifies three phases of transitions, 
during which the importance of networks gradually decreases vis-à-vis competitive 
resources and capabilities. As institutions are to reduce uncertainty by providing clear 
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rules, the process of market-oriented institutional transition is theorized as moving from 
one primary mode of exchange to another, in order to reduce uncertainty (Peng 2003: 
278). Peng’s theory is focused on the notions of performance and efficiency, 
showcasing how firms rationally change their strategies as market-based strategies 
becomes more important. This perspective however, captures only part of firms’ 
behaviours and motivations. Other scholars for instance consider the issue of legitimacy 
more important than rationality (DiMaggio and Powell 2000). Even though Peng is 
focusing only on one side of the story, his theory has importance for this thesis for two 
reasons. First he theorizes networking as a way of doing business that can be rational 
and successful in certain circumstances, i.e. during the early phase of transition. Second 
his study provides a theoretical framework, in which it becomes possible to investigate 
the trans-national strategies of domestic firms, which is essential in relation to 
Europeanization. As it was noted earlier in this chapter, MNCs have a very influential 
or rather dominant role in EE economic coordination. Scholars argue that EE countries 
‘depend’ on multinationals’ capital and investments, even to the point where the 
economic development of the region depends on transnational corporations (Nölke and 
Vliegenthart 2009; Nölke 2011). By linking Peng’s theory with the investigation of 
MNCs lobbying strategies in the EE context this thesis will further explore how 
multinationals interact with domestic firms and how they integrate into the post-socialist 
capitalist context. Peng posits that MNCs face conflicting pressures when entering 
transition economies – because on the one hand they want to be in line with their global 
norms, but on the other hand they want to adapt to the local network-based exchange 
mechanisms. Peng concludes that firms’ strategic choices - whether to adapt to local 
conditions by adapting to networking or maintaining their familiar home-based market-
based strategy - will depend on the institutional pressures that firms face in the given 
institutional environment (Peng 2003). Furthermore, Peng posits that networks may be 
disadvantageous for domestic firms as they constitute “barriers to entry”, as firms that 
are embedded in local networks and relationships, may be reluctant to work with new 
business partners (Peng 2003: 282). This thesis applies this framework to lobbying. It 
investigates how the “barriers to entry” phenomenon would apply to the field of 
lobbying i.e. how MNCs can integrate into the domestic system of interest 
representation in EE countries. As it was shown above, informal relationship-based 
networks dominate business activities in post-socialist countries even after 10 years of 
EU membership. Consequently, the investigation of multinationals’ strategic choices in 
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relation to Peng’s theory will provide essential insights into the determinants of 
corporate lobbying in the emerging capitalist context.  
The extensive use of networks and the dominant role of the state in the business 
sector is not a unique characteristic of EE countries. The same characterisation would 
apply to many East Asian states as well, where people predominantly rely on 
personalised arrangements instead of formal legal structures (Kali 1999). Indeed, the 
notion of ‘network capitalism’ (Boisot and Child 1996) was first used to describe the 
capitalism experienced in China, where - instead of the rule-based institutions of market 
capitalism - a more local and personalised institutional order defines the market 
economy (Boisot and Child 1996: 621). Based on this classification, and the similar and 
growing state involvement in business Puffer and McCarthy classified Russia’s 
coordination as ‘state-managed network capitalism’ (2007). In this type of capitalism, 
the economy relies primarily on the cognitive institutional pillar (built on accepted 
beliefs and norms), and networking is fundamental to conducting business (Puffer and 
McCarthy 2007). Puffer and McCarthy follow on Peng’s longitudinal theory, and refer 
to Russia as being still in the early phases of its transition, since market exchanges are 
dominated by personal relations. In view of the importance of informal networks and 
informal institutions in the post-socialist context, the question arises whether the 
‘network capitalist’ model could be applied to other Eastern European states, like 
Hungary for instance and how this Eastern European type of coordination impacts the 
opportunity structures that arise for managers in their lobbying decisions.  
 
In sum, in this section the characteristics of Eastern European capitalist 
coordination have been identified. From the analysis, it emerged that post-socialist 
states cannot be simply ‘placed’ in any of the existing ideal typical coordination systems 
(LME/CME) or interest politics frameworks (pluralism/corporatism). The emerging 
capitalist countries differ ‘structurally’ in most coordination elements from Western 
European systems. In relation to corporate lobbying two of these structural differences 
may have a ‘conditioning’ impact on Europeanization. These are the extreme 
importance of informal institutions and networks and the determining role of MNCs in 
national economies. The interaction and role of these factors needs to be further 
explored in the empirical analysis with the aim to identify their impact on corporate 
lobbying and Europeanization. Now that the key theoretical models and empirical 
studies in the field of corporate lobbying, Europeanization and post-socialist capitalism 
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have been explored, the following section will attempt to design an analytical 
framework that will guide us through the empirical analysis.  
2.5 Towards an analytical framework 
Through the analysis of existing studies the above detailed sections have been 
trying to find the answer to the research question: What determines how large firms 
develop their lobbying at the domestic and EU level in developed and developing 
capitalist systems?  
The critical analysis of the literature in the earlier sections informed us about the gaps in 
current knowledge in relation to corporate Europeanization. Based on the theoretical 
and empirical studies that have been discussed so far, five research questions may be 
identified that will guide us through the empirical analysis of this study. These 
questions comprise key themes that will be addressed in the following chapters. The 
questions are as follows: 
 
1. What factors determine the corporate process of Europeanization? 
2. How do firms transpose their domestic lobbying capabilities and political 
strategy to EU level? 
3. In what respect does the domestic institutional environment impact managerial 
choice in relation to the development of lobbying capabilities and 
Europeanization? 
4. How do the characteristics of post-socialist capitalism affect the ways, in which 
EE firms develop their lobbying strategy and manage their Europeanization 
process?  
5. How do the functional organizational units (or departments) of public affairs 
relate to the Europeanization of firms? 
 
Based on these ‘guiding’ questions that point towards current gaps in scholarly 
knowledge, in relation to the Europeanization of corporate lobbying, an analytical 
framework has been developed for this thesis. In this framework, the key is managerial 
choice. Managerial choice has been identified as the missing link from the 
Europeanization literature. Hence, without the conceptualisation of managerial choice, 
the Europeanization process of corporate lobbying cannot be properly understood, 
especially in the context of the enlarged European Union. Based on the analysis of the 
literature, it becomes evident, that firms are influenced in their Europeanization process 
both by firm level and institutional level factors. Among these factors, in this study, 
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those three have been identified as independent variables that may have a determining 
impact on EU level lobbying engagement. First, the impact of the domestic institutional 
environment, second the firm’s available capabilities (financial, size and expertise) and 
third organizational structures. Depending on how these antecedents influence firms, 
managers make their decision on how to engage in lobbying, and how to construct 
lobbying capabilities. Based on this analytical framework, I hope to be able to answer 
the above listed five thematic questions and contribute to the literature by extending our 
knowledge on the Europeanization of direct firm lobbying. My perspective 
acknowledges institutional pressures, but also takes actors10 seriously (Jackson 2009; 
Jackson 2010), by focusing on the leeway that actors have through managerial choice or 
more specifically ‘managerial choice within institutional constraints’. It has to be noted 
that this analytical framework provides only a starting point for the investigation, since 
it identifies those elements of scholarly knowledge that are already established. By 
applying this theoretical model on the empirical analysis of semi-structured interviews, 
I hope to explore how corporate lobbying capabilities are becoming transposed to the 
supranational level. Figure 2.1 below illustrates the analytical framework for the 
investigation of the Europeanization process of corporate lobbying.  
Figure 2.1: Analytical framework of the Europeanization of corporate lobbying 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This sort of interpretation is in line with recent scholarship on actor-centred institutionalism that 
acknowledges the interdependence of institutions and actors, and conceptualises them as being mutually 
constitutive of each other (Jackson 2010).  
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domestic institutional 
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EU level engagement 
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From the above discussed three theoretical groups it becomes evident that all of 
the existing theoretical accounts, investigating the determinants of Europeanization, 
mostly handle firms as a ‘black-box’. EU lobbying and political science studies more 
generally do not link their findings and conceptual arguments with the management 
literature that focuses more specifically on firm level processes, strategy development 
and managerial choice. Although political scientists have increasingly investigated 
Europeanization from the perspective of large firms, firm level analysis of the key 
determinants of Europeanization is largely missing from the political science literature.  
Referring to the analysis above, in the empirical chapters the following key 
propositions will be explored: 
1. Firms build on their domestic lobbying capabilities when they design and 
construct their EU-level lobbying activities.  
2. Firms build on their domestic organizational design of lobbying in their 
Europeanization process.  
3. Environmental resource dependencies both at the domestic and EU level 
determine how firms design the organizational arrangement of lobbying 
and how they internationalise their lobbying structures.   
4. The domestic institutional structure of post-socialist capitalism impacts 
Hungarian firms’ Europeanization by affecting managers’ opportunity 
structures.  
 
It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the literature by investigating the 
above identified propositions by linking political science studies with theories of 
strategic management.  
2.6 Summary 
In the literature review a multilevel and multi context approach was taken. The 
chapter started with the analysis of studies that focus their attention on the 
representation of EE interest groups in Brussels. It was argued that although the 
marginal representation and limited political influence of EE organizations in EU level 
policy-making is well documented, studies have so far neglected the investigation of the 
reasons behind this phenomenon. After the analysis of scholarly work on the EU level 
representation of Eastern European interests, the literature was explored in relation to 
the question: What are the main determinants of large firms’ Europeanization? In this 
section the analysis highlighted key theoretical themes that are considered to have a 
crucial impact on how large firms develop their lobbying capabilities and in relation to 
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that engage in EU level lobbying. The first issue under investigation was the role of 
resources and firm size. In relation to the determining influence of resources it was 
argued that the resource-based view does not provide sufficient explanation to the 
notion why some firms with large resources Europeanize their lobbying activities, while 
others do not. The alternative theoretical approach, the dynamic capabilities framework 
was argued to provide more support in understanding the development of firm level 
lobbying activities, as it places emphasis on change and the ‘process’ through which 
managerial choices in relation to lobbying capability design can be explored. At the end 
of the section on resources, it was argued that the managerial process of resource 
allocation and capability design may be influenced by environmental factors through the 
impact of the external and internal institutional environment. To make the link between 
resources and the institutional environment, the theoretical model of resource 
dependence was analysed. Available EU lobbying studies were explored that investigate 
environmental resource dependencies at the domestic and EU levels. The analysis found 
that scholarly work on RDM, in relation to EU lobbying, is crucial to this thesis, since it 
establishes a model through which the interaction of resources and institutions can be 
investigated. The framework was argued to be applicable for the analysis of EE firms 
Europeanization. In the second section, institutional theories were analysed through 
different disciplinary approaches.  
After the definition of institutions, we looked at institutionalist theories from a 
management perspective and explored how these theories may be relevant for the study 
of corporate political activities. It was argued that management studies remain ‘thin’ in 
explaining the question of how institutions affect strategy building and capability 
design; therefore we turned to the Varieties of Capitalism theory. In this section it was 
established that different capitalist systems lead to different corporate strategies and 
consequently lobbying approaches. Hence in the ensuing paragraphs interest 
representation structures were explored in relation to capitalist coordination. The 
analysis revealed that interest politics is determined by the characteristics of capitalism, 
and hence the ideal typical interest representation structures of pluralism and 
corporatism that characterise pluralist democracies, may not be applicable or suitable to 
explain lobbying in Eastern Europe. In the last part of this section those political science 
studies were examined that deal with the impact of the domestic institutional 
environment on Europeanization. This part was concluded with the argument that 
research could not show variation in the Europeanization of domestic organizations, 
because it limited its scope to the western capitalist context and hence has not 
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conceptualised Eastern European capitalism as a distinct category. By investigating the 
Europeanization of EE corporations, this thesis intends to fill this gap in the literature.  
The ensuing subsection explored management studies that investigate firm-
specific determinants of political activities. I found that among these, the investigation 
of the organizational structure may present a new variable in the literature on EU 
lobbying. The approach of lobbying as a functional activity, and how this activity is 
designed and arranged in firms’ organizational structure may open new avenues to 
understand why some firms engage at EU level, while other do not. As most studies in 
public affairs management and EU scholarship explore corporate lobbying from the 
perspective of those firms that already have dedicated PA departments, the investigation 
of lobbying as an activity allows us to extend the scope of the analysis, to those firms 
that do not have formalised units. It also allows us to explore corporate lobbying and 
Europeanization from a comparative capitalist perspective.  
The chapter continued with the investigation of EE capitalism and state-firm 
relations in the post-socialist context. The analysis revealed that the emerging capitalist 
system has important structural features that are different from western capitalist 
systems and these may have a determining impact on the type of lobbying activities that 
firms engage in. In the second part, the analysis was focused on state-firm relations, 
specifically analysing theories in relation to state-business and party-business overlaps. 
It was found that the state and especially political parties have an important role in the 
emerging capitalist framework of Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary. These non-
transparent business-state links may have an impact on the development of lobbying 
capabilities through informal networks. It was emphasised that in the economic 
coordination of the region, informal institutions and the dependence from multinationals 
play a determining role. Hence the investigation of these two factors would extend the 
literature in international business. The subsequent chapters will investigate those 
themes that have emerged through this analysis by applying the above detailed 
theoretical constructs to empirical data.  
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3. Methodology: Hungary - the critical case 
 As it was identified in the previous chapters, the field of research on EU 
lobbying suffers from the lack of detailed knowledge about how corporations 
Europeanize their lobbying activities. This chapter offers insights into examining this 
gap in the literature. In particular, the following sections will explain the choice of data 
collection methods and how these methods were implemented in the study. In so doing, 
the chapter argues for the use of semi-structured interviews to collect data about the 
lobbying practices of large Western and EE firms. It also describes the actors under 
study and the specific details of data collection. The chapter will describe the methods 
and research design, the collection of data and how the data was coded and analysed. At 
last it will summarize the contributions of the research study and describe limitations. A 
final section will conclude. 
3.1 Methods and Research Design 
This study was set out to answer the intellectual puzzle of increasing importance 
of large firm’s direct EU-level representation and the parallel marginalisation of Eastern 
European businesses in Brussels. The scope under examination in this research is 
corporate lobbying, and the Europeanization of corporate lobbying activities in the 
Eastern and Western European institutional contexts. In this study an interpretive case 
study approach was followed, with a one-country case study and a ‘shadow case’. The 
study aims to develop a theory that can contribute to the general understanding of the 
Europeanization of corporate lobbying activities, and the link between Europeanization 
and the characteristics of the domestic capitalist environment. As it was shown in the 
analysis of the literature, in current studies relatively little is known about the reasons 
behind the phenomenon of differential Europeanization. Existing perspectives are 
conflicting at times. Moreover the research topic is also relatively ‘new’, due to the 
relatively recent phenomenon of the EU’s eastern enlargements. Hence, the case study 
method seemed most appropriate, because it allows theory building and “is based on the 
need to understand a real-life phenomenon”, which is exactly what this study was set to 
do (Riege 2003: 80). Case study research is a central method of analysis in political 
science research (Yanow, P. et al. 2008). While a case study cannot confirm a theory, in 
explanatory studies this model is useful in investigating a single phenomenon especially 
in the stage of concept creation (Gerring 2004). The initial research question was: Why 
are Eastern European companies under-represented at EU level? Or in other words: 
How can we explain the under-representation of EE firms at EU level? In the light of 
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these questions, it is easy to see that the focus of the study was on an actual 
phenomenon that has rarely been addressed and answered previously. In such cases, 
when “’how and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon” the case 
study method is the preferred strategy (Yin 1984: 1). 
However, as this study’s investigation focused on the understanding of EE 
firms’ Europeanization, in comparison to Western European firms (which were argued 
to be better represented at EU level), a single one-country study, focusing on a single 
post-socialist state would not have been able to provide sufficient empirical evidence for 
generalisations or conceptualisations. Therefore, the research was designed with the aim 
to include a larger geographical and socio-economic field of investigation. As the study 
was also set out to explore the reasons behind the regional differences in 
Europeanization patterns, the inclusion of a western and an Eastern European nation 
state was evident and necessary. However due to the rich body of available empirical 
studies in the field of Europeanization in the western capitalist context, the case of a 
Western European member state was only used as a shadow case. Based on this 
rationale, Hungary was chosen for the case study, while the UK was included as a 
shadow case for comparison and benchmarking. Empirical evidence was collected 
through semi-structured interviews both at the domestic (Budapest – London) and EU 
levels (Brussels). Before explaining the rationale behind interviewing, the following 
sections will provide justification as to why the above mentioned countries were chosen 
for the study.  
 The in-depth one-country study was carried out in Hungary. Through the 
investigation of the specificities of lobbying in the post-socialist capitalist environment, 
the study set out to explore how the characteristics of the domestic context determines 
firm level lobbying, and the Europeanization of EE firms. Hungary was chosen, because 
it experienced post-socialist transformation and almost 10 years of full EU-membership 
with a democratized political system and a completely marketized economy (Stark and 
Vedres 2012). Based on these characteristics, firms from Hungary would have been 
expected to Europeanize faster, and more easily than corporations from less developed 
EE states. However the change in government at the last parliamentary elections in 
2010, and the new government’s subsequent institutional ‘reforms’ turned Hungary into 
a ‘critical case’. The strong domestic institutional pressures on businesses, and the 
almost authoritarian political regime under the Orbán administration made Hungary a 
good case to test the impacts of the post-socialist institutional structures on 
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Europeanization. Surprisingly however - despite the last three years that have changed 
the developmental path of the Hungarian economy - the thesis will show that 
Europeanization was not ‘interrupted’ by the governmental change in 2010. Firms had 
not tended to engage in larger numbers at EU level before the current government 
either. However the reasons behind non-engagement were not so well visible. The 
recent drastic change in political governance made Hungary a ‘critical’ case of Eastern 
European development; because the arbitrariness of the new regime amplified the 
system characteristics of post-socialism and hence contextual relationships that had also 
been there previously, became apparent and observable. This, from a methodological 
perspective, is an important difference, which makes Hungary one of the most suitable 
states for the investigation of our research question.  
Although the representativeness of the case study is limited, due to its ‘critical’ 
nature, nevertheless the Hungarian case may not be unique for at least two reasons. 
First, in the future, other states from the region may also turn into a similar 
developmental path (Vliegenthart 2010) and second - even if other countries continue 
on a more democratic developmental path – it is presumed that the system 
characteristics of post-socialist capitalism, that affect business in Hungary, influence 
firms in other EE states too, even if on a less observable way. If the model about the 
impacts of post-socialist capitalism on supranational lobbying is tested in the Hungarian 
context, then the findings can open the way for further hypothesis formation for 
lobbying and capitalism in general. 
 As it was noted earlier, besides Hungary, the UK was also included in the 
research and was chosen to represent a ‘shadow case’ in this study. The rationale behind 
the inclusion of the UK was twofold. First, the UK is one of the most developed 
capitalist societies among EU member states and second because the UK’s pluralist 
interest intermediation system is comparable to the ‘elite pluralist’ (Coen 1997) 
structure that characterises EU lobbying - at least in terms of its professionalism. In 
London, firms cannot rely on their personal contacts any more, since “the quality of 
their argument is fundamental” in political interest representation (Thomson and John 
2007: 5). Due to this high level of professionalism, empirical evidence, compiled in the 
UK, was used on the one hand for theory conception, in relation to firm level 
Europeanization, and on the other hand as a shadow case for comparison to the post-
socialist case study.  
 In order to compare practices and determinants of corporate lobbying, it was 
necessary to explore the characteristics of the EU level lobbying scene. Hence, the 
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inclusion of Brussels-based stakeholders was natural, and justified by Brussels being the 
heart of the European Union’s legislature, as well as the centre of EU-level lobbying.  
 
3.1.1 Data collection 
The research was conducted in two distinct phases, in three locations. The first 
research phase was conducted in 2009-2010, and included interviews with stakeholders 
predominantly from London and Brussels, while the second phase was carried out in 
Budapest during 2011-2013. The empirical study comprised 51 semi-structured 
interviews that were conducted in the above mentioned two phases. The rationale 
behind semi-structured interviewing was the following. In-depth interviews are an 
insightful method for exploring the “often nuanced causal factors of specific managerial 
action” (Lawton et al. 2013: 231). It is argued that quantitative data would not be able to 
reveal the often complex thought processes that determine managerial decisions in 
relation to lobbying engagement; these may be only revealed through in-depth 
interviews. Due to the exploratory nature of the research, the semi-structured interview 
technique provided a single framework for the different interviews – since it permits 
comparison (Flynn, Sakakibara et al. 1990) – but also gave flexibility to ask questions, 
in relation to previously not identified issues that arose from the interviewee’s 
comments (Bryman 2004). This type of interviewing also provided the flexibility for 
participants to highlight issues they considered most relevant in relation to the topic 
(Bryman, 2004). These two distinct characteristics of the interviews proved to be 
particularly useful, since participants identified extremely different – sometimes 
opposing - issues in relation to corporate lobbying, at the domestic analytical level in 
the UK and Hungary. Similar contextual questions were answered in the two different 
jurisdictions in extremely differing ways. This phenomenon provided rich grounds for 
the empirical analysis and concept formation. The typical interview lasted 
approximately an hour and was a one-off occurrence.  
 
Interviewing and data comparison 
 Interview questions were pre-defined in the interview guides. Questions were 
grouped into main categories in order to gear discussions toward the specific 
propositions that were detailed in chapter 2. A list of specific interview questions was 
created for in-house lobbyists and consultancies (see Appendix C, D). Specific topics 
were targeted with a few general questions grouped in different subgroups, such as 
questions relating to lobbying strategies, the motivations behind engagement decisions, 
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the characteristics of the lobby market, as well as opinions and experiences about the 
outcomes of lobbying.  
 Additionally, at the second-stage, interviews were extended with additional 
questions, closely related to the Hungarian domestic institutional situation (see appendix 
E). The additional questions in this guide were used to shed light on the characteristics 
of the interest representation system in Hungary, and explore how corporate leaders 
view their lobbying opportunities, how they formulate their strategies and what kind of 
capabilities they have to engage in political activities.  
 Data comparison between the first and second stage interviews was managed 
through the coding and comparison of the answers in the same subcategories. For 
instance to gather information about lobbying capabilities - in both phases - respondents 
were asked about the cases they have been involved in or the available expertise and 
human resources for public affairs activities. The proposition about the organizational 
arrangement of lobbying was formed by applying the management theory of 
organizational design to the Europeanization of corporate lobbying. This proposition 
was tested through the analysis of corporate information found on company websites as 
well as the answers to the questions in section two of the interview guide, exploring the 
arrangement of lobbying activities within the firm (see Appendix C). 
 Besides, as most firms in Hungary did not have a formalised PA department, in 
the second phase, additional questions were used to explore what type of capabilities 
firms would need to engage politically if they wanted to. The initial questions on 
capabilities were rather broad so as not to bias the answers, but during the interviews 
follow up questions were used to further steer the interviewees into the direction of 
exploring the organizational arrangement of lobbying activities. At those firms where 
public affairs activities were not formalised, some questions were aimed to shed light on 
the importance of informal networks in lobbying as well as the role of CEOs in political 
engagement. These questions provided additional insights into the analysis on post-
socialist capitalism.  
The third proposition - ‘Environmental resource dependencies both at the 
domestic and EU level determine how firms design the organizational arrangement of 
lobbying and how they internationalise their lobbying structures – was explored by 
section four and eight of the question list (Appendix C). Some of these questions were 
aimed to investigate factors that influence and motivate, or discourage firms to engage 
in lobbying, while other questions explored what organizations would win or loose by 
getting involved in interest representation.  
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In the Hungarian case, section one of the questionnaire (Appendix E) was used to 
explore the importance of lobbying in corporate governance and to shed light on 
domestic institutional factors that may impact how firms engage with policy-makers.  
 In relation to the fourth proposition the second-stage questionnaires (Appendix  
E, F) explored specific issues that were considered to impact opportunity structures. 
Respondents were asked to speak about the impact of policy-making on their 




The research was carried out based on purposive sampling through 
predetermined selection criteria as it is mostly done in qualitative research (Miles and 
Huberman 1984). The sample of the first phase included 20 key experts in lobbying, 
who were either active at the domestic level in the UK, or at the EU level in Brussels. In 
this sample 7 of the interviewees were experts from the Hungarian, Polish and Slovak 
capitals. These participants were included into the first phase due to their lobbying 
practice and experience in Brussels. Three of the first phase interviews were carried out 
over the phone. The selection criteria at this stage included the position of the 
participant and his/her experience on the field of lobbying. The aim was to find people 
who have direct experience in domestic or EU level lobbying. The identification of 
potential interviewees was rather easy compared to the second phase, since in London 
and Brussels company websites often lead to the person, who is responsible for public 
affairs. Potential participants that had been approached were generally open and willing 
to participate. Besides the author’s personal contacts, public EU directories, and internet 
sites of public affairs agencies led to the first participants. Later on, as the project 
evolved a snowball sample was formed, building on the recommendations and contacts 
of interviewees. The majority of participants in this phase turned out to be senior or 
managerial level public affairs professionals in London and Brussels - who actively 
engage in EU lobbying at agencies or in-house departments of politically active 
corporations. Among the consultancies, a selection of multinationals and local 
independent agencies was chosen. Figure 3.1 below shows the share of participants in 








Figure 3.1 Type of participants in the first phase 
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 In the second phase a further 31 participants were interviewed. The selection 
criteria at this stage included businesses that were considered to be affected by domestic 
and EU legislation. After the selection of potential firms, the aim was to find the 
relevant experts, who personally engage in lobbying as part of their job. During the 
contact phase it became evident that Hungarian firms generally do not have PA or 
lobbying departments, consequently the identification of relevant interviewees proved 
more complicated than in the first phase. Also in Hungary, a general distrust was 
experienced by the researcher, which was especially striking compared to the openness 
of the participants at the first phase. The research project at this stage was relatively 
slow to ‘kick-in’ since many companies that were approached based on their size 
(turnover), declined to participate. The researcher first targeted the top 50 largest 
Hungarian firms, based on their turnover. In this first sample, none of the targeted 
companies accepted the invitation for an interview, most of them have not even replied. 
The breakthrough was made by the researcher by starting to identify personal contacts 
in the business sector at large domestic firms, and initiating interviews from this 
interpersonal approach. After the first two interviews the rest followed, based on 
participants’ recommendations. This way, the second stage was also based on a snow-
ball sample. Interestingly however, the targeted, and the eventual group of participants 
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at this stage became different from the originally planned. Despite the initial aim of the 
researcher to target and interview public affairs professionals and lobbyists, as it was 
done in the first phase, when potential participant firms were contacted, CEOs emerged 
in most cases as the most relevant interviewees in Hungary.  
 It is acknowledged here that the above described selection method may have 
biased the study’s sampling and hence could possibly bias the results as well. Self-
selection bias in this respect may mean that if only a certain type of companies replies 
and participates in the project, it would bias the outcome of the interviews in one 
direction or another. The researcher tried to mitigate these possible biases by selecting 
participants from a wide variety of sectors, and by including additional interviewees 
from the context of the cases as well. Eventually the second phase sample included 15 
top managers (CEOs, vice-CEOs, board members, heads of unit) of large Hungarian 
firms, 9 CEOs and PA directors of local subsidiaries of multinational companies 
(MNCs) as well as two Hungarian political advisers (one left-wing and one right-wing), 
3 non-governmental organizations, one association and one trade union. The inclusion 
of these not only helped in eliminating the potentially occurring self-bias, but also to 
triangulate results. 
 
In case study research it is an accepted form of triangulation to include additional 
interviewees from the “context’ of the cases, such as government advisers or industry 
association people (Perry 1998: 798). In the first phase a professor and a member of the 
European Parliament were included in order to triangulate, whereas in the second phase 
two political advisers, one entrepreneur, three NGOs and one association and one trade 
union were also included. NGOs and associations were also included due to their 
important role in interest intermediation and because of their activities in relation to 
political analysis and investigatory research. As an alternative form of triangulation, 
secondary data analysis was also applied in order to check the reliability of the 
emerging theories. Empirical findings in relation to the organizational arrangement of 
lobbying in chapter 4 were triangulated by contrasting what corporate leaders described 
in the interviews with the information available on corporate websites and in the 
Transparency Register. Findings in chapter 5 and 6 were compared with journalistic 
resources, especially investigatory articles and non-academic publications. Besides, the 
civil society group, atlatszo.hu was used to explore the validity of interview data in 
relation to concrete cases, where government officials were argued to misuse their 
political power for economic gains. Reports of Hungary-based international watchdogs, 
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like Transparency International as well as several non-academic political publications 
were used to investigate cases of state capture and the interlacement of state-firm ties. 
Newspaper articles from the Hungarian economic weekly, HVG and trustworthy online 
sources, such as Bloomberg.com, the Telegraph, Reuters.com, EurActiv, and The 
Economist were used to investigate cases of nationalisation, the government’s sector-
specific interventions and alleged corruption issues.  
 Figure 3.2 below shows the types of respondents in the second phase. 













 It is important to note here that in some cases corporate leaders were also board 
members at different industrial associations and hence their insights were taken into 
account in both roles. As it was noted earlier in chapter 2, the inclusion of multinational 
subsidiaries constituted a theory-testing experience. In the initial stages of the second 
phase only large, domestic public and private firms were targeted. However as the 
project evolved the group was extended to local subsidiaries of multinational companies 
too. This way in different phases of the study, data collection and data analysis was 
carried out in parallel, which made it possible for the researcher to develop theoretical 
insights and propositions, while testing and modifying these as the project evolved. 
Overlaps in data collection and analysis is argued to be beneficial, since it speeds the 
analysis and “reveals helpful adjustments to data collection” (Eisenhardt 1989: 535) 
Among the interviewed 24 corporations, 9 were subsidiaries of multinationals and 14 









Figure 3.3: Types of firms in the second phase 















Out of the 14 domestic firms, 8 were state-owned, 3 privatised and 3 new, privately 
owned companies. In the sample, 8 public and 16 private firms were included (see 
figure 3.4).  
Figure 3.4: Number of interviewed firms by ownership structure 





Private companies Public companies
 
 
The sectoral share of interviewed firms has been rather diverse, since companies from 
12 different sectors have been included in the sample. Out of all the sectors, the 
banking, energy and IT sectors had the most respondents with 4 interviewees from each.  
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Figure 3.5: Number of interviewed firms by sector 
Sectoral share of firms Number of firms 
Retail 2 




Real estate 2 
Manufacturing 1 







3.2 Ethical considerations 
The study was granted ‘full approval’ by King’s College’s Education and 
Management Research Ethics Panel, after being classified as a ‘not high risk’ project. 
The interview process in both phases was managed in full compliance with the Ethics 
Panel’s guidelines. In most cases, participants were first approached by an introductory 
e-mail. In this e-mail the information sheet from the ethical documentation pack was 
sent to participants with a short accompanying letter, in which the author asked their 
permission for a personal interview. The information sheet and the accompanying letter 
contained detailed information about the research project, its goals and objectives and 
the procedure of the interviewing process. It also contained the contact information of 
the researcher and her supervisor. Potential informants were informed about their rights 
and were assured that interviews will be handled in a confidential way. A week after the 
initial contact, participants were contacted again by e-mail or in some instances by 
phone. When participants confirmed their participation, a time was set for the interview. 
The researcher prepared for the interviews by developing an interview guide, which 
contained specific topics that were to be covered in each interview. The interview guide 
included a list of open and closed questions about the participant’s experiences, 
opinions and experiences in interest representation and corporate lobbying activities. 
This guide was generally not sent to interviewees, however if someone asked for it then 
it was sent by e-mail before the interview.  
At the beginning of each interview the researcher shortly summarized the 
research project again and informed participants of their rights as well as the process 
 82 
through which their data will be anonymised. Interviews were audio recorded with the 
previous consent of the participants and subsequently transcribed. Telephone interviews 
were also recorded and handled the same way as the personal interviews. At the end of 
the interviews, interviewees were asked to sign the Form of Consent and the Use and 
Retention Form and were handed a copy. All interviews were anonymised and handled 
according to the ethical procedures of the College based on the procedure of ethical 
approval. Interviews were given an anonym code and a number, such as ‘consultant 1’ 
or ‘CEO of large Hungarian company 2’ for instance. Data of interviewees were kept 
safe separately from the coded data.  
 
3.3 Data analysis 
The data analysis of this study may be best described as a two stage process, in 
which the researcher first ‘tested’ existing theories that were identified in the analysis of 
the literature - chapter 2 - then by applying these onto the empirical material existing 
theories were extended, and completed in a more inductive (theory-building) fashion. 
Hence the researcher built her own theory in an inductive manner, by looking for factors 
that emerged from the interviews, and explaining the unexplained gaps in existing 
theories. This approach is generally referred to as ‘abduction’. The procedure of 
‘abduction’ may be described as an iterative process between deduction and induction, 
whereby the researcher first develops propositions from existing theories, then in the 
explorative field research generates new hypotheses and finally confronts findings with 
existing theories (Héritier 2008). Through this procedure, it becomes possible to modify 
pre-existing theories and validate the generated propositions with new data (Héritier 
2008). Following on Child et al (2012: 1254) who argue that ‘we should not have to be 
shy about mobilizing both inductive (data-driven) and deductive (theory-driven) 
approaches iteratively or simultaneously as inspiration guides us’, the researcher looked 
for factors that emerged from the interviews, and tried to explain the unexplained gaps 
in existing theories. 
In the first stage of the analysis, the researcher relied on a deductive approach in 
order to find the most important reasons behind the under-representation of EE firms in 
Brussels. A deductive analysis “presupposes some prior, theory-guided 
conceptualization of the situation” (Héritier 2008: 63), which gets translated into a 
model that can explain the key factors of a concrete empirical situation (Héritier 2008). 
In this study, the theories in relation to financial resources, the domestic institutional 
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environment and the organizational structure were used to explore the reasons behind 
EE firms’ lack of representation. A deductive theoretical model (see Figure 2.1. in 
chapter 2) was formed, in order to guide the empirical analysis and investigate the real-
world situation of corporate lobbying in Hungary. Beside the theoretical analysis, the 
researcher developed key propositions in order to shed light on the gaps in theory. 
However as the research question relates to a phenomenon that has not been explained 
previously, the researcher has found that some of the variables that are explored in this 
study have not been integrated into theory so far, for instance the relevance of the 
organizational structure in the process of Europeanization.  
Consequently, in some parts of the study, the researcher had to rely on an 
inductive approach in order to “gain a new view of what is relevant in the empirical area 
of study by seeing it from the perspective of the actors involved” (Héritier 2008: 64). 
An inductive approach was followed in the process of exploring the relevance of the 
organizational structure of lobbying in relation to Europeanization. Hence, while in the 
case of three propositions (in relation to capabilities, opportunity structures and resource 
dependencies), theories were formed in a deductive manner, the proposition about 
organizational structures was explored inductively.  
In previous studies the theoretical link between the arrangement of lobbying and 
Europeanization was not explored. Hence as the project evolved - and in Hungary 
interviews revealed that at EE firms CEOs manage lobbying exclusively in a centralised 
and informal manner - the researcher started to test whether this structural difference in 
the organizational arrangement of lobbying, between UK and Hungarian firms, had an 
impact on how firms manage their engagement in Brussels. In the iteration process 
between the first and second stage interviews, the researcher tried to identify the causal 
mechanisms in Europeanization. For this purpose, I explored possible causes that may 
prevent companies to Europeanize when they had the necessary resources.  
 
The analysis also revealed that there is a direct link between firms’ EU-level 
strategies and the structural arrangement of lobbying in their domestic headquarters. 
This finding directed the researcher’s attention to the analysis of organizational 
structures and their impact Europeanization. In the analytical work, the framework of 
Miles and Huberman (1994) has been applied, and their codified procedures for 
qualitative analysis were followed - namely the process of reducing data, displaying 
data and drawing and verifying conclusions. Due to the two-stage process - in which the 
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researcher tested existing theories in the light of empirical data and in parallel 
formulated her own theory - data collection and analysis overlapped in most of the 
research process. This feature of the study, when collection, coding and analysis are 
done simultaneously is an accepted form of theory building case studies (Eisenhardt 
1989). The researcher started the study with the initial definition of the research 
question, which was much ‘wider‘ in scope, compared to the final one that has been 
discussed in earlier sections. The aim of the research, at the initial stages was to 
investigate and compare the corporate lobbying strategies of eastern and Western 
European companies and the reasons behind these differences. After mapping the 
existing theories in the field of corporate lobbying in western and eastern contexts – by 
preparing an initial literature review – the field work started with the selection of cases. 
At this stage the concept of ‘population’ was crucial, since it defines the set of entities 
“from which the research sample is to be drawn” (Eisenhardt 1989: 537). Two countries 
have been selected with relatively opposing economic and political backgrounds (UK 
and Hungary) with the aim to test the relevant impact of the domestic institutional 
framework on corporate lobbying practices, and also control for the differences in 
lobbying experience due to the different contextual factors. From this latter perspective 
it was important that the UK has been an EU member since 1973, while Hungary joined 
the Union only in 2004. By so choosing these countries, the researcher intended to 
‘extend’ the scope of existing theories and also provide samples of polar types. This 
type of ‘theoretical sampling’ is an accepted method of case study research, which helps 
to replicate or extend emergent theories (Eisenhardt 1989). In the first phase 20 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. After the field work in this phase preliminary 
findings were wrote up in the upgrade report, which contained the first insights that 
appeared from these interviews. Data was processed manually as well as by using 
NVivo software for coding. The software helped in displaying ideas and creating links 
between themes and occurring patterns. After the transcription of interviews the 
researcher coded the data according to themes that seemed to be reoccurring. Based on 
the nodes that have been formed the researcher identified patterns and arranged key 
themes in node trees. Afterwards occurring patterns were analysed in relation to existing 
theories and the researcher drew some preliminary conclusions about corporate 
lobbying patterns and strategies. The analysis revealed that some of the initially 
considered issues that were included in the interview guide proved to be irrelevant or 
too vague and hence these were dropped. Such an issue was the relevance of lobbying 
legislation on lobbying practices for instance. The initial literature review explored and 
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contrasted the lobbying legislation in the different institutional settings – legislation in 
EE states, at the EU level and the US – because it was assumed that these rules might 
affect the way stakeholders engaged in lobbying. However the first stage interviews 
revealed that stakeholders – although some acknowledged their importance – mostly did 
not consider the lobbying legislation to have a determining impact on lobbying 
activities and the structure of the public affairs market. As the views of almost all 
stakeholders in London, Brussels and Eastern European capitals were in line, this 
parameter was taken out of the analysis. Other themes however emerged as being more 
important than initially expected. For instance data that emerged in relation to the 
relationships between in-house teams and consultancy teams was initially not 
considered crucial. It was coded but did not fit any of the emerging arguments in the 
first phase. Later on however, when the second stage interviews were analysed and the 
theoretical scope of the study had been extended to the investigation of how firms 
choose their organizational form for lobbying, the importance of this data increased 
substantially. Similarly, the theme of ‘professionalism’, which often occurred both in 
the London-based and the Brussels-based interviews, was included into the analysis at 
the first stage, but only in a narrow sense, arguing that eastern and western approaches 
differ in their ‘professionalism’, however the reasons behind this observation was not 
explained. Since all the interviewed stakeholders converged along a similar pattern of 
using ‘professional’ tools and applying generally accepted, theoretically grounded 
strategies in their practice, in the upgrade report the researcher highlighted that 
stakeholders, who engage in Brussels from EE countries seem to “adapt” to the western 
practices of their competitors. It was only in the second stage of the analysis that the 
analysis revealed that the theme ‘professionalism’ and ‘professionalization’ has crucial 
importance in the investigation of corporate lobbying strategy development for two 
reasons. First, from the firms’ perspective in western institutional contexts, 
‘professionalism’ grants access to decision-making, while in EE environments the same 
trait may hinders access. Secondly from an institutional perspective, the 
‘professionalization’ is encouraged or hindered depending on how institutions change 
the environment in which access is granted. More specifically, ‘professionalism’ is 
determined by how different institutional settings impact what type of ‘access goods’ 
are required from firms. Consequently, in the second stage it was found that the 
domestic institutional environment impacts the strategies and the level of 
professionalism of corporate lobbying. 
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The analysis of the first-stage interviews confirmed the initial assumption of the 
researcher that eastern and western practices differ and also provided some empirical 
evidence to confirm that Eastern European firms are ‘missing’ from the EU lobby 
market both as individual corporate players and as clients of consultancies. After the 
first stage it became evident that the causes of marginal representation cannot be 
explored at the supranational level since interviews only referred to resources as a 
possible factor that would prevent Europeanization, other factors that would stem from 
the nature of multi-level decision-making or access to institutions have not emerged. 
The theoretical assumption that EU institutions may be ‘exclusionary’ towards Eastern 
European stakeholders - who may need help to engage at EU level - or that EE firms are 
disadvantaged because of their lack of experience and know-how in supranational 
lobbying were not confirmed. Rather the analysis revealed that EE interests cannot get 
access or reach ‘success’ in influencing issues, because they are not there in Brussels in 
the first place. In other words, they do not even get to enter the lobbying system at EU 
level. Hence the analysis suggested that the reasons of marginal representation need to 
be further investigated at the domestic level.  
The second stage of the project is second only in chronological order, since it 
provided the most substantial data for this study. Interviewing in Hungary was started 
with a similar interview guide as was used in the first phase (see Appendix F). Some 
additional questions were inserted that referred to the domestic situation. However as 
data collection evolved, it was necessary to adapt the interview guide to the experiences 
of the participants, as questions related to professional lobbying techniques, lobbying 
activities and strategies were found in most cases irrelevant - participants could not 
answer them. After the first 18 interviews with Hungarian stakeholders, the researcher 
realised that the interview guide needed to be changed, since interviewees evolved into 
different directions from what had been initially planned. This became especially 
obvious in the cases of CEOs – since sometimes lower level informants were perceived 
as less ‘honest’ and open – or when interviewees ‘trusted’ the researcher and opened up 
beyond the scope of the questions. This does not mean that interviews were not 
insightful or rich in data, in contrast they were very ‘deep’ with many additional 
insights and key themes that the researcher has not considered previously. Based on this 
field experience, when the researcher started to code data by identifying themes and 
emerging arguments, in parallel she also modified some of the questions and extended 
the scope of the interviews. In this process new themes got integrated into the analysis, 
such as the impact of the state or informal networks and some sections were eliminated 
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from the interview guide. As a result, the questionnaire was simplified and shortened, 
mainly because many questions in relation to EU-level interest representation (see 
section 3 and 5 in Appendix E) became irrelevant. The modified questionnaire was 
aimed to check and explore in more detail the emerging themes in relation to EE 
lobbying. Consequently, in the second phase of the project, the first 18 interviews were 
carried out with the first questionnaire (Appendix F) that covered the same issues as the 
one used in the first phase, whereas the last 13 interviews were carried out with a more 
focused and adapted questionnaire (Appendix F) that explored newly emerging themes, 
such as the role of CEOs in lobbying or the importance of networks.  
Additionally, at the second phase the researcher also extended the literature 
review to include the varieties of capitalism theory, which helped in extending the 
analytical scope of the thesis and re-defined the research question to have a more 
specific and targeted focus on the key issues. In the first year of the second stage, 18 
interviews have been transcribed and analysed. At this point the researcher started to 
write-up the findings and to develop arguments. Hence, in the second year of the second 
stage – when an additional 13 interviews were conducted – the researcher was already 
formulating theories. This was a good arrangement, because while writing-up the 
researcher was able to ‘probe’ emergent themes (Eisenhardt 1989) and also approach 
new interviewees, whose relevance became important. This is how a representative of a 
trade union and an entrepreneur became included in the data set, since they both had 
important insights in some newly emerging themes in relation to the role of the state for 
instance.  
During the second stage analysis, data was first analysed within the Hungarian 
case. This was done similarly to the first stage coding process. Patterns that emerged in 
this stage seemed very different from the key themes that were identified in the first 
stage. For instance speaking about lobbying strategies, first-stage respondents detailed 
their political intelligence techniques, formal interactions with decision-makers, or 
activities with the media, while second-stage respondents talked about their networks, 
about their “letters to the prime minister” or their associational work. So after coding 
both stages separately, the researcher developed categories and then looked for ‘cross-
case’ differences and similarities along these pre-defined patterns. In this particular case 
for instance, the category was ‘strategy building’ and the cross-case analysis helped to 
reveal the initial themes that led to the development of the framework of lobbying 
strategies. To give a more specific example of the analytical process, here I attempt to 
describe how the theory of ‘golden cage’ was developed. When data was analyzed in 
 88 
both stages and cross-case patterns were identified, it was already assumed that informal 
networks provide access to decision-making. It was also evident that MNCs adapt their 
strategies and hence are able to integrate into the post-socialist lobbying structure. At 
this point, based on the cross-case patterns in relation to the first-stage interviews I 
assumed that despite the local importance of networks, when EE firms engage at EU 
level, they ‘adapt’ to the multi-national environment - similarly to how MNCs adapt to 
the post-socialist context. This also seemed to be ‘confirmed’ by first stage interviews – 
since as it was noted earlier, stakeholders in Brussels argued that EE businesses engage 
in ‘western’ strategies when lobbying at the supranational level. However, when I 
controlled this cross-case finding again by searching for the ‘engagement attempts’ of 
EE businesses in the second stage interviews, the analysis revealed that firms that are 
not represented in Brussels - but tried to engage – failed because of their ‘networking’ 
approach. This way the analysis revealed that networks ‘operate’ similarly to ‘cages’, 
since they ‘lock’ members in and prevent them from successfully engaging at EU level. 
In sum, the iteration between within-case and cross-case codes helped me to see the 
pattern that did not emerge straight from the interviews, since EU level actors only saw 
those that engaged ‘professionally’ and domestic actors considered their strategies 
‘professional’ and did not perceive their ‘failure’ in getting access as a failure, rather 
they concluded that Brussels is not ‘relevant’ for their business.  
 
3.4 Contributions and Limitations 
It is hoped that this study makes a contribution to the literature by linking 
management studies on corporate political action and capability design with the political 
science research on EU lobbying. The study is attempted to move theory forward, by 
shifting the analytical focus of EU level lobbying as being environmentally constrained, 
to lobbying and the Europeanization of corporate lobbying as being an outcome of 
managerial decision making that is influenced by the institutional and political 
environment. Although the importance of environmental constraints is fully 
acknowledged in the study, it is argued that in the investigation of EU level lobbying 
patterns, more attention should be paid on the one hand to the effect of managerial 
choice - or more specifically managerial ‘choice within institutional constraints’ – and 
on the other hand to the firm level process of Europeanization. It is argued that the 
Europeanization process of corporate lobbying is determined by the institutional 
context, through its impact on intra-organizational processes and managerial decisions.  
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The study is a qualitative research based on a case-based approach. Limitations 
stemming from the methodology of the research may be grouped into three distinct 
issues. First, the study is based on the case-study of Hungary. As it was noted earlier in 
this chapter, Hungary was chosen, because it is a ‘critical case’ among the Eastern 
European member states of the European Union. Using a critical case is beneficial, 
since it allows the exploration of such patterns that may not be easily recognisable at a 
typical case. The analysis of the Orbán government’s actions and their impact on 
business lobbying, allowed the researcher to make empirically rich observations that 
stemmed from the extreme characteristics of the regime. Consequently, although the 
mechanisms that have been identified in the thesis may be representative and hence may 
be applied in other contexts, the generalisability of the case study itself is limited. In 
other words, the nature of the critical case limited the generalisability of the study. 
Therefore further comparative research projects are necessary to test, whether the 
findings of this study are applicable to other Eastern European EU member states and 
also to explore how more typical EE cases differ from the Hungarian case.  
The second issue that should be considered as a limitation is the nature of the 
firm level analysis. Despite the fact that this study applied a firm level perspective, it 
still treated the firm a little bit as a “black box”. Although the study has attempted to 
open the ‘black-box’ and explored the Europeanization of corporate lobbying from a 
firm level perspective, the method did not allow the in-depth investigation of 
participating firms. The researcher had only one interview at each firm, and hence did 
not have the opportunity to explore the more nuanced characteristics of internal 
decision-making processes regarding the Europeanization of lobbying activities. This 
limitation also stemmed from the fact that, at Hungarian firms, decision-making over 
lobbying is centralised in the hands of CEOs. Furthermore, interviewees in Hungary 
were not familiar with ways to organize professional political capabilities, developing 
political strategies, standards or routines for public affairs. At most domestic firms, 
lobbying was not differentiated as a separate corporate activity and hence functional 
units for public affairs were non-existent. Therefore, in this study the focus of 
investigation was limited to the antecedents of managerial choice in relation to 
Europeanization, and the firm level organizational process of Europeanization. Further 
empirical studies may extend the findings of this project by exploring the managerial 
decision-making process of Europeanization in more depth. The study conceptualised 
the process of the Europeanization of corporate lobbying, from the perspective of 
organizational structure and strategy development, and generated testable propositions 
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for future quantitative studies. Further research should test whether these models could 
be applied in other contexts. 
In future research studies, the inclusion of fewer firms in the sample, would 
allow more interviews at the individual firms, both horizontally, including more 
members of the top management team and vertically, by including lower-level decision-
makers from the corporate hierarchy. This type of more in-depth, firm level approach 
would allow the exploration of the managerial decision-making process in the 
Europeanization of lobbying activities.  
The third limitation concerns sampling. In the context of Hungary, capitalism, 
interest politics and state-firm relations were investigated only from the perspective of 
interest groups, business actors and especially companies. Public sector decision-makers 
and / or government officials were not included among interview participants. Although 
this one-sidedness represents a methodological limitation, it was a deliberate choice of 
the researcher. In the current political environment, most issues that have been explored 
in the thesis - such as nationalisations, state capture, public consultations or state-firm 
relations in general - are communicated to the public with strong government 
propaganda. There is a fear among people and business leaders in general from political 
retaliation. During the interviews the researcher has been warned by some of the 
business leaders, not to get involved too much into the exploration of state-business ties 
and the investigation of state capture, because it may be “dangerous”. Some 
interviewees seemed genuinely worried about being involved in the project and 
although they wanted and chose to get involved, in order to raise awareness, they felt 
very strongly about their participation remaining anonymous. Although the researcher is 
aware that Hungary is still a democracy, partly due to these concerns, she decided not to 
expose the research and its directions to government officials or public sectors decision-
makers before it is finished. The inclusion of the government, not only could have 
endangered the completion of the project, but also might have meant raising the 
attention of political decision-makers to the research and indirectly could have 
threatened the anonymity of interviewed business leaders. Besides, due to the autocratic 
characteristics of the Orbán regime, it was considered that the experiences of business 
stakeholders would provide more insights into how the system works than the political 
propaganda of the government.  
Findings of this study present many future research opportunities. Although the 
conceptual model of corporate Europeanization is grounded in theory, empirical 
confirmation of the different strategic choices should be explored. Further research 
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should therefore generalize and confirm these findings from a quantitative perspective. 
Theoretical findings in relation to the impacts of post-socialist network capitalism on 
supranational lobbying were tested only in the Hungarian context and therefore limit the 
generalisability of the study. However findings in the Hungarian context may open the 
way for further hypothesis formation for lobbying and capitalism in general. Insights 
from the new theories might be useful for the analysis of business lobbying in other 
institutional contexts, especially in other Eastern European and emerging economies, 
where informal institutions have similar importance. In addition, the question of 
marginal EE representation may be examined from an EU level perspective. It should be 
explored how EU institutions may be able to overcome the potential ‘democratic deficit’ 
of EU level decision-making if EE interests become permanently under-represented in 
supranational policy-making.  
Future research may include the investigation of Europeanization in longitudinal 
research projects, where Europeanization is linked to the length of EU membership and 
hence it may be measured whether the golden cage of EE capitalism would ‘dissolve’ 
over time. In addition, other variables may be examined that can affect the 
Europeanization of domestic lobbying, or lobbying in other international contexts. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate whether the golden cage 
phenomenon could be applied for the Europeanization of other interest groups, such as 
associations or NGOs.  
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4. Europeanization and managerial choice 
 The objective of this chapter is to investigate how firms develop their EU level 
lobbying strategies. Determinants of corporate lobbying have been thoroughly 
investigated from the perspective of access to EU level decision-making (Coen 1997; 
Coen 1998; Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004; Beyers 2002; Eising 2007) as well as from 
the perspective of strategy formation in general (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman 2003; 
Hillman, Keim et al. 2004). Both streams of research identify the institutional 
environment and financial resources or firm size as major factors that influence 
corporate political activity. The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to our 
understanding of how firms organize their lobbying capabilities at the domestic level 
and how this capacity building affects EU level strategies. Here it is argued that the 
Europeanization of large firms needs to be investigated at the firm level, because it is 
essentially a firm level process that depends on managerial decisions. By applying 
political science and management theories to the analysis of empirical data, this chapter 
will explore how firms develop their lobbying strategy and how the Europeanization 
process of lobbying is impacted by institutional and resource-related constraints. It will 
also investigate the question that was set out in chapter 2, whether the organizational 
arrangement of lobbying may be linked to the process of EU level engagement.  
 On the basis of ideas from resource dependence theory and management 
scholarship on dynamic capabilities, a conceptual model is developed for the illustration 
of the process of how firms Europeanize their lobbying activities. Based on this 
theoretical model, the chapter investigates the antecedents and the process of managerial 
choice in relation to Europeanization. As in this study the focus is on large firms’ direct 
individual lobbying, collective action through associations fall out of the scope of this 
chapter and hence will not be discussed. The theoretical analysis is combined with 
empirical data, based on semi-structured, in depth interviews with lobbying 
professionals from London, Brussels and Budapest. The chapter will be structured as 
follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework, with a special focus on the 
determinants of large firms’ direct EU-level engagement. The ensuing section will look 
at the impact of institutional change on corporate lobbying and the role of 
environmental resource dependencies. The chapter then goes on to discuss firms’ 
lobbying strategies, in relation to their lobbying capabilities, and presents a framework 
of four firm level strategies. The last section presents a dual-level theoretical model of 
managerial choice on Europeanization. A final section concludes.  
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4.1 The determinants of large firms’ direct EU-level engagement 
4.1.1 Financial resources  
 In European studies financial resources and firm size have been identified as 
having one of the most crucial influences on how firms Europeanize their lobbying 
activities. It has been argued by scholars in interest group research that size is a 
significant predictor of EU level lobbying (Sadrieh and Annavarjula 2005; Eising 
2007), since mostly large firms, with extensive financial and human resources are able 
to set up an EU office, and manage a multi-level lobbying strategy in Brussels (Bouwen 
2002: 374). Financial resources are a necessary precondition of Europeanization, since 
the investment into EU level representation requires substantial investments. However, 
resources alone may not make firms able to engage in EU level interest representation, 
corporate managers need to design and work out the characteristics of the EU level 
lobbying strategy. Even when financial resources are available, managers decide, 
whether it is worthwhile to engage at EU level and if it is, then what type of capabilities 
and strategies need to be developed in order to engage in direct supranational interest 
representation. As it was discussed in chapter two, literature on Europeanization 
explored how resources influence lobbying outcomes, or support or hinder 
organizations’ ability to engage with institutions, but rarely addressed the question of 
how resources influence firm level lobbying structures. Therefore, scholarship on EU 
lobbying does not help us understand how financial resources influence lobbying 
structures inside the firm at the domestic and the EU levels. Thus, to understand direct 
EU level engagement patterns we need to investigate how firms develop their lobbying 
capabilities. Studies that base their arguments on the determining importance of 
resources, ignore critical resource dependencies and assume that „interest groups are 
always prepared to modify and Europeanize their strategies as soon as their material 
self-interests would require or their resources would enable them to do so” (Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007: 464). Based on the critique of Beyers and Kerremans, this study 
stresses that besides resources, engagement in EU level interest politics requires the 
strategic actions of corporate managers, to organize and manage available resources 
through their skills, experience, time and managerial choices into lobbying capabilities. 
At firms, management decides on what type of lobbying activities the firm should 
engage in, what type of internal and external capabilities it should develop for interest 
representation and what kind of resources the firm is able to invest in these activities. 
Within the political science and EU lobbying literature the theory on managerial choices 
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is underdeveloped (Dahan 2005). Therefore in our analysis we turn to management 
theories. In management studies, it is acknowledged that the design of lobbying 
capabilities require management interventions and that managerial choices are 
important in this respect (Lawton and Rajwani 2011: 10). Capabilities are “ways of 
organizing and getting things done”, including know-how, experience and 
organizational structures (Teece, Pisano et al. 1997: 517). Firms generally develop their 
capabilities in functional areas (Amit and Schoemaker 1993), just like public affairs or 
lobbying. Firms may also develop capabilities in lobbying with the aim to influence 
public policy. By definition, political capabilities are organizational and strategic 
activities by which management reconfigure, leverage and release political resources to 
achieve new resource configurations that enable the company to affect the corporate 
political environment (Lawton, Rajwani et al. 2013: 230).  
In this chapter a theoretical link will be constructed between firm level public 
affairs structures, managerial choice and direct EU level lobbying. The purpose of this 
chapter is to identify the determinants that influence the process through which firms 
develop direct EU level lobbying capabilities. Through the analysis of semi-structured 
interviews, it will be argued that three interrelated factors determine managerial choice 
on EU level lobbying: financial resources, environmental resource dependencies and 
existing firm level lobbying structures.  
The chapter posits that the different domestic institutional environment of 
developed and developing capitalist systems, affects firms to develop different types of 
capabilities for the management of their corporate political activities. Based on the 
dynamic capabilities literature, it will be stressed that Europeanization needs to be 
analysed in terms of resource dependencies, organizational structures, lobbying 
capabilities and managerial choices (Teece, Pisano et al. 1997; Lawton, Rajwani et al. 
2013). Hence, instead of investigating institutional factors that determine 
Europeanization generally, greater emphasis needs to be given to the understanding of 
how firms design their lobbying capabilities, construct and position lobbying as a 
functional corporate activity and arrange these activities in relation to the organizational 
structure.  
 
4.1.2 Institutional environments 
Besides financial resources, literature has thoroughly investigated the 
importance of domestic institutional characteristics on corporate political strategies. 
Political scientists looked at domestic environmental characteristics in relation to their 
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influence on organizations’ Europeanization. As it was already noted in chapter two, 
literature on this field may be grouped in three main perspectives. First, scholars 
investigated the ‘degree of fit’ between domestic and supranational interest 
representation structures, focusing on the institutional comparison of national and 
supranational interest intermediation, arguing that firms from different jurisdictions 
adapt differently to the EU system (Coen 1998; Schmidt 1999). Other European 
scholars focused on the impact of institutional structures on organizations’ domestic 
access to decision-making and investigated links between domestic and EU-level access 
patterns (Beyers 2002; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010). At last, studies in the third 
perspective looked at how EU institutions impact firms’ direct EU level strategies. In 
this context, referring to the institutional changes at EU level, Coen (1997) pointed out 
how multinationals have changed their strategies and lobbying structures in adapting to 
the emerging EU lobbying ‘style’. Recently however, the overall importance of 
domestic institutional structures as a major determinant of Europeanization abilities has 
been questioned (Eising 2007; Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). Although 
the above mentioned studies helped us immensely in understanding Europeanization 
processes generally, EU scholarship have not constructed a direct link between 
institutional structures and firm-level lobbying capabilities. Therefore literature could 
not explain how the domestic institutional context influences firm level decisions on the 
design and development of lobbying capabilities at the domestic level and in the 
Europeanization process. EU scholarship rarely investigated further at the level of the 
firm, how environments impact the development and position of lobbying capabilities 
and managerial choice concerning Europeanization.  
 To address this defined gap in the literature, this chapter will link EU literature 
and scholarship of strategic management, with the help of the Resource Dependence 
Model (RDM). According to resource dependence theory organizations are not self-
sufficient; they need to acquire resources from their environments (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003). The environment provides uncertainties, constraints and contingencies that affect 
the distribution of power and influence within the organization (Aldrich and Pfeffer 
1976: 89). Consequently, organizational environments come to affect firm’s structure 
and managerial decisions (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). RDM “posits that organizations 
attempt to manage their environments” through “conscious, planned responses to 
environmental contingencies” (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976: 86). However what happens in 
an organization is a “consequence of the environment and the particular contingencies 
and constraints deriving from that environment” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer and 
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Salancik 2003: 3). Consequently, the choice of lobbying actions are important in 
different environmental contexts (Lawton and Rajwani 2011). In this chapter, it is 
argued that in the context of Europeanization, the domestic institutional environment 
has a crucial influence on firms’ political activities. In particular, the impact of the 
institutional environment on the development of public affairs capabilities will be 
emphasized. Building on the theory of resource dependence, this chapter posits that 
managerial choice about EU level engagement strategy is determined partly by the 
firm’s dependence on its domestic environment and partly on its exposure to EU 
legislation. In contrast to the political science studies, this chapter takes a closer look at 
the firm-level determinants of Europeanization. In keeping with prior research from 
Lawton and Rajwani (2011) and Lawton, Rajwani et al. (2013), this chapter contributes 
to the literature by exploring and linking the antecedents of domestic managerial choice 
on lobbying capabilities with the managerial choice on EU level public affairs 
engagement.  
4.2. The role of environmental resource dependencies 
The objective of this section is to investigate the impact of the institutional 
environment on the development of EU level lobbying activities at large firms. We will 
look at the link between institutional processes in political decision-making, and the 
professionalization process of lobbying, with an aim to explain how environmental 
resource dependencies have influenced the development of firms’ public affairs 
capabilities. It is generally accepted that the increasing complexity of the business 
environment, in developed market economies, forces firms to reorganize their 
structures, add capabilities and design organizational mechanisms to deal with their 
environment (Post, Murray et al. 1982). In the last decades, both national governments 
and EU institutions gained an increasingly dominant regulatory role in the economy. 
Besides the increasing regulatory role of public institutions, legislator’s need for 
external expertise has also steadily increased (Eising 2004; Mahoney 2004; Coen 2007).  
State-business and EU-business relationships have become characterised by 
interdependence (Bouwen 2004). Through the historical overview of the 
professionalization process in London and Brussels, it is argued that, due to firms’ 
environmental resource dependencies, the democratisation of policy-making in 
developed capitalist systems encouraged firms to exchange network-based lobbying 
strategies to professional public affairs capabilities. In contrast, in the post-socialist, 
developing capitalist context, this type of professionalization has not taken place. As a 
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result, lobbying in Eastern Europe requires firms to engage in network-based lobbying 
strategies.  
Through the contrasting cases of western and Eastern European lobbying, the 
following sections will highlight how the domestic institutional context directly changes 
the characteristics of lobbying actions and strategy. The chapter will also explore the 
link between resource dependencies and the organizational arrangement of lobbying in 
order to test the proposition that ‘Environmental resource dependencies both at the 
domestic and EU level determine how firms design the organizational arrangement of 
lobbying and how they internationalise their lobbying structures’. If we find that this 
proposition is supported by empirical date then it could be argued that in different 
institutional contexts firms organize their lobbying structures differently in order to suit 
the requirements of the given environment. However it needs to be explored how firms 
internationalise their structures if the institutional environment has different 
requirements at the domestic and the EU level. Would firms transpose their domestic 
structures to the EU level regardless of the requirements in Brussels, or would they 
implement converging organizational arrangements that suit the access criteria of EU 
institutions?  
  
4.2.1 The UK experience 
 National level lobbying in the UK is a growing industry. Since the 2000s interest 
representation has become an increasingly professional industry in Great Britain, - 
involving around 3000 practitioners, consultants and in-house experts (Thomson and 
John 2007). In 2007 the public relations field was employing around 14,000 people, 
with a value of the PA industry estimated at around £1.9 billion (Parvin 2007: 10). 
Firms have realised the importance of “government liaison” for the “pursuit of 
organizational goals”, and on the other hand the government has recognised that it 
depends on the “external input for information and advice” (Harris, Moss et al. 1998: 
203). In the UK, before the public affairs boom of the 2000s, the industry was 
dominated by only a few large firms (Thomson and John 2007: 6). Main companies in 
lobbying were led by influential personalities, who had good interpersonal networks and 
links to the government (Thomson and John 2007). Public affairs were about contacts to 
leading politicians. Consequently despite the advanced capitalist institutional 
framework and the existence of formal institutions, companies chose network-based 
strategies when lobbying the public sector. Hence, while lobbying competition was on 
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the rise, corruption scandals11 raised attention to the need for more transparency in 
decision-making (Thomson and John 2007). Over the years the UK Parliament has 
increased the pre-legislative scrutiny of bills and the government started to “consult 
with outside groups when developing policies” (Parvin 2007: 7). Today policy 
proposals in the British system may come from diverse sources, including think tanks 
and interest groups, while the consultation arenas of public policies are diffuse and 
multiplying (Parvin 2007) - including policy forums, conferences and seminars held in 
Westminster. Due to the institutional changes in the public sector, legislative decision-
making became more accessible for businesses and required new capabilities from firms 
that wanted to engage in lobbying.  
  
Certain management scholars, like Peng (2003) for instance, argue that firms 
adapt to their environment through making rational choices. Network-based strategies 
have been mostly investigated in the context of transition economies. Peng argued that 
in transitioning countries, companies adapt to the relation-based transaction structure of 
the institutional environment by engaging in network-based strategies, and as transition 
evolves and a rule-based exchange regime gets implemented, these strategies will be 
turned into rule-based, impersonal, market-centred strategies (Peng 2003: 275). 
According to this theory corporate network strategies are changing in character as 
capitalism evolves, because firms adapt to the formalisation of the institutional 
environment. Applying this model to lobbying, we have to note that despite the fact that 
the UK has long had a democratic and capitalist market economy - in which an 
impersonal exchange regime was prevalent in business transactions - lobbying was still 
based on interpersonal networks up until the 1990s. As Peng noted, networks in the 
Western European context are probably less based on interpersonal ties than in post-
socialist countries, nevertheless they had an important role in the lobbying practices of 
firms until recently. Hence, applying Peng’s argument to lobbying one would expect 
that firms in the rule-based, arm’s length institutional context of the UK would engage 
in professional, rule-based lobbying practices and would not rely on interpersonal 
networks to get access to decision-making. Following on this logic, the question arises: 
Why did not firms use arm’s length strategies, in the developed capitalist system of the 
UK earlier, and why do they rely on these today? If the existence of a developed formal 
institutional context in itself was not enough to encourage firms to adapt to their 
                                                 
11
 See for instance the ‘cash for questions scandal’ in 1994, when under the Conservative Government in 
the UK, MPs were paid cash for asking question in the Parliament (Thomson and John 2007).  
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environment and introduce rule-based impersonal exchange strategies than what else 
triggered organizations to transform their network-based strategies into professional 
lobbying practices?  
To shed light on this puzzle we need to turn to the resource dependence model 
(RDM). According to the RDM, firms require resources from their environment trough 
their interaction with those institutions that control the resources they need (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978: 258). In the context of lobbying, private and public actors become 
interdependent because they need resources from each other (Bouwen 2002). As 
Bouwen identified in the context of EU lobbying, the crucial resource required by 
private actors, is access to public institutions. In return for access, EU institutions 
demand ‘access goods’ or more specifically different types of information that are 
crucial for their own functioning and legitimacy (2002: 369). Applying Bouwen’ theory 
to our question, it becomes clear that network-based strategies have started to change, 
when the UK government increasingly started to include business interests into political 
decision-making. As the UK “government undertakes more consultations now than at 
any time before” (Thomson and John 2007: 33) firms do not have to rely on old-school 
methods or with other words network-based strategies any more. The more professional 
firms are in their lobbying practices, the more results they are able to achieve in 
influencing public policy. As the director of a London-based public affairs agency 
argued, the network-based style is still used among consultants, but it is changing and 
clients demand a different style these days: 
“There are big differences in the market; there are noticeable differences in 
style.  
The main difference is between the old-style lobbyists, who rely on ‘I can 
arrange this meeting for you, that meeting for you’ and everything would be fine. 
That comes out of lobbying as it was done in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. But 
there is still Bell and Pottenger, they hire very high-profile people, like ex-
ministers and base their business around networks. And it can be effective in 
some things and other things it’s not.” 12 
He added that the network-based strategy is useful sometimes, but most often clients 
demand a more professional approach, because that brings long-term results: 
“They are very good in getting business and not very good in keeping it. People 
very quickly reach the limits of what they are going to achieve. Very quickly 
clients go back to the market and say we need something different. „ 
                                                 
12
 Director of London-based PA agency, interviewed 17.09.2009 
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As the two quotes show network-based practices are still present, although becoming 
less and less efficient in lobbying. Because of the institutional environment’s growing 
openness, firms increasingly use arm’s length strategies. As interest intermediation 
becomes more and more formalised, the long-term added value of personal relationships 
decreases. Empirical evidence of the interviews confirms previous findings of the 
literature that today “lobbying is an essential, legitimate and distinguishable activity, 
which supplements business activity” (Hadjikhani and Ghauri 2006: 391). This is 
confirmed by a quote from a London-based PA manager: 
“It is a growing industry. I would expect it to get bigger and become a more and 
more recognised discipline. It is becoming more and more professional and it is 
more alongside accountancy, law and business consultancy13”. 
In sum, applying the RBV to empirical evidence, it becomes evident that instead of 
adapting to the institutional framework in general, firms changed their lobbying 
practices as a consequence of direct environmental resource dependencies. The growing 
regulatory role of the government in industry, increased firms’ dependencies on 
legislation and public investment (Miller 1990). To manage their resource dependencies 
and acquire access to public legislation, firms adapted to the demands of the public 
sector, and when networks provided access they used networks, but once the institutions 
opened up towards the professional input of businesses, they changed their strategy and 
developed formalised lobbying capabilities.  
 
4.2.2 The EU experience 
Similarly to the UK, at the EU level, the fast expansion of common market 
legislation encouraged the European Commission and the European Parliament to open 
towards lobbyists and the technical expertise of business actors (Coen 2009) and 
institutionalise their input through consultation processes and expert committees (Coen 
2007). As a result in a matter of a few years, industry became recognised as a policy 
player (Coen 1997; Bouwen 2002). Today, the number of corporations with an 
established European office in Brussels is estimated to be around 500, with a further 
200 law offices and approximately 150 European affairs consultants (Gueguen 2007). 
See table 4.1 below.  
                                                 
13
 Public affairs manager at London-based multinational PA agency, interview by author, 28.10.2009 
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Table 4.1: Number of interest groups in Brussels by actor type 
Actors Number of organizations Number of employees 
Corporations +500 2000 






Source: excerpts from (Gueguen 2007) based on 2006 statistics from the European 
Public Affairs Directory 
 
Most interest groups do not have a Brussels-based representation. However recent 
empirical data of Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) shows that those firms, which do have 
a direct EU office are mostly come form the most developed EU countries, such as 
France, Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and Spain. Outside these countries 
the number of firms with direct offices from member states “drastically drops” 
(Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 166). Research also highlights that besides large firms 
the number of consultancies and consultants has also increased at the EU level (Lahusen 
2003). European affairs consultants may belong to large multi-client consultancies, or 
smaller agencies – including law firms -, as well as be self-employed experts. Two 
major types of consultancies dominate the Brussels playing field. On the one hand 
public affairs consultancies – including political consultants, PR agencies and economic 
and management consultants - provide public affairs or sometimes solely lobby 
services, while on the other hand law firms provide public affairs and legal services 
together (Lahusen 2003). In terms of their clientele, “companies are the most usual 
customers of commercial consultancies” (Lahusen 2003: 199), however most clients 
seem to come from only a limited number of countries, such as the US, UK, Belgium, 
Germany and France. Empirical findings of this thesis confirm these findings. 
Interviews show that the majority of agency clients in Brussels - according to their 
national origin - were Anglo-Saxon, Japanese and Western-European multinationals.  
At EU level, a similar gradual transformation from network-based to rule-based 
approaches was observed as in the UK, although it was triggered by different 
mechanisms. In Brussels the public affairs market changed as a result of the shift of 
regulatory competencies from the national to the supranational level. Before the 1980s, 
the focus of business lobbying was on the nation state, lobbying was reactive as well as 
destructive, since a veto of the Council of Ministers generally led to lobbying success 
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(Coen 2010: 289). However the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council 
of Ministers, the growing competences of EU institutions and the fact that the 
Commission and the European Parliament started to facilitate dialogue with organized 
stakeholders led to the explosion of direct lobbying involvement (Coen 2010). Reacting 
to these institutional changes, companies altered their EU-level political strategy and 
instead of the reactive focus on member-state level decision-making, they started to set 
up direct representation offices to implement more proactive strategies directly in 
Brussels (Coen 1997). Consequently, “…the regulatory agency style of Brussels policy-
making has produced the emergence of an elite, trust-based relationship between insider 
interest groups and EU officials” (Coen 2009: 152) and created a multilevel decision-
making process that led to the “professionalization of public affairs and government 
affairs functions in the late 1990s” (Coen and Richardson 2009: 7). Similarly to the UK, 
when firms started to set up direct lobbying or in other words EU-offices in Brussels, 
they first employed ‘ex-Commission officials’, hoping that their existing personal 
networks would positively impact interest representation (Mazey and Richardson 1993 
as cited in Coen 2009). By the 1990s however, firms realised that networking alone 
cannot lead to lobbying success (Coen 2009). Instead, they started to professionalize 
their public affairs function (Coen 2009 p: 159), and harmonize lobbying activities 
within the internal organizational structure (Coen 2009). Studies show that not only 
firms, but interest group in general went through a professionalization process (Klüver 
2012; Klüver and Saurugger 2013), furthermore those interest groups with a high degree 
of professionalization are argued to find it easier to provide information to EU 
institutions than those that work with less professional staff (Klüver 2012: 505). As 
Coen noted the style of lobbying activities has changed as the EU’s “procedural rules 
have changed and EU interests and functionaries learned to trust one another” (Coen 
2009: 151). Despite the differences in domestic interest representation practices, over 
the last twenty years business interests have adapted to the EU’s “changing institutional 
environment” by developing new direct lobbying strategies (Coen and Richardson 
2009: 345). The following quote, from the director of a Brussels-based public affairs 
agency, confirms that lobbying techniques are determined by environmental 
contingencies and that in Brussels, formal rule-based processes need to be followed: 
“There is not a lot of room for creativity in Brussels. If you do pure lobbying on 
a piece of legislation, you need to go on the route.”14  
 
                                                 
14
 Director at Brussels-based consultancy 7, telephone interviewed by author 30.10.2009 
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As it was noted earlier, resource dependency theory suggests that managers need to 
control external dependences and secure necessary resources for survival (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003). As the institutional environment becomes more and more open and 
demanding towards firms’ involvement into political representation, the need to manage 
external dependencies increases and consequently organizations are becoming more 
committed to “creating effective internal organizational routines and structures” (Griffin 
and Dunn 2004: 200).  
 
“The first step is political intelligence – accessing not published, which does not 
necessary mean confidential information but it is just getting to know what the 
Commission is working on… So it is these kinds of formal interactions with 
decision-makers …”15 
 
In sum, the institutional structure of EU level decision-making triggered firms to 
develop professional, arm’s length lobbying strategies. Firms monitor legislative 
proposals and gather information through formal channels. Now that there seems to be 
at least some empirical evidence for a causal link between institutional democratisation 
and the professionalization of lobbying in developed capitalist systems, in the next 
section we will investigate the influence of domestic institutions in the post-socialist 
environment.  
4.2.3 The Eastern European experience: the case of Hungary 
 After nine years of full membership, practitioners and scholars alike agree that 
EE corporations are still largely missing from the EU-level interest representation 
system. To mention but one indicator, in the Transparency Register of the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, those organizations are expected to register, 
which engage in lobbying in Brussels. By November 2012, out of 757 registered 
organizations under the ‘companies and groups’ category only 31 were from the ten 
post-socialist member states, Poland having the most registrants, with 11 firms, while 
Hungary and Romania each has four and all the others less. Despite the fact that the 
figures from the register have to be used with caution due to its voluntary nature, they 
confirm the commonly acknowledged view that EE firms are drastically under-
represented. Interviews have confirmed that EU-level representation of EE firms is 
marginal. Most interviewed Brussels-based consultancies have not had any post-
                                                 
15
 Director at Brussels-based consultancy 7, telephone interviewed by author 30.10.2009 
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socialist clients by 2009. Stakeholders in Brussels could hardly name a handful of large 
EE firms that are active in EU level lobbying.  
“There are very few Brussels-based consultants from CEE - you have the big 
names in Brussels but you don’t have the local Eastern European offices16”. 
Many interviewees argued that post-socialist firms mostly represent themselves through 
national associations and try to ‘free-ride’ on others’ lobbying efforts, instead of 
investing into costly direct representation17. Interview participants also confirmed the 
general findings of the Eastern European lobbying literature that interest representation 
is very young and immature in EE countries (Evanson 2008; Hrebenar, McBeth et al. 
2008; McGrath 2008). Findings suggest that EE lobbying tend to be locally focused, 
firms rarely engage in international and/or EU-level campaigns. As a consultant 
explained, in Eastern Europe companies are “still dealing with people, who are 
individually just feed off their personal contacts with politicians, so lobbying is nothing 
very sophisticated.”18 
 
 Marginal EU level representation may be a consequence of the ‘under-
developed’ nature of lobbying at the domestic level. This question falls outside the 
scope of this chapter, but will be investigated later in chapter 6. Here we will focus on 
the relationship between the characteristics of domestic level political decision-making 
and the professionalization or more specifically in this case the non-professionalization 
of corporate lobbying. As it will be further detailed in the following chapters, EE 
businesses operate in fast changing, uncertain institutional environments, where formal 
institutions are weak and generally less open to the professional input of business 
stakeholders, than the government in the UK or supranational institutions at EU level. 
Decision-makers often neglect or disregard public consultations and the expertise of 
industrial stakeholders in the law-making process (Cianciara 2013: 11). As chapters 5 
and 6 will show, the transformation of lobbying from network-based to arm’s length 
practices, has not taken place in Eastern Europe. Decision-making processes are not as 
transparent to the public as in WE democracies; therefore the transfer of insider 
information through informal channels, as part of the process of lobbying, is inevitable. 
Information therefore is mostly shared within the network of acquaintances and 
interpersonal relationships, on an informal basis. As it will be shown in chapter 5, in 
                                                 
16
 Interview with consultant 8,  06.09.2009 
17
 This view was supported by consultant07, consultant08 and consultant10 (Interviews by author, 
30.10.2009, 06.09.2009 and 23.11.2009 respectively). 
18
 Interview with consultant 8,  06.09.2009 
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Hungary, firms have no other option than informally contacting state officials in order 
to get access to the policy process, through network-based strategies. Business leaders 
in Hungary feel that there is not much they can do formally, to influence the domestic 
legislative framework. Consequently, as the following quote from a Hungarian CEO 
shows, firms contact state officials directly through interpersonal relations to channel 
their messages.  
„Politically nobody has a say in issues, policy issues are the responsibilities of 
the state. We do not employ lobbying groups to push those people to decide in 
other directions. If we have any insights that we want to communicate then I go 
to the ministry personally and tell them that we have a technical problem…But 
you do not try to influence the legal background.”19 
 
The quote illustrates how business leaders feel that they cannot influence the legal 
background. Therefore – in contrast to British firms in the UK, or companies that lobby 
at EU level - instead of initiating strategic cooperation in policy-making with public 
officials, corporate leaders engage in ad hoc case-specific negotiations with top-level 
politicians. Due to the lack of formal access to policy-making - instead of long-term 
professional strategies - firms engage in short-term, one-off actions through 
interpersonal relations. With the exception of multinational subsidiaries, instead of 
working on policy analysis, firms approach members of the parliament (MPs) 
occasionally and try to initiate modifications in given legislative proposals. Permanent, 
strategic actions and proactive approaches are substituted by reactive behaviours, since 
in most cases companies do not have information in advance about the planned 
legislative proposals. 
„Lobbying here means that you have to reach that the MP puts this or that into 
his/her legislative proposal. Everybody is interested in the result and not in the 
process. Nobody wants to spend money on the process [of lobbying]. “20 
 
This type of strategy is in sharp contrast with the above detailed approach of UK firms, 
or practices at EU level. As we saw earlier, firm in the UK professionalize their 
lobbying, in order to become able to provide sophisticated input into legislative 
decision-making through presenting expertise, policy papers or running media 
campaigns. In the institutional framework of advanced capitalist societies - where the 
process of legislation is backed up by impact assessments and formalised public 
consultations - political analysis forms an essential part of lobbying. Consequently, 
                                                 
19
 CEO at large Hungarian company 4,  22.06.2011 
20
 Political adviser 1,  31.08.2011 
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lobbyists’ expertise in political analysis is essential, since public institutions rely on the 
sectoral and industrial insights of potentially affected business stakeholders. In Hungary 
on the other hand, firms do not need to present analytical argumentations or present 
policy documents, because they are not always allowed into policy-making. As a result, 
corporations do not invest into professionalization that would enable them to provide 
analytical insights into legislative proposals, but rather focus on the one-off act of 
personal persuasion through network-based strategies. The Hungarian case clearly 
indicates the importance of environmental resource dependencies and how the lack of 
institutional demands towards stakeholders’ policy input leads to the development of 
network-based practices. It also shows how the professionalization process can be 
triggered by the ‘democratization’ of domestic legislative decision-making. These 
findings confirm the view that organizations are influenced by their environments and 
“tend to become isomorphic with them” (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 346), since this 
guarantees their success and survival. Consequently, firms that follow externally 
legitimated formal procedures, meet society’s expectations and protect themselves from 
having their practices questioned (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 349). This classical 
institutional theory provides a link that may help us understand the differences in 
organizational structure, and the positioning of lobbying as well as public affairs 
activities in western and eastern firms. 
 
While in the last three sections we analysed how institutional policy-making 
structures affect lobbying practices, in the following section we will turn to the firm 
level analysis and will investigate how firms create their organizational structures for 
lobbying and what kind of capabilities they develop for the management of their 
political activities in the different institutional contexts. 
 
4.3 Firms’ lobbying strategy in relation to their lobbying 
capabilities 
Classical institutional theory provides a link that helps us understand the 
differences in public affairs activities in western and eastern firms. As it was shown in 
chapter 2, the institutional environment of Western European and post-socialist states 
are different, in almost all coordination elements, and consequently require firms to 
adapt to them with distinct organizational arrangements for lobbying. As it was argued 
in the previous sections, while today - in the western context - corporate political 
activity is mostly about legal, firm-level engagement with institutionalised political 
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actors and institutions, in post-socialist countries a more informal lobbying style is 
observable (Lawton, McGuire et al. 2012: 2). Contingency theory’s concept of ‘fit’ 
provides the link, between the external institutional environment and firms’ 
organizational structure (Burns and Stalker 1961; Peteraf and Randal 2007). According 
to this theory firms, operating in stable and predictable markets tend to have more 
bureaucratic models with a clear hierarchy, task specialization and formal structures 
(Burns and Stalker 1961), whereas uncertainty is hypothesized to lead to less formalised 
organizational structures (Burns and Stalker 1961). Consequently, it can be expected 
that companies in developed market economies will have more formal structures and 
bureaucratic systems for lobbying in their internal organizational structures than those 
from developing capitalist systems. The concept of ‘fit’ shows that “managers, as a 
group, are remarkably adaptive” (Peteraf and Randal 2007: 1105) and will create 
internal structures for lobbying that best adapt to their external institutional constraints. 
As the following sections will show, empirical data of this research confirms this view.  
In order to understand how managers design firms’ EU level lobbying structures, 
we need to explore the factors or antecedents that influence corporate Europeanization. 
As it was noted earlier, the institutional environment influences the development of 
lobbying strategies, through resource dependences. However, as the figure 4.1 below 
shows, environmental constraints impact firm level strategy-making through 
opportunity structures too. Yet, as this chapter explores Europeanization from a firm 
level perspective, the impact of institutional opportunity structures on Europeanization 
will be examined in detail in the following chapter (chapter 5), through the institutional 
level analysis. Besides institutions, resources also affect the development of lobbying 
strategies through lobbying capabilities that managers construct for the management of 
political strategies. Once the lobbying strategy is developed, firms find different 
organizational arrangements that suit the implementation of their strategy best. Findings 
of this study suggest that, once firms developed their capabilities, strategy and 
organizational form for lobbying, based on these ‘ingredients’ managers will design and 
construct their EU level engagement strategy. The determinants of corporate 
Europeanization are shown below in figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: Framework of determinants of corporate Europeanization 
The figure indicates that internally the ‘triple impact’ of strategy, capabilities and 
organizational arrangement of lobbying determines corporate Europeanization. 
However, as the decision on Europeanization depends on managerial choice, in the 
following sections we will investigate the firm level process through which corporate 
leaders develop their EU level lobbying strategies. Based on the above developed 
‘framework of determinants of corporate Europeanization’ and existing scholarship on 
EU lobbying and lobbying capabilities, this study explores the Europeanization process 
from two perspectives. First it investigates the antecedents of managerial choice in 
relation to the development of EU level strategies and second it examines the firm level 
process of Europeanization itself. For the analysis of these two aspects of 
Europeanization (i.e. antecedents and process) a theoretical model is created, arguing 
that corporate Europeanization has to be divided into two distinct levels. The ‘dual-level 
model of managerial choice’ is a conceptual model that aims to describe the process of 
how corporations develop their domestic lobbying strategies and transpose these onto 
the EU level. According to the ‘dual-level model’, in the process of corporate 
Europeanization first managers decide on how the firm should engage politically at the 


















* Environmental constraints through opportunity structures will be discussed 
in the following chapter (chapter 5). 
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strategy and organizational structure, managers construct the corporation’s EU (second) 
level strategy. Besides referring to the level of engagement (i.e. domestic and 
supranational), the dual-level model also suggests a procedural sequence or 
prioritization in the process of Europeanization. To engage successfully at EU level, 
first, firms need to develop a lobbying strategy, lobbying capabilities and integrate 
political activities in the organizational structure at the domestic level. Figure 4.2 below 
shows the framework of antecedents of managerial choice in the process of corporate 
Europeanization.  
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Figure 4.2: The antecedents of managerial choice in the process of corporate 
Europeanization 
 
Based on this theoretical model, it is argued that when managers design and 
develop their organization’s lobbying structures; they are influenced by internal and 
external factors at the same time. At the domestic level, internally the available financial 
resources constitute limitations for what a firm can afford when it decides to engage in 
political activities. Hence, this study acknowledges the importance of financial 
resources, but argues that instead of being the most important determinant of 
Europeanization, resources only provide a ‘threshold’ factor. Below a certain 
‘threshold’ firms are unable to engage in direct individual lobbying or European 
engagement. Yet, even above the ‘threshold’, Europeanization does not come 
automatically – it depends on managerial choice, which is impacted by other factors as 
well, such as environmental constraints. If resources are available, managers can decide 
whether they engage in political activities and what types of capabilities they will 
develop for these activities. Besides, managerial choice is also influenced by external 
factors, such as the institutional environment and the political context. As it was 
explained earlier, environmental characteristics influence managerial decisions through 
Managerial choice on domestic lobbying 
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environmental resource dependencies and opportunity structures, which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Applying this conceptualisation to the empirical 
data that was derived from the interviews, this chapter argues that the Europeanization 
process of large firms’ lobbying ought to be divided into two distinct levels. The first 
level includes managerial choice concerning the design and construction of domestic 
lobbying structures, while the second level concerns managerial choice in relation to EU 
level capability building.  
 
The analysis of the interviews revealed that managerial choice at the second 
level (Europeanization) is determined both by firm level and institutional level, internal 
and external factors. Confirming EU lobbying studies, findings suggest that managerial 
choice at the second level is influenced by environment-related constraints - such as EU 
level resource dependencies and domestic and EU level opportunity structures – as well 
as the available financial resources within the firm. However, besides these factors, this 
study found that Europeanization strategies are also significantly determined by the 
internal, firm level ‘triple impact’ of domestically available variables, such as the 
domestic lobbying strategy, political capabilities and the organizational structure for 
lobbying. These variables according to the researcher’s knowledge have not been linked 
to the process of corporate Europeanization in previous studies. Yet, as the analysis in 
the following sections will show, managers tend to rely on the already existing 
domestically available lobbying structures when they design and construct the EU level 
engagement plans.  
However, before further investigating the dual-level managerial process, we 
have to explore how lobbying capabilities are related to firm level lobbying strategies, 
how these strategies influence firms’ organizational structures and finally how these 
three variables impact EU level strategy development. Political management capabilities 
are defined as “the dynamic processes by which a firm influences or complies with their 
political environment” (Oliver and Holzinger 2008: 5). Political capabilities can be 
internal and external in nature (Oliver and Holzinger 2008). While internal capabilities 
refer to individual lobbying, external capabilities describe political action through trade 
associations and contract lobbyists (Lawton, Rajwani et al. 2013). In this chapter 
however a different classification is taken. Consistent with Oliver and Holzinger’s claim 
that the “dynamic capabilities perspective can draw attention to the crucial role of 
internal competencies in enabling firms to execute political strategies successfully” 
(2008: 6), lobbying capabilities will be investigated in relation to firms’ organizational 
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structures. Therefore, this study defines internal political capabilities as a set of 
corporate political competencies, managed under a functional and formalised 
department of public affairs. Unlike previous definitions, this classification stresses that 
internal capabilities are integrated in the organizational structure and form an 
inseparable part of it. External capabilities, on the other hand will be defined as 
corporate political activities and competencies that are managed outside the 
organizational structure, through external contract agencies. Hence, in contrast to 
previous definitions, this study considers external capabilities as part of ‘individual’ or 
‘direct’ lobbying too. The scope of this study covers only direct, individual lobbying; 
therefore contracting will be understood only through public affairs agencies or experts. 
Hence, although collective action strategies through associations may be also 
considered external capabilities, these will not be explored in the study. In terms of 
professionalism, external capabilities are equally sophisticated, but compared to internal 
capabilities, less integrated into the firm’s organizational structure. As such, internal 
capabilities lead to an integrated lobbying strategy, whereas external capabilities lead to 
an outsourced lobbying strategy. 
Based on the analysis of the semi-structured interviews with large firms and 
lobbying consultancies, this study presents a ‘framework of four firm level strategies for 
the organization of lobbying capabilities’. It is argued that - based on their managerial 
decisions – large firms develop one of the four ideal typical strategies for managing 
their lobbying capabilities. The four strategies concern four different corporate 
approaches towards lobbying and can be linked with different types of lobbying 
capabilities as shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Type of strategy Type of lobbying capability 
Integrated Internal 
Outsourced External 
Network-based Networks used as capabilities 
Inactive No capabilities 




4.3.1 The ‘integrated strategy’ 
The first type is specified as the ‘integrated strategy’. This strategy is 
developed by firms that integrate professionalized public affairs capabilities inside the 
organizational structure. It was found that in this group firms’ top management 
recognizes the strategic importance of lobbying in relation to business strategy and 
therefore assigns a formal organizational unit exclusively for public affairs with 
dedicated human resources and a separate budget. These firms may also extend their 
internal lobbying capabilities by contracting public affairs agencies as an additional 
resource for the in-house unit. Firms’ public affairs function is defined in the literature 
as an organizational unit “responsible for maintaining external legitimacy by managing 
the interface between an organization and its socio-political environment (Meznar and 
Nigh 1995: 975). Literature shows that “public affairs as a distinctive function is more 
likely to be found in larger national, international and global” companies (Moss, 
McGrath et al. 2012: 48), however the size, structure and scope of their activities may 
be very diverse in different countries (Moss, McGrath et al. 2012), nevertheless 
corporate lobbying constitutes a part of the public affairs function (Harris, Moss et al. 
1998). Firms with a well-managed and well-organized public affairs function are most 
likely to be able to undertake very sophisticated political analysis and have a ‘strategic 
focus’ in public affairs (McGrath, Moss et al. 2010: 343). Interviews suggest that in the 
UK, most large firms have a dedicated public affairs or government relations 
department. As a London-based public affairs manager explained:  
“at organizations at a certain size that is the norm…The vast majority, who 
want to engage will have an in-house team and we will work for that team. For 
smaller organizations… this is not the case.”21 
Although the ‘functional titles’ of these units may be different, their roles are largely 
similar. Interviews confirmed previous findings of the literature that these in-house 
teams are functional units that support senior management with their expertise in public 
affairs and corporate lobbying (Harris, Moss et al. 1998; Moss, McGrath et al. 2012). 
The PA unit is generally linked directly to top management, reporting to the CEO or 
vice-chair level (Baysinger and Woodman 1982; Harris, Moss et al. 1998; Moss, 
McGrath et al. 2012). As one of the London-based in-house lobbyists explained the PA 
unit is recognised “as a centre of expertise on distilling what are sometimes very 
technically and legally complex cases”22.”This section does not aim to give a 
                                                 
21
 Consultant 6 at London-based multinational agency, interview by author, 28.10.2009 
22
 In-house lobbyist 4 at large British company, interview by author, 28.08.2009 
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comprehensive picture of in-house public affairs functions (for a detailed analysis on 
that see Harris et al (1998) focusing on UK organizations, Baysinger and Woodman 
(1982) and Post et al (1982) on US firms and Moss et al (2012) on a global overview). 
Rather the mechanisms between firms’ domestic lobbying capabilities and 
Europeanization abilities will be investigated.  
The analysis of interviews revealed that, although firms with an ‘integrated 
strategy’ have a comparable structural design at the domestic level, their European level 
capabilities may be different. While some firms with an ‘integrated strategy’ set up an 
EU office in Brussels, others do not. As noted earlier, resource dependencies influence 
lobbying strategies through the institutional environment. Differences in 
Europeanization, more specifically dual-level (domestic + EU) design versus one-level 
(only domestic) design of lobbying capabilities seem to be a consequence of firms’ 
environmental dependencies. A London-based in-house lobbyist explained, highly 
regulated markets require firms to develop strong links with the public sector both at the 
national and the EU level: “We operate infrastructure that has national importance. We 
are important to the UK economy. We need to have close ties with government in all 
levels”. Since its privatisation the company also has an EU office in Brussels, which 
handles all the regulatory issues stemming from the EU. Conversely however the 
existence of an in-house team does not necessarily imply that the firm also has an EU 
office in Brussels. Those firms, which are not as much dependent on having close links 
with EU level decision-makers do not invest into setting up a dedicated EU 
representation. In the following paragraphs, first we will explore those firms that have 
EU offices and then in the ensuing sections those that did not invest in EU level 
representation. Figure 4.3. below that shows the most typical internal lobbying structure 
of a multinational or large international UK company that follows an ‘integrated 
strategy’ and has a dedicated EU office. The arrows do not imply reporting structures, 
but show the informational input from various stakeholders on the different corporate 
and institutional (domestic + EU) levels. The dotted lines show that the units at the 
different corporate levels may or may not use external capabilities.  
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Figure 4.3: ’Integrated strategy’ at multinational and international companies with 
an EU office  
Interviews suggest that at firms, which have both an in-house public affairs 
department and an EU office in Brussels, the two teams work closely together and their 
work is interdependent on each other. The in-house team needs the regulatory expertise 
of the Brussels office, while the EU office needs the lobbying experience and know-
how of the in-house department. In terms of EU level lobbying, at firms with an 
‘integrated strategy’ the corporation’s EU office is the central player, since it receives 
all the important informational input from the local subsidiaries, the headquarters as 




































synthesise all available information and present it towards the EU institutions and vica 
versa, receive information from the institutions and then ask input from all other 
internal corporate stakeholders. The internal sophistication of lobbying requires each 
corporate unit to do their task as professionally as possible; since they feed their 
expertise into the internal network and the quality of their job have an impact on the 
overall lobbying success of the corporation. This hierarchical informational dependence 
is well characterised by the quote from a government relations manager at a 
multinational’s Hungarian subsidiary: “We have 8-people staff in our Brussels office 
and they give us a mandate who to meet and what kind of interests we should 
represent.”23  
 Apart from multinationals, large non-international public and private firms with 
an ‘integrated strategy’ have a similar internal structure, but instead of three different 
layers they only have the headquarter-level and the EU-level. Nevertheless the 
sophistication – including the structure and the formalisation of the lobbying function - 
remains the same. Figure 4.4 below shows this arrangement.  
                                                 
23
 Government relations manager CEE, at multinational’s subsidiary in Hungary, interviewed 10.08.2009 
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Figure 4.4: ‘Integrated strategy’ at large non-international private and public 
firms with EU office 
Interviews suggest that those companies that follow the ‘integrated strategy’ and set up 
dedicated, in-house EU-offices tend to have a government/public affairs unit in their 
domestic headquarters as well. In this case, as it was noted before, the national and the 
Brussels-based PA unit work together on policy issues, but talk to different audiences. 
While the domestic unit lobbies the national government, the EU unit talks to the 
supranational institutions in legislative matters and international stakeholders (including 
competitors, NGOs and associations) in building alliances. Such high profile of 
formalisation - creating complex internal structures for lobbying - is very typical among 
large UK firms. Large (multinational / international and non-international) companies 
tend to have an in-house lobbying department in London and many have a separate EU 
























At those companies however that follow an ‘integral strategy’, have an in-house PA 
department, but no EU office, the public affairs professionals of the in-house team 
lobby EU institutions - by regularly travelling to Brussels. I argue that at those firms 
where the financial resources would be available for a permanent EU level 
representation, companies will only set up a Brussels office, if their operations are 
strongly affected by EU-level regulatory pressures. Hence these findings support the 
proposition: ‘Environmental resource dependencies both at the domestic and EU level 
determine how firms design the organizational arrangement of lobbying and how they 
internationalise their lobbying structures.’ Out of those firms that have enough financial 
resources and follow an integrated strategy, only those will invest into an EU office, 
which are strongly affected by EU-level environmental resource dependencies and 
hence consider it important to have direct day-to-day relationship with EU institutions. 
All the other will only rely on their domestic structures and will leverage the capacities 
of the in-house team.  
 
As an in-house lobbyist24 at a London-based firm explained smaller PA 
departments do both national level and EU lobbying. These firms also follow the 
‘integrated strategy’, but as it is shown in Figure 4.5 below, their strategy is managed 
from the domestic headquarter. 
Figure 4.5: ’Integrated strategy at firms without an EU office 
 
 
                                                 
24




















In the next section the ‘outsourced strategy’ will be explored with the objective to 
understand how this approach influences companies’ Europeanization strategies.  
 
4.3.2 ‘Outsourced strategy’ 
Firms follow an ‘outsourced strategy’ when they engage in professional 
lobbying, but develop their lobbying capabilities outside the firm’s organizational 
structure by relying only on external capabilities. In this type of arrangement, firms do 
not develop functional, in-house departments for lobbying, but rather outsource this task 
to public affairs agencies and/or lobby through associations only. For some large firms, 
agencies provide the only way to directly engage in lobbying. The figure below shows 
the structure of a firm, where lobbying is outsourced. The dotted lines indicate that the 
firm may or may not rely on domestic and EU-level associations and participate in issue 
networks. Figure 4.6 below shows this strategy.  
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As the figure shows, despite the lack of internal capabilities for lobbying, the 
inclusion of a specialised agency provides professional, external lobbying capabilities 
for the firm’s management. Hence the ‘outsourced strategy’ remains similarly strategic 
and professional as the ‘integrated strategy’, but instead of the long learning and 
investing process, the firm acquires professional public affairs services from the market 
as an external resource. This political resource is then turned into external political 
capabilities through the cooperation and joint work of the contractor firm’s top 
management and the contracted agency’s PA team. Firms that follow the ‘outsourced 
strategy’, contract a specialist agency or law firm to represent their interests at EU 
institutions; or at the domestic level the government. Consequently, in this type of 
relationship, the contractor acts as an intermediary between the legislative decision-
makers and the corporate management.  
 „Most of it is business diplomacy, which means that we position ourselves as a 
mediator between the company that we represent and the European and member 
state authorities.”25 
Agencies act on behalf of their clients, enabling organizations to get active by providing 
monitoring services, the interpretation of information and support in implementing 
lobbying campaigns (Lahusen 2003). Interviews suggest that when firms follow the 
‘outsourced strategy’ - besides being supported by human resources, professional 
services and lobbying expertise - top managers become ‘educated’, coached and 
consequently empowered by agency teams to represent their interest individually too. 
Consequently, contrary to what one would expect that companies keep the most 
important political tasks in-house; from the interviews it emerges that firms tend to 
outsource the strategic parts of lobbying. Consultants argued that they are seen more 
like management consultants than commercial lobbyists, because they can look at the 
strategic implications of the legislative changes or changes in government.  
“the main job of business people is to manage the company. They keep inside the 
lower-end work, but they delegate the really interesting jobs, such as the 
political negotiations or compromise building.”26 
This is a typical approach of a UK company that acknowledges the necessity to support 
internal knowledge with professional external know-how. Firms realise that the specific 
public affairs expertise is necessary for successful lobbying and internally this know-
how may not be available.  
                                                 
25
 Consultant 4 at Brussels-based consultancy, interview by author, 15.10.2009 
26
 Consultant 4 at Brussels-based consultancy, interview by author, 15.10.2009 
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“Internally you are too close or you are too focused on your job. You are on the 
fire fighting aspect, rather than the strategic part.”27 
 
Interestingly, the analysis of the interviews revealed that agencies are not only used by 
firms that do not have internal lobbying capabilities. Data shows that many of the large 
UK companies that follow an ‘integrated strategy’ also use public affairs agencies as an 
external resource. Hence the question arises: why do firms, which invested a lot in in-
house lobbying capabilities contract agencies additionally as well? Interviews suggest 
that two major factors encourage firms with an ‘integrated strategy’ to contract external 
agencies: the internal demand of the PA team for additional resources (human and 
lobbying expertise) and the environmental pressure of public institutions for objective, 
non-biased information in exchange for access to decision-making (Bouwen 2004). 
Additional resources may be particularly important in a campaign or a specific case, 
when workload is multiplied. As an in-house PA professional at a London-based firm 
explained: 
“we are under-resourced as a team in terms of headcount, they provide support 
and added value in terms of ideas in a number of policy objectives…… they give 
us intelligence so that they are eyes and ears and looking around the corner for 
us, which is fantastic so they are a worthwhile service to have. “28 
In these cases, it is the in-house team, which contracts the agency to extend its own 
resources. The same interviewee added: 
“It is an ideal structure. It is a happy balance. I must admit if you want to bring 
all of that service in-house, it is a lot of work, and you are talking about 2-3-4 
heads and I am not so sure you can do it so well, because these guys specialise 
in the field, know what they are talking about, have the networks and contacts, 
have the knowledge and you want that.” 
Although it is accepted by many that agencies or independent lobbyists have less 
technical knowledge in the specific sector than their clients, many stakeholders argue 
that contracted experts may have a deeper understanding of the political decision-
making mechanisms, and a wider network with policy-makers.  
“What an outside team brings is intelligence and more political stuff. The in-
house team will have more technical expertise to draw on and they can be close 
to the issues, whereas an agency is able to bring outside perspective, draw on 
                                                 
27
 Consultant 6 at London-based agency, interviewed 28.10.2009 
28
 In-house lobbyist 5 at London-based firm, interviewed 20.10.2009 
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other clients’ experiences and also the connections that they make on a day-to-
day basis politically.”29 
As it can be seen from the above quotes, in-house teams rely on agencies, because they 
need the capabilities, more specifically the external human resources and special 
expertise that these consultancies provide.  
“Some of what we do is to make the in-house team look good. We feed in a lot to 
the in-house team and then they present that as their own.”30 
As it was mentioned earlier, besides resources, environmental resource dependencies 
also trigger firms to extend internal capabilities. Although the public sector both in 
Brussels and in London strives to increase the transparency and legitimacy of decision-
making by involving a wide array of different interests, institutions will always remain 
wary of relying too much on individual businesses (Coen 2009). In the EU, those 
businesses are able to gain an insider status, which can provide “reliable, sector-specific 
and pan-European information” (Coen 2009: 156). To achieve this, firms participate in 
coalitions and issue networks or take the help of agencies. Agencies provide a brokerage 
role, because they may be perceived by public officials as less biased. Firms realise that 
access to decision-making does not only require them to be professional in public affairs 
and provide up-to-date and technical expertise (Bouwen 2002), but also to triangulate 
information and be able to manage positions from a more objective external perspective. 
Companies recognise that they need to counterbalance their messages with an external 
point of view - even if they have internal capabilities - because the institutions demand a 
balanced argument. As Brussels-based senior lobbyist claimed:  
“company employees are not seen as independent by the authorities. It happens 
regularly to me in any country that a senior official tells me, I tell you this, but it 
is only for you not for the client, but they tell me in order to find the compromise, 
to find a solution. They could never do that with a public affairs manager of the 
company, not even with the CEO.”31 
He argued that authorities and decision-makers might be more open with consultants, 
because they expect them to work for a compromise. They exchange information for 
information and they expect consultants to represent their views towards the company’s 
decision-makers: 
“We try to reach a compromise what the authorities want and what the company 
would like to achieve or obtain. So it is very much kind of honest broker 
                                                 
29
 Consultant 6 at London-based agency, interviewed 28.10.2009 
30
 Consultant 6 at London-based agency, interviewed 28.10.2009 
31
 Consultant 4 at Brussels-based agency, interviewed 15.10.2009 
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approach that we take. We defend the public views with the client and discuss 
with them how they can adapt to it and then we go back and discuss the client’s 
views and the interests with the public authorities. „ 
Besides the triangulation of political arguments, in-house teams also ‘use’ their external 
counterparts for pushing ‘sensitive’ messages through their internal organizational 
hierarchy, by providing an external view to top management. As one of the senior 
London-based consultants explained:  
“it is easier for us to tell the management something they do not want to hear, 
than for their in-house team. They worry about their jobs. Quite often it is the 
internal team that says we need you guys to come in because we can’t say these 
things.”32 
Agencies act as a mirror of the environment and able to show a different perspective 
without the limiting factors of intra-organizational hierarchy and power struggles. By 
having an external point of view, firms and their management get additional information 
about a case.  
 “We are independent. I still need to meet the first in-house lobbyist who dares 
to tell the CEO, that you are wrong; whereas we are independent. We will tell 
the companies, this is not a winner.”33 
However when the internal public affairs capabilities are extended, there may be 
tensions between the two teams. Stakeholders argued that when the in-house and the 
external team work together, the most important issue is the clear division of labour 
among the two ‘competing’ units. Without formalised and well-defined roles for both 
the in-house and the agency teams, duplications and overlaps may occur.  
“our roles are clearly defined; otherwise there is no value to us.”34  
In cases however when the added-value of the contracted agency is not clear cut, 
competition between the internal and external units can lead to frustrations on both 
sides. As lobbyist at one of the biggest London-based PR and PA companies 
highlighted:  
“We had a client who had a very big PA team. It was very competitive. The 
internal PA team was trying to prove itself for the parent company all the time. 
You are there to add value or additional resources but it becomes much more 
like them and us and I don’t know if it works that well actually. There need to be 
a very clear set of rules around who does what. At clients where they don’t have 
                                                 
32
 Consultant 3 at London-based agency, interviewed 17.09.2009 
33
 Consultant 4 at Brussels-based agency, interviewed 15.10.2009 
34
 Consultant 6 at London-based agency, interviewed 28.10.2009 
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a team you are genuinely adding value. You are giving high-level strategic 
advice, really shaping their agenda, help them deliver and make a difference. 
That is great and does not happen that often. Bigger clients are much more 
likely to have in-house teams, who will be struggling to deliver. “35 
Empirical evidence of the above section suggests that in Brussels and London even 
firms that follow an ‘integrated strategy’ will contract specialised agencies. In this case 
the agency is contracted by the in-house team with the aim to deliver additional 
resources and an independent, objective view. The latter is used to triangulate political 
positions towards public decision-makers on the one hand and to push ‘sensitive’ 
messages through top management on the other hand. Managers however have to 
consider many interrelated issues when committing to the extension of lobbying 
capabilities, such as tensions and responsibilities between the two teams. These findings 
confirm previous claims that consultancies “should be seen as complementary to the 
political action of firms” (Coen 1997: 103) and provide useful additional insights about 
the share of responsibilities between in-house and external teams and the added values 
of agencies for corporate political activity.  
 
4.3.3 ‘Network-based strategy’ 
The third type of approach, which will be referred to as the ‘network-based 
strategy’, is followed by companies that do not develop any formalised structure, 
internal or external capabilities for lobbying. Instead, these firms follow an informal, 
network-based strategy, which is developed through the mobilization of the top 
management’s interpersonal relationships. The network-based strategy means that 
neither a declared, formal budget, nor personnel is dedicated to corporate political 
activity internally or externally, instead networks are used as capabilities to influence 
decision-making. Hence due to the lack of a well-defined expertise, budget or 
organizational structure this approach is considered in this study as non-professional. 
Figure 4.7 below shows this strategy.  
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Figure 4.7: The network-based strategy 
 
As it becomes obvious from the figure above, this type of strategy has its 
limitations. The most striking is that firms’ top management does not develop 
additional, specialised capabilities for lobbying, but only leverage existing internal 
resources, in the form of personal connections. As it was shown earlier, large firms 
followed the ‘network-based strategy’ in Brussels and London only before the 
professionalization process, whereas EE firms still engage in lobbying with this type of 
strategy. Interviews also suggest that besides its crucial importance in EE countries, the 
network-based approach remains important both in the UK and at EU level as well. But 
in contrast to EE practices it is used only as a ‘supplement’ to the ‘integrated’ and 
‘outsourced’ strategies and not as an individual lobbying strategy. Due to its crucial 
importance in the Eastern European context, this type of strategy will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 6. 
 
4.3.4 ‘Inactive strategy’ 
The last ideal typical approach under investigation is the ‘inactive strategy’. This 
is followed by firms that do not engage in corporate political activity and consequently 
do not develop any type of internal, external or network-based capabilities for lobbying. 
Managers may choose the ‘inactive strategy’ due to many interrelated factors, however 















besides this approach, which are not dependent or do not consider themselves dependent 
upon regulatory pressures, do not have sufficient financial resources for interest 
representation and have a less functionally diversified organizational structure. This 
second type of ‘non-professional’ strategy is followed mostly by companies that are 
small and medium-sized and operate in less regulated sectors.  
 
4.4 Dual-level model of managerial process on Europeanization 
Besides revealing the link between domestic and EU level organizational 
arrangements, the analysis provided two more important findings. First that managerial 
choice, in relation to EU level strategy development, is not exclusively determined by 
the ‘triple impact’ of domestic firm level strategy, capabilities and organizational 
arrangements, because then all companies with in-house structures would set up an EU 
office automatically. Instead, it was found that managers are also influenced by 
environment-related resource dependencies and the availability of financial resources. 
Resource dependencies at EU level present themselves through the regulatory pressure 
of EU legislation. When a firm operates in a strongly EU regulated field, it needs more 
access to EU decision-making than those that operate in relatively less regulated fields. 
Without such pressures firms might not have the ‘incentive’ to Europeanize and seek 
access to EU institutions. The analysis of the interviews posits that managerial choice 
about EU-level engagement is directly influenced by the EU’s regulatory pressure - 
which ‘forces’ firms to extend their lobbying capabilities in Brussels, in order to 
influence EU legislation. As the in-house public affairs manager of a London-based 
firm explained: 
“Lot of the UK legislation originates in Brussels and need to be implemented in 
the member states, so lot of the legislation comes from Europe, so we always 
had a strong presence in Brussels.“36  
This type of regulatory pressure is also identifiable at those firms, which follow the 
‘outsourced’ strategy and engage in political representation only through agencies. In 
this case firms push their contracted public affairs agencies to represent them at EU 
level as well. As a lobbyist in Brussels explained:  
“I hear about more and more British companies setting up arms in Brussels. 
They have clients in the UK, who want to do more work in Europe.” 37  
                                                 
36
 In-house lobbyist at large British firm, interviewed 28.08.2009 
37
 Self-employed Brussels-based consultant 13, interviewed 17.11.2009 
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The director of a London-based agency confirmed the same by claiming that their 
clients are interested in working not only in the UK, but across a “range of different 
jurisdictions.”38 These quotes highlight that EU level resource dependencies create an 
internal demand for Europeanization at those firms that follow an ‘integrated’ or an 
‘outsourced’ strategy. Hence managers will be influenced by their EU level resource 
dependencies as an important antecedent of their choices regarding EU level 
engagement. Consequently firms with less EU-related resource dependencies will be 
less inclined to set up direct EU offices and may prefer to engage at EU level through 
the domestic in-house team.  
 From the analysis of the four ideal typical strategies it becomes clear that the 
organizational arrangement of lobbying have a determining impact on how firms 
construct their EU level lobbying strategies. Evidence presented above suggests that 
firms’ Europeanization routes seem to mirror their domestic practices, since companies 
tend to build on their already existing lobbying structures when they engage in Brussels. 
Conversely, the structure of EU-level engagement mirrors firms’ domestic level 
lobbying strategies. Firms with in-house teams and an ‘integrated strategy’ tend to 
assign EU lobbying to this team or develop an additional EU office. Firms that follow 
the ‘outsourced strategy’ tend to push their agencies to extend their capabilities in 
Brussels and will keep on acquiring EU lobbying services externally. Firms with 
network-based strategies tend to have a similar network-based approach in Brussels as 
in their home environments, while firms without lobbying capabilities, or as classified 
with an ‘inactive’ strategy tend not to engage in Brussels either. The framework of 
corporate Europeanization variables is illustrated in table 4.3 below.  
Table 4.3: Framework of corporate Europeanization variables 
Capabilities Domestic strategy Organizational form for 
EU level lobbying 
Internal  Integrated Domestic in-house team / 
EU office 
External  Outsourced Representation through 
agencies 
Network Network-based Network-based contacts 
directly in Brussels 
None Inactive No contact 
                                                 
38
 Consultant 13 at London-based agency, interviewed 17.09.2009 
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Hence, Europeanization theoretically may take four different forms depending on the 
design and construction of lobbying capabilities, strategies and the arrangement of 
public affairs activities in the organizational structure. These findings confirm previous 
work suggesting that firms build on their domestic political capabilities (Holburn and 
Zelner 2010) and that those firms with existing CPA structures and experience in 
political engagement are more likely to engage in CPA again (Getz 1997; Getz 2001) in 
their internationalisation processes.  
 
The analysis above supports the proposition that firms build on their domestic 
lobbying capabilities in their Europeanization. Findings suggest that those firms, which 
already have formalised, internal lobbying capabilities at the domestic level, will rely on 
these facilities, whereas those that rely on external or informal structures, will use these 
channels at EU-level too. Moreover these findings also suggest that the availability of 
capabilities in itself would not be enough to explain the differences in corporate 
structures. Interviews revealed that firms build on their existing capabilities but only 
extend them if they feel pressured to do so. This pressure comes from EU-level 
environmental resource dependencies. While firms in the UK and Brussels set up 
formalised internal structures to meet the requirements of their institutional 
environment, firms in Hungary do not formalise their lobbying activities. At the same 
time, when they enter the EU-level arena, firms that are affected by strong legislative 
pressures from Brussels invest heavily in formalised and professional structures, 
whereas those that perceive less pressure will ‘only’ transpose their national structures 
to the supranational level.  
Hence although the Europeanization of firms that follow the ‘integrated’ and 
‘outsourced’ strategies is relatively straightforward, EU level engagement for firms with 
‘network-based’ or ‘inactive’ strategies proves more difficult. Consequently, firms with 
non-professional strategies may be handicapped in their Europeanization efforts. As it 
will be shown in chapter 6, firms in these latter two categories tend to have difficulties 
transposing their domestic strategies to the supranational level and hence their direct EU 
engagement remains limited and constrained.  
 Based on the empirical insights, derived from the analysis of the framework of 
the four ideal typical strategies, in the following section the previously discussed 
theoretical model of ‘dual-level managerial process of corporate Europeanization’ will 
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be applied to the four ideal typical strategies. Figure 4.8 below shows the dual-level 
managerial process of Europeanization in relation to the different strategy types.  
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Figure 4.8: Theoretical model of the dual-level managerial process on 
Europeanization in relation to the different strategy types 
 
With the theoretical framework of the ‘dual-level model of managerial choice of 
Europeanization’, an attempt is made to explain the complex process, in which firms 
transpose their lobbying capabilities to EU level. On the basis of firm level and 
institutional level variables, this framework tries to understand the differences in 
corporate Europeanization. The model seeks to contribute to the debate about how firms 
Europeanize their lobbying strategies (McLaughlin, Jordan et al. 1993; Coen 1997; 
Bouwen 2002; Coen and Dannreuther 2003; Taminiau and Wilts 2006; Bernhagen and 
Mitchell 2009; Coen 2009). Furthermore, the model improves our understanding of how 
firms transpose their lobbying strategies to the supranational level, by extending the 
scope of the analysis to the firm level process of Europeanization. It thereby extends the 
literature on public affairs management at the EU level (Moss, McGrath et al. 2012; van 
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instead of exploring the activities of those that have already developed professional 
public affairs functions and/or Europeanized their lobbying strategies. In keeping with 
prior research from Lawton and Rajwani (2011) and Lawton, Rajwani et al. (2013), this 
chapter explores and links the antecedents of domestic managerial decisions on 
lobbying capabilities, with the variables of managerial choice concerning EU level 
public affairs engagement.  
 
The dual level model of managerial choice is also related to the existing 
literature on corporate political activity (Hillman et al 2004). The model addresses EU 
level strategy development from the perspective of domestic level organizational 
structures, which previously have not been considered as being crucial in strategy 
development on Europeanization. In the new model, the organizational arrangement of 
lobbying determines the process of strategy development at the supranational level. By 
extending the analysis of corporate Europeanization to those firms, which do not have 
EU offices or permanent in-house representatives in Brussels the study contributes to 
the corporate lobbying literature that focus predominantly to the engagement strategies 
of the largest firms with EU offices (Coen 1997; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Barron 
2011; van Schendelen 2012).  
The dual level model illustrates well how the study supports the second 
proposition that ‘Firms build on their domestic organizational design of lobbying in 
their Europeanization processes’. Findings suggest that those firms, which already have 
internally formalized structures for lobbying at the time of entering the EU arena, will 
rely on these structures directly, or will extend these with internal EU-offices. Whereas 
those that arrange their activities externally, or relied on network-based structures at the 
domestic level, will rely on external arrangements or networks in their 
internationalisation process too.  
 
Assertions from interviews in relation to the propositions were triangulated by exploring 
the corporate structure of interviewed corporations both at the domestic and EU levels. 




The chapter investigated the Europeanization process of large firms, by 
analysing the process, through which firms develop their lobbying structures and 
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Europeanize their public affairs. The chapter consisted of four main parts. In the first 
part it was investigated what factors determine corporate political engagement 
strategies. It was argued that while financial resources constituted a certain ‘threshold’ 
factor for the development of lobbying strategies, capabilities were found to be essential 
in the process of Europeanization. It was claimed that EU level engagement depends on 
managerial choice and therefore instead of resources, the investigation of capability 
development needs to be explored. Besides resources, the domestic institutional context 
was examined as the other crucial determinant of Europeanization.  
In the second section it was argued that domestic institutions act through 
environmental resource dependencies. Through the investigation of the UK, EU and EE 
experiences, the impact of domestic institutional structures were contrasted in relation to 
lobbying strategies. More specifically, we investigated the question of how the domestic 
institutional environment impacts firms’ professionalization. It was argued that in the 
UK and EU contexts the lobbying industry’s professionalization process - through 
which network-based strategies were turned into arm’s length formalised activities – 
was triggered by firms’ resource dependencies in the increasingly regulated institutional 
environments. Here we investigated factors behind the professionalization process by 
applying two competing dynamic theories, the theory on institutional transitions and the 
resource dependence theory. We found that Peng’s theory on institutional transitions is 
less helpful in explaining managerial choices behind professionalization, since network-
based strategies dominated lobbying practices for a long time, despite the fact that the 
UK already had a democratic and formalised institutional system, and firms in other 
respects managed their relations through arm’s length processes. It was argued that 
instead of efficiency considerations, firms started to professionalize their public affairs 
activities, as a consequence of the increasing environmental resource dependencies, and 
the parallel ‘democratisation’ of the institutional system, through which firms became 
legitimate political actors. These findings were then contrasted with the EE experience, 
through the overview of the Hungarian case. It was argued that the post-socialist 
institutional environment does not provide the same incentives for professionalization 
than western capitalist systems and hence lobbying in Eastern European states were 
found to be still dominated by network-based strategies. 
In the third section, the theoretical model of a ‘two-stage managerial process of 
Europeanization’ was presented and applied to the investigation of the antecedents of 
managerial choice - in relation to EU level strategy development - as well as the 
organizational process of Europeanization. It was argued that Europeanization of large 
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firms needs to be divided into two distinct stages. The first is when managers design 
and construct domestic lobbying structures, and the second is when they decide upon 
EU level capability building. The ‘Framework of the antecedents of managerial choice 
in the process of corporate Europeanization’ illustrated that when managers decide on 
how to engage in political activities at the first (domestic) level they are ‘only’ 
influenced by environmental constraints and the constraints of available financial 
resources. However, the analysis showed that managerial choice at the second level 
(Europeanization) is affected both by firm level and institutional level, internal and 
external factors. Confirming EU lobbying studies, findings suggested that managerial 
choice at the second level is not only influenced by environment-related constraints and 
financial resources, but also by the ‘triple impact’ of domestically available variables, 
such as the domestic lobbying strategy, political capabilities and the organizational 
structure for lobbying. Extending the findings of previous studies, this research found 
that these internal, firm level variables have a crucial impact on how firms Europeanize 
their lobbying activities. Furthermore, in contrast to previous EU studies, the chapter 
investigated Europeanization from a firm level perspective, by linking the process of 
strategy development to the analysis of organizational structures. Based on theories 
related to resource dependence, dynamic capabilities and public affairs management, a 
framework of four firm level strategies was developed. According to the framework, 
firms were grouped into four main categories. Those that integrated lobbying 
capabilities into the firm’s organizational structure were classified as having an 
‘integrated strategy’. Under this category, three different organizational arrangements 
were classified, based on whether the firm was a multinational corporation or a non-
international firm and had or did not have a separate EU office. In the second category 
those firms were grouped that relied only on external capabilities in their lobbying and 
did not internalise capabilities. These firms were identified as having an ‘outsourced 
strategy’. The first two strategies were discussed in detail as most of the UK firms and 
those active at EU level were found to follow these strategies. The other two strategies 
were argued to be less typical among large firms in the UK and at EU level. The 
‘network-based strategy’ was found to characterise firms before the professionalization 
process in the UK and Brussels and Eastern European firms presently. At last the 
‘inactive strategy’ was presented as an ideal typical type of strategy that is mostly 
followed by SMEs in less regulated sectors. Through the analysis of the different 
organizational arrangements the chapter created a link between firms’ domestic and 
European level public affairs strategies. Based on the findings I argued that besides 
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resources and the influence of the institutional environment, at the firm level the ‘triple 
impact’ of strategy, capabilities and organizational arrangement of lobbying determines 
corporate Europeanization.  
 In the last section the ‘Theoretical model of the dual-level managerial process on 
Europeanization’ was applied to the four ideal typical lobbying strategies. It was found 
that firms’ Europeanization routes seem to mirror their domestic practices, since 
companies tend to build on their already existing lobbying capabilities when they 
engage in Brussels. Firms with internal lobbying capabilities were found to manage 
integrated strategies at the domestic level, and lobby at EU level through their domestic 
in-house teams or dedicated EU office. Those that rely on internal capabilities at the 
domestic level, were argued to engage in outsourced strategies in their national capitals, 
and rely on external agencies at EU level as well. At those firms, where networks 
constitute the main form of lobbying capabilities, managers were argued to engage in 
network-based strategies at the domestic level, and tend to focus on interpersonal 
relations in their EU level strategies too. Firms without lobbying capabilities were 
argued to remain inactive at the domestic level too, and not having lobbying contacts at 
EU level either. Findings suggested that the lack of professional domestic capabilities 
make EU level engagement difficult, since the lack of available organizational processes 
limit the process of EU level engagement and political strategy management. Findings 
were argued to confirm and extend previous work in relation to how firms build on their 
domestic political capabilities in their internationalisation processes (Holburn and 
Zelner 2010).  
 Now we have established how firms Europeanize their activities, and what 
factors impact this process. However, as it was noted earlier, the impact of domestic 
institutions was only explored through environmental resource dependencies. In the 
next chapter, we will investigate how domestic institutions affect firms’ 
Europeanization decision, through the opportunity structures they create for interest 
representation.  
 
5. Capitalism in Hungary 
The previous chapter highlighted that the institutional context affects 
Europeanization through environmental resource dependencies that influence how firms 
can access decision-making. It was argued that domestic institutions therefore impact 
lobbying through strategy that is being constructed as a response to environmental 
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resource dependencies. The analysis explored firm level mechanisms of 
Europeanization. In contrast, this chapter takes a more political science approach, 
investigating how domestic institutional structures affect firms’ Europeanization 
decisions, through opportunity structures in a developing capitalist or more specifically 
post-socialist context. The objective of this chapter is to investigate the question of how 
domestic institutions impact the Europeanization decision of firms. The scope of the 
analysis will be limited to the themes of interest politics, state-society and state-business 
relations. As the state has a crucial role in the institutional transformation process of 
post-socialist capitalism, this chapter will investigate the determinants of lobbying with 
the theoretical framework of comparative capitalism (Jackson and Deeg 2008) and the 
comparative institutional approach of industrial transformation (Evans 1995).  
According to comparative capitalism literature, the institutional context 
influences the “identity and interests of economic actors, and hence the development of 
firm resources and capabilities” (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 549). Consequently, 
institutions also shape the internal governance of firms and endow them with different 
capabilities (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 550). In contrast to the firm-centred view that was 
applied in the previous chapter, in this empirical chapter the question of 
Europeanization will be explored from a different angle, the perspective of institutions. 
Institutions have a crucial impact on capabilities in corporate governance, industrial 
relations and other domains (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 551). Following the varieties of 
capitalism thesis that institutions shape the internal governance of firms, by offering 
them particular opportunities, and shaping the power of different stakeholders (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Jackson and Deeg 2008), in this chapter it is argued that lobbying is a 
managerial choice that is influenced by institutional opportunity structures. Therefore, 
this chapter will investigate how EE firms’ lobbying strategies and decision on 
Europeanization is (or can be) determined by the characteristics of the emerging 
institutional system. Therefore, in the coming sections, the characteristics of the post-
socialist institutional environment will be explored, in relation to the firm’s 
Europeanization decision.  
 
5.1 Domestic institutions and Europeanization 
As the main research question concerns Europeanization of large firms, a link 
needs to be created in the analysis, between the institutional environment of post-
socialism and EU level lobbying. This link will be made through the political science 
theory of the ‘degree of access’. In the EU literature scholars have contrasting views 
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about the impact of domestic interest intermediation on Europeanization. While some 
admit their importance, and investigate how they affect Europeanization, others argue 
that their importance in the European interest representation literature is exaggerated 
(Eising 2007) or their role is “irrelevant” (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 171). This 
chapter contributes to this debate by arguing that scholars could not find variation in 
Europeanization abilities in relation to domestic structures, because they based their 
analysis in the developed capitalist context - exploring differences between 
organizations that came from pluralist, corporatist and statist modes of interest 
intermediation. These interest intermediation structures however are prevalent only in 
developed capitalist systems and have many similarities to the EU’s lobbying structure. 
As Richardson and Coen noted the “EU lobbying system is no different to most national 
lobbying systems (at least in Western and Northern Europe) (2009: 341, brackets in 
original). Hence, although there are national differences, it is very difficult to show how 
these relate to Europeanization.  
 
It is generally accepted that engagement in political representation requires 
organizational capabilities at both the domestic and the EU levels, and consequently 
managerial choices may be significantly different in diverse interest representation 
systems (Burns and Carson 2002). In the EU lobbying literature two contrasting views 
are theorized about the impact of domestic interest intermediation on Europeanization. 
Through these two contrasting theories, EU scholars argue that domestic institutions 
matter, although consensus is not found on how they do. According to these theories 
organization’s domestic access to decision-making have a direct impact on how they are 
able to access European level policy-making. The compensation hypothesis argues that 
those organizations, which have weak access in their home environment - due to the 
lack of institutionalised interest representation channels - try to compensate their lack of 
access by lobbying at the supranational level (Beyers 2002; Klüver 2010). Conversely, 
according to the positive persistence theory weak domestic access leads to weak 
European engagement, because actors’ access to decision-making in their home context 
directly stimulates or hinders their Europeanization abilities (Beyers 2002; Eising 
2007). Hence, actors with limited domestic opportunities, focus on consolidating their 
situation at home, and “do not seem to bypass national governments in order to 
compensate for their domestic weakness” (Beyers 2002: 608).  
In contrast to those that contest the importance of domestic institutions, this 
chapter posits that the characteristics of post-socialist capitalism create a structurally 
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different environment for interest intermediation than it is known in western capitalism, 
and consequently affects firms’ Europeanization differently than corporatism, pluralism 
or statism. By joining the debate about the impacts of the ‘degree of access’, the 
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate whether the emerging capitalist environment 
supports or hinders firms’ Europeanization.  
 
5.2 The state’s role in the domestic institutional environment 
The purpose of this section is to highlight the role of the state in creating interest 
intermediation structures, and shed light on the differences of eastern and western 
interest representation environments. A plausible explanation for the marginal EU level 
representation of EE firms may be the lack of former EU policy-making experience, and 
hence the preference to represent interests through the national corporatist structures. It 
may be assumed that by empowering domestic business associations to represent their 
interests in Brussels, EE firms save the investment in costly EU-offices and ‘learn’ how 
to participate in EU level lobbying. Hence if EE firms are not present in direct 
supranational lobbying, then it could be expected that they invest a lot in indirect 
associational representation and go through the corporatist route to make their voices 
heard in Brussels. In order to investigate this proposition, the chapter will explore the 
corporatist interest intermediation structures in Hungary. Yet, if we find that 
associational representation is not available to companies then our research question 
becomes even more puzzling – how do these firms represent their interests at home and 
in Brussels? Do they try to get access directly at their national government as the 
positive persistence theory claims or do they bypass their domestic structures and try to 
influence EU decision-making instead as the compensation hypothesis suggests? 
Unlike in developed corporatist and pluralist democracies the state has a 
determinant role not only in terms of economic coordination, but also in how it impacts 
the institutional environment in which firms represent their interests. Hence, for the 
understanding of the interest representation system in the post-socialist context, the role 
of the state needs to be investigated more thoroughly. The chapter follows the notion 
that in post-socialist contexts, the state institutionalises the conceptions of power and 
authority that influence corporate governance and the development of capabilities 
(Whitley 2007: 40). As empirical data will highlight, in the post-socialist context, the 
state has a central role by creating the framework conditions that are necessary for the 
development of firm level lobbying capabilities and Europeanization. Hence, in order to 
shed light on the characteristics of the domestic interest politics in emerging capitalist 
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systems we need to look at what kind of relationship is emerging between state and 
society as well as the state and businesses.  
Due to the crucial differences between western and Eastern European capitalist 
coordination and the dynamism of transition, scholars have classified post-socialist 
capitalism in many different ways (Lane 2005; King 2007; Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2009; 
Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). Without getting involved in the debate about the type of 
emerging capitalism, this study will build on one of the most prominent criticism of the 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) theory, the importance of the state’s role in economic 
coordination. While in the original framework of Hall and Soskice (2001) the state’ role 
is largely ignored, due to the “heuristic focus on two types of capitalism in which the 
state played a relatively distant role” (Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2009: 292) this chapter will 
investigate the influence of the domestic institutional framework on Europeanization, 
with a special focus on the state’s role in the economy.  
Empirical evidence of semi-structured interviews with top managers of EE 
corporations and representatives of local NGOs, will be linked to the compensation and 
positive persistence thesis. By combining the theoretical constructs of political science, 
comparative capitalism and institutional theory, in the dynamic process of transition the 
implications of domestic institutions on firms’ Europeanization will be highlighted. In 
the coming sections the state’s role is investigated in three fields: the emerging interest 
representation structure, state-society relations and state-business relations.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section the characteristics of 
post-socialist interest intermediation structures will be investigated in order to answer 
the question: What kind of interest representation system is emerging in Hungary? The 
second section investigates the role of the state in state-society relations. Here the theory 
of embedded autonomy (Evans 1995) will be applied in the post-socialist context. In the 
third section the chapter investigates state-business relations. Ensuing sections will 
explore the impact of the emerging capitalist context on managerial decisions 
concerning Europeanization, while a last section concludes.  
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5.3 Interest intermediation: corporatism built as a house of 
cards? 
Following the notion that different kinds of states lead to different varieties of 
firm governance structures and organizational capabilities (Whitley 2007: 36) in the 
following sections the characteristics of emerging post-socialist interest intermediation 
system will be analysed from a historical perspective. Governments can influence the 
structure of influence groups, hence “the structure of the state is reflected in the 
structure of interest groups” (Coen, Grant et al. 2010 p: 22). The national distinctiveness 
of business systems depends on the “active structuring and coordination of interest 
groups and their interrelationships with state agencies” (Whitley 2007: 35). The 
objective of the coming historical overview is to show the path-dependence that led to 
the situation in 2013. It is argued that the emerging characteristics of the Hungarian 
interest intermediation system - in which firms ‘socialized’ and learned how to lobby, 
since the fall of socialism – had a direct impact on how firms today perceive their 
opportunities and chances for interest representation at the domestic and EU level.  
Although this section can be also viewed as an intermezzo – since collective 
bargaining is not directly related to corporate lobbying – it is necessary to include, 
because interest intermediation structures impact the way business interests are shaped 
and show how domestic institutional interest representation works in general. 
Consequently, collective bargaining is used here as a proxy for interest representation 
structures. It is argued that the different institutional structure of interest intermediation 
provides firms with different capabilities. In this context collective bargaining can be 
viewed as an infrastructure for political representation as it leads to the development of 
certain political capabilities. The following section investigates interest intermediation 
in Hungary in the first twenty years of transition, up until 2010, when the second Orbán 
government came into power. As the period after 2010 brought substantial structural 
changes into the system, it will be analysed separately in the next section.  
 
The institutionalization of bargaining was an ambiguous process in Hungary 
from the beginning. The ambiguity stemmed from the fact that while political leaders 
wanted to set up Western-type institutions in their quest for EU-membership and 
Westernization, in practice they saw strong unions as obstacles of the necessary 
economic reforms (Neumann 1997: 198) and the emerging corporatist structures had 
many in-built inadequacies. Industrial relations and social bargaining in 1998-2010 was 
moving along a pendulum between complete window-dressing and strategic 
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negotiations, depending on the actual government’s commitment towards social 
dialogue. However - with the exception of the first Orbán administration (in 1998-2002) 
- the emerging corporatist structure was working relatively well and provided 
institutionalised channels for interest intermediation. As it will be shown in the coming 
sections, Hungary implemented a quasi-corporatist system, based on an institutional and 
legal framework that resembled a top-down patchwork instead of a well-structured 
bottom-up “politically stabilizing and economically inclusionary class compromise that 
was West European neocorporatism’s great achievement” (Ost 2000 p: 504). The newly 
emerging corporatist system can be characterised by legitimacy issues stemming from a 
non-coherent legal structure, weak and fragmented social partners (both on the side of 
employers and labour), and an internally fragile system that is not protected from being 
bypassed or easily eliminated from policy-making.  
 
Under socialism neither trade union freedom, nor employers’ autonomy was 
allowed, nevertheless mostly state controlled trade unions and employers' associations 
played a prominent part in Hungary’s authoritarian corporatism (Crouch et al. 2009). 
Workplace trade unions belonged to a sectoral organization in the firms’ relevant 
industrial field. Trade union membership was compulsory for all employees, regardless 
of their position at the company and collective agreements were “a collection of 
offerings of performance targets by employees” (Tóth 1997 p:151). After the regime 
change, Hungary has set up a “system of social dialogue covering labour, social and 
economic policies” (Héthy 2002 p: 1). The freedom of association, free bargaining, and 
the right to strike were introduced by new legislation. The Act on the Right of 
Association (1990) secured the right to establish and operate associations, including 
trade unions and employer organizations. The right to strike was ensured by the newly 
introduced Strike Law (1990), whereas the Labour Code (Act 22 of 1992) recognized 
the right to organize together with the right for collective bargaining (Héthy 1999).  
The Labour Code institutionalised a model in which workplace-level trade union 
organizations coexist with works councils (Tóth, Ghellab et al. 2004). Employees at 
non-unionized companies could choose to set up a union to represent their interest or 
alternatively to elect works councils (Crouch et al 2009). In the newly introduced 
system the statutory works councils served as a secondary representation channel for 
employees - used for information and consultation procedures at the company level, but 
they did not have co-determination rights (Crouch et al 2009). Works councils had to be 
elected by secret ballot in every company, where the number of employees exceeded 50 
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(Mako and Simonyi 1997). Besides the newly established works councils however, the 
role of trade unions as main actors in collective bargaining was also retained. Unions 
had the right to join any sectoral, regional, or national trade union associations, or to 
maintain their independence as a company union. Consequently, the new system created 
overlapping rights and responsibilities between trade unions and works councils 
“mostly because of the unclear division of targets and responsibilities and overlapping 
information and consultation rights” (Eurofound 2009). Hence, employers could choose 
which body they want to cooperate with, the works council at the company level or the 
trade unions at the sectoral level. Although the Labour Code was introduced with the 
aim to “harmonize industrial relations with west European institutions”, due to these 
anomalies, in practice it weakened “union presence at company level” (Neumann 1997: 
191). It took away unions’ option to formulate an opinion in the most important 
economic issues, such as restructuring, privatization and lay-offs. Due to the 
decentralised system and the overlaps of institutions it became difficult to distinguish 
between works councils and trade unions (Tóth, Ghellab et al. 2004). As Neumann 
argued in relation to the newly forming institutional structure “behind the façade of 
western style institutions, closer scrutiny reveals a special blend of formal channels, 
individual labour market behaviour and informal group activity” (Neumann1997: 184). 
 
Yet, even without the anomalies around work councils and trade unions, the 
trade union movement in Hungary “had a fragmented character” (Mako and Simonyi 
1997: 224). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many different unions and federations were 
formed and their relations were rather conflict-driven (Mako and Simonyi 1997: 224). 
Both at national and sectoral levels, trade unions faced the problems of limited financial 
and human resources, serious understaffing and lack of specialised knowledge 
(Neumann 2006: 66). While Western European sectoral trade unions have several tens 
of employees, Hungarian confederations have at most ten to twenty full or part-time 
staff. Even in the best periods of social dialogue, trade unions were not able to influence 
policy decisions on the national level, nor to fulfil their interest representation role 
(Neumann 2006: 57).  
In Hungary - as well as in other EE countries - labour is much weaker than in 
corporatist systems due to the strong competition for foreign direct investment and the 
dependence on multinational’s investment decisions (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009: 
684). By the mid-1990s labour “as an organized force almost ceased to exist” (King 
2007: 308).  
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Besides labour, social partners on the employers’ side are similarly fragmented. 
In Hungary, employers’ organizations are the most heterogeneous group among social 
partners. They differ in almost all of their main characteristics: their political affiliation, 
size as well as the origin of their capital (Mako and Simonyi 1997). Most of them are 
successors of their socialist counterparts and so inherited considerable assets, staff and 
revenues from previous compulsory memberships. In the transition period they wanted 
to continue their activities and find their new place in the transforming interest 
representation system, while the new ones – created after the political change - were 
focusing on representing political and business interests of their members (Tóth 2006) 
towards political parties. While older organizations had an inherited sectoral structure 
from the socialist times, the new associations united individual companies at the branch 
or regional level (Koltay 2010). Given their low revenues, associations have always 
been supported financially by the actual governments in the form of “earmarked 
financial support for various activities” (Tóth and Neumann 2005). Due to their 
financial dependence, associations either competed for the ‘friendship’ of the state in 
their quest for preferential treatment and stronger voice in economic policy or supported 
the state without counterbalancing its reforms (Tóth and Neumann 2005).  
Their organizational weakness however, combined with the lack of expertise and 
dependence on state funds often “compromised their autonomy” (Koltay 2010: 11) and 
affect their independence in interest representation. In the background of formal 
tripartite negotiations, employers’ organizations often informally tried to cut deals with 
the government “to obtain a tax cut or budget support in exchange for wage concessions 
to trade unions” (Tóth 2006: 53). Cooperation with trade unions also played a marginal 
role in the life of employers’ organizations, if at all (Tóth 2006). They did not organize 
as a counterweight to trade unions (Tóth 2006) even in the more peaceful years of social 
dialogue - and as it will be shown in the following sections has not been able to team up 
as partners since 2010 either, when their existence became seriously threatened by the 
state. Contrary to classic corporatist arrangements, in Hungary, employers’ 
organizations have always regarded trade unions as ‘just’ another actor in tripartism, 
“instead of a partner in the bilateral regulation of the labour market and employment 
relations” (Tóth 2006: 56).  
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In the post-socialist period between 1988-1999 and 2002-2010, social dialogue 
was structured around the Interest Representation Council (IRC) 39. Its communist 
predecessor was originally limited to wage determination however after its reforms in 
1990, the IRC’s functions were extended on economic and social policy and its 
institutional structure became complemented with specialized committees and a 
secretariat (Héthy 1995). In the IRC various economic and social issues were discussed, 
such as labour market questions, social issues, minimum wage and wage increase 
recommendations, tax reforms, working time reduction and vocational training policies. 
In contrast to western corporatism, in Hungary the strongest participant at national 
tripartite negotiations has always been the government (Neumann 2010). Even in 
national-level wage bargaining the government has always played the decisive role 
(Tóth 2006: 53). Hungarian tripartism even in its pre-2010 form differed greatly from 
Western European neocorporatism. While in developed corporatist societies, tripartism 
is a political arrangement that offers labour and capital an institutionalised input into 
decision-making – in Hungary tripartism was a forum for formal negotiations over 
“very broad issues, with no guarantee that the agreements will become law or be 
respected by employers” (Ost 2000: 515).  
Corporatist negotiations had direct impacts only on the state sphere and did not 
include the majority of the private sector. Private interests, especially foreign capital – 
which has a dominant role in Hungary’s economy – has been largely missing from the 
tripartite structure (Ost 2000: 516). According to Ost – the lack of negotiations in the 
private sphere showed well that post-socialist tripartism was more about the government 
getting the consent of labour to neoliberal reforms than enhancing its class power (Ost 
2000). Consequently in this respect industrial relations had been more similar to those 
found in LMEs than CMEs (King 2007: 309). A strikingly non-corporatist feature of the 
emerging system was that the IRC’s collective bargaining positions were not legally 
binding. The IRC was the platform for national-level bargaining rounds for the 
minimum wage, and the body that issued annual recommendations for wage increases 
(Eurofound 2009). Contrary to the German corporatist system however - where “near-
universal collective bargaining” is supported by “strongly institutionalised industry-
wide negotiations and the legal enforcement of agreements” (Streeck 1995: 12) - in 
Hungary, the national wage recommendations of IRC were considered to have only an 
‘orientation’ function for lower level negotiations and the non-unionised sector 
                                                 
39
 Its predecessor the National Interest Reconciliation Council (NIRC) was set up in December 1988 by 
the last communist government. It was renamed as ‘The Interest Reconciliation Council’ (IRC) by the 
first post-communist conservative (Antal) government in 1990.  
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(Eurofound 2009). Unlike in Western corporatist systems, national wage agreements in 
Hungary were never legally binding, so they did not qualify as inter-sectoral agreements 
(Eurofound 2009). Similarly to other EE countries, in the highly decentralised 
Hungarian system, instead of industry-wide agreements, the firm level has been the 
dominant level of wage bargaining (Du Caju, Gautier et al. 2008). Not only because of 
the characteristics of the legal system, but mainly because of the dominance of 
multinational corporations in the economy, which would not consent to comprehensive 
collective agreements (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009).  
Another unusual feature of the emerging corporatist system was the 
‘vulnerability’ or weakness of its institutions. The central institution of the emerging 
tripartite structure, the IRC had such a weak legal basis that it could simply be ignored 
or straightforward eliminated from the system if a government wanted to disregard its 
existence. Consequently, in the years of the first and second Orbán governments (during 
1998-2002 and from 2010 till today) the IRC was not operating - its operation and 
position in the corporatist system was terminated. This situation could occur, because 
the IRC’s legitimacy was controversial from the beginning and was ultimately contested 
by both the first and the second Orbán administrations. Surprisingly neither the IRC, nor 
its predecessor the NIRC had written legal foundations. Some of its rights were 
regulated by the Employment Act (1991) and others by the Labour Code (1992) (Héthy 
1995: 361), but for instance, membership in the IRC was originally based only on 
Government invitation. Invitation was declared once in 1990 and subsequently it did not 
receive any further legal basis. As a consequence, membership as well as the legitimacy 
of membership has always been an issue in IRC, since it was not clear how 
organizations were to win a seat and how much weight they had in decision-making 
(Tóth 2006).  
Initiatives for the creation of a transparent legal basis have always failed, due to 
the lack of a political consensus, and as legal anomalies were not resolved until the 
2010 change in government. As the managing director of one of the trade unions 
explained in 2012: “Up until today this whole system did not have any legal framework. 
It was a gentlemen’s agreement.”40 He added that potential new entrants were sent away 
from the inner circle of trade unions, while at the employers’ organizations side; two 
new organizations could enter in the last 20 years “with political help”. Partly this legal 
void was used by the first Orbán administration (1998-02), when in 1999 it dissolved 
the IRC and “tripartism went into even further decline” (Ost 2000: 511). In this period 
                                                 
40
 Interview with trade union, interviewed 23.01.2012 
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interest intermediation came to a complete standstill. Instead of the IRC, the 
government established the National Labour Council (NLC) and the Economic Council 
(EC), which took over the IRC’s functions (Héthy 2002) with important limitations. The 
NLC’s scope did not cover economic (income) policy issues anymore; therefore it could 
not be involved in incomes policy consultations as its predecessor had been. As a 
consequence NLC’s right to set the statutory minimum wage was also taken away in the 
new framework (Héthy 2002: 11). The completely new institution, the EC was set up 
additionally for economic policy consultations with the objective to include new 
important players into the social dialogue - beyond trade unions and employers. The 
government argued that multinational companies, chambers of commerce and financial 
institutions also have to have a say in policy-making. Consequently, the EC had more 
participants than the IRC but did not have the IRC’s tripartite privileges. Even though it 
was formally consulted with the participation of the Prime Minister in 1999-2000, its 
recommendations were usually disregarded by the government (McGrath 2006) and its 
meetings had been “nicknamed as ‘audiences’ by participants” (Héthy 2002:12). Up 
until the second Orbán government, the years of the first Orbán cabinet was referred to 
as the most “critical period of interest reconciliation in Hungary, due to the ‘emptying 
out’ of the social dialogue” (Héthy 2002: 7). The newly introduced institutional 
framework had hardly any “performance, while relations with the social partners, 
especially with unions cooled below freezing point” (Héthy 2002: 8).  
After the four-year rule of the Orbán government, a coalition of the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) formed 
alliance and came into power in 2002. Social dialogue was opened up again in IRC and 
with more or less effectiveness - social partners were continuously consulted until the 
second Orbán administration in 2010. In sum, in the period of 1998 - 2010 each 
government has tried to adapt the institutional framework of tripartism to its own 
objectives, renaming and restructuring again and again the same institutions and 
dedicating slightly different tasks to them. With the exemption of the Orbán 
administration (1998-2002) however, the tripartite system more or less worked 
according to its original logic - of formally intermediating interests between the private 
(and public) sectors and the actual government.  
The word ‘formally’ is important to highlight here, as in practice the Hungarian 
experience of corporatism resembled only the “façade of tripartism”, with 
“unenforceable agreements treated instrumentally and imperiously by the government, 
impotent in defending workers’ interests, and serving as cover for the onset of a 
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neoliberal economy” (Ost 2000: 504). Looking through the tripartite experience of 
Hungary in the first twenty years of transition, it becomes clear that not only an 
‘illusory’ (Ost 2000: 503) or ‘fake’ (King 2007: 309), but also a fragile and defenceless 
system was created, which counted on the goodwill of the state in its commitment 
towards democracy and social dialogue. Neither the social partners, nor the legal 
framework was strong and coherent enough to hold against if governments wanted to 
ignore dialogue, bypass41 or dismantle bargaining structures. As the coming sections 
will highlight the emerging system was so weak that it could only operate as long as 
governments wanted to cooperate with the social partners. In contrast to its Western 
counterparts the emerging corporatist system was based on hierarchy and dependence 
instead of partnership - even in its blossoming years. Contrary to liberal corporatism - 
where employers are well organized, but trade unions are fragmented42 - or social 
corporatism, where unions are strong, but employers are divided43, in Hungary both 
employers and trade unions have always been fragmented and divided. While in 
Western corporatist systems ‘tripartite’ social dialogue between employers, workers and 
the government is managed horizontally between independent, well-acknowledged 
social and economic actors, in Hungary corporatism has been characterised by the 
hierarchical relations between the state and the weak, fragmented, state-dependent 
social partners. Additionally due to its dependence on multinationals, unorganized 
labour has not enjoyed real power over wages and collective agreements (Nölke and 
Vliegenthart 2009: 684). Hence economic coordination in Hungary has been dependent 
“on the state and on international companies” (Lane 2005: 245). Hierarchy as a central 
coordination mechanism in emerging economies has been identified in different 
concepts in the Varieties of Capitalism debate. Nölke and Vliegenthart referred to the 
Visegrád countries as Dependent Market Economies (DMEs) (2009), due to their strong 
dependence on trans-national corporations’ investment decisions, whereas Schneider 
(2008) applied the concept of Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs) to Latin 
America. In both cases scholars argue that hierarchy plays a major role in the 
coordination mechanisms of emerging economies, especially because of the dominant 
role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and hierarchical inter-firm and firm-labour 
relations. Applying these theories to Hungary, it becomes evident that the emerging 
                                                 
41
 Like in 1995 the Socialist Party introduced its austerity budget and reinstituted wage controls, 
bypassing the IRC (Ost, 2000). 
42
 Like in Switzerland or the Netherlands 
43
 As in Austria 
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interest intermediation structure can be characterised both by hierarchy and dependence 
as well as a patchy legal framework that was only as strong as a house of cards.  
The eventual failure seems to have been coded in the system. The next section 
will show how a more autocratic government could dismantle all the emerging 
corporatist structures and eliminate industrial relations from political decision-making.  
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5.4 State-society relations: one for all? 
As Evans points out “state involvement is a given. The appropriate question is 
not “how much” but “what kind” (1995: 10). Following the notion that “different kinds 
of state structures create different capacities for action” (Evans 1995: 11) in this section 
it will be explored how the second Orbán government has restructured power relations 
and internal opportunity structures in the Hungarian economy since 2010. The analysis 
will try to position the emerging state structure in the framework of Evans’s theory of 
‘embedded autonomy’. As it was noted in chapter 2, according to Evans (1995), states 
that go through the process of industrial transformation – which is in some sense what 
post-socialist states go through – can be placed in or in between the ideal types of 
‘predatory’ or ‘developmental’ states. While predatory states extract at the expense of 
society, developmental states take a role in the process of industrial transformation 
(Evans 1995: 12). In predatory regimes personal ties dominate and individual 
maximization has prominence over the pursuit of collective goals. Ties to society are 
ties to individuals and not institutionalised channels between organized constituents and 
the state (Evans 1995: 12). In contrast in developmental regimes formal competence is 
more important than clientelistic networks or traditional loyalties. These systems, 
according to Evans, are characterised by the ‘embedded autonomy’ of the state, where 
the public sector is internally cohesive, based on well-developed bureaucratic structure 
and linked to society through organized public-private ties (Evans 1995: 72).  
Based on this theoretical framework, in this section we will investigate the 
Hungarian state’s role in the economy as well as its relationship with its social partners. 
This section investigates how the second Orbán government has systematically 
dismantled the emerging corporatist structure of interest representation in Hungary. It is 
argued that the conservative government built its governance on a three-pillar strategy. 
First it systematically took away the autonomy of the public sector, second it 
disorganized civil society and emerging social bargaining structures and third it 
arbitrarily selected politically supportive social partners in order to manage ‘shop 
window’ style social dialogue. Each of the three strategies was carried out with 
substantial changes in the legal framework. The three seemingly independent strategies 
have contributed to the development of a new capitalist system that not only differs 
from LMEs and CMEs, but also from Dependent Market Economies (Nölke and 
Vliegenthart 2009). The emerging structure is based on autocracy and centralism. The 
state is not embedded into civil society, but completely distanced and isolated from 
social interests. Instead of partnership it dominates interest intermediation by colonising 
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the third sector, ignoring well-established professional associations but maintaining the 
‘appearance’ of social dialogue. In the coming sections the three-pillar strategy will be 
described by the detailed overview of the major changes since 2010.  
 
5.4.1 The seizure of state autonomy 
According to the theory of ‘embedded autonomy’, in developmental states, 
informal networks provide the internal coherence of the bureaucratic state. However 
these informal networks depend on the strict selection process through which the office 
holders are chosen into the “powerful, talented, and prestige-laden economic 
bureaucracy” (Evans 1995: 48). In contrast “the incoherent despotism of the predatory 
state combines undisciplined internal structures with anarchic external ties ruled by the 
“invisible hand” of clientelistic exchange relations (Evans 1995: 72). Public autonomy 
in Hungary has been threatened by politics well before the second Orbán government 
entered into power. Scholars noted that “governing parties have a deep reach into the 
ministries, in that they can potentially exercise control over the staffing of the entire 
ministerial civil service” (Meyer-Sahling 2006: 294). The Hungarian public sector was 
found to be polarized along the politically opposing left and right-wing parties, 
especially the ex-communist MSZP on the one hand and the anti-communist Fidesz, on 
the other (Meyer-Sahling 2006; Stark and Vedres 2012). This already existing 
politicization and compromised autonomy was further ‘developed’ when the Orbán 
cabinet regained power in 2010. While the first Orbán administration, as well as all 
other post-socialist governments before 2010, had a limited power in Parliament; the 
current Fidesz-KDNP44 cabinet with the two-third majority has an unprecedented place 
of manoeuvre.  
Empirical evidence shows that this majority is used by the cabinet to 
systematically restructure the legislative framework and “create a system based on the 
monopolization of the most important elements of political power” (Bozóki 2011: 650). 
As it will be shown in the sections below, the government compromised state autonomy 
through three interrelated processes: it centralised governmental policy-making, 
politicized previously independent public institutions and changed the process of law-
making. The centralisation of governmental decision-making started right after the 
Orbán cabinet entered into power. The cabinet introduced a previously unknown 
ministerial structure that paved the way to centralised decision-making. In the new 
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system the total number of political portfolios decreased from 15 to eight covering three 
to four different policy fields. For instance the Ministry of National Development 
covers development, infrastructure, ICT and EU funds. The government renamed public 
institutions as “government” institutions (Bozóki 2011: 652) and appointed Fidesz-
related persons to key positions. By this it weakened the independence of those state 
institutions, which previously played important roles in counterbalancing the state’s 
powers (Transparency 2012_b), such as the State Audit Office, the Prosecutor’s Office, 
the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the Budgetary Council (Bozóki 
2011: 652). A former Fidesz representative has become elected as President of the 
Media Authority, while the spouse of prominent MEP of Fidesz became appointed as 
the Head of the National Judicial Office (Bozóki 2011). Besides changing the 
ministerial structure the cabinet introduced a legislation that made it possible to dismiss 
public officials without ‘cause’. As a consequence “the cleansing of the entire 
government apparatus” (Bozóki 2011: 652) became possible. As the quote below 
illustrates, the autonomy of the state apparatus is seriously threatened today. Interviews 
suggest that public administrators do not manage their work along autonomous, 
professional criteria, but instead based on political motives.  
“…public administrators are very much threatened – today they can be fired 
without a reason. It is not necessary to even give them a mandate to do this or 
that because they are so scared that they want to please politicians. If the 
shadow lies on somebody that he does not accept the ‘National Cooperation 
System’45 in 100 percent then he is in trouble. Consequently, even the lowest-
level administrator wants to prove that he is a good, loyal employee of the 
government. Everybody wants to adapt to the system.“46 
 
Discussions show that in the public sector, instead of long-term career paths, internal 
coherence and formal competences, political loyalties and uncertainty prevails.  
“I know somebody, who used to work for a ministry two years ago, and since 
then he cannot find a job. Just because he worked there at the time of the other 
government, it is worse than China.”47 
 
As a consequence, the mood in the public sector is dominated by fear, existential 
vulnerability and servility. Interviews suggest that even top-level decision-makers 
cannot make decisions due to the lack of professional autonomy. Discussions show that 
authority for decision-making is kept in most cases at the prime minister and without his 
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consent, ministers are one-handed giants. A representative of a multinational’s 
subsidiary for instance explained that when the government introduced special taxes in 
some sectors – the so-called ‘crisis taxes’ – she went to negotiate with the ministry as a 
representative of an industry association. In the meeting the state secretary highlighted 
that he ‘was allowed’ to meet the representatives, indicating that higher level ‘assent’ 
had to be acquired for meeting the representatives of interest organizations at a time 
when important industry-related legislation was being introduced.   
“When the crisis tax was introduced a state secretary met us – in our role as 
representatives of the trade association - in the ministry of economy and he said 
to us that he was ‘allowed’ to meet us.” 48 
 
“I believe that today the power is in one hand – Orbán’s. Not even his ministers 
know which way to go. So this adds to the uncertainty. People do not know what 
they can or cannot do. People cannot operate.”49  
These quotes indicate two important points. First, how centralisation and hierarchy 
paralyzes the public sector and second, how the lack of autonomy affects domestic and 
multinational businesses. When ministers and state secretaries need top-level political 
permission to meet with the representatives of sectoral associations then the autonomy 
of the public sector does not seem to be guaranteed.  
 Besides the above detailed institutional changes, the cabinet has also changed 
the practice of law-making. Not legally, but in practice. It set the trend of legislation 
without consultations. In Hungary, the right to propose legislation lies with the 
government, Members of the Parliament (MPs), parliamentary committees or the 
President of the country (Transparency 2012 p: 50). This proposal then goes through a 
formal procedure – including in most cases ministry-led public consultations - before it 
gets accepted or rejected in the Parliament. The Orbán administration institutionalised 
an existing, but rarely used process in political decision-making, when legislation is 
proposed through MP’s motions. The majority of proposals submitted to the Parliament 
in 2010 were MP’s motions (Transparency 2012). When a legislative proposal is not 
submitted through the general way by the government, but by individual MPs, then the 
bill or legal modification can go through the decision-making system without the 
obligatory ministerial consultation procedures or the involvement of the government. 
This way all social partners, including business associations are completely left out of 
the process, not only because their input is ignored as in the years of quasi-corporatism, 
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but legislatively as well. Due to the unprecedentedly large number of legislative acts 
going through the majority-ruled parliament, businesses feel excluded from decision-
making.  
“Today we have to admit that there is a fastened legislative process. More 
negotiations were done in the last six months than in the last 10 years. I see 
professional organizations, which are not able and do not want to take this 
tempo of negotiations.” 50 
“In Hungary it is not worth to represent interests because today in the 
Parliament a ‘voting machine’ operates.” 51 
Talking about the reformed interest intermediation structures the executive director at 
Hungarian NGO52 argued that “this government does not care about the opinion of 
others. It is a closed system.” Former CEO of a large Hungarian company explained the 
same:  
“When we give information to the relevant ministry, they do not take it on-board 
or handle the information in any way. They are not open to our opinion at all. In 
the current governmental philosophy there is no culture or will for this kind of 
consultation.” 53  
So although the government formally has not changed the legislative procedure of 
political decision-making, by using individual motions in the majority of legal 
proposals, it changed the every-day practice of law making, excluding both the 
government and all kinds of corporatist channels from political decision-making. 
Interviews show that business people are confused in terms of the remained channels for 
formal interest representation. The vice-CEO of a large Hungarian company explained 
that he does not know what is going on in the legislative process, how can businesses 
today formally channel their messages:  
“The ministries should provide a gate [access point] in the different phases of 
the legislative process, a gate at the commission’s proposal, one at the 
parliamentary debate and a gate at the voting stage in the parliament.” 54 
 
The director of stakeholder relations at a multinational corporation55 in the energy sector 
argued that due to the changes “there are no formal, written and enforced forms of 
interest reconciliation” in Hungary any more. The available transparent ways of political 
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interest representation in these instances seize to exist, since the law is proposed and 
accepted in a matter of days, without any real debate or preparatory work. Furthermore, 
when an individual or a committee submits a motion, the original source of the proposal 
remains unknown. When legal acts go through this ‘fast-track’ process, the influence of 
strong lobby groups (Transparency 2012) and/or individuals (Janecskó 2012) are 
suspected. Therefore these legislations are often referred to as ‘lex’ and the name of the 
company or individual who presumably initiated the legislation56. These practical 
changes in the legislative system considerably changed the playing field, where 
business actors can promote their interests and left stakeholders without institutional 
interest representation channels. As executive director of an NGO explained firms can 
only directly manipulate legislation:  
“There are legal acts in the Parliament that are sold for certain amounts of 
money. The same goes for legal acts at municipalities. There are acts that the 
government wants to push through and they do. But there are regulations that 
the government does not care about. These are sold. I cannot prove this, but I 
heard that legal acts are sold in the parliament. They have their prices. It is 
known in business circles how much a change of legislation costs. With the 
current two-third majority anything can be pushed through the Parliament. 
Once the money is paid, the parliament votes in favour of the legislation.”57 
 
There is no evidence to prove that this type of corruption really occurs in Hungary.  
Nevertheless the above quote suggests that instead of bureaucratically formalised 
legislative procedures - which are carried out through the consensus formation between 
industry associations and state organizations (Evans 1995: 50) – legislative decision-
making is based on particularism and the exclusion of societal interests. The above 
detailed institutional and procedural changes raise our attention to the fact that both the 
public sector and its policy-making structure has started to move away from the well-
defined, coherent Weberian bureaucracy and Evans’s ‘state autonomy’. The state’s 
autonomy is increasingly compromised by the government’s efforts towards 
centralisation and control. Hence the question arises: How do these changes affect 
businesses and their lobbying strategies? In the coming section we will investigate the 
Orbán cabinet’s strategy towards social dialogue and the changes that occurred since 
2010.  
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5.4.2 The disorganization of civil society and corporatist bargaining 
structures 
In this section state-society relations will be investigated. In terms of social 
dialogue the Orbán government continued its previously introduced efforts in 
restructuring interest reconciliation. A stand-alone logic can be observed in the 
institutional reforms of the two Orbán governments between 1998-02 and since 2010 up 
until today. While all the other governments tried to at least formally meet the 
requirements of tripartite consultations and keep up the post-socialist quasi-corporatist 
arrangement, the conservative Orbán administrations strived to implement a completely 
different and in their view a “more pluralist model” (Hungarian_Government 2011: 29). 
A clear continuity exists between the first and the current Orbán approaches, with one 
big difference – the current cabinet’s unprecedented concentration of power and success 
in centralisation. As we saw in the previous sections, the system of interest 
representation went through several transformations between 1989 and 2010, but did 
not change fundamentally. Corporatism in its 2010 form resembled a patchwork of 
neoliberal governance through a quasi-corporatist framework. As it was shown in the 
previous sections, social partners have been weak and dependent, while institutions 
lacked legitimacy and power. However, compared to the system that is emerging since 
2010, in the previous system the civil society was weak, but at least ‘organized’. As it 
will be shown in this section, the Orbán cabinet has started to systematically 
‘disorganize’ this weak, but well-established civil sector. Just like in the definition of 
predatory states, the cabinet has been working at “weakening the traditional 
collectivises” (Evans 1995: 47) and has started to make sure that national level 
organized interests become disrupted even before they emerge. Since 2010, the 
conservative government has dismantled the emerging post-socialist corporatist 
structures and introduced centralised governance with the almost complete exclusion of 
social partners from political decision-making. The drastic restructuring happened with 
the paralysed mutism of not only the third sector but also the opposition parties. The 
question arises, how did this process evolve? What has changed in 2010 that led to so 
drastic changes in an emerging capitalist society? 
 
 After coming into power, the second Orbán government has disorganized the 
civil sector and dismantled tripartite bargaining in two steps: it abolished the IRC, and 
colonised the third sector. The government convened the meeting of IRC only once 
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before it announced its plans to restructure the entire system of social dialogue in May 
2011. The prime minister argued that by giving two-third majority to the government, 
the population delegated all its representational authority to the government. He 
explained that the government did not convene the IRC, because it only introduced 
legislation on fields where the electorate had empowered them to do so (Muhari 2012). 
On the IRC meeting, Orbán made it clear that instead of corporatism he believes in 
direct governmental representation. He said that it is not the trade unions who represent 
employees or employers organizations who represent employers, but the cabinet 
represents “the electorate of the Hungarian nation” including all social partners (Muhari 
2012). Although this political discourse may be attractive to voters, it clearly indicates 
the government’s approach towards interest intermediation: One for all. The majority 
government expressed its will to represent the nation and all of its diverse interests.  
 
Even though the Labour Code prescribed the IRC to negotiate with the 
government on all issues that concern labour, tax and budgetary policies, in its first year 
of governance the Orbán government has passed all of its important legal changes (the 
most important being: - the change in income tax58, - the legislation on the ‘option of 
dismissal of public sector workers without a reason’ and a 98 per cent penalty tax on 
dismissal pay in the public sector) without consulting any of the social partners 
(Bednárik 2010). Although all of these legislative acts must have been discussed with 
the IRC in the previous corporatist system, the Orbán cabinet has not consulted the 
organization despite the continuous request of the employees (Bednárik 2010). As the 
managing director of one of the trade unions59 explained: 
“He [Orbán] said he thinks that he represents everybody and these interest 
organizations [tripartite institutions] are substituted by the two-third and the 
direct consultations of the government with the citizens. … 
He also told us that he thinks we are important. Then we once again met, when 
we set the wage minimum and wage recommendations – here everybody was 
very effective because we wanted to prove that the government needs us and we 
are useful.  
Afterwards dead silence again. Half a year passed before they legally destroyed 
the IRC. And then in the next half a year we tried everything, wrote letters and 
tried to get in touch with the government. The government broke the law by not 
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negotiating with the IRC, and in the meantime, they accepted a lot of legislation 
that even in the narrow sense would be the responsibility of the IRC, because 
they were about employment. “ 
Business leaders expressed their scepticism about their interest representation rights 
under the new system. The chairman of the Board at a large Hungarian firm argued that 
without the IRC firms remain without support in interest representation:  
“Look at the Interest Reconciliation Council, which had only one session under 
the Orbán government. This shows the IRC’s weight. It has voice in the press, 
but it is ineffective in helping companies. With the increased level of minimal 
wage and the sectoral taxes, the government puts the economic responsibility 
onto the shoulders of firms.”60 
 
From January 2012 the government changed the tripartite system, by replacing the 
Interest Representation Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Economic 
Interest Coordination Forum with one newly established body called the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC). Besides trade unions and employers, the new 
institution includes the representatives of business chambers, civil society and scientific 
institutions as well as Hungary’s historical churches. Contrary to IRC however, in this 
organizations state representatives are not official members any more. At the plenary 
sessions of NESC, ministers take part only as observers (Komiljovics 2011). The 
government explained the changes with the inefficiency of the old system, and argued 
that the three bodies (IRC, ESC and EICF) were operating in parallel, with many 
overlaps. Contrary to IRC however, the new body has no decision-making rights, only 
the option to draft proposals. In effect, according to the new system the government can 
decide on wage and employment-related regulations on its own without any 
consultations (Komiljovics 2011).  
Trade union leaders as well as employer organizations regarded these changes as 
setbacks and argued that the new body will not be able to take over the functions of 
IRC. The inclusion of chambers of commerce, civil society and the representatives of 
science into the consultative processes (Hungarian_Government 2011) together with the 
restructuring of the whole tripartite institutional system created a centralised state, 
where decisions can be made with the complete negligence of social partners. As 
business leaders in Hungary say: 
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“There are no formal, written, enforced forms of interest reconciliation today.” 61 
With the abolition of the IRC society remained completely without formal access points 
in representing its interests. As political adviser argued:  
„Until this current government came to power, the reconciliation council and the other 
tripartite institutions were not very strong, but at least they worked. What we have 
today is a worse system. In the previous structure, at least information was flowing 
through a tiny tube, now this tube is completely stuck.”62 
Besides abolishing the IRC, the government has introduced several crucial laws 
without public consultations that drastically influenced interest representation structures 
in Hungary. Between 2011-2013, the government limited the rights of trade unions, 
restricted the rights to strike, reduced the rights to assembly and through the changes in 
the labour code decreased the rights of employees (Bozóki 2011). The words of the 
managing director of one of the trade unions63 show well how desperate social partners 
became: 
“We tried to push the government to make the IRC work, but it killed it after a 
year so we could not do anything else. If you look at our homepage, we tried to 
give our opinions about every legal act that is in our competence. We sent our 
opinions to everybody, we sent opinions to civil forums, we went through the 
press and we made a lot of constitutional court petitions. We tried to strike, but 
already then the government changed the strike law drastically over a 
weekend.”  
“Beforehand if there was no agreement the strike was still legal. In the past 20 
years very rarely was negotiation between the partners, but the strike was still 
legal without an agreement. Now it is not any more.”  
The Strike Law was changed in a week, based on an individual FIDESZ MP’s motion, 
without public consultation. Hence, even though the right to strike is ensured, the 
technical conditions of a strike are linked to such difficult criteria, that in practice it is 
impossible to carry out anti-government protests. By enforcing these legal changes, 
trade unions have been disempowered. After the modification of the Strike Law, the 
numbers of industrial actions drastically dropped. In 2010 only one warning strike took 
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place (Kajtár and Kun 2013). The modification of the Strike Law introduced “severe” 
limitations into the system of industrial action (Kajtár and Kun 2013: 15). Due to the 
changes in the strike law in the first two years of the conservative government, trade 
unions, although they tried, could not strike at all. Instead civil groups (such as 
Facebook groups like ‘One million people for the freedom of press’) organized street 
protests against the government.  
As the discussion above illustrates, the current government does not negotiate 
with social partners. Empirical evidence - derived from the interviews and secondary 
research of newspaper articles - shows that the cabinet’s policy-making follows a 
different path compared to all previous post-socialist governments. It is a path towards 
autocracy, where the institutionalised input of social partners is not welcome. In its 
interest politics, the Orbán regime seem to resemble the characteristics of Evan’s 
‘predatory regime’, in which the state “lacking its own programme of social and 
economic transformation” feels “threatened by the potential agendas of civil society” 
(Evans 1995: 47). As it will be argued in the next section, the cabinet has a unique 
strategy for social dialogue. It distances itself from all social stakeholders and then - to 
showcase its democratic commitment - it arbitrarily selects one or two organizations, 
and invites them to negotiate. Orbán relies on this tactic with trade unions, employers’ 
organizations as well as individual businesses and actors of the civil society.  
5.4.3 The rise of state corporatism 
Due to the above discussed changes in interest intermediation, organized 
interests today face a completely different institutional environment compared to the 
pre-2010 period. In this new institutional context, the government chooses its partners 
selectively by ignoring those that are well-established but not ‘friendly’ and privileging 
those that are politically controlled or ‘pro-government’. Through a few examples, the 
next section shows how the government colonises its social partners and picks 
selectively who it negotiates with. The following quotes illustrate how arbitrarily the 
government selects its partners and how previously formalised channels of interest 
intermediation have been turned into informal discussions. The managing director of 
one of the trade unions explained how previously formal corporatist negotiations has 
turned into informal, relationship-based meetings from one day to the other, when the 
government introduced its plans to introduce a new Labour Code. As social partners 
were not involved in the preparation of the legislation, unions competed with each other 
in order to become able to channel their views to the cabinet: 
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“…we realised that we do not have enough tools now, there are no formal 
forums and we still have to negotiate.  
…So we had to sit down informally with the government, with Viktor Orbán and 
managed to agree on some changes. When we realised that the government 
negotiates with us, we brought together our members and said that our positions 
are not good and everybody else will call us betrayers, what shall we do. Our 
members said ‘let’s do it even if like this, informally, and on our own, this 
employment legislation is so bad that whatever we can do, let us do it.’”64 
The director added that on the negotiations only those trade unions and employers’ 
organizations were represented, which were invited by the government, all others were 
excluded. This quote clearly shows how arbitrary and one-sided the government has 
become, in relation to its social partners and how it creates internal and external 
tensions among organized interests. Particularism also takes form in the government’s 
efforts in ignoring existing, well-established associations and supporting the creation of 
new ones, which are less critical towards the governing elite.  
“Interest associations can make publicity and communicate well. For example 
the president of Hungarian Trade Association (OKSZ) has been there in the last 
10 years and he is always there for the press, the press likes him and asks him. 
And what happened two weeks ago. Orbán thought that he is too much, so he 
had an idea to set up a new association instead - the ‘Hungarian Commerce 
Association.’” 65 
 
“This government tries not to negotiate with the established sectoral 
associations, but tries to bypass them and rather prefers newly formed 
organizations, which it thinks are closer to them. Or they consult individuals and 
bypass existing organizations.” 66 
The above quotes are excerpts from interviews with large domestic firms’ CEOs. 
Discussions suggest that business leaders are disturbed by what is happening in the civil 
sector, mainly because most of them are actively involved in the work of sectoral 
associations and hence through these roles they experience the arbitrary and autocratic 
manners of the government directly. One-sidedness also presents itself in how the 
government picks and selects its negotiating partners. In 2012, the government has 
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introduced the system of ‘Strategic Partnerships’ with the aim to include the “civil 
sector in the preparation of legislation” (The Hungarian Government 2012). The newly 
introduced system of social dialogue is a good example of how universal interest 
representation rights have been exchanged to particularistic, relationship-based ones. 
Under the new framework, NGOs, churches, trade unions, chambers and other interest 
associations are supposed to directly negotiate with the ministries in legislative 
procedures. Consultations however, are based on invitation only. Hence only those 
organizations can get involved, which are invited by the relevant ministries. The 
Ministry of Public Administration and Justice signed strategic partnership agreements 
with 47 civil society organizations in early 2012. These organizations can now 
participate in the preparation of legislative proposals - although their inputs are not 
necessarily taken into consideration, since they only have consultative rights. 
Consequently, all non-invited organizations are excluded from consultations. In 
practice, a centralised and clientele-based consultation structure has been introduced, 
which formally satisfies the political rhetoric of providing social dialogue, but lacks real 
rights and opportunities for stakeholders to engage in public decision-making through 
formal, institutionalised channels. Similarly to the civil sector, after almost two years of 
complete lack of dialogue, the government also ‘opened’ politically towards the 
business sector. Yet, instead of following the paved route of business dialogue through 
associations and the IRC, it signed ‘Partnership Agreements’ with individual firms. By 
December 2012 the Ministry of National Economy has signed agreements with 10 
multinational companies and declared its aim to conclude 40 more in the following 
year. The agreements were based on individual criteria and deals, without any 
transparent procedure and publicly available information. Business actors do not know, 
who and on what basis can conclude an agreement with the government. The contracts 
were presumably negotiated through informal personal negotiations, since information 
is not available about the procedures - the ministry publishes a news feed about the 
deals, only when contracts are already signed.  
As a left-wing activist organization, Transparency International reported 
(2012_b) while previous socialist-led governments rarely and indirectly communicated 
with civil society organizations and rather built its own clienteles, by establishing and 
cooperating with their own ‘friend-organizations’ (Transparency 2012_b), the Orbán 
administration shows a “general disinterest and lack of vision about the role and 
functions of civil society” (Transparency 2012). Despite its shortcomings and in-built 
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inadequacies (Duman and Kureková 2012) the emerging post-socialist quasi-corporatist 
structure and institutional framework in the pre-2010 period at least provided the 
semblance of corporatism. The analysis in this study however shows that the Orbán 
government has destructed even the illusion of corporatism and introduced a centralised 
system with the complete marginalisation of social dialogue. The way, in which the 
government has restructured the whole well-established – even if weak - institutional 
framework of tripartism, points us to believe that a new type of corporatism is evolving 
in Hungary. A more centralised and authoritarian form of corporatism that resembles 
more the classical corporatism of the early twentieth century than that known in the EU 
today. In this new system, the government privileges some social partners for the 
expense of all others, and creates a completely new system for interest reconciliation - 
taking out all the counterbalancing powers that the previous structure had. In the 
emerging framework, not only the legitimacy of associations, but also their operations 
get controlled by the state. This evolution is new in the history of Hungarian capitalism 
and might lead to the evolution of a form of centralised corporatism, in which the state 
negotiates with only a few politically selected, privileged stakeholders and ignores well-
established professional associations. In the last century, dictatorial regimes often used 
“state corporatism” (Schmitter 1974: 105) to provide “superior governability in the 
national interest compared to the conflict and disorder caused by the abstract formalism 
of parliamentary democracy” (Streeck and Kenworthy 2005: 444). Governmental 
actions enforced with the exclusion of organized interests and the deliberate 
disorganization of state-society as well as state-business relations seem to lead to the 
evolution of an authoritarian corporatist system in Hungary. The “invisible hand” that 
divides civil society and one-sidedly selects privileged partners, has demolished the 
emerging quasi-corporatist structure, and paved the way towards a despotic, centralised 
and authoritarian system. In a state corporatist system, the government can create and 
maintain “all of the corporatist organizations and may grant itself the power to assign 
and remove their leaders at will. Often such 'representative organizations' serve a 
function of pre-empting the emergence of autonomous organizations” (Unger and Chan 
1995: 31). Instead of voluntary or societal corporatism (which is often called 
neocorporatism or simply corporatism) - known in advanced capitalist, democratic 
welfare states - state corporatism is the “defining element of the anti-liberal, delayed 
capitalist, authoritarian” state (Schmitter 1974: 105). As Schmitter explains state 
corporatism is used to introduce ‘social peace’ by “repressing and excluding the 
autonomous articulation of class demands” (1974: 108).  
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Hence from a theoretical viewpoint, the Orbán government’s efforts to 
restructure and centralise the institutional and legal framework of social dialogue, may 
be seen as a step towards a new, but historically classical form of corporatism of the 
twentieth century that uses “corporatist organization as an instrument of state rule” 
(Streeck and Kenworthy 2005: 444). Today, nearly 23 years after the political and 
economic change even the “fake” (King 2007) guise of corporatism is over. While the 
“illusory” corporatism of Hungary only legitimatized the “marginalisation of labour” 
(Ost 2000: 508), the former regime at least had the formal legitimacy of some sort of 
societal corporatism. Current political processes however hold the threat of a new type 
of interest representation system and point toward an authoritarian type of corporatism 
or no corporatism at all. In this new institutional environment businesses have to face 
completely new challenges.  
In the next section we will investigate those actions of the government that 
directly impact the institutional environment of Hungarian firms and their corporate 
governance, including their interest representation abilities.  
 
5.5 State-business relations: the winner takes it all? 
The third perspective under investigation is state-business relations. Business 
and state is linked in all legal jurisdictions, since the government needs the resources 
and revenues that business generates and companies have interests in regulation (Coen, 
Grant et al. 2010). States play different roles in industry, depending on the country’s 
institutional design. Besides the interest intermediation structure, the current 
government has drastically changed the business environment too. First it restructured 
markets, disadvantaging multinationals and creating new state monopolies for selected 
industries and in parallel it colonised the economy by initiating forced buy-outs and 
using the state’s infrastructure for private interests. All of these actions were carried out 
by legislative changes that – instead of impact assessments and social dialogue – were 
based on and influenced by private interests and short-term political goals.  
 
5.5.1 Market restructuring  
In its economic strategy, the Orbán government relied on the same methods as in 
its approach towards social dialogue: particularism, centralism, one-sidedness and 
arbitrariness. In the summer of 2010, the government introduced ‘special’ taxes on the 
banking and insurance sectors (Balazs 2010) and in October it introduced ‘extra’ sector-
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specific taxes in other strategically important and foreign dominated industries, such as 
retail, telecommunication and energy (EurActiv 2010). The government has introduced 
its measures suddenly and unexpectedly, without any type of reconciliation with the 
concerned sectors. Particularism and protectionism showed through these interventions 
as well. The newly introduced sector-specific taxes for instance in retail affected not 
only multinationals but Hungarian businesses too. So the government has created a 
competition-distorting exception in the legislation and introduced different rules for 
domestically-owned chains of stores. This way the income-based tax affects domestic 
stores substantially less than their foreign competitors, although their income levels are 
similar (Index 2010). Adding to the uncertainty of businesses, the extra taxes were 
introduced retroactively, meaning that they became payable in the same year, despite 
the fact that the legislation was introduced in the last quarter.  
The Orbán government’s unfavourable policies against multinationals, presents a 
brake with all previous cabinets’ approach towards economic policy. Up until 2010 ”all 
post-socialist Hungarian governments, whatever their political persuasion, have posed 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as the main economic policy tool to restructure and 
modernize the national economy” (Crouch, Keune et al. 2009: 53). MNCs have been the 
engines of the post-socialist Hungarian economy. As Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009: 
676) declared Hungary – as well as other East Central European countries – is 
fundamentally dependent on the investment decisions of transnational corporations. By 
attacking multinationals, the cabinet has taken a new direction in its economic policy, 
compared to all previous post-socialist governments. As the analysis in the following 
sections will show, it is argued in this thesis that the economic policy of the Fidesz 
government paved the way for economic restructuring or more precisely the reallocation 
of private capital.  
 
In parallel with anti-foreign taxes, an avalanche of nationalisation plans was 
introduced by the cabinet since 2010. In 2010, acting seemingly on impulse, the 
government nationalised one of the largest aluminium manufacturers. The Hungarian 
Aluminium Production and Trade Company (MAL Zrt) caused an environmental 
disaster in 2010, because its red sludge reservoir at an alumina plant in western Hungary 
burst, killing 8 people (Dunai 2010). Soon after the disaster, the government introduced 
a bill and a few days later the Parliament nationalised MAL (Day 2010). Besides, in 
August 2012, the government declared its plans to re-nationalise the gas sector by 
buying back E-On’s Hungarian gas industry (EurActiv 2012) and signed a preliminary 
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deal with the company in November (Than 2012). In 2012, the state has also bought 
back 21.2 percent of the previously privatized national oil and gas corporation MOL, 
from Russian oil company Surgutneftegas and consequently partially renationalised the 
oil giant (BBJ 2012). When asked about the industry’s view on one of these 
nationalisations, one of the interviewees explained that his company did not have any 
options to influence the state’s nationalisation plans, even though it was highly 
disadvantageous for most private sector players. He explained that they tried to put 
pressure on the government via lobbying in Brussels, but even there failed to have an 
impact.  
“The problem was that with this step the government had broken all the 
Hungarian gas legislation, as well as the relevant EU-legislation. So we went to 
Brussels with our complaints. Consequently, Brussels called the government 
representatives and the representatives of the affected companies, and told them 
that this buy-out is problematic, because it violates EU law. Afterwards public 
officials came home and re-wrote the Hungarian legislation on a way that it did 
not infringe EU legislation any more, but still contained the same principles. 
Then they had to go back to Brussels and since the new act was still not in line 
with the EU’s principles, they were told that the Commission will write an 
official letter[start infringement procedure] against Hungary. Coming back from 
Brussels I was together with government officials on the plane. They laughed 
themselves dead and said that at least they will have something to wipe it 
with…Literally.” 67 
This quote shows the arrogance of the current administration not only towards its social 
partners domestically, but also towards EU institutions. Besides the straightforward 
nationalisation efforts, the cabinet has also introduced crucial legislative modifications 
in many sectors, and consequently considerably changed the playing field by pushing 
existing competitors out of the market and paving the way for new business entrants. 
For instance, it introduced a law that guarantees state monopoly for retail sales of 
tobacco products from July 1, 2013 and banned the sales of cigarettes in every previous 
retail outlets (Econews 2012). This step has drastically disadvantaged all major tobacco 
companies in Hungary, most of all multinationals, but also many thousands of small 
family-owned retail shops. Large social scandal followed the process when in May 2013 
the government awarded the new state concessions allegedly mostly to Fidesz 
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 Details of this interivew are available from the author. As the nature of the quote threatens the 
anonymity of the informant, due to the protection of the confidentiality rights of the participant, details of 
this interivew are not specified here. 
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politicians, their relatives, known sympathizers and their close economic circles (Nagy 
and Szabó 2013). Due to the monopolisation of the retail of tobacco products, the 
number of retail outlets selling tobacco products has dropped sharply from the previous 
fourty-two thousand to five thousand four hundred and fifteen (JM 2013; Piac és Profit 
2013). Investigatory journalists report that the new legislation originally was aimed to 
create market for a Fidesz-related tobacco manufacturer Continental Zrt. (Batka 2012; 
Pető 2012), whose employees and their family members have indeed won many of the 
new concession contracts (HVG 2013). As the press revealed the tobacco act was 
written on the computer of Continental’s CEO, a close friend of Fidesz’s faction leader, 
who officially submitted the proposal to the Parliament (HVG 2013). In relation to this 
thesis, it is not important whether these claims turn out to be proven or not, or how 
ethical this process had been. Instead this case has crucial relevance in a way that it 
illustrates how the government re-nationalises network-based sectors temporarily before 
re-privatising them (Magyar 2013: 265) by reallocating property to its own supporters. 
It also shows how legislation is ‘made’ in Hungary today, and how the government can 
change the entire structure, and legislative background of certain economic sectors from 
one day to the next without consulting social partners or the affected stakeholders. It 
also shows how economic restructuring or rather economic reallocation takes place. 
After the monopolisation of tobacco sales the appointed new outlets also got the right to 
sell alcoholic beverages and lotto sales.  
“… they are killing the economy with indirect tools, like tobacco legislation. 
They put the retail trade of tobacco products state monopoly and then they put 
the retail of alcohol and lotto sales a state monopoly as well. So all private 
tobacco firms, alcohol firms, and toto-lotto firms will go bankrupt. This is how 
they create market for their own economic empire.”68 
 
Besides the tobacco industry, the cabinet also restructured the voucher system69 and 
introduced state-monopoly in the provision of recreational and food vouchers for 
employees (All Hungary News 2012) from 2012. This legislative change suddenly 
excluded all those companies from the system that provided vouchers previously. 
Similarly the cabinet has introduced its plans to nationalise the waste management 
industry, by nationalising the purchase of recycled metal (EurActiv 2012). Although the 
political rhetoric of this initiative was to prevent black market sales of metals, the 
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form of compensation with tax benefits for firms. 
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proposed legislation has provoked an infringement procedure of the European 
Commission, because it would exclude all non-public companies from the waste 
market.  
Although far reaching conclusions cannot be drawn from the above discussed 
cases, nevertheless it becomes evident in the light of these changes that a “slow, 
surreptitious expansion of the state sector” is occurring (Kornai 2012: 56). The 
government propaganda argues that these re-nationalisation steps are taken for the sake 
of Hungarian people, protecting the interests of citizens and fighting for the success of 
national entrepreneurs. However interviews suggest that behind the politically noble 
thoughts and objectives, pure private interests are paving the way for a structured take-
over of economic ownership and power.  
 “It is the total re-allocation of economic power positions. It is not by accident 
that Orbán said after being re-elected that they will brake down the oligarchs. 
No it is about giving the main roles to their own oligarchs.”70 
 
“The government puts itself on the economy. Simply if there is a larger 
investment, there political deals rule. Firms have to win the favours of 
politicians… Behind politics there is always private business.”71 
The quotes highlight that businesses in Hungary operate in an environment, 
where competition and market structures can be changed from one day to the next as a 
consequence of unexpected and swiftly introduced bills. These quotes are supported by 
alternative data sources as well. For instance a non-academic book that was written by 
the Hungarian liberal intelligentsia (economists, sociologists, philosophers and fact-
finding journalists) argues that this new form of nationalisation takes place due to the 
lack of privatisable state assets (Magyar 2013: 414).  
 
In this uncertain institutional environment - as the previous sections have already 
showed - firms are deprived of their previously existing channels of interest 
representation through which they could do something to prevent or alter policy 
changes that affect their operations. In the light of the above discussed economic 
changes, the question arises: What kind of system is evolving? Can this new system be 
called ‘state capitalism’ or is it something else?  
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State capitalism can be defined as “the widespread influence of government in 
the economy, either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or 
through the provision of subsidized credit and / or privileges to private companies” 
(Musacchio and Lazzarini 2012: 4). As the above mentioned interventions show the 
conservative government has a politically admitted objective towards the nationalisation 
of those sectors that it considers strategically important. State capitalism “melds the 
powers of the state with the powers of capitalism”, hence instead of direct market 
competition, it depends on “government to pick winners and promote economic 
growth” (Wooldridge 2012: 1). State capitalism features not only the growing share of 
state-owned enterprises in national economies, but also those formally privately owned 
enterprises, which enjoy the support of the actual government (Wooldridge 2012). At a 
first glance this is exactly what happens in Hungary.  
“..the state wants to get an influential or rather major market share in those 
sectors that it considers strategic – not in an economic sense, but politically. 
Because the government believes that this is how it can influence market 
processes.”72  
 
State capitalism however can only partly be applicable to what is happening in post-
socialist Hungary. Findings of the interviews suggest that the label ‘state capitalism’ 
may not be the most appropriate. Because, even though on the one hand - similarly to 
Chinese state capitalism - the state acquires ownership (either majority or minority) in 
private firms, but on the other hand it is presumed that it deliberately distorts 
competition – with the help of legislative changes – to make way for new private, party-
related business entrants. Similarly to what Myant and Drahokupil (2010) noted in 
relation to Russia’s state capitalism that state-owned firms often behave like Russia’s 
private businesses by earning profits that were transferred into the hands of private 
individuals, in Hungary too the penetration of the state into the economy seems to be 
more a sign of predation or colonisation than the evolution of classical state capitalism. 
Apart from the political rhetoric behind nationalisations and anti-foreign economic 
strategies, investigatory journalism suggests that government officials have private 
interests in economic restructuring (Pethő 2011; atlatszo.hu 2012). The analysis of 
interview data, secondary sources of newspaper articles and online investigatory reports, 
form a picture of Hungarian capitalism that is less and less democratic and increasingly 
predatory. Empirical evidence derived from the interviews suggests that private interests 
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behind the governing elite use the infrastructure of the state in gaining unjustified 
economic advantages on the market.  
 We talk about state capture when certain circles of firms and individuals control 
public decision-making through public offices and hence influence legislation. In 
academic terms, Hellman et al (2003: 756) defined state capture as:  
“the efforts of firms to shape the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. 
laws, rules, decrees and regulations) through illicit and non-transparent private 
payments to public officials. “ 
According to scholars, state capture “should be measured by the extent of its impact on 
the economy” (Hellman, Jones et al. 2003: 757), which is exactly why it is important for 
us to understand the impacts of state capture on domestic enterprises. In order to 
understand how the domestic institutional environment of post-socialist capitalism 
affects firm level decisions of Europeanization, we need to explore how the state 
interferes with businesses. The objective of this thesis is to understand why large EE 
firms are under-represented at the supranational level, and how is it possible that the 
increasing length of EU membership does not seem to lead to increasing participation. 
In order to explore this puzzle, we need to unpack the characteristics of the domestic 
environment in which firms operate. Although Hungary in the early 2000s was among 
the low-captured states in Eastern Europe (Hellman, Jones et al. 2003), today this 
situation might have changed. Interviews suggest that the economic climate has 
changed drastically with the change in government, and this had a drastic impact on 
day-to-day business decisions. The next section presents actual cases that illustrate the 
unprecedented rent creation of political elites through state infrastructure, and shows in 
practice how this process impacts managerial decisions.  
5.5.2 The colonisation of the state 
Investigatory journalists argue that under the current government, individuals - 
who previously had strong ties to certain businesses or belonged to given interest groups 
- got into legislative decision-making positions at state offices, public companies as well 
as public monitoring authorities (atlatszo.hu 2012). The watchdog, Átlátszó.hu reported 
four main interest groups that according to their investigations have captured the 
Hungarian state under the Orbán administration (atlatszo.hu 2012). The article claims 
that close friends, relations and business partners of leading governing politicians have 
got top positions in key economic ministries, state authorities and state-owned 
companies, where they provide unfair advantages to certain business circles. The 
Hungarian press has investigated several cases where strong links are suspected to exist 
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between prime minister Viktor Orbán and private businesses favoured in state 
investment projects (Pethő 2011; Haász and Molnár 2012). HVG, the Hungarian 
business weekly has published a six-page investigatory article about the corporate 
network of more than 100 firms in the ownership of two businessmen, who are closely 
linked to prime minister Orbán (Rádi and Vitéz 2012). Lajos Simicska (owner of 
Közgép Zrt.73, and previously Chair of the National Tax Authority, under the first 
Orbán government) and Zsolt Nyerges (CEO of Közgép Zrt.) are the managers of those 
private firms, which won public tenders in the value of more than 300 billion HUF 
through state investments and EU-funded projects, since 2010 (Rádi and Vitéz 2012). 
Private interests seem to be interlinked with public offices closer than in advanced 
market economies. Mr. Nyerges besides being the CEO of Fidesz-related Közgép Zrt., 
is also the brother of Attila Nyerges, who became the main political adviser of Lászlóné 
Németh, Minister of National Development. The previous minister on the post is 
assumed to have left because of his conflicts with the new economic elite – around 
Simicska and Nyerges that have close relationships with large public firms (Pethő 
2012). The ministry is supervising all the large Hungarian public companies and 
handled more than 570 billion HUFs worth of public funds in 2012 (Pethő 2012).  
In the 2010 change in government many of Közgép Zrt’s top managers were 
invited to work in the public sector or got appointed as CEOs of public firms. One of its 
directors, Zoltán Schváb got appointed as state secretary of the Ministry of National 
Development, another previously Közgép employee, Csaba Baji became CEO of MVM 
Group (Hungarian Electricity Ltd.), Péter Gopcsa got appointed as CEO of OVIT 
National Power Line Company Ltd., Zoltán Kövesdi became chair of the Public 
Procurement Authority, while for instance Zoltán Petykó became chair of the National 
Development Agency (Magyar 2013: 242). These transitions from Fidesz-related 
Közgép into key state positions and to the top of public firms illustrates well how the 
revolving door has started to become institutionalised when Fidesz got into power.  
Although the above mentioned claims are not academically proven, and may 
remain only political allegations, they cannot be ignored. Interviews suggest that since 
2010, business leaders experience a new type of political pressure, a certain economic 
vulnerability, which has a direct influence on their corporate governance and managerial 
decisions. The unprecedented representation of politically supported private interests in 
the public sector, has brought about a new type of state-driven behaviour that resembles 
the characteristics of a predatory state. In predatory regimes the strong state takes 
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advantage of a “dispersed and weak business sector” and society and “pursue outright 
expropriation” (Kang: 182). In this type of regime, the state has a strong influence over 
the economy – through the political elite - and therefore can “expropriate” businesses 
(Kang 2002: 182). The analysis of this phenomenon is crucial in relation to lobbying 
and Europeanization. Throughout this chapter it is investigated how the domestic 
institutional environment influences firms’ Europeanization. The empirical evidence of 
the next section highlights how the predatory nature of the state directly impacts firm 
leaders’ managerial choices both in their every-day business decisions as well as their 
lobbying actions.  
Interviews suggest that since 2010, a new practice has occurred, through which 
certain elites misuse the state’s power: the phenomenon of ‘forced buy-outs’. In these 
instances, individuals that are considered party-related approach the owners of private 
companies and blackmail them into the ‘sales’ of their ownership rights, often without 
actual payment. In case the owners do not want to ‘cooperate’ and sell part or the whole 
company, the buyer threatens the targeted firm with tax office investigations, lack of 
public contracts or other negative intervention from public authorities. In contrast to 
state capitalism however, in these exchanges the firm does not get into state ownership, 
but instead, into the private ownership of a certain business elite close to the 
government. Exchanges are not traceable through statistics, therefore instead of the 
blurring of ownership structures between public and private (Stark 1996) or the 
expansion of state ownership through state capitalism (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2012; 
Wooldridge 2012) - private property gets in the hands of individuals through the misuse 
of state power.  
In the interviews, business leaders referred to many concrete cases that illustrate 
‘forced buy-outs’. Analysis revealed two major issues. First, that forced buy-outs are 
suggested to be directly linked to governmental elites and second that CEO’s non-
cooperation - in some instances - lead to direct legal consequences or ‘sanctions’. The 
direct link between forced buy-out cases and subsequent changes in legislation as a 
consequence shows how deeply private interest have penetrated into the public policy-
making sphere and how much the state has lost its autonomy under the Orbán regime.  
“They buy up a lot of companies…They use mafia tools. They use the power of 
the state. They go to the firms… 
For example I know of a media company, which made lamp post posters for 
parties during elections. They were always very careful to have 50-50 percent of 
Fidesz and MSZP on their posters. It is a private company. Some people went 
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there and said ‘we would like to have 50 percent of your company for free’. As 
the company did not want to sell, after two months the same people went back 
and said we want 80 percent of the company. Then - when the owners still did 
not ‘sell’ - after two weeks they introduced a law that forbids political posters on 
city lights [lamp posts]. As a consequence the market value of the firm went 
down to its 10 percent. This was einstand.”74  
This quote highlights how forced buy-outs are directly linked to political decision-
making, or in other words how ‘failure’ of corporate cooperation leads to legal revenge 
by the state. The use and in these cases misuse of majority power in furthering private 
interests is an unprecedented characteristic of political governance in Hungary, and 
indicates clearly the hierarchical relationship between the private sector and the state. 
Several interviewees referred to friends and acquaintances at large companies, who 
were approached by politicians or mediators, and were forced to ‘sell’ or more 
specifically give away their companies. An entrepreneur75, whose company was also 
‘taken away’ or more correctly ‘bought’ by a businessman in 2010, explained how his 
company got out of his ownership. Although during the interview he stressed many 
times that he acted on his own will without any external threats, his example shows in 
practice the general business climate that led many business leaders to give up on the 
ownership of their companies. In this respect, the following case is a practical example 
of how the emerging institutional structure directly influences firms in their every-day 
corporate governance and business decisions.  
 His story started when his company started to look for a new managing director 
in 2010, the period of the financial crises. The firm could not acquire new jobs from the 
private sector and started to apply for public projects on state tenders. As public tenders 
in Hungary are highly affected by corruption, when a mediator - who said to be close to 
Mr. Nyerges (Fidesz-related entrepreneur/oligarch76) - approached them and said that 
through his personal contacts he could bring new contracts from the public sector, the 
management welcomed him. They signed a pre-contract, in which the buyer promised to 
bring new jobs and pay the value of the company from the future expected income. In a 
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few months time the company was restructured, got a new owner as well as a new 
managing director and all the clients were informed about the changes in leadership. 
However, when the time came to sign the final contract the buyer said that he changed 
his mind and would not like to pay for the company and hence will not sign the final 
contract. The entrepreneur explained that the whole process was legal and he was not 
under any threat to go ahead with the takeover, however given the actual business 
climate and politically influenced economy, he felt there was no other option. 
Eventually, he gave his company over without being paid anything in return. He lost 
everything he invested.  
“If you imagine yourself in my situation there were two ways, you either go 
bankrupt or give your firm to them…..Everything went on its way, we signed the 
contract, they settled in, got introduced, restructured. But then the buyer did not 
want to pay – that was the game.“ 
The entrepreneur believes that the buyer wanted to take the company into bankrupt 
intentionally: “We do not know how many swindlers were sent out to firms – which 
were chosen to be taken into bankrupt.” He also told a story of a friend, whose transport 
company was ‘taken away’ the same way. Once he wanted to enter the domestic market, 
he was approached by a mediator, who was told to be close to Mr. Nyerges. He was told 
that he either ‘sells’ his company or will not get any public contracts. He was promised 
to receive the invested amount of money after a few years, when the company starts to 
win tenders from the public sector. They signed a similar contract, but the company so 
far could not get any contracts, and is going into bankrupt.  
 
 As these cases show, the general business climate has changed drastically in the 
first three years of the Orbán government. Business leaders feel trapped and threatened 
and increasingly base their decisions on emotions and beliefs instead of rational 
business logic.  
“You make decisions that you would not make in a stable environment. I give 
work to this person…, money to that person… just leave me alone…77” 
In the new authoritarian system, fear dominates. Some corporate leaders feel threatened 
by the state, since they can never be sure, what kind of calumny is fabricated against 
them if they are not loyal politically. 
“It is economic profit seeking, not political. Certain elites think they have to put 
their hands on particular sectors, because they are profitable”. 
                                                 
77
 CEO of large Hungarian company 6, interviewed 14.08.2011 
 173 
“Behind the state there are personal interests and companies. People get easily 
threatened or blackmailed. Look at the news, how many times people were taken 
away in handcuffs. The news never says whether they were innocent or guilty. So 
CEOs are kept in fear. Anybody could be taken away any time, people are 
scared of the state today.” 78 
Interviews suggest that state authorities misuse their power for reaching particular 
political or business objectives. If a problem or argument occurs between public 
authorities and a firm, managers are often threatened with financial (mostly tax) or other 
types of state investigations in order to comply with what the public authority wants 
from them. As chairman of the board of a large Hungarian company explained, when 
they had a financial issue about unpaid invoices with a public company, the dispute has 
been settled by the forceful interruption of the state: 
“I was ordered to go to the Ministry to see the Public Affairs State Secretary. He 
was very rude and told me that whatever will happen he will sit in his chair in 
the next 8 years and therefore he advises me not to go ahead …, because 
obviously he will make me feel the weight of my decision in 16 places. There 
were five people there, including the National Development Agency and the 
Hungarian State Holding company. They did not even have as much creativity to 
offer other solutions.  
I even asked them in what roles are they sitting there with me? There was 
nobody from (name of partner company anonymised)…Obviously this is a 
historical legacy of the past. “79 
Business people in Hungary argue that certain business elites - close to the government 
- compete in the private economy through the use of the state’s infrastructure, adding 
that corruption has become more sophisticated compared to the pre-Orbán era.  
 
“In my view, it is not the state that competes with the firms, but rather 
individuals [close to the government] who compete through the use of the state’s 
infrastructure. Today there is a more developed system in Hungary; they do not 
need money boxes any more. They simply do not give public jobs to anybody 
else, but their own firms. As a result you cannot trace corruption any more. You 
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only observe that there are privileged and not privileged firms. It is hard to get 
jobs for anybody else on the market... “80 
In early 2012, Transparency International has labelled this process ‘state capture’ 
(Transparency 2012_a) and raised attention to the phenomenon, by warning the 
structural weakening of the country’s checks and balances and a parallel growing 
influence of certain business circles. Transparency’s report has claimed that the state 
has been captured by powerful interest groups through the symbiotic relationship 
between the political and the business elite, the lack of independence of control 
institutions, and the lack of transparency in the legislative process (Transparency 
2012_b). As the CEO of a multinational’s subsidiary explained: 
 „…an economic background is being built, or more precisely, a system is 
building on the duality of political and economic restructuring, which is there in 
many countries, but here it is very protectionist. This is my biggest problem. It is 
possible to support friends but prove that they are good on the market.”81 
 
 “corruption is not about companies paying back a certain amount of money, or 
having Fidesz-related companies. Business is theirs today. Fidesz is only a 
brand82.” 
Discussions suggest that the process of economic ‘restructuring’ or more specifically 
the reallocation of property is not done through informal networks and clientelism as in 
the first twenty years of post-socialism, but rather through state legislation. In academic 
terms we talk about state capture when state resources are used by political actors for 
private means or political benefits (Grzymala-Busse 2008). State capture can take the 
form of clientelism and predation, depending on the degree of rent distribution and 
compatibility with competition (Grzymala-Busse 2008). In clientelist regimes or as 
Wedel defined in ‘partically appropriated states’, elites “use state actors, who are 
corruptible or ‘bought’ (Wedel 2003: 437). Under this system private and public 
institutions are separated but rents are extracted through corruption and bribery and 
distributed to supporters of the regime in exchange for their loyalty (Grzymala-Busse 
2008: 639). In contrast, in predatory regimes resources are extracted without the 
systematic redistribution to political opposition and citizens. In these regimes rulers 
“steal government funds and expropriate both state property and private assets” 
(Grzymala-Busse 2008: 644). Placing Hungary in this matrix, in this chapter it is argued 
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that pre-2010 governments were clientelist regimes, since clientelism had became a 
“form of social organization” (Sajo 1998) in the transition period, whereas today a more 
predatory-type of regime seems to rule. The top-down rent seeking together with the 
centralisation and overall politicization of the public sector - under the Orbán 
government - has created a relatively coherent (although politicised) state, where 
hierarchy and high level orders rule. Through the extensive changes in the legislative 
framework and economic power relations the state had acquired a strong influence over 
the economy. Interviews suggest that privileged groups close to the governing elite 
benefit at the expense of others. As it was noted earlier, in this type of regimes, the 
political elites “expropriate” businesses (Kang 2002: 182). According to Hellman et al. 
(2003) state capture is done mostly by larger firms, which are new entrants on the 
market, having no formal ownership ties to the state and limited access to public 
officials. However - based on the claims of investigatory reports and the data that 
emerged from interviews - in the Hungarian case the largest captor firm Közgép is 
directly linked to the prime minister and its owner is assumed to have direct access to 
public officials not only through Orbán, but also through former employees, business 
partners and friends.  
“The situation when the economic and political life is separated from each other 
and have a corrupt relationship – is over. This is not the case any more. Today 
the two (economy and politics) are the same. Nobody can enter this system. Only 
their companies get jobs. Previously this was not a problem, because firms did 
not have to enter public tenders. Even working for a public company was far 
from being corrupted, so you could choose. Today it is different. Lots of 
companies cannot live on the private market any more and as the market goes 
down the importance of the public market comes up. If you are them – then you 
can work. But then you are not you [referring to ownership]. Otherwise if you 
have to work for the public sector, than you go bankrupt.” 83 
 
As the quote shows the colonisation process has a direct impact on how managers make 
their decisions and how ‘trapped’ they feel in relation to their domestic institutional 
environment. Interview data suggest that politically supported private interests dominate 
public sector tenders and state-firm relations. Certain non-academic publications, like 
the book of an investigatory journalist (Ferenczi 2014) explore the enrichment of groups 
of individuals in the close surroundings of Prime Minister Orbán. Ferenczi (2014) 
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explains how the family and friends of Orbán have accumulated a wealth that worth 
billions of HUFs through state-funded infrastructure projects or for instance land 
acquisitions sine 2010 (Ferenczi 2014).  
It has to be noted here that extensive overlaps between the public and private 
sector is not a new phenomenon in Hungary. Ownership structures have always been 
interwoven since the political transformation (Stark 1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Stark 
and Vedres 2006). Scholars explained state-firm links from different perspectives. Stark 
(1996) for instance argued that post-socialist firms are interlinked with the state through 
their ownership structures, while Stark and Vedres (2012: 700) went even further and 
declared that in Hungary, although “political and economic fields have been 
institutionally separated, firms and parties have become organizationally entangled” 
through corporate boards. They also highlighted that due to the strong political 
polarisation, the economy is “divided into political camps” (Stark and Vedres 2012 p: 
712). In this system, the political affiliations of corporations are closely linked to party-
financing, as in Hungary, the “competition for votes became competition for firms” 
(Stark and Vedres 2012: 705). The Orbán regime acquired majority in this environment 
and as the previous sections has shown immediately started to deepen the politicization 
of the economy by colonising the public administration and directly intervening into the 
economy. Through the use of public authorities and the overwhelming majority in 
parliament, elites behind the predatory state have the opportunity today to serve private 
interests quasi ‘legitimately’.  
 
In sum, in the above sections it was investigated how the capitalist system in 
Hungary has evolved and created the institutional environment in which firms develop 
their lobbying capabilities and make decisions about getting involved in EU lobbying. 
In the next section it will be explored how the above mentioned features of the 
institutional system affect firm level decisions on lobbying and Europeanization.  
 177 
5.6 The impact of the new institutional structure on firms’ 
lobbying capabilities and Europeanization: do firms adapt or 
bypass? 
As it was noted earlier in this chapter, according to the compensation hypothesis, 
the national institutional context has a negative effect on organizations’ 
Europeanization. Hence, organizations without sufficient access to decision-making at 
the domestic level engage more intensely at EU level than those with good 
institutionalised access (Klüver 2010). Moreover previous studies suggested that very 
high resources “constitute a sufficient condition for Europeanization, whereas high 
resources would lead to Europeanization only if combined with embeddedness in the 
statist and centralised” institutional framework (Klüver 2010: 187). On the other hand 
Beyers investigated interest organizations’ domestic and European access patterns and 
concluded that association with limited access to decision-making in their domestic 
environments do not bypass national governments in order to compensate for their 
domestic weakness, but rather focus on consolidating their domestic situation (Beyers 
2002: 608; Beyers and Kerremans 2007). In some studies, this type of weak access at 
the domestic level coupled with limited European engagement is called the ‘reversed 
positive persistence hypothesis’ (Beyers 2002: 594).  
 
The previous sections showed that the Orbán cabinet has introduced major 
changes in the institutional framework. Hence the question arises what are the 
implications of these changes on firms’ lobbying capabilities? Will firms adapt to these 
changes and try to ‘consolidate’ their domestic situation as Beyers and Kerremans argue 
or will they bypass the government and compensate their limited domestic access to 
decision-making by engaging at EU level as Klüver suggested? In the coming sections 
these questions will be analysed from two perspectives. First we will investigate how 
firm managers perceive their access to domestic policy-making and secondly we will 
explore the determinants behind their decision about EU level engagement. In the 
analysis it will be evaluated whether firms’ decision on EU level lobbying is influenced 
by the perceived degree of domestic access or something else. 
Concerning the first question, interviews show that large firms feel excluded 
from political decision-making. Businesses feel that they do not have time to prepare for 
legal changes and their formal options for influencing initiatives are restricted. The 
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CEO of a multinational financial institution complained about the lack of lobbying 
opportunities by saying: 
“If we look at the last two years (2011-2012), what we could achieve in lobbying 
is almost zero. There was not openness for negotiations, no cooperation at 
all.“84 
The legal changes together with the ‘reform’ of tripartism have practically blocked all 
channels for corporatist interest representation and left firms to lobby on their own. 
Multinational’s subsidiaries are especially offended since they were used to the 
openness of previous governments:  
“In Hungary, recently public affairs communication has broken down. 
Communication is down. You send an e-mail they do not even reply.  
I do not want to hurt them. They do not understand that the company wants to do 
good, we deliver values, but they are not interested. Anyway this is how it goes 
today.”85  
 
“In practice the government does not talk to us. This government does not talk to 
us. Our sector is announced the evil and bad, so they do not talk to us 
especially.86” 
As it becomes obvious from the above quotes the government’s increasingly centralised 
and authoritarian style, in relation to its social partners has a crucial influence on how 
firms can or in this case cannot lobby. The lack of formalised social dialogue and the 
lack of openness of the public sector towards the professional input of businesses create 
an environment where formal interest representation - either directly by individual 
companies or through associations - becomes impossible.  
“We do not get anything upfront about what is being prepared – like the crises 
tax for energy companies – but once it is introduced, we get the whole legislative 
text in English.”87 
 
“They make people work, but positions are not taken into consideration. It is 
very hard to lobby today.”88 
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“I see that the situation will get worse, because interest intermediation is not 
possible today, the system will heat up. It is a centralised system, and the 
government says that they do not need anybody to influence their decisions – 
their own interests are more important.” 89 
Discussions suggest that as all formal channels are blocked up, firms try to get access to 
policy makers through interpersonal contacts and informal channels. Although these 
will be investigated thoroughly in the next empirical chapter, it is important to note here 
that evidence of this study suggests that it is not the almost complete lack of domestic 
level access to political decision-making that impacts firms’ Europeanization decision 
most. Instead, as data of the coming sections will show, managers are affected by the 
government’s aggressive ‘predatory’ actions and hence the opportunity structures that 
are available to them. Independently from firms’ size and available resources corporate 
leaders increasingly base their managerial decisions on EU lobbying, in relation to how 
they perceive their situation in the domestic environment.  
 
The next section presents empirical evidence that creates a link between the 
domestic environment and firms’ decision on Europeanization. As previous sections 
showed the reformed institutional structure of interest intermediation, the centralised 
nature of state-society relations together with the colonised character of state-business 
relations created an environment, in which businesses became vulnerable to the state, 
and got deprived of their previously existing channels for representing their interests. 
Interviews suggests that although some associations try to bypass the government by 
engaging in European umbrella organizations, most associations and individual 
businesses do not raise their voices at EU level, because they are ’scared’ of being 
retaliated at home by their own government. Firms argue that bypassing the government 
in Brussels would lead to problems with national authorities and the government. 
Consequently, although many of the government’s interventions impact them 
negatively, business leaders decide not to raise their voices at the supranational level.  
“So you asked why companies do not go to Brussels – because they do not 
believe that Brussels can protect them from anything. There is no company in 
Hungary, which would say that I choose EU directives, which override 
Hungarian laws. … In the vein of today’s people there is a fear from central 
authority, fear that they can take away anything, do anything. “90 
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CEOs rather choose to become servile to the state than oppose it. Business leaders in the 
private sector do not want to let their companies be forced out of the market, while in 
the case of public companies CEOs are political nominees, who are afraid to lose their 
jobs. Moreover - besides firms - associations act similarly and often choose to keep out 
of EU level lobbying, not only due to financial resource dependencies as it was 
suggested in the literature (Beyers and Kerremans 2007), but also due to internal 
organizational pressures that stem from corporate leaders’ exposure to the tyranny of the 
state.  
 
“Companies are afraid of the state because the state can punish – in this 
environment it is hard to go to lobby in Brussels…. But even associations can be 
afraid, because they can say, OK I am trying to influence something in Brussels, 
a legislation that may try to counterbalance or maybe push back the state that 
wants to get into all the sectors of the economy. But then I come back the next 
day and what do I find. I am threatened. My own association’s board or its 
majority will tell me off because they are under pressure” 91 
 
A representative of a multinational’s subsidiary - who is also a member at a domestic 
association – explained that through the domestic association they actively engage in a 
sectoral European umbrella organization in Brussels. However they intentionally do not 
formulate messages at EU level, because that might make their ‘fingers burnt’ at home:  
“Truly we do not let our voice heard. Whatever the leader of the Polish 
association (who is the president of this committee now) says is good - they have 
a consolidated situation at home, and he can talk. We say nothing.  
…It can cause troubles at home. I believe that it does not matter who says things 
out loud. It does not have to be me, somebody else can say things out. Then, it 
cannot be said that our association went to Brussels and offended the 
government. “92 
 
Similarly to multinational’s subsidiaries, large firms in Hungarian ownership think 
alike. Talking about getting engaged in Brussels, the CEO of a large Hungarian 
company explained:  
 “No, I cannot do it. I want to, but I cannot do it, because it is not wise. … 
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It does not matter if I can reach something in Brussels and it is a success - if at 
home my company gets killed because of it. Revenge will come.”93 
 
These quotes clearly indicate that corporate leaders in the current environment do not 
compensate their limited access by engaging more dynamically in Brussels. Conversely, 
they refrain from engagement or engage in PR-type activities instead of real political 
pressure-making through lobbying, because their domestic environment has a direct 
hindering influence on their engagement strategies. Surprisingly however this hindering 
effect does not seem to be the result of the degree of access to domestic decision-
making, but more a direct result of the institutional environment in which firms operate. 
This shows that instead of the perceived cause and effect relation between domestic and 
EU level access patterns in previous studies (Beyers 2002; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010), 
firms’ and associations’ decision on whether to Europeanize or not depends primarily 
on how institutions at the domestic level affect organizations’ “identities, interests, and 
capacities for action” (Jackson and Deeg 2008). The findings of this chapter indicate 
that in the emerging capitalist context of Hungary, domestic institutional constraints 
weigh more in managerial decisions than potential EU level policy gains.  
 
Consequently, corporate leaders adapt their EU level lobbying strategies to the 
domestic institutional context. Hence the impact of domestic institutions affects firms’ 
Europeanization through managerial choice. Yet, in the case of emerging capitalist 
systems, the impact of domestic institutions influences managerial choice not only 
through environmental resource dependencies, but also through the process of how 
corporate governance adapts to domestic institutional constraints. Managers do not only 
decide how to engage in lobbying, but more importantly whether to engage in EU level 
interest representation at all or not. Evidence of this chapter suggests that managers in 
the newly forming post-socialist capitalist environment, decide not to bypass the 
government, because the opportunity structures of post-socialist capitalism constrain 
them to do so. After the serious consideration of the pros and cons of EU level 
engagement, managers in Hungary today prefer to stay away from Brussels.  
 
As we saw from previous sections, the state in Hungary has marched into the economy 
and started a ‘war’ over ownership and power. The outcome of this ‘war’ is far beyond 
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the scope of this thesis; however the current situation showcases well, how much the 
institutional environment affects national and supranational lobbying abilities and 
capabilities. Hungary’s case illustrates that the domestic institutional environment may 
have a determining impact on whether and how large firms Europeanize their lobbying, 
through its influence on the opportunity structures. Empirical evidence in this chapter 
supports the proposition that ‘The domestic institutional structure of post-socialist 
capitalism impacts Hungarian firms’ Europeanization by affecting the opportunity 
structures available for managerial decisions’. In the emerging system, firms are 
constrained in their managerial choices, because the current government creates an 
environment, in which the formal channels of interest representation are eliminated, 
informal channels are managed arbitrarily, and the institutional environment is 
repressive and intimidating both for firms. As the above discussion illustrates, domestic 
opportunity structures directly affect the EU level activities of companies in Hungary. 
Firms that feel threatened and fear retaliation tend to choose not to engage in EU-level 
representation, even when resources are available and their interests would require 
engagement.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of access to domestic policy-making has a direct influence on 
firms’ EU level engagement strategies. But not ‘only’ because of the lack of 
‘institutional fit’ between modes of interest intermediation at the national and European 
level, as previously suggested in the literature (Schmidt 2006). Rather because firms 
base their managerial choices on their domestic constraints. While the compensation 
hypothesis might be applicable in a developed capitalist environment, in the post-
socialist context, firms are a lot more vulnerable and exposed to government actions. In 
the post-socialist capitalist context, weak access at domestic level leads to weak access 
at EU level too. However this type of negative persistence is not the result of the 
‘misfit’ between domestic and EU level institutional structures or the fact that EE 
businesses cannot access EU institutions, but a direct result of managerial choice. 
Consequently, in this chapter it is argued that the nature of Hungarian capitalism has a 
defining impact on the Europeanization choices of firms. Although the country has been 
a member of the EU for almost 10 years, domestic and foreign businesses alike still 
fight for their survival, and intentionally refrain from EU level lobbying.  
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter investigated the question of how the domestic institutional structure 
of affects firms’ Europeanization in Hungary. In the first section a historical overview – 
through secondary data analysis - illustrated how tripartism evolved in Hungary, and 
what type of corporatism was emerging in the post-socialist context up until 2010. It 
was argued that the emerging quasi-corporatist system was characterised by hierarchy 
and dependency. Showing its fragility and lack of legitimacy, it was argued to be 
comparable to a ‘house of cards’. The second section focused on state-society relations 
from the start of the second Orbán government’s rule in 2010. It was argued that the 
conservative cabinet has dismantled the emerging post-socialist structure of social 
bargaining, and introduced a system based on authority. The new interest intermediation 
structure was argued to resemble a type of state corporatism, where institutionalist 
structures have been dismantled from political decision-making, and businesses became 
left without formal channels to represent their interests in politics. In the third section, 
through the analysis of state-business relations, the chapter showed that the state under 
the Orbán administration has intervened into the economy by restructuring the private 
sector and colonising businesses. The evolving state was argued to be captured by 
party-related elites, which use the state infrastructure for advancing private interests. 
The post-2010 government in Hungary was argued to resemble the characteristics of a 
predatory regime. Interviews showed that under this regime, firms feel excluded from 
political decision-making and threatened economically in their existence.  
Following on studies that question the importance of domestic institutions in 
relation to Europeanization (Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009), it was argued 
that the emerging domestic institutional structure in Hungary directly affects the 
Europeanization decision of corporate managers and their willingness to enter the EU 
level lobbying arena. Findings highlighted that, although Hungarian businesses have 
very weak access to their domestic level policy-making, they choose not to bypass the 
domestic government by engaging in Brussels - as the compensation hypothesis would 
argue (Klüver 2010) – but instead, choose to stay away from EU level lobbying, in 
order to avoid domestic ‘revenge’. Instead of the compensation hypothesis, evidence 
supports the positive persistence thesis or more specifically the reversed positive 
persistence hypothesis (Beyers 2002: 594), whereby weak access leads to weak 
Europeanization. Moreover, weak Europeanization is not the result of the ‘misfit’ 
between national modes of interest intermediation and the EU system as institutional 
scholars have noted (Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001), but more a direct result of a 
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managerial decision, due to domestic constraints, as well as firms’ vulnerability, 
stemming from the characteristics of the emerging capitalist system. Furthermore, 
empirical findings do not seem to support the findings of earlier studies, according to 
which very high resources “constitute a sufficient condition for Europeanization, 
whereas high resources would lead to Europeanization only if combined with 
embeddedness in the statist and centralised” institutional framework (Klüver 2010: 
187). As subsidiaries of multinationals in Hungary behave similarly to large domestic 
firms - and deliberately choose to stay away from EU level lobbying due to domestic 
institutional pressures - it is argued that firms in emerging capitalist environments do 
not Europeanize even if high or very high financial resources are available to them. This 
does not mean that multinationals do not lobby at EU level, rather that subsidiaries of 
multinationals also avoid EU level political pressure making - even through 
associations, similarly to local firms - as a consequence of their ‘domestic’ 
environmental constraints.  
 
In the next chapter the firm level determinants of corporate lobbying will be 
investigated in order to explore how managers in this environment design their lobbying 
capabilities and construct lobbying strategies.  
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6. The golden cage of network capitalism 
In the previous chapters we have established that firms’ decision on 
Europeanization is influenced not only by their available financial resources or size, but 
also by the domestic institutional environment in which they operate. In chapter 4 it was 
argued that at the domestic level corporate managers develop four types of lobbying 
strategies based on their environmental resource dependencies, available resources and 
the type of capabilities that their firms invest in. Large firms in the UK and at EU level 
were found to engage mostly in ‘integrated’ and ‘outsourced’ strategies. Both of these 
approaches were identified as professional, since firms use sophisticated, arm’s length 
interest representation tools and methods when they follow these strategies. The 
difference between the two is that firms with the ‘integrated’ approach manage lobbying 
by using internal capabilities, whereas companies with an ‘outsourced’ strategy rely on 
external capabilities only. The other two strategy types – the network-based and the 
inactive strategies – were argued to characterise Eastern European firms and SMEs 
respectively, however these claims remained on the theoretical level and were not 
investigated through empirical analysis. In this chapter we will investigate which of 
these four strategies can be applied to firms in Hungary. More specifically, building on 
the findings of the previous chapters, it will be investigated how firms design and 
construct their lobbying capabilities in the post-socialist institutional context. In chapter 
5, it was argued that the characteristics of the emerging capitalist system in Hungary 
have a direct impact on firms’ Europeanization decisions. We have investigated the 
institutional level determinants of interest representation and lobbying, but have not 
looked at how these institutional factors affect firm level processes and strategy 
formulation. In this chapter this is exactly what is going to be done. Using the Varieties 
of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) thesis as well as the resource dependence model 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), it will be explored how the characteristics of the 
institutional structure affect the lobbying strategies of large firms.  
In chapter 4 and 5 it was argued that the institutional environment of developed 
and developing capitalist societies influence the development of corporate lobbying 
capabilities differently. While in the UK and at EU level, the institutional environment 
triggers the ‘professionalization’ of lobbying strategies, in chapter 5 it was argued that 
the domestic institutional characteristics of the emerging capitalist system in Hungary, 
hinders the Europeanization of domestic firms. As we have seen in chapter 4, the 
institutional environment in developed capitalist systems make firms develop arm’s 
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length lobbying strategies, based on reliability and professionalism. It was highlighted 
earlier that the “European business-government model is based on information 
dependency”, where EU institutions require specialized knowledge, while firms develop 
direct representation strategies based on trust and accountability – being aware that 
“misrepresentation and bad practice may result in exclusion from the policy 
process”(Coen, Grant et al. 2010: 302). In chapter 4, it was argued that managerial 
choice in relation to lobbying strategies is determined by the domestic institutional 
environment through firms’ environmental resource dependencies and financial 
resources/size.  
Following on from these findings, one would expect that the different domestic 
institutional arrangement of post-socialist countries will not only impact the decision on 
Europeanization as it was argued in chapter 5, but also the characteristics of the 
lobbying strategy that firms develop. Based on this theoretical framework, if the 
institutional structure of advanced capitalism encourages firms to develop 
professionalized lobbying capabilities then it can be expected that post-socialist 
capitalism leads to the development of different types of lobbying capabilities, which 
might or might not fit the requirements of EU lobbying. It may be also possible that the 
specific characteristics of EE capitalism lead to the development of such lobbying 
strategies that cannot be transposed to the EU level. In order to be able to investigate the 
impacts of the institutional environment on firms’ lobbying strategies, this chapter 
conceptualises the mode of coordination in EE countries as ‘post-socialist network 
capitalism’.  
We will explore the question of how network capitalism impacts the 
development of lobbying capabilities and the abilities of firms to engage in EU 
lobbying. Furthermore, by analysing the lobbying strategies of multinational 
subsidiaries, we will investigate whether the availability of large financial resources 
would override the determining impact of the domestic institutional environment on 
lobbying strategies. In other words, through the test case of MNCs, it will be explored 
how multinationals adapt to the characteristics of the ‘post-socialist network capitalist’ 
environment and how they transpose their ‘domestic’ practices to the post-socialist 
context. If we find that multinationals ‘import’ their strategies to Hungary and lobby 
just like in London or Brussels then that would suggest the precedence of resources and 
lobbying expertise over institutional pressures. However if we find that MNCs adapt to 
the local requirements and lobby similarly to domestic firms then the determining 
impact of domestic institutions on corporate lobbying strategies may be confirmed. 
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 The chapter is structured as follows. The first section investigates the question of 
what type of capitalism is emerging in Hungary. The second section explores the 
impacts of the domestic institutional environment on firms’ lobbying processes, while 
the third part examines corporate lobbying strategies in Hungary. The last section 
investigates the implications of the findings on firms’ EU level engagement strategies 
and the question of how companies are able to transpose their domestic strategies onto 
the supranational level. A final section concludes. 
6.1 What type of capitalism is emerging in Hungary? 
Many scholars have tried to explain the nature of the new democratic and 
capitalist systems of post-socialist countries and the implications of transition on an 
institutional level. In this section it is argued that the unique nature of Hungarian 
capitalism – which is “hard to fit into one of the two boxes of the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) framework” (Crouch, Keune et al. 2009: 12) - leads to a different type 
of lobbying, so strongly embedded in the domestic institutional context that it is hard to 
‘export’ onto the supranational level. Firms must adapt to their environments (Fligstein 
and Feeland 1995). Therefore, depending on context, they use different strategies when 
engaging in political interest representation. As it was noted earlier in chapter 2, in 
liberal market economies (LME), pluralism represents a decentralised system of interest 
representation - where many small interest groups and individual firms compete for 
influence – whereas in the corporatist systems of coordinated market economies (CME) 
the relationship between government and a small number of encompassing interest 
organizations is structural (Peters 2005). Yet, if EE states do not fit under the categories 
of the LME/CME divide, then businesses cannot rely on associations like actors from 
CMEs - since they do not have institutionalised corporatism in their national capitals - 
or represent their own interests through individual lobbying as would actors from 
LMEs, since their structures for individual lobbying are immature and not 
institutionalised (McGrath 2008). As it was argued earlier in chapters 2 and 5, managers 
of EE firms - being used to particularism94 and centralism - tend to have a feeling of 
‘powerlessness’ towards political decision-making (Hrebenar, Courtney et al. 2008: 55) 
and hence may consider lobbying a taboo. Lobbying is seen by business people as an ad 
hoc, short-term, reactive and often corrupt set of activities, done in different opaque 
ways, mostly through informal interpersonal networks (Kalnins 2005; Evanson 2008). 
Consequently, the majority of advocacy is done through informal interactions that do 
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not necessarily include direct monetary exchanges, but are mostly based on mutual 
social favours over a longer period of time.  
 In order to understand the nature of post-socialist lobbying, here we have to 
make a distinction between informal networking and corporate lobbying. Networking is 
widely used at every level of the company to overcome bureaucratic barriers or to seize 
personal and organizational opportunities. Informal networks are used to solve problems 
that formal channels will not or cannot address (Böröcz and Southworth 1998). Hence, 
employees manage their own formal and informal relations with lower level state 
officials and economic actors. These formal and informal networks at different levels of 
the organizational hierarchy complement each other, like layers of an onion. The lower 
the organizational hierarchy, the more formalized procedures become and less and less 
information is available about political strategy. This chapter will show that in contrast 
to networking, corporate lobbying - in the sense of influencing the company’s legal and 
institutional environment - is exclusively done by the top-layers of the organization. 
If Anglo-Saxon interest representation is characterised by direct firm lobbying 
and WE interest representation by corporatist negotiation, lobbying in EE can be best 
compared to the ‘network capitalist’ model of China (Boisot and Child 1996) or Russia 
(Puffer and McCarthy 2007). The latter model is characterised by a “personalised 
institutional order” (Boisot and Child 1996: 622). As it was shown in chapter 5, politics 
and the economy are more closely interlinked in post-socialist countries than in 
traditional market economies. In business-government relations, parties have a decisive 
role and influence both in Poland (Schoenman 2005; McMenamin and Schoenman 
2007) and Hungary (Stark and Vedres 2012). Parties need finances for political 
competition, whereas firms use networks for acquiring political concessions and 
government contracts (Stark and Vedres 2012). Furthermore, in Hungary corporate 
boards blur the boundaries between firm managers and party representatives (Stark and 
Vedres 2012: 700). Whereas in developed capitalism, state and economy is 
institutionally separated, in post-socialist systems their “boundaries are crossed” (Stark 
and Vedres 2012: 719). As a Hungarian professor95 explained public and private spheres 
are formally separated in Hungary, but informally they are not.  
„The institutional system is separated, but in the operation of the institutional 
system, people who handle public assets treat these as if they were their own, 
personally…It is a culture, a way of thinking, an everyday, built-in routine.“96 
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Consequently, in most former communist countries lobbying, has a clientelist character. 
As it was discussed in chapter 2, ‘clientelism’ refers to the informal relationships 
between individuals and groups of unequal status, based on the mutual exchange of 
benefits (Kalnins 2005). People in the economic and political elites know each other, 
and particularistic interests are represented through personal relations and informal or 
semi-formal meetings. People survive through favouritism and personal social 
interactions, therefore laws may be “written in ways that enable insider dealing” (Sajo 
1998: 40), and the governing elite might form the institutional environment according to 
their own particular interests. 
“As everybody lobbies like a fool, the politicians cannot resist, they change the 
legislative system all too often. This means that there is no reliable legal 
environment. It is not possible to build strategy, only crisis management.” 97 
While in the West, lobbying towards the state is crucial, since the “institutions of the 
state make and administer the rules that govern” economic interactions (Fligstein 1990: 
31), in a network-based capitalist environment, the role of institutions as well the rule of 
law becomes ambiguous. The “public’s belief in, and allegiance to”, the rule of law is 
fragile (Sajo 1998: 40). As formal channels are not accessible, firms approach political 
decision-makers directly. 
“…There are no formal, written and enforced forms of interest reconciliation. 
The newly formed investor council is a fake institution…  
Orbán does not meet with any CEOs. But ministers behave in more European 
ways and they do [meet with CEOs]. There is no longer-term economic strategy, 
it is always changing, and we cannot plan. We feel that, because of the short-
sightedness of politics, the government misses big opportunities, for example 
investments.”98  
 
The above quote indicates three important points that will be detailed in the following 
sections. First that formal legislative decision-making is not accessible for business 
stakeholders, second as a consequence managers can only lobby by personally meeting 
top-level politicians, and third that the uncertain legal and political environment makes 
long-term planning and strategy formulation difficult. Relationships are important 
everywhere, especially in those states where networks have traditional importance like 
in France. As it was shown in chapter 4, EU level lobbying also requires firms to use 
networking strategies in some of the legislative stages. However - although networks 
and interpersonal relationships may be used as an additional element of lobbying - at 
EU level, corporate lobbying is essentially based on political analysis and formalised 
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arm’s length interest representation strategies. In contrast, findings of this chapter will 
suggest that in Hungary interpersonal relationships have priority over professionalism, 
since people rely on networks more than their counterparts in developed capitalist 
countries and more than they did under communism (Sik and Wellman 1997: 1). The 
question arises hence, what is the impact of networks on firms’ public affairs strategy? 
Indeed, if we accept that the domestic environment shapes firms’ capabilities, then it 
can be expected that the ‘network capitalist’ institutional characteristics may have an 
impact on firms’ lobbying activities and capabilities. In this respect, the resource 
dependence model (RDM) (Pfeffer and Aldrich 1972; Burt 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003) can help to explain the link between informal networks and lobbying capabilities. 
RDM assumes that firms try to reduce their environmental uncertainties by using 
interpersonal relations as an instrument (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) or a type of 
resource (Bandelj and Purg 2006: 588). Consequently RDM can explain the 
unprecedented importance of relationships in Hungary following the economic and 
political change of the regime in 1989, since when uncertainties has increased 
considerably. In the following sections we will analyse how the ‘post-socialist network 
capitalist’ environment impacts firms’ lobbying strategies in Hungary. 
 
6.2. How does the capitalist environment impact firms’ lobbying 
processes?  
 It became clear from the previous sections that interpersonal networks have a 
crucial importance in Hungary. But how do they impact lobbying? In order to answer 
this question, we have to look at the characteristics of Eastern European lobbying, and 
how the institutional structure determines these characteristics, compared to western 
ones. In the following sections we will investigate the impact of institutions on firms’ 
lobbying strategies, by focusing on three key issues in detail. First, we will investigate 
how the domestic environment impacts access to decision-making, by looking at the 
process of lobbying, the role of networks, the role of associations and the exchange 
goods that are provided by businesses to access policy-making. Secondly, we will 
explore how institutions influence firms’ decisions on how they position / develop 
lobbying activities in the corporate organizational structure or more generally what type 
of lobbying capabilities they create. And third, we will investigate how the domestic 
environment impacts the strategies of multinationals.  
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 The analysis of the semi-structured interviews suggest that executives in 
Hungary channel political messages to policy-makers through personal relations, 
company boards as well as their networks in associations. Political connections are 
considered crucial in many different aspects. An appointment into a leadership positions 
at public firms or a position at an industrial association may both be dependent on 
personal relationships. Interviews suggest that even the forum of associations is 
predominantly used for networking or getting access to decision-makers, instead of 
political interest representation. In this respect, associations are often argued to be 
representing “multinationals only” or influential Hungarian “oligarchs” instead of 
representing the encompassing interests of whole industrial sectors. 
 
“We only engage directly with decision-makers, because our company is not a 
member of any Hungarian trade association. Hungarian trade associations have 
not represented Hungarian interests so far, they serve the interests of local 
multinationals.” 99 
 
“People get to CEO positions at public firms through personal relations in the 
first place. At interest associations, those people are chosen into positions, 
which have political contacts. Economic elites make associations. This way, 
their own individual interests can be presented as social interests. Not Demján 
[name of one of the most influential domestic businessman] goes to the ministry 
but the association.”100  
 
These quotes suggest that associations are used by business people as a forum for 
networking and reaching public officials. Besides individual relationships, membership 
in associations provides an additional channel for accessing decision-makers, since 
other formal, institutional channels are not available. Although employers’ 
organizations are much “less capable of influencing economic policy than their 
counterparts in developed market economies” (Koltay and Neumann 2006: 56), 
nevertheless they are an important official forum for networking. Being on the board of 
one of the largest employer associations - the Confederation of Hungarian Employers 
and Industrialists (MGYOSZ) – is an important and respectful position that many 
businessmen strives for. Despite the acknowledged organizational ineffectiveness of 
large boards, the social importance of board membership has led MGYOSZ to have a 
board of 40 people - 2 Chairs, 16 vice-chairs and 22 board members in 2012.  
 However, direct firm-level representation or representation through associations 
is not an ‘either-or’ decision. Most firms use both routes. Yet, interviews suggest that if 
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firms want to achieve an outcome in lobbying than only direct, firm-level lobbying 
leads to success. Therefore, in essence, individual interpersonal contacts virtually 
always supplement associational representation.  
“I am a board member at the American chamber of commerce. And the role of 
the chambers is to connect people - all chambers do this differently. Chambers 
themselves are not efficient. Most of the memberships in chambers are a waste 
of money. 
…I think, large firms would do it [solve an issue through lobbying] on their own. 
Rather on their own. Maybe they would do something through chambers, but 
mostly on their own.” 101 
 
“Firms do not really believe in common coordinated industry level positions, 
everybody believes that they can arrange things better on their own.”102 
 
Hence, executives become key information channels, because in the post-socialist 
institutional environment, personal networks become the key resource for lobbying. 
Friends and relations provide the only access to information. As it was discussed in 
chapter 4, in contrast to EU-level lobbying, where information gives access, in Hungary 
networks provide entry.  
 Due to the non-transparent nature of network-based transactions, before the 
further discussion of lobbying strategies, here the question of corruption has to be 
addressed. Corruption is defined as the “use of public position for private gain” (Rose-
Ackerman 2001). In the post-socialist context however corruption is linked to the earlier 
discussed phenomenon of clientelism, which “in interaction with various forms and 
levels of corruption – is becoming a stable form of social organization” (Sajo 1998: 38). 
Hence in Eastern Europe corruption is part of every-day business, and consequently 
may or may not become part of lobbying too.  
“…corruption is structural. It is part of the system. It is included in business 
plans. The state almost equals corruption. Obviously companies think that 
corruption is part of the system and therefore needs to be calculated with.”103 
Managers get information through their direct contacts to politicians and pay for the 
access by providing in-kind contribution to parties in the form of advertising campaigns 
or consultancy (Stark and Vedres 2012), promising to do something in return for the 
decision-maker, or sometimes by paying the price in cash. Despite the fact that the 
researcher has not asked specific questions about corruption, many respondents brought 
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up the topic voluntarily in the interviews and expressed their views in length on the 
issue.  
“I think there are a few lobbyists with money bags. Professional lobbyists go 
with a bag. They convince MPs but take a bag. They are not professional in an 
American sense. The culture of professional lobbying has not developed in the 
last 20 years.” 104 
 
“The raw truth is very sad. The most important element here is money. All the 
other things are a matter of techniques.”105  
 
“While in other countries corruption is maybe a few percent of the project 
budget, here companies have to pay back [pay cash for parties or 
representatives of the state in exchange for public contracts] 30 percent of the 
budget for corruption. It is not only about informal relationships, it is corruption 
too, as in most cases, there is money exchange included. “106 
 
Interviewees started to talk about corruption, when they were asked about their opinion 
on lobbying in Hungary. Corporate leaders talked disappointedly about this part of 
lobbying and from the interviews it became clear that instead of considering corruption 
as an easy and simple way of getting things done, managers would rather avoid getting 
into corrupting situations. However as businesses operate “in an environment where 
corruption is common, legal standards are often unclear, and the judiciary is unreliable” 
(Rose-Ackerman 2001: 563) firms often get involved into corruption in order to remain 
‘competitive’. Some interviewees acknowledged that they wanted to avoid corruption 
and ‘clear’ the firm from corrupt practices but they failed because the public authorities 
pressured the company to pay monthly ‘fees’ or include additional ‘costs’ into the 
project budget in order to be ‘left alone’107. The reason behind the often ‘unethical’ 
ways of network-based lobbying can be explained by the ‘over-politicised’ nature of the 
Hungarian economy. Previous studies found that the Hungarian economy is divided into 
political camps, whereby 20 percent of large companies are politically ‘tagged’ or in 
other words have distinctive affiliations with a party (Stark and Vedres 2012: 712, 719). 
Interviews confirmed the findings of previous research – that was based on a Polish 
case study - that lobbying is directly linked to politics through party-financing 
(McMenamin and Schoenman 2007). Due to the strong ‘invisible’ links between parties 
and firms, in Hungary it remains difficult to separate corruption from lobbying.  
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“Relationships are important. Those who have money, have real influence. 
Lobbying is very closely interlinked with party financing. The link is a lot 
stronger than 10 years after the political change. It is a lot more centralised 
than before. “108 
 
Consequently, it is not surprising that, when asked about their government affairs 
strategy - instead of talking about contact programmes, policy papers or media 
campaigns as their UK counterparts - some interviewees referred to their party 
affiliation, like:  
“We are a hundred percent Fidesz company.”109 
 
This type of political ‘loyalty’ is unusual in a developed capitalist society, but in 
Hungary lobbying is vastly influenced by political affiliations. As it was argued in 
chapter 5, the party-‘friendliness’ of businesses have a direct impact on whether they 
can be successful in accessing political decision-makers or participate successfully in 
public sector tenders.  
Yet, it would be misleading to argue that interest representation in Hungary is 
only done via corruption or party-financing. Money is useful, but in itself does not 
necessarily lead to lobbying success. The availability of financial resources may form a 
certain kind of precondition to access, however without knowing the right people at the 
right places, money cannot grant access. Communism socialized people to use networks 
in order to avoid or overcome problems and seize opportunities, making the investment 
into network capital profitable (Sik and Wellman 1997: 13). And even though the 
political and economic system has changed, networks remained crucial for people to 
deal with decreasing state control, increasing opportunities and long-term uncertainty 
(Sik and Wellman 1997: 13; Windolf 2002; Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 2004; Bandelj and 
Purg 2006). As a former CEO of a multinational’s subsidiary highlighted “business goes 
through networks”110. 
 
“Companies choose the classic method of interest representation, they do not 
want to be corrupt, their aim is not to ‘buy’ anybody, but they desperately look 
for acquaintances. Relatives, political acquaintances, people from the same 
village, old colleagues.”111  
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Besides direct monetary exchange, access may also be granted in exchange for social 
favours. Favours are not always quantifiable in monetary terms or traceable in time. 
Paying private school fees for politicians’ children, employing their relatives at the 
company, or taking them on hunting trips, may be the most typical examples among the 
many that are spread over time and have no direct link with the act of political 
persuasion.  
“Whenever there is a hint for it, we have to show other so-to-say ‘under the line 
items’. We take them [politicians, public officials] to nice holidays etc.”112 
 
“They [domestic Hungarian firms] organize hunting, pay for family holidays etc. 
…they do not know who the real decision-maker is. [Firms approach those 
politicians ] who they think might be relevant. A town mayor has no influence in 
the milk industry; still, it is worth building good relations with him, because he 
is the local ‘lord’. This is the modern version of feudal networks. But this is only 
true for Hungarian companies [and not multinationals].”113 
  
As the quotes show, the nature of environmental resource dependencies, in the 
Hungarian context, differs greatly from the UK and EU contexts. While in developed 
capitalist societies, information is the most sought-after resource for public institutions, 
in the emerging post-socialist capitalist environment, individuals and parties need more 
concrete material or non-material resources, such as money or in-kind contributions in 
the form of favours. As a professor explained, in Hungary social favours create network 
capital. The process is based on trust and interpersonal relationships. In lobbying 
procedures, social favours are essential. 
“The action is not linked; I do not pay now for the advantage I ask. Either I 
already paid for it long ago or I will, in the distant future. … I do something for 
you and in 15 years time you do something for me… 
So network capital works in a way, as if I would put something in the bank now 
and then in the future I would take it out. I trust in you that you give it back one 
day. 
So this is how network capital is created, which is not necessarily as brutal as 
saying ‘here is the money’. …Probably in quite a big scale, there might be 
corruption behind these activities.”114  
 
Corruption in these cases is invisible and immeasurable. Based on the insights of 
the interviews it seems that in the post-socialist context, the categories of lobbying and 
corruption are not so clearly distinguishable as in western societies. Network-based 
lobbying may or may not include monetary exchange. It has to be acknowledged that in 
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some instances purely professional exchange of information may take place between 
private and public actors. However, findings of this thesis suggest that in the majority of 
cases, network-based lobbying includes some kind of compensation (material or in-
kind) to public officials or other non-transparent gains for party-related politicians. 
Consequently, instead of making a distinction between corruption and lobbying - in this 
study - both monetary exchange and social favours are viewed as ‘exchange currencies’ 
that provide access to decision-making.  
“Interest representation is done through networks and money. These two make it 
work, without these it does not work. Or you can say money, networks and 
certain power relations [under power relations the interviewee referred to 
associational membership as formal channels of interest representation]. “115 
 
Based on the insight of the quotes in this section, it becomes evident that post-socialist 
lobbying has four major components: formal and informal networks that provide access 
to decision-making on the one hand, while money and social favours are resources that 
corporations ‘pay’ with. Formal networks through associational and corporate board 
memberships and informal networks through interpersonal relationships supplement and 
strengthen each other. To become influential, business people have to engage in both. 
As interviewees stated, both access (formal relations through memberships and informal 
relationships through interpersonal networks) and currency (cash or social favours) are 
inevitable for lobbying success. Consequently, even if firms wanted to use professional 
lobbying techniques to further their interests, they have to adapt to the local rules, since 
Western-type access goods (information and expertise) do not lead to success.  
6.2.1 The process of exchange in lobbying in different institutional 
contexts 
As information from economic actors is rarely valued by decision-makers the 
exchange currency is money and / or social favours. This implies that there are different 
types of access goods including monetary exchange. As it was noted earlier in chapter 2, 
lobbying can only be successful, if stakeholders are able to access legislative decision-
making and get a chance to channel their political messages to the relevant public 
officials. As discussed in chapter 4, according to the exchange theory - in return for 
access to EU-level policy-making - interest organizations provide information to 
institutions (Bouwen 2002). Based on the theory of resource dependence, Bouwen 
argued that EU institutions and businesses become interdependent, because they need 
resources from each other (Bouwen 2002: 368). Firms require access to institutions, 
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while institutions demand information or as Bouwen called them ‘access goods’ (2002). 
Information about the domestic environment, the impacts of a legislative proposal at 
EU-level or expertise, all provide valuable knowledge and the sense of legitimacy for 
decision-makers in Brussels (Bouwen 2004). Hence, at the EU level, when private 
actors are able to provide the necessary information that institutions demand, they are 
granted access to policy-making. Applying Bouwen’s theory to the Hungarian context, 
it is easy to see that firms in post-socialist countries similarly require access to policy-
making. However due to the weak accessibility of public decision-making, the resources 
that are exchanged become different. As public institutions are less open to the 
professional input of private actors - instead of formally contacting public institutions 
and providing information through professional lobbying techniques – firms acquire 
access through interpersonal relations and offer financial or social gains to public 
officials in exchange. Hence, an important difference between EU-level and Hungarian 
domestic lobbying is the ‘currency’ in which companies have to ‘pay’ for access. 
Adapting and extending Bouwen’s theory in the post-socialist institutional structure, 
table 6.1 below shows the characteristics of exchange relations in western and post-
socialist institutional contexts.  
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Table 6.1: Comparison of exchange relations based on Bouwen’s 
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As table 6.1 illustrates, in different institutional contexts different exchange relations 
take place. While in the UK and at EU level firms predominantly get access to decision-
makers by providing expertise and industry-related information, by formally contacting 
public officials and presenting their interests via formal lobbying tools, in Hungary 
companies access policy-making through interpersonal networks in social places and 
‘pay’ for their access by offering material or immaterial gains to public office holders. 
Moreover, in the UK and at EU level, lobbying focuses on the exchange of information 
at the administrator’s level, especially in the policy formulation and implementation 
stages of political decision-making. Top-level lobbying characterises only the agenda-
setting phase, when “CEO/Commissioner contact is encouraged for the political 
momentum” (Coen 2009: 160). In contrast, in Hungary information exchange with 
lower-level administrators are mostly missing from domestic firms’ practices. Firms 
that lobby in the post-socialist institutional context target top-level decision-makers 
predominantly. In sum, the comparison of the different environments illustrates how the 
institutional context determines lobbying practices and the exchange relations of public 
decision-makers and business stakeholders. 
Now that we have established the exchange relations of lobbying, we have to 
investigate the lobbying process itself. In the following sections we will explore the 
impact of domestic institutions, on how firms develop and position their lobbying 
activities in the organizational structure. We will investigate the characteristics of EE 
lobbying and how these characteristics influence firm level lobbying capabilities and 
strategy creation.  
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6.2.2 Lobbying: The privilege or burden of the economic elite? 
 As we have seen in chapter 2, in London and Brussels there are two main factors 
that influence how much attention and money corporations allocate to lobbying. The 
first is the organization’s size or available resources (Coen and Dannreuther 2003; 
Beyers and Kerremans 2006; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009) and the second is 
regulatory exposure (Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). Generally the bigger 
a company, the more it will spend on lobbying. Partly because large firms incorporate 
public affairs in their general communications activities seeing it as a tool to maintain a 
positive image (Thomson and John 2007); and because they are more significantly 
affected by legislation. Western corporations in heavily regulated industries are more 
likely to channel substantial financial and human resources towards lobbying, as they 
realise that their activities can be drastically affected by regulation. In contrast in 
Hungary, larger size or regulatory exposure does not lead to more professional lobbying 
among domestic firms. Even highly regulated companies that rely on public investment 
projects do not have PA/government offices - or even a dedicated professional - dealing 
with government engagement; nor a declared separate budget for political involvement. 
At some EE companies there is a separate budget for ‘constitutional expenses’, but in 
these cases the budget is explicitly set aside for corruption purposes. Indeed, the term 
‘constitutional expenses’ is used in business circles and usually means cash, but was 
first publicly referred to by a former CEO of the national Hungarian Power Companies 
Ltd. (Sághy 2009).  
 
 When asked about their interest representation practices, interviewees in London 
and Brussels talked about media campaigns, engagement programmes, monitoring and 
other public affairs tools, while Hungarian stakeholders referred to their ‘wide 
networks’, their projects that are blocked by the authorities, or their initiatives when 
they tried to formally get in touch with the government. The classical tools of public 
affairs (such as political intelligence, contact programme, media campaign, legislative 
lobbying etc) were almost never mentioned at large domestic firms. In the interviews, 
all domestic firms in Hungary declared that they do not have an official political or 
lobbying strategy. Yet, when executives talked about interest representation, they 
mentioned issues they personally manage through ‘lobbying’ people in their own 
networks. The nature of post-socialist interest representation can be best illustrated with 
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the words of a large Hungarian firm’s director116, who answered the following when 
asked whether his company had a written political strategy: “No, absolutely not, this is a 
real taboo. It exists but we do not even talk about it.” Interviews show that firms engage 
in lobbying on a daily basis, but they use informal channels instead of formal 
procedures. Managers rely both on their personal relationships and official positions in 
their lobbying strategy, confirming that networking is “neither a private affair, nor a 
purely official contact” (Sik and Wellman 1997: 6). Interview data suggests that firms 
put public affairs into the hands of their CEOs, because they have the most reliable 
information about the company and therefore they are the ones who are taken most 
seriously by public or government officials.  
“In the public sector they [officials] like to talk to people on the top…“117 
 
At the same time top managers are the only ones who also have the informal channels to 
be able to access top-level decision-makers, so lobbying becomes their exclusive task. 
When asked about who lobbies at their companies, CEOs of domestic and multinational 
firms alike answered that lobbying is the sole responsibility of CEOs or vice-CEOs.  
“This is a new field in corporate policy. In socialism, when something needed to 
be done, it was the CEO who did it. When there was something to be done in the 
interest of the company, then the CEO represented the case at the ministry or the 
Party. CEOs know best what is in the interest of the company…”118 
 
“Only me. The CEO. This is on my shoulders entirely, but we lobby only with 
legal tools. There are some byzantic characteristics here. Compared to the 
normal market environment, in adapting into this byzantic system, lobbying is 
evidently steered into the direction of the CEOs, through their informal 
networks. And as I had a few years experience in the public sectors, I have my 
own contacts here and there, other persons would be unnecessary in this 
process. Even if we had a person for this [lobbying] my contacts would be 
necessary. Some contacts are important, if we want to contact a minister for 
example.”119  
 
“In every case it is the top management, CEO and vice-CEO…  
If the secretary of the association goes to the ministry, how will he/she be 
accepted there? It is different [if the CEO goes], CEOs are taken seriously.”120 
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As CEOs are the only ‘channel’ of corporate public affairs, interest representation 
becomes an ambiguous and secretive activity. A member of the board at a large 
Hungarian firm explained how lobbying works in Hungary very illustratively: 
„Corporate lobbying in Hungary is like sex was in our grandmother’s days. It 
was there in the family, but nobody talked about it, because it was a taboo.”121 
Being a taboo also means that the lobbying strategy is rarely communicated within the 
firm. At most large, Hungarian firms, even middle management does not know the 
directions of corporate political strategy, it is strictly kept at top-levels. A Head of the 
Strategy Department at a large state-owned company122, explained that he does not 
know the political strategy of the firm and added: 
”Directions and policy-level issues, as well as informal contacts are managed 
by the highest level management. Our CEO’s main task is to have these contacts. 
It’s kept in the higher regions…”  
Consequently, instead of setting political objectives in business planning, “boards use 
the forum of meetings to discuss who knows who and therefore who should take on 
which issues”123. Hence, the management and communication of a firm’s political 
strategy reflects the characteristics of its top executives. CEOs decide what type of 
information they share with their colleagues and what methods they use when they 
engage in lobbying. This is a completely non-transparent procedure. As a Member of 
the Board124 at a large Hungarian company explained:  
“The CEO can choose to keep all the contacts and distribute the information to 
his colleagues. Or he employs people who have good personal network capital. 
If he knows that a colleague knows a person, who is necessary for the company, 
then the colleague will get tasks that he can arrange through his relationship.”  
 
Despite their crucial role in corporate lobbying, business leaders have mixed feelings 
towards this part of their job. They talk about it with pride – since they are the key 
people, who hold the most important contacts and information, necessary for the 
representation of their firm’s interests. But at the same time they feel that this privilege 
is sometimes a burden, since their own personal acquaintances are the inseparable assets 
of the company and they cannot trust anybody else in lobbying matters.  
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 When asked about how much of his working time is consumed with lobbying 
tasks, the CEO of a large public company answered 30-40 percent125. A vice-CEO of 
another public corporation126 explained that under the “fastened legislative process” 
since the Orbán cabinet, they have to get back to the ministry to negotiate with public 
officials every day, while the managing director of a large private corporation said that 
he meets with politicians “several times every week”127. Hence, corporate leaders spend 
a considerable amount of their working time lobbying, which also means that lobbying 
is more a ‘necessity’ or burden for them, besides their general strategic and operational 
tasks.  
 
“[Lobbying] is a constraint. I consider it a burden. But it is also a necessity to 
remain alive in the market.“128 
 
As the following quote shows, the burdens of lobbying does not only affect CEOs of 
domestic corporations, but also the top managers of multinationals’ subsidiaries: 
We have to get back to them [the ministry] everyday. I was in the ministry in the 
morning and then we will negotiate in the [name of the sector] association and 
afterwards we will get back to the government. We have to be reliable, it 
[lobbying] cannot depend on one company. In the Hungarian [name of the 
sector] sector 80 percent of the industry is multinational. CEOs [of 
multinationals] negotiate and then they have to get a mandate internally, within 
the company and that takes time.” 129 
 
It is difficult to draw a line between top managers’ personal and business lives. 
Furthermore they always have to excuse themselves and assure everyone that the 
lobbying they do does not include bribery or other unethical practices, even if it 
sometimes presumably does. 
“…there is always a doubt that something goes on behind the scene.”130 
 
Top-level, network-based lobbying limits the development of lobbying capabilities and 
presents an efficiency deficit for CEOs – since a large amount of their working time is 
taken by the fulfilment of lobbying tasks. An important consequence of top-level 
lobbying is that it limits the reach of corporate lobbying activity. Not only, because the 
number of a CEO’s contacts will be naturally finite, but also because the wide array of 
professional lobbying tools and strategies are not available to directors.  
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“The biggest problem with the informal lobbying technique is its incoherence. 
Different phone calls will never be the same as a formal reminder or minutes of 
a meeting that sets the objectives for everybody in the whole organization. 
Transparency is catastrophic.”131 
Executives are limited in time, know-how as well as in the number of relations they 
have. This constitutes a particularly important handicap regarding the development of 
lobbying capabilities and engagement with EU-level institutions. 
 
 Nevertheless, the domestic level effectiveness of network-based lobbying makes 
business leaders feel that they do not need intermediaries. When asked about the reasons 
of lobbying being confined to top-level, former CEO of a subsidiary of a multinational 
explained that: “This is a small country, everybody knows everybody. Why should 
anybody fool themselves with having PA professionals?”132 Similar reasoning was used 
by a CEO of a large domestic firm when he explained the lack of professional 
monitoring procedures in his company: “This is a small country. We get to know 
everything in time.” 133 
 The factor smallness however, seems to be more a subjective perception of size 
than a reality. Indeed, people who believe that their direct influence in the domestic 
institutional environment is a consequence of their country’s ‘small’ size, also think that 
they are not able to engage at EU-level for the same reason.  
“The weight of Hungary is so small…it [EU level lobbying] is not rational.”134  
 
Contrary to the measurable geographical size of a state, a country’s self-perception of its 
size and importance (Thorhallson 2006) might have an influence on the perception of its 
own lobbying abilities. Perceptions however might be misleading. How well 
organizations are able to engage with EU institutions does not primarily have to do with 
the size of their country. Small WE countries – like the Netherlands or Belgium – have 
a lot more firms engaging in Brussels, than EE states. Conversely Poland, although 
perceives itself as “big and important” (Copsey and Haughton 2009) is not much more 
active in EU-level corporate lobbying than Hungary. Therefore as it was already noted 
in chapter 4, the main determinant of Europeanization may not be size, but lobbying 
capabilities. In Hungary corporate leaders lobby through their own top-level, informal, 
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interpersonal networks, following unwritten rules, without any declared budget. They 
are not supported by professional public affairs departments and a centralised political 
strategy.  
 
 As it was described in chapter 4, large firms in the UK, and also those that are 
active at EU level, manage their political activities through middle-level public affairs 
departments that generally report directly to top management. Through their 
memberships these firms use associational membership as a channel for influence both 
at the domestic and at EU levels. Their political strategy is generally worked out in a 
written form, based on middle- or long-term corporate objectives. UK firms often use 
agencies for ad hoc projects or even for long-term public affairs cooperation; and 
channel their messages to public decision-makers mostly through formal channels. In 
contrast, interviews suggest that in Hungary, lobbying is positioned exclusively at the 
top-level of the organizational hierarchy. Associations are predominantly used for 
providing access to decision-makers, instead of providing a reliable channel of influence 
for corporations. Firm level political strategies are mostly non-existent; corporations 
have short-term political goals mostly as a response to actual threats and / or 
opportunities. As it will be shown in the following sections, firms in Hungary do not 
tend to use agencies for political activities and channel their political messages mostly 
through informal channels. As a summary, table 6.2 below illustrates the main 
differences in the characteristics of Eastern and Western European lobbying. 
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Table 6.2: Typology of Eastern European lobbying in contrast to UK 
practices 
 UK lobbying EE lobbying 
Position of lobbying in 
the organizational 
structure 
Middle-level as a support 
function for top-level 
management 
Top-level only 
Use of associations Used as channels for 
influence 
Used as channels for 
access 
Political strategy Long-term, based on 
analytical work 
Short-term based on 
actual threats and/or 
opportunities 
Outsourcing Ad hoc or continuous 
outsourcing as part of 
lobbying mix 
No outsourcing 
Channels of influence Formal and occasionally 
informal 
Informal and occasionally 
formal 
 
In sum, domestic firms adapt to their institutional environment. In Hungary, by 
developing a post-socialist lobbying style that is based on short-terminism, the 
particularistic use of associations, top-level interpersonal contacts and informal channels 
of influence. In contrast in the UK, firms may be successful in lobbying, if they 
professionalize their lobbying activities, use associations as channels of influence (if at 
all), manage a long-term political strategy, contract agencies if necessary, and use 
predominantly formal channels of influence. Now that we have seen how domestic 
firms adapt to the local constraints, in the next section we will explore how subsidiaries 
of multinationals develop their lobbying strategies in the post-socialist context.  
 
6.3 Multinationals: excluded or embraced? 
 The Hungarian economy is dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs). 
Hence, through the investigation of multinationals’ lobbying strategies in EE, it can be 
tested whether the institutional context is a more important determinant of lobbying 
than the availability of resources and professional expertise. The investigation of 
MNCs’ lobbying strategies provides an opportunity to test the findings that were 
summarized above in relation to domestic firms – i.e. that the domestic institutional 
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structure has a determining impact on firms’ lobbying strategies. MNCs were among the 
first to open direct representation offices in Brussels, using professional PA methods for 
channelling their interests. In the Hungarian economy foreign MNCs have an influential 
role through FDI. They dominate the Budapest stock market and Hungarian firms rely 
on them for finance (Bohle and Greskovits 2007). Looking at foreign MNCs’ behaviour 
constitutes a ‘natural experiment’, since they have the necessary resources as well as the 
know-how to use professional lobbying methods. So the question arises whether they 
try to achieve their goals the same way in Budapest as in Brussels, or do they adapt to 
the local networking games? If we find that they lobby professionally just like in 
Brussels and London then that provides evidence against the claim that the domestic 
institutional environment have a major or even determining impact on corporate 
lobbying strategies and we can conclude that resources and lobbying expertise override 
institutional pressures. However if we find that MNCs adapt to the local networking 
strategies and lobby as locals than it can be argued that the determining impact of 
domestic institutions is stronger on firms’ lobbying strategies than the impact of 
financial resources.  
  
 Based on the analysis of the interviews it becomes clear that multinationals 
‘import’ their professional lobbying expertise to Hungary and tend to set up in-house 
capabilities for public affairs. Interestingly – in contrast to UK firms, where many in-
house teams were supported by external agencies - among the interviewed subsidiaries 
of multinationals only one had a contracted relationship with an external PA agency in 
Hungary, all the others had only the internal unit for public affairs. The same was found 
in other Eastern European countries. In Slovakia for instance, the country manager of a 
multinational PA/PR agency explained that multinationals – that are managed by local 
managers – have a similar attitude towards professional lobbying as domestic firms.  
“Even at multinationals that are run by Slovak managers, they still think it is not 
efficient to run it [lobbying] externally - you have to have somebody internally. 
One person is enough and you have to do it [arrange lobbying capabilities] 
inside.”135 
 
As the quote shows, even though multinationals acknowledge the importance of the 
‘integrated strategy’ and implement western-style lobbying structures, they adapt to 
their institutional environment. As it was detailed earlier in this chapter, lobbying in 
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Hungary requires less political analysis or other ‘western’ type professional lobbying 
expertise, than lobbying in the UK or at EU level. Therefore, although they implement 
their international standards, in terms of the design and management of their lobbying 
capabilities, subsidiaries of MNCs adapt to their local institutional environment, by 
keeping these in-house units small and manage lobbying capabilities exclusively from 
inside the organizational structure. Adaptation however does not stop at limiting the size 
of professional lobbying capabilities or refraining from outsourcing. Multinationals 
have to find a way to get access to decision-making, but as it was argued earlier, in 
Hungary only networks provide access. However, interviews suggest that foreign and 
local top managers do not mingle; they rather engage in their own separate circle of 
‘friends’. Foreigners meet in international chambers of commerce and embassies, while 
domestic managers at domestic associations, social and sports clubs and private 
gatherings136. Hence, instead of integrating into social networks, multinationals have to 
find a different path into local relationships. Foreign multinationals or new domestic 
entrants seek to acquire network capital when entering EE markets, either by using 
brokers to access informal networks (Sik and Wellman 1997) or by hiring local 
managers (Peng 2003). Interviews suggest that at the stage of entering post-socialist 
markets, subsidiaries of multinationals engage in networking by paying mediators to 
“buy” access.137. Yet, once they are in the market, they use two different approaches. 
On the one hand, they appoint CEOs, who either worked at state organizations before, 
or otherwise have strong interpersonal connections with the industry and the state. On 
the other hand, if the CEO is an expatriate foreign person, then he/she gets supported by 
a senior government relations professional, who opens the doors for the executive. As a 
former CEO at a foreign multinational’s subsidiary in Hungary138 explained: 
„If multinationals want to arrange something, the CEO goes to see the minister 
not the PA director. The director or the team is just preparing documents for 
him.”  
As a public affairs professional explained, he organizes meetings between leading 
decision-makers – ministers and state secretaries – and the management of the 
company, however when a serious issue appears on the agenda, the CEO personally 
goes to see the relevant political leader139. Interviews suggest that although MNCs base 
their strategies on their international standards and ‘imported’ expertise, multinationals 
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accept the local rules and do whatever is necessary locally to access decision-making. 
The following quotation shows how open MNCs are to the requirements of the local 
context, and how far they would go to meet the access criteria of domestic institutions.  
“The CEO of a large multinational in Hungary is an important person. Maybe 
politically it is necessary to bring here the CEO of the headquarters, then that’s 
what they do. Multinationals are pragmatic. No problem. They will bring here 
whoever is necessary, the regional or even the world leader, if it is worth it.  
In my case as well…If I can arrange something, then I do, but when I feel that 
somebody needs a more important person, then I invite the regional CEO or, if 
they [public officials] want the world leader of the company, then we bring him 
here. Whatever is necessary...”140   
 
As the quote suggests, multinationals adapt to the domestic environment by accepting 
the local rules of networking. They understand that networking provides access to 
decision-making, and adapt to this requirement by linking international top managers of 
the mother company or the subsidiary with the relevant, local decision-makers. 
Multinationals adapt to the networking game, but extend these with all their capabilities, 
including their professional lobbying know-how, financial and human resources and 
economic weight. Hence, besides engaging in interpersonal relationship-based lobbying 
with political decision-makers, CEOs of multinational’s subsidiaries are also supported 
by professional public affairs personnel. As one of the lobbyists at a multinational’s 
subsidiary explained: “… big bosses do not go into deep details, so working the issues 
out is my job.”141  
“They [multinationals] have professionals for this activity [lobbying], who help 
to analyse the given issue. There is huge experience and background internally 
at these companies. …At the biggest ones they have a professional for this and 
international support. They collect international benchmarks; they hire 
consultants to write policy papers, [and] even legislative proposals.”142  
The quote clearly indicates that MNCs implement all the necessary western-type 
support functions that professional political analysis and political lobbying requires. 
They make use of their international networks, professional expertise as well as human 
and financial resources when it comes to political engagement. In contrast - as it was 
shown in previous sections - this type of assistance is not available to domestic 
managers, because domestic firms do not invest in professional capabilities. Therefore 
in those relatively rare, occasional instances when political decision-making opens up 
                                                 
140
 CEO, multinational in Hungary 5, interviewed 24.01.2012 
141
 Director, multinational in Hungary 8, interviewed 16.04.2012 
142
 Director of stakeholder relations, multinational in Hungary 1, interviewed 06.09.2011 
 209 
for the professional input of industry in legislative processes, only multinationals are 
able to provide useful, analysis-based lobbying input. As it was argued earlier in chapter 
5, it often happens that when a social dialogue is carried out, industrial feedback is 
required on a given legislative proposal on an extremely short deadline, for instance 
overnight or over the weekend. As the following quote illustrates, in these cases only 
multinationals stand a chance to respond: 
When the government – reluctantly – sends documents for review or debate, it 
tries to prevent opinions by sending the document last night, requiring feedback 
by the following morning. They send 30-50 pages of a legislative proposal the 
day before the deadline, and they think that formally they met the requirements 
of corporatist negotiations. Companies are normally not prepared to submit any 
feedback to these. But multinationals are prepared to give feedback even in 24 
hours.”143  
 
As a result, due to the large gap in expertise and lobbying capabilities, 
Hungarian business people often feel that multinationals have an ‘unfair’ competitive 
advantage, because they have comparably larger resources, and because they often get 
extra state funding or tax-related financial support, when they enter the market. 
Although multinationals are seen by most of the business leaders as less corrupt and 
more professional in their lobbying activities than their domestic counterparts, their 
network-based strategies are considered highly sophisticated, even in comparison to 
local practices. As one of the informants explained, local subsidiaries of multinationals 
engage in network-based strategies in a more systematic way than domestic firms. They 
build up a layer of young, local managerial group that engages with public officials at 
every level of political decision-making or as the interviewee claimed, they are “there 
everywhere”144.  
“They choose the personal form of making contacts; they do not offer money for 
government administrators, but promise success for the government. When the 
government desperately wants success - because it is not doing fine, or even if it 
does - they go to the Ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office. There they say 
that ‘there are so many good things we could do together, give us some money, if 
you get in we get in…’. They are so very much present in the different layers of 
public administration that it is shocking.  
Now, this is not forbidden, I could say a little bit cynically that these actions are 
almost PPP [private-public-partnership] issues that everybody likes. There is 
nothing illegal in these co-operations. They found the method of building 
contacts very well, which is not disprovable, in some respect it is even positive, 
but it nicely fits into this Eastern picture.”145 
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As the above quote shows, multinationals acquire access to decision-making similarly 
to domestic firms through interpersonal connections. However, while domestic firms 
were found to concentrate on top-level engagement exclusively through CEOs 
interpersonal contacts, MNCs focus their efforts on targeting the whole vertical 
spectrum of legislative policy-making. Compared to domestic firms, this type of 
approach suggests a more professional and conscious strategy building effort, even in 
the process of networking. Subsidiaries do not limit their networks and consequently 
their access to the top of the political elite, but rather extend their web of relations over 
a wider circle of decision-makers. For them, it is important to know who is dealing with 
policy in the administrative level at the different ministries, because they have the 
expertise and resources to prepare analysis-based lobbying documents that can be 
channelled into the legislative process early on. This type of engagement strategy is 
frequent in London and Brussels, however in the Hungarian institutional environment 
multinationals support administrators with expert information predominantly more than 
their domestic counterparts. As a result, domestic companies may ‘slip out’ of the 
policy-making process even at the domestic level, whenever a legislative proposal goes 
through the whole legislative process. Below table 6.3 indicates that domestic and 
multinational firms use different types of approaches in their local lobbying activities.  
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Table 6.3: Different ‘ingredients’ of lobbying used by multinationals 
and domestic firms.  
Ingredients of lobbying Subsidiaries of 
multinationals 
Domestic firms 
Networking reach Systematically/strategically 
through the whole vertical 
spectrum of the public sector 
Through the interpersonal 
network of top-level 
managers (friends, family, 
acquaintances etc.) 




Political strategy Long-term and clearly 
defined 
Short-term and not 
defined 
Responsible person for 
lobbying 
CEO, PA manager (and 
maybe team) 
CEO and vice-CEO 
Tools of lobbying Informal meetings, 
associational representation, 
political analysis, legislative 
monitoring, coalition 
building  




As the table above indicates, multinationals are more ‘professional’ and strategically-
driven in their lobbying processes than their domestic counterparts. MNCs build 
networks consciously, systematically targeting the whole vertical spectrum of relevant 
public officials, based on a clearly defined political strategy, whereas domestic firms 
make use of their top leaders interpersonal relationships, based on ad hoc, actual 
interests and long-term trust-based exchanges rather than a systematic policy-driven 
approach. In contrast to subsidiaries, domestic firms limit their lobbying scope to the 
top layers of political decision-makers and do not engage systematically with lower 
level officials. As it was noted earlier in this chapter, CEOs of multinationals are 
supported by a person or a team of public affairs professionals, so their lobbying 
expertise is extended beyond the strategic levels. Domestic managers however, do not 
have the same type of support and consequently their lobbying tools are limited to 
informal meetings and associational representation. Besides these two, the additional 
lobbying capabilities make multinationals able to engage in legislative monitoring, 
policy analysis or coalition building as well.  
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 As it was argued earlier in chapter 4, firms develop different types of lobbying 
strategies for managing their available lobbying capabilities. In this theoretical 
framework internal lobbying capabilities were associated with the ‘integrated strategy’, 
external capabilities were linked with the ‘outsourced strategy’, whereas network-based 
capabilities belonged to the ‘network-based strategy’ and the lack of capabilities were 
argued to lead to an ‘inactive strategy’. Based on the findings of this chapter, 
capabilities of multinational subsidiaries and domestic firms seem to differ, even though 
they both engage in lobbying in the same institutional context. Below, table 6.4 
summarizes the differences in lobbying capabilities and sets the scene for the 
investigation of Eastern European firms’ lobbying strategies.  
Table 6.4: Capabilities of domestic and multinational firms in Hungary 
Capability Subsidiaries of 
multinationals 
Domestic firms 
Lobbying know-how and 
expertise in public affairs 
Available Not available 
Personnel / team for 
lobbying besides the 
CEO 
Available Not available 
Corporate political 
strategy 
Available Not available 
Networks Available Available 
 
Table 6.4 indicates that even at the domestic level, local firms have less available 
lobbying capabilities than their multinational counterparts. While multinationals make 
use and integrate networks as the locally crucial ingredient of lobbying into their 
lobbying mix, they extend their capabilities with those that they import from their 
international headquarters, such as their professional lobbying know-how, human 
resources and the written and strategically designed corporate political strategy. 
However, as it was argued earlier in this chapter, it has to be highlighted that the sole 
implementation of professional lobbying methods would not make multinationals able 
to influence decision-making in Hungary. Besides their imported resources, skills and 
expertise, their investment in networking has crucial importance.  
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 These findings support the claim that domestic institutional structures determine 
lobbying strategies, not only at domestic firms, but also at multinationals. The analysis 
revealed that although MNCs ‘import’ all their professional lobbying capabilities into 
Hungary, they need to extend these by investing in the development of local networking 
strategies in order to become able to manage a successful corporate political strategy. 
Hence, the determining role of domestic institutions in the process of firm level 
lobbying strategy design is argued to be more important, than the availability of 
financial resources and professional lobbying capabilities. The analysis in the above 
section indicates that financial resources and expertise have a crucial role in MNCs 
strategy development, since subsidiaries develop in-house capabilities for professional 
lobbying and implement their internationally standardized public affairs procedures. 
However these resources and capabilities get supplemented by the local know-how of 
interpersonal, top-level networking. Consequently, the lobbying strategy that MNCs 
develop in Eastern Europe is a mixture of ingredients from western and eastern 
lobbying practices. The result is an efficient and localised lobbying strategy, through 
which subsidiaries get full access to local decision-making and can successfully 
participate in domestic interest representation. 
 Furthermore, findings also suggest that networks are not protecting local 
companies, nor are they excluding towards foreigners. Foreign companies are welcome 
in the networking game, as long as they play by the local rules. Informal networks are 
generally considered economically inefficient, since they are thought to fence insiders 
from external competition (World Bank 2001). Yet, the data presented in this chapter 
shows that, rather than excluding outsiders, the organizational structure of top-level, 
network-based strategy creates a ‘golden cage’ for insiders for two reasons. First, it 
forms a ‘lock-in effect’ for internal members, because they cannot develop professional 
lobbying capabilities and therefore they can achieve results only at the domestic level. 
Secondly, by being penetrable to more professional and resourceful foreign companies, 
domestic firms become exposed to lobbying competition and lose their competitive 
advantages in their own markets. Indeed, in contrast to scholars who investigate 
networks from the outsiders’ point of view (Peng 2003), this chapter shows the impact 
of networks on insiders. Peng, who theorized firms’ network-based strategies, claims 
that networks will have an ‘exclusionary’ effect on outsiders and consequently they 
create barriers to entry (2003). Yet, this chapter shows that on the one hand, networks 
are penetrable for foreign companies – which adapt to the local institutional 
environment and use networking strategies too – and on the other hand, instead of being 
 214 
a barrier of entry, networks have a lock-in effect, as they create a ‘barrier to exit’ for 
insiders. In other words, network-based strategies limit EE firms’ international 
engagement. 
 So far we have investigated how the domestic institutional environment affects 
the design and construction of direct firm level lobbying capabilities. The next section 
will investigate the lobbying strategies of domestic and multinational firms in Hungary, 
by examining how the theoretical framework that was developed in chapter 4 can be 
applied to Eastern European firms.  
 
6.4 Firms’ lobbying strategies 
 In chapter 4, four different strategies were identified: the integrated, outsourced, 
network-based and inactive strategies. Firms that integrated lobbying capabilities into 
their organizational structure were argued to follow the ‘integrated strategy’. Most large 
UK firms were argued to belong to this category. In contrast, those firms that relied only 
on external capabilities and did not internalise lobbying expertise were argued to follow 
an ‘outsourced strategy’. The ‘network-based strategy’ was argued to be followed by 
companies that do not develop any formalised structure, internal or external capabilities 
for lobbying, but mobilize the interpersonal relationships of their top managers. It was 
claimed that these companies do not have a declared budget, nor dedicated personnel for 
public affairs and they use networks capabilities for lobbying. This approach was 
referred to as non-professional and was contrasted to the integrated and outsourced 
strategies that were labelled professional. The fourth type of strategy was labelled as the 
‘inactive strategy’ and was found at SMEs. The inactive strategy indicates that the firm 
does not engage in political activities at all. Interviews suggest that - based on these 
typologies - corporations in Hungary may be grouped into three major groups in relation 
to their lobbying strategies. Table 6.5 illustrates the combination of strategies by firm 
types.  
Table 6.5: Lobbying strategies of firms in Hungary  
Lobbying strategies Type of business in Hungary 
‘Network-based strategy’ Large domestic businesses (both public 
and private) 
Mix of ‘Integrated’ + ‘network-based 
strategy’ 
Subsidiaries of MNCs 
‘Inactive strategy’ Mostly SMEs  
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The first group consists of large public and private domestic firms, which were found to 
follow the ‘network-based’ strategy. The majority of interviewed domestic businesses 
belonged to this category. Although they belong to the same group, interview 
discussions showed a slight difference between the approach of public and private firms 
in relation to the managerial choice on public affairs capabilities. While private sector 
CEOs were mostly satisfied and relatively content with the top-level network-based 
strategy, managers of public firms expressed more discontent towards the lobbying part 
of their jobs. Furthermore, in the interviewing period, at several public firms initiatives 
were started or at least planned, for the creation of a professional public affairs 
department. Although some of these initiatives remained at the planning phase, 
nevertheless public firms seem to be more open to the ‘professionalization’ process. In 
contrast, similar plans or initiatives were not observed at private domestic firms. Instead 
CEOs more often expressed their rational concerns about the profitability of such in-
house departments or further investment into professional lobbying capabilities.  
If I have to do it myself, I do not have time for this [lobbying]. But if I want 
somebody else to do it, that would cost a fortune. It is a waste of money. To 
employ somebody who might reach something or not - is not good enough. 
Instead I employ two more engineers and get more jobs. The costs are too high 
compared to the value or the profit it brings146”. 
 
 The second group of companies includes the subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations. As it was detailed earlier in this chapter, subsidiaries develop a lobbying 
mix in Hungary, using both western and eastern lobbying practices. Consequently, 
multinationals engage in a special form of Eastern European lobbying strategy, in which 
they combine the ‘integrated’ and the ‘network-based’ strategies and use the tools of 
both approaches. These firms generally have an in-house team or a professional 
employee for the management of public affairs, but through local mediators, they also 
engage in network-based practices.  
 In the third category those firms are grouped, which follow the ‘inactive 
strategy’. These firms intentionally distance themselves from lobbying and do not even 
develop network-based channels for interest representation. In the interview sample, 
two small- and medium-sized firms, a large export-oriented manufacturing firm and a 
construction company belonged in this category.147  
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 The analysis of the interviews shows that the confinement of lobbying at the top 
of the organizational hierarchy is triggered by the domestic institutional environment. 
As the public sector does not require professional ‘access goods’ in the form of 
information and expertise; at domestic firms lobbying capabilities do not become 
structured and professionalized either internally or externally. Firms do not develop in-
house public affairs departments or contract professional public affairs agencies to 
represent their interests. Unlike subsidiaries of multinationals, local CEOs are not 
supported by the know-how and professional expertise of an in-house expert or a team. 
As a consequence, domestic firms are not able to formulate analysis-based arguments or 
create professional written materials for decision-makers. As a result, public affairs 
messages remain at the strategic level and do not include detailed policy-level analysis.  
“Hungarian lobbying is more a surface type lobbying, not carrying hundreds of 
pages of professional arguments. … An MP, similarly to a CEO talks in 
generalities, so it is a bit natural [that CEOs should be appointed to talk to 
MPs]. “148 
In sum, interviews suggest that with the exception of multinational subsidiaries in 
Hungary, most domestic firms develop ‘network-based’ strategies exclusively or do not 
lobby at all.  
Besides the above detailed characteristics of Eastern European lobbying, the study 
revealed an interesting finding in relation to external lobbying capabilities. External 
lobbying capabilities were not mentioned earlier in the above section, because firms in 
Hungary do not seem to use outsourcing in the field of political activities and therefore 
none of the 24 interviewed firms were found to engage in the ‘outsourced strategy’. In 
the sample only one subsidiary of a multination and a domestic firm were found to rely 
on agencies to extend their in-house capabilities. In the following sections, we will 
investigate this phenomenon and explore the reasons behind.  
6.4.1 Internal versus external capabilities  
 Compared to the findings of this study in the UK and at EU level, the Hungarian 
case study presents surprising results in relation to external lobbying capabilities. As it 
was posited in chapter 4, large UK firms tend to contract public affairs agencies either 
as a support function for the in-house public affairs team or as an external capability if 
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expertise is not available internally. By contracting agencies those firms can also engage 
in professional lobbying that do not have the sufficient financial resources or expertise 
for public affairs, inside the organizational structure (Lahusen 2003; Bouwen 20002). 
However, interviews showed that in Hungary and other Eastern European states, 
companies would refuse external support in lobbying, even if they needed help due to 
the overload of their CEOs.  
 As it was discussed in chapter 4, firms in the UK tend to outsource the most 
strategic parts of lobbying. In contrast, in Eastern Europe, if companies invest into 
lobbying, they prefer to keep everything in relation to political strategy in-house. The 
difference in the perception and use of agencies once again hints at the importance of 
the institutional environment on the development of lobbying capabilities. In the UK, 
the institutional framework provides a legal background, in which the rule of law 
provides guarantees for the enforcement of business contracts. In Eastern Europe 
however, formal institutions are weak and contracts are not always enforced. In this 
post-socialist capitalist environment, trust becomes crucial. If there are problems with 
the enforcement of laws - since public institutions are weak and corrupt - than firms will 
consider it carefully with whom they engage in business relationships (Kornai 2003), or 
whether they contract agencies at all. Instead of contracting the best on the market, 
firms will presumably contract the one that they know and trust. Consequently, the 
managerial choice concerning professional capabilities will be based on the question, 
whether anyone can be trusted enough to carry out delicate lobbying strategies and 
whether sensitive corporate information can be handed over to external stakeholders. 
This implies that in Hungary, trust is a precondition of outsourcing. If in the domestic 
institutional environment there is a lack of trust between businesses, then outsourcing of 
lobbying becomes difficult. Hence the domestic institutional context limits the choices 
that are available for the development of lobbying capabilities.  
 
What holds for Hungary, also holds for other post-socialist countries. Interviews 
confirmed that firms in Slovakia and Poland manage lobbying capabilities similarly to 
their Hungarian counterparts, and if they invest into professional lobbying, then they 
prefer in-house arrangements to agencies. As a Bratislava-based country manager at a 
multinational PR and PA agency explained: 
“Many companies try to build up their in-house public affairs, lobbying teams or 
at least have one person responsible for public affairs. If companies decide to 
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have a public affairs expert, they do not tend to use an external agency.”149 
 
As the managing director of a Polish public affairs agency explained, agencies find it 
difficult to get contracts from domestic corporations.  
„We very rarely found business from domestic companies – by that I mean 
companies that are local either state owned or owned by the new domestic 
entrepreneurial class, big business oligarchs, locally… We found it very difficult 
to get business from them.”150  
 
Consultants argued that interpersonal networks make the use of agencies practically 
unnecessary, because local managers have direct informal access to decision-makers. 
“That’s why we rarely work with public companies. All these managers of these 
big state companies are political nominees, and in a way quite rightly say: ‘why 
should I hire you? What is the benefit? I can talk with the ministry any time.”151  
 
Interviews suggest that the tenacity of firms to keep corporate political lobbying in-
house is a direct consequence of the characteristics of the domestic institutional 
environment. Due to the institutional uncertainties, managers base their decisions on 
trust. CEOs of public and private domestic firms argued that they cannot extend their 
capabilities or outsource lobbying, because they would not be able to find an employee 
or contractor that they could trust enough.  
“What would happen if that person lied to me? I cannot trust anybody. Some of 
this or most of this [lobbying] is illegal. People are scared of being taken away 
[to prison].”152 
 
As the above quote shows CEOs do not consider giving lobbying out of their own 
hands, because they cannot. Post-socialist network-capitalism does not provide the 
necessary institutional framework that would make the professionalization and 
outsourcing of lobbying possible. Once again this is evidence that domestic institutions 
determine lobbying strategies, in this case through trust. While UK firms can freely 
contract professional agencies if they want to develop or extend their lobbying 
capabilities, eastern firms are constrained in their choices because in their institutional 
environment trust and personal connections provide the most reliable guarantees for the 
enforcement of contracts. In sum, the Eastern European capitalist environment limits the 
choices that firms have in terms of developing their lobbying capabilities. Furthermore, 
if trust gives the basis of business contracting then the question arises, how will firms 
transpose their lobbying strategies to the EU level?  
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6.5 Europeanization of Eastern European firms or the 
implications of domestic capitalism on EU level lobbying 
strategies 
 Following this thought, one would expect that when firms enter a different 
institutional environment - where formal contracting is ‘safer’ and the rule of law 
provides guarantees – they would adapt to that environment. Due to the relatively short 
membership in the EU, and lack of domestic experiences in professional lobbying one 
would expect that when EE firms engage at EU level, they would invest in professional 
lobbying capabilities, by employing senior professionals or contracting specialised 
agencies. Surprisingly however, interviews suggest that domestic preferences spill over 
to the European level. Firms that reject consultancies at home, try to build in-house 
capabilities in Brussels too. Despite the fact that EU level policy-making and access to 
decision-making requires different skills and experience than domestic lobbying, 
Eastern European firms tend not to hand over their lobbying activities abroad either.  
“State companies are now increasingly aware of the importance of Brussels; 
some major Eastern European companies are opening representative offices in 
Brussels to do their own lobbying. They think if they open their own offices they 
will do their own lobbying. They usually hire quite young people, who are not 
very experienced. So it has not got to the point where they think ‘we actually 
need to hire a professional agency for Brussels, who have the right experience’. 
So even though, they are’ waking up’ to Brussels they are not actually giving 
business to consultancies. These are the publicly owned companies particularly 
in the energy sector or aviation...”153 
 
As the quote suggests, even though in-house expertise and experience is not available 
for successful lobbying campaigns, firms prefer internal capabilities to outsourcing. 
However the reason behind this choice is not necessarily a rational evaluation of the 
added-value of agencies. Firm leaders do not necessary know that at EU level “lobbyists 
are regarded as relatively poor value for money” or that outsourcing of lobbying does 
not necessarily help to „establish political “goodwill” or facilitate firms in the creation 
of “insider status” in Europe” (Coen 1997: 23) as it was noted by scholars. Based on the 
findings of this study, it is argued that EE leaders insist on in-house representation as a 
direct consequence of their domestic experiences.  
In chapter 4 it was argued that firms build on their domestic lobbying 
capabilities and lobbying strategies when they enter the arena of EU lobbying. It was 
argued that domestic organizational level structures determine EU level strategies, since 
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internal lobbying capabilities have a crucial impact on managerial choices concerning 
Europeanization. The question arises hence, how Eastern European firms can transpose 
their network-based strategy to EU level. Would they try to export their top-level 
informal strategies to Brussels, or would they adapt to the “distinct” (Coen 2009: 155) 
EU lobbying style? Would they professionalize their PA function (Coen 2009: 159), as 
their western counterparts did, in order to harmonize lobbying activities within the 
internal organizational structure or would they try to engage through top-level 
interpersonal networks, as in their domestic environments? In chapter 4, it was argued 
that firms that follow an ‘integrated strategy’ will tend to set up an EU office in 
Brussels, or manage EU level activities from the domestic level in-house unit. Those 
that follow the outsourced strategy were argued to build on outsourced capabilities in 
their Europeanization process too. Network-based firms were theorized to follow 
network-based strategies in Brussels, whereas ‘inactive’ firms were argued to remain 
inactive at the EU level too.  
 From the analysis of interviews it becomes evident that managers of most 
Hungarian and Eastern European firms choose not to engage in EU level lobbying. 
Indeed, out of the 13 interviewed large, domestic firms only one had an in-house 
lobbyist in Brussels, while the rest had no representation at all. Interview data suggests 
that domestic firms that follow the ‘network-based’ strategy follow a similar strategy at 
EU level too. Findings show that CEOs that manage their firm’s lobbying activities, 
also manage EU level engagement by occasionally travelling to Brussels in order to 
meet with Hungarian MEPs and Hungarian officials at the Hungarian Permanent 
Representation in Brussels or meet with the representatives of umbrella organizations.  
“We have a Hungarian MEP who helps us permanently and several other 
Hungarian MEPs who we keep contact with.”154 
 
Despite the fact that lobbying at the European Commission is “regarded as the best 
means of influencing the European policy process” (Coen 1997: 21), interviews suggest 
that Hungarian firms generally do not engage with the Commission. Based on the 
findings, it is evident that most corporate leaders have little understanding of EU level 
policy-making and consequently the role and responsibilities of the Commission too. 
This is not surprising however, since they are not public affairs professionals. Hence, 
instead of policy-negotiations or political persuasion, business leaders visit Brussels for 
exploring what is going on, searching for EU funds or just to keep in contact, or build 
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networks with Hungarian representatives. The two quotes below illustrates why the 
network-based strategy cannot be successfully transposed to Brussels. They also 
highlight that CEOs do not have much knowledge about what they could do in Brussels.  
“In my view, it is difficult for a firm to go to Brussels on their own. It seems that 
CEOs are not ‘received’ [public officials do not meet with CEOs] in Brussels 
either. So it [lobbying] is only possible through associations, like Business 
Europe. There is the Economic and Social Committee and there are regional 
representations. I was surprised that Budapest has a representative in Brussels 
too, we never heard about this representation before.”155 
 
“No, we do not have any live contacts there…this may be a mistake…  
We do not deal with it [EU lobbying]. It [EU lobbying] is weak for Hungary as a 
country too. It would be such a waste of time and cost that it is not worth it. 
…If I am honest it is the lack of information - we do not even realise if there is 
an opportunity to go and do something. Based on the current information or 
experiences this is an activity with low effectiveness. And I do not even know 
what kind of channels could be used for this activity for a firm like us….” 156 
 
Others, who have contacts, use the network-based strategy to channel messages at EU 
level too: “We have a guy in Brussels. He is our ‘in-built brick’ and we deliver our 
policy documents through him.”157 For the question in which institution this ‘informant’ 
works in, the managing director said: “Wherever there is interest representation. A 
committee, hell knows where these organizations are, committees and such.”158 The last 
two quotes indicate that business leaders are not really familiar with the structure and 
operation of EU level institutions. And they should not be. It is not their job. However, 
while western CEOs might have the same level of knowledge in EU decision-making, 
they are supported by the professional expertise of their PA departments or agencies. In 
contrast, Hungarian CEOs try to engage in the haze of Brussels’ lobbying labyrinth on 
their own. Business leaders try to implement their network-based strategies in Brussels, 
but they find that the same strategies have different effects in Brussels. While 
interpersonal relations and informal meetings open doors and lead to concrete outcomes 
in Budapest, in Brussels these channels – also important and sometimes available – do 
not provide the same results. Access to administrators does not necessarily result in 
access to decision-making. Channelling messages to domestic MEPs most probably 
does not have much impact on EU level legislative outcomes. As a consequence, some 
CEOs seemed rather irritated by not being able to access Brussels-based decision-
making as well as they intended to.  
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“The Hungarian MEPs like us, but the others…They just listen, nod, say ‘yeah, 





Presumably due to the lack of know-how and experience in how to access EU level 
institutions – in contrast to the proactive approach of UK firms - corporate leaders seem 
to wait for EU level decisions and decision-makers to reach them. Instead of building a 
long-term engagement strategy or monitoring EU legislation, firms seem to expect the 
EU to reach out to them and ‘invite’ them to participate in decision-making. 
“Brussels is a ‘putty society’. If they would come to me and say that we need to 
formulate a pan-European industrial policy and opinions are welcome, I would 
be happy to participate and integrate other people from my network in this.”160 
 
As the quote shows corporate leaders want to transpose their expertise and lobbying 
capabilities, or more specifically their networks onto the supranational level, but they 
find obstacles. As their lobbying capabilities are not professionalized they find it 
difficult to ‘understand’ and evaluate EU level legislative processes and integrate into 
EU level lobbying activities. At the same time, the ‘inability’ and relative ‘failure’ of 
their attempts make them feel offended, left-out and excluded. As a consequence, they 
turn away from Brussels and argue that lobbying in Brussels is a waste of time and 
money. It is not suggested here that eastern firms stay away from EU level lobbying 
because of being resented by being left out. It is acknowledged and confirmed by the 
interviews that EU level representation presents a large financial challenge for Eastern 
European firms. However, findings suggest that financial resources are only partially 
responsible for the lack of representation of EE firms. As it was argued earlier in 
chapter 4, resources present a ‘threshold’ factor. Below a certain size, firms cannot 
afford to engage in direct EU level representation. However, above the ‘threshold’ 
Europeanization becomes a managerial choice. The analysis of the interviews shows 
that at the large domestic firms even if financial resources were available, the choice of 
Europeanization was constrained by domestic lobbying experiences and the fact that 
corporate leaders wanted to transpose their network-based strategies at EU level. These 
findings confirm the conceptual argument that was developed in chapter 4 that firms 
build on their domestic lobbying capabilities when designing their EU level engagement 
strategies.  
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 Although the EU’s institutional environment have very different requirements 
towards private actors – since EU institutions demand professional, insightful 
information or expertise in exchange for access to decision-making - those relatively 
few EE firms that actively engage in Brussels, seem to ignore this difference and try to 
‘export’ their domestic know-how to EU level. These firms are argued to focus on PR-
type activities and networking, instead of professional public affairs activities or 
strategic lobbying.  
“Eastern European corporations are not in Brussels, and if they are there, they 
have a representation office running receptions. But they are not working on the 
political, economical analysis. Activities in Brussels are short-term. They are 
aimed at getting subsidies or getting contracts. Their activities are not 
strategic.161” 
The quote indicates that even those firms that invest financial resources into opening 
direct EU offices in Brussels engage in a different and - according to professional 
stakeholders - less effective way than their western counterparts. Instead of adapting to 
the institutional requirements of EU level lobbying and professionalizing their activities 
they choose the familiar route and engage in networking. As a Brussels-based 
consultant explained there is a “brutal difference” 162 in the professionalism of eastern 
and western firms. While EE firms tend to focus all their lobbying efforts to their 
national representatives in Brussels - for instance the Polish stakeholders lobby the 
Polish MEPs, Hungarians the Hungarians – British advocates contact whichever MEP 
would be the most influential in the decision-making process163. 
“In Eastern Europe, we have this feeling of ‘sorry to disturb’; meanwhile for a 
British lobbyist it is natural that if an issue affects his organization, he/she has 
the right to express his opinion. This is also part of a professional lobby strategy 
- not to limit your contacts to your national networks, but focusing on the issue, 
contacting every stakeholder regardless of their nationality164.” 
It is not suggested that all Eastern European firms have a similar approach in Brussels. 
It is acknowledged and highlighted here that some eastern firms lobby just as 
professionally at EU level as British or French firms. However, the insights of the 
interviewed stakeholders suggest that the general perception of EE firms in Brussels is 
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that their presence is limited and their lobbying efforts are less professional and 
sophisticated than their western counterparts’.  
 These EU level lobbying strategies may change as the experience of EE firms 
increases in Brussels. However, for the time being, the ‘lock-in’ effect of the golden 
cage makes it very difficult for EE firms to transpose their domestic strategies to the EU 
level. Nothing that works at the domestic level seems to fit with what leads to success in 
the supranational arena. Networks do not provide access to policy-making and EU level 
exchange goods (information) may seem intangible compared to the more evident 
exchange goods known at the domestic level. Even finding the right decision-makers or 
figuring out the process of legislative decision-making would require a lot more 
capabilities than EE firms possess, even if they open EU level offices. Additional 
capabilities, such as the external help of professional Brussels-based agencies would be 
available. However as it was argued earlier, managers prefer sending their own junior 
personnel to Brussels to contracting agencies or employing senior professionals they do 
not trust. In the choice of experts and/or contracted partners, professional references and 
reputation - that count in developed capitalist societies - may not be sufficient enough 
for eastern firms. Due to their domestic experiences, EE managers need to make sure 
that their partners can be trusted, and trust only comes through informal, interpersonal 
connections. Available connections however might not lead to the most appropriate 
solutions at the supranational level. Therefore EE firms remain disadvantaged in their 
lobbying expertise – due to the limited nature of their choices - compared to their 
western counterparts. These findings further support the proposition on opportunity 
structures. As the discussion shows, firms avoid the use of agencies in Brussels, because 
their domestic legal environment and institutional framework do not provide a secure 
business environment, in which contracts could be enforced and in which interpersonal 
trust would be unnecessary. As corporate managers base their decisions on their 
domestic experiences, they avoid the use of agencies in both jurisdictions.  
 
 Furthermore empirical evidence of the interviews suggests two additional issues 
in relation to this proposition. First that the domestic institutional environment of post-
socialist network capitalism hinders the professionalization of lobbying capabilities at 
EU level, because managers limit their own choices based on domestic experiences. 
Due to the domestic environmental constraints, Eastern European firms do not invest 
into external capabilities or professional in-house expertise, because the environment in 
Brussels seems even more uncertain, unpredictable and confusing for business leaders 
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than their domestic context. Second, as the network-based lobbying strategy is not 
compatible with the requirements of EU level lobbying practices, the Eastern European 
lobbying know-how is not transferable to the supranational level. Hence, the ‘golden 
cage’ prevents firms from integrating into EU level policy-making. Firms remain 
locked-in the golden cage of their domestic environment.  
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter attempted to explore how the network-capitalist system of Hungary 
impacts the development of domestic and EU level lobbying capabilities at large firms 
in Hungary. It was argued that in Hungary - where networks provide access to decision-
making for business lobbying - the nature of post-socialist capitalism forces firms to 
develop a distinctive lobbying strategy, which is highly effective in the domestic arena, 
but leads to exclusion at the supranational level. The Hungarian institutional 
environment makes formalized lobbying strategies less effective, as the public sector is 
not open to professional input from economic actors and public consultations are 
limited and vague. Consequently, policy analysis and legislative monitoring seems often 
unnecessary or ineffective for economic actors, since legislation changes from one day 
to the other. Findings showed that firms adapt their organizational structure to the 
institutional framework of post-socialist capitalism and confine lobbying to the top of 
the corporate hierarchy, in the hands of their executives. Interviews showed that only 
top-level positioning together with informal, network-based lobbying strategies allow 
firms to directly influence policy or at least certain political decisions. In this 
environment, informal relationships give access to decision-making and the exchange 
currency in lobbying - instead of information and expertise - is money (in the form of 
party financing or corruption) or social favours. The system is efficient for insiders. 
Those, who have top-level formal and informal networks and money (or power) can 
exert influence. Firms feel that they do not have much room for manoeuvre in policy-
making, but the little they have, is used most effectively. It was shown that although 
managers feel ‘powerless’, networking gives them access to politicians. Yet, the 
unpredictable nature of this strategy makes it risky or even impossible for them to build 
a long-term political strategy or professional capabilities for supranational engagement. 
Consequently companies do not want to develop their lobbying capabilities any further, 
as they can arrange anything based on relationships, especially since they perceive their 
country as ‘small’. This same perception on the other hand prevents them from 
engaging at the supranational level. Indeed, as Hungarian firms confine lobbying to the 
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top of the organizational hierarchy, they limit the development of their capabilities. 
Therefore, the exclusivity of top-level lobbying creates a ‘golden cage’ for domestic 
businesses. While it provides access at national level, it prevents domestic firms from 
transposing their engagement strategies at supranational level. The inability of 
corporations to develop professional PA capabilities together with the top-level 
positioning of informal practices puts a natural barrier on firms’ lobbying effectiveness.  
The door of the ‘golden cage’ however is open for outsiders. Whereas large 
domestic companies naturally have the networking assets through their socialist heritage 
and build exclusively on their managers’ social capital, multinationals ‘buy’ their entry 
through mediators. Once they are in, resourceful foreign firms adapt to the local 
lobbying strategies and master them so well that domestic competitors feel that MNCs 
even overtake them in their own game. Indeed, besides implementing all their western-
type, professional lobbying strategies, multinationals ‘professionalize’ the networking 
game as well, by strategically building webs of networks and systematically targeting 
the whole vertical spectrum of relevant public officials. MNCs base their lobbying on a 
clearly defined political strategy, whereas domestic firms make use of their top leaders’ 
interpersonal relationships, based on ad hoc, actual interests and long-term trust-based 
exchanges, rather than a systematic policy-driven approach. This finding contradicts 
views that see networks mainly as a barrier to entry. Rather in Hungary networks are 
mainly a barrier to ‘exit’ the domestic market. 
The analysis of firms’ lobbying strategies revealed that - in relation to the 
theoretical model that was developed in chapter 4 about the four different lobbying 
strategies – firms in Hungary may be grouped into three different categories. The first 
group consists of domestic firms, the second includes subsidiaries of multinationals, 
whereas the third is mainly made of SMEs. Almost all interviewed large domestic firms 
were found to follow the ‘network-based strategy’, whereas subsidiaries of 
multinationals were argued to develop a ‘lobbying mix’, in which they combine the 
lobbying methods of the ‘integrated’ and the ‘network-based’ strategies and hence 
‘overtake’ domestic firms in their own domestic lobbying game. The third group 
included those domestic firms that do not engage in lobbying at all and therefore were 
found to follow the ‘inactive’ strategy. This group was the smallest in the sample, since 
with the exception of two SMEs and two large companies all the others belonged to the 
other two categories.  
 The last section of this chapter investigated the Europeanization strategies of 
Eastern European firms. Contrary to the researcher’s initial expectations, findings 
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suggested that instead of adapting and integrating into the EU level institutional 
environment, EE firms try to ‘export’ their domestic network-based lobbying strategies 
to the supranational level. Yet, the ‘lock-in’ effect of the golden cage makes it difficult 
for EE firms to transpose their domestic strategies to the EU level. Everything that 
works at the domestic level seems to be incompatible with what leads to success in the 
supranational arena. Networks may provide access to officials, but that does not 
automatically lead to access to policy-making. From the perspective of domestic 
businesses, EU level access goods are relatively intangible compared to the domestic 
ones and the whole decision-making system seems distant and incomprehensible. Firms 
would need expertise in order to become able to engage, but their domestic experiences 
hinder their internal professionalization process and limit their choices when acquiring 
experts or external support for EU engagement. Due to the domestic environmental 
constraints, and the ‘incompatibility’ of domestic know-how with the requirements of 
EU level lobbying practices, EE firms are not able to transfer their lobbying strategy to 
the supranational level. Hence, the door of the ‘golden cage’ remains locked when 
eastern firms try to integrate into EU level policy-making.  
 Findings suggest that even if firms acquire more experience in EU lobbying, due 
to the increasing length of EU membership, this situation may not change. Due to the 
institutional determinism of lobbying strategies, the ‘golden cage’ would only open if 
the characteristics of the current post-socialist capitalist environment changed. As long 
as the nature of western and Eastern European capitalism remains so different, lobbying 
strategies will also be diverting. Hence the increase of EE interests and representation in 
EU level decision-making may remain a dream. However, if half of the continent 
remains permanently outside of EU level policy-making in the long run, then policy-
makers will have to face the problem of a ‘democratic deficit’ in decision-making and 
consider alternative ways to support Eastern European stakeholders to participate in the 
shaping of the future of Europe.  
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7. Conclusion: Europeanization from a different 
perspective 
The study set out to explore the puzzle that despite the current trend of growing 
direct corporate representation at EU level, large firms from Eastern Europe are under-
represented in Brussels. Even though EU legislation increasingly affects the operation 
of businesses in eastern and Western Europe, it is puzzling that businesses from the 
poorer half of the common market are seriously under-represented in influencing 
supranational decision-making. The literature so far has not addressed this issue from 
the perspective of corporations. To address this intellectual puzzle the thesis was set out 
to answer the following research question:  
What determines how large firms develop their lobbying at the domestic and EU 
level in developed and developing capitalist systems? 
The background of the problem is twofold. First it concerns the determinants of large 
firms’ lobbying and second it relates to the contextual differences in developed and 
developing capitalist systems. Hence, due to the complexity of the research question, in 
this study a dual-level and multi-context approach was taken. The objective was to 
explore the key determinants of corporate lobbying at the domestic and the EU level, 
while contrasting empirical evidence in the light of previously identified theoretical 
themes in the western and Eastern European socio-economic contexts. The thesis 
addresses the real-life phenomenon of marginal representation of Eastern European 
business interest at EU level, and attempts to create a conceptual framework that may 
help scholars and business practitioners to understand the determinants and process of 
the Europeanization of corporate lobbying. The study also provides rich practical 
insights for EU institutions that may want to address the issue of differential 
participation in EU level policy-making. The membership, and hence the tasks and 
responsibilities of the European Union have changed drastically in the last ten years. In 
2013, almost half of all the EU member states are post-socialist countries. It is now time 
to take stock of how interest representation structures in these countries differ from 
Western European ones, and evaluate why interest groups or stakeholders from the 
business community from post-socialist countries get less involved into EU level 
politics, than their western counterparts. Attempts have been made to explore EU level 
representation of Eastern European interest groups. Therefore, instead of focusing on 
EU level access or the interaction of firms and EU institutions, this research attempted 
to address the reasons behind marginal Eastern European business representation in EU 
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level policy-making - a question that rarely have been addressed before. Unpacking this 
question is not easy, since the researcher needs to explore a relatively new and abstract 
phenomenon, since in this case the question relates to the reasons behind the ‘lack of 
representation’. As the study investigates something that is not happening, therefore 
instead of limiting the scope of the analysis to the question of ‘why EE firms are under-
represented’, the research must explore the whole issue of how firms develop their 
lobbying structures, how they Europeanize their lobbying strategies, and what factors 
determine this process. By taking this more ‘holistic’ perspective, it becomes possible to 
map the process of Europeanization and explore it in different institutional contexts. 
The understanding of the characteristics of corporate lobbying in the framework of 
comparative capitalism helped the researcher to extend the perspective of existing 
studies, and explore Europeanization from a different aspect. Hence, by integrating the 
study of corporate lobbying and direct firm level Europeanization into a common 
framework that includes both post-socialist network capitalism and western type 
advanced capitalist systems, it became possible to explore the differences in practices, 
approaches, and firm level processes. This way, instead of investigating something that 
is missing, the study could explore the reasons behind this void and generate concepts 
that help us understand why this phenomenon occurred in the first place.  
Besides the innovation to include the comparative capitalist perspective into the 
analysis of corporate lobbying, the study attempted to move theory forward, by shifting 
the analytical focus of EU lobbying, from the institutional level to the firm level. 
Instead of limiting the research focus on environmental constraints by investigating how 
firms can access decision-making in different contexts, whether domestic and EU level 
interest representation structures are compatible or not, or how EU institutions differ in 
their openness towards lobbying, this study takes a firm level approach. It is argued that 
the theorisation of large firms’ EU level lobbying requires the integration of managerial 
choice into the framework of analysis. In contrast to political science approaches that 
investigate the determinants of Europeanization from an institutional perspective and 
treat the firm as a “black-box”, this study has taken a firm level perspective, and 
explored the determinants of Europeanization through managerial choice and 
organizational processes. Although it is acknowledged that institutions have an 
important constraining effect - both on firms’ domestic lobbying strategies, as well as 
the Europeanization process of lobbying activities - it is argued that these constraints act 
through managerial choice and organizational processes. So instead of considering 
institutions as external determinants of corporate lobbying strategies, in this thesis 
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institutional contexts are viewed in relation to their direct impact on strategy 
development and capability design. In sum, this study found that the Europeanization of 
lobbying is essentially a corporate process based on managerial decisions that are 
constrained by institutional variables. Hence, Europeanization has to be conceptualised 
as an internal process, at the level of the firm and external determinants (such as 
environmental constraints or resource dependencies) that may impact this process need 
to be analysed as the antecedents of the Europeanization process and/or decision. From 
this perspective, Europeanization was found to be influenced and constrained on two 
levels. First at the firm level, it is influenced by the ‘triple impact’ of the firm’s 
domestic lobbying strategy, the organizational structure for lobbying and available 
capabilities. Second, at the institutional level Europeanization was argued to be 
determined by the characteristics of the domestic capitalist system.  
The conclusion is structured as follows. The next section will synthesize the 
findings of the study. This will be followed by an overview of theoretical implications 
and the contributions of the thesis. The chapter then goes on to discuss the findings of 
the individual chapters, followed by recommendations for future research and the 
evaluation of limitations. A final section concludes.  
 
7.1 Empirical findings 
In the next paragraphs I will review my findings in light of the research 
questions that I raised in the first part of the thesis. These questions were used to guide 
the empirical analysis by incorporating key themes that were addressed in the thesis. 
The first research question was: ‘What factors determine the managerial choice on 
Europeanization?’ How do my findings allow us to answer this question? Previous 
studies on the determinants of business lobbying in the European Union has focused 
predominantly on the investigation of how resources (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009) 
and the domestic institutional environment (Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; 
Beyers and Kerremans 2006) influences Europeanization. In EU studies, resources were 
argued to impact Europeanization through the question of whether companies ‘afforded’ 
or ‘not afforded’ to engage in direct EU level representation (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; 
Bouwen 2002; Coen and Dannreuther 2003; Eising 2004; Eising 2007; Bernhagen and 
Mitchell 2009). Most political science studies however have not explored the role of 
resources within the firm, but focused more on the costly nature of EU level 
representation. In contrast, findings of this thesis posit that resources need to be 
investigated through the perspective of their impact on corporate strategy making and 
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the process of firm level capability design. Acknowledging the importance of financial 
resources and size, it is argued that resources impact Europeanization not directly 
through the ‘go’ versus ‘no go’ decision of managers, but rather through capability 
design and strategy development. Following the management literature’s concept on 
dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano et al. 1997; Oliver and Holzinger 2008; Helfat, 
Finkelstein et al. 2009; Holburn and Zelner 2010), as well as lobbying capabilities and 
managerial choice (Lawton and Rajwani 2011; Lawton, Rajwani et al. 2013), it is 
argued that financial resources are important and create a ‘threshold’ factor for 
Europeanization, but the availability of resources or a sufficiently large size, are not 
sufficient to explain differences in Europeanization abilities. Findings suggest that 
public affairs management and direct lobbying either at domestic or EU level, requires 
manager’s strategic actions to organize and manage financial resources into lobbying 
capabilities through their skills, experience, time and managerial decisions. Hence the 
decision on Europeanization is not a direct outcome of ‘only’ resource-related 
considerations, as it was suggested in the literature, but more a consequence of how 
these resources are turned into lobbying capabilities and how these capabilities are then 
used for strategy development. Hence financial resources impact Europeanization 
through capabilities, by influencing the development of a lobbying strategy and 
affecting how firms Europeanize their organizational resources for public affairs. 
Besides, acknowledging the findings of previous studies that size and resources matter, 
it is argued that instead of determining Europeanization, resources constitute a 
‘threshold’ factor in direct lobbying. Below a certain ‘threshold’, firms are unable to 
engage in direct individual lobbying or European engagement. Yet, even above the 
‘threshold’, Europeanization does not come automatically – but requires managerial 
choice. The analysis of the interviews revealed that that in Hungary, firms do not 
choose to engage in EU level lobbying, even though most of them would have sufficient 
available resources to do so. In this context, the study found that instead of resources, 
other factors have a more determining impact on how firms Europeanize.  
The second research question was: ‘How do firms transpose their domestic 
lobbying capabilities and political strategy to EU level?’ In the following paragraphs we 
will explore how findings in relation to this question provided new insights to existing 
knowledge. Previous research have investigated how firms engage in EU level interest 
representation from an institutional perspective, focusing on how businesses can access 
decision-making (Beyers 2002; Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2004; Eising 2007), or 
investigating the lobbying style (Coen 2009) and lobbying strategies (Coen 1998; 
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Taminiau and Wilts 2006; Klüver 2010; van Schendelen 2012) of businesses that are 
represented in Brussels. Although these studies provide rich insights into the 
characteristics of EU level corporate lobbying, they are less helpful in explaining the 
internal firm level process of how Europeanization ‘happens’. To address this gap in 
knowledge, and to investigate the process of Europeanization, a conceptual framework 
was constructed. According to the ‘framework of determinants of corporate 
Europeanization’ (see Figure 4.1), lobbying strategy is influenced on the one hand by 
the domestic institutional environment, through opportunity structures and 
environmental resource dependencies and on the other hand by resources, through 
lobbying capabilities. The firm’s lobbying strategy then affects the organizational 
arrangement of lobbying as well as the company’s Europeanization strategy. Hence, the 
model illustrates that, since Europeanization is an internal process, the Europeanization 
strategy of the firm is determined by the triple impact of three firm level variables such 
as strategy, capabilities and organizational structure. Based on the ‘framework of 
determinants of corporate Europeanization’ the study explored the Europeanization 
process from two perspectives. First it investigated the antecedents of managerial choice 
in relation to the development of EU level strategies and second it examined the firm 
level process of Europeanization itself. For the analysis of these two aspects of 
Europeanization (i.e. antecedents and process) a theoretical model was created, arguing 
that corporate Europeanization has to be divided into two distinct levels. The model is 
aimed to provide a framework to illustrate the process of how corporations develop their 
domestic lobbying structures and transpose these onto the EU level. It was argued that 
first managers decide on how to manage the firm’s political activities at the domestic 
(first) level and then based on the available domestic capabilities, strategy and 
organizational design corporate leaders construct the firm’s EU (second) level strategy. 
Besides illustrating the level of engagement (i.e. domestic and supranational), the dual-
level model also suggests a procedural sequence or prioritization in the process of 
Europeanization. The study found that in order to engage successfully at EU level, first, 
firms need to develop lobbying structures at the domestic level.  
Based on the capabilities that firms develop for managing their political 
activities, in the study four ideal typical domestic level lobbying strategies have been 
identified: the integrated, outsourced, network-based and the inactive strategies. 
Extending the findings of previous studies, in this research it was found that firms try to 
adapt their existing national systems and transpose their national strategies to EU level 
(Coen 1998; Wilts and Quittkat 2003; Holburn and Zelner 2010) by building on their 
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domestic organizational arrangement for lobbying and ‘exporting’ their lobbying 
practices to the supranational arena. It was shown that while the transfer of lobbying 
know-how is relatively straightforward for those firms that originate from advanced 
capitalist institutional contexts however - due to the extreme differences between 
western and Eastern European capitalist coordination modes - this transposition presents 
serious obstacles to post-socialist firms. The study contributes to the EU literature by 
extending previous studies, which argue that organizations build on the interest 
representation ‘know-how’ of their national institutional systems and hence adapt to 
supranational lobbying differently (Coen 1998; Schmidt 1999; Eising 2004; Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007). The thesis provides extensive insights into this debate, by extending 
the scope of the analysis to firm level variables and to the post-socialist context. 
Contrary to previous research findings, according to which the domestic institutional 
environment have only an insignificant influence on EU level engagement (Eising 2007; 
Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009), I argued that in the post-socialist context, domestic 
institutions have a crucial impact on Europeanization. Instead of the investigation of 
institutional level differences between domestic and EU level policy-making structures 
or interest politics, the thesis took a unique approach by exploring how institutions 
affect the transfer of domestic lobbying activities to the EU level by investigating the 
managerial choice in relation to the construction and development of lobbying 
capabilities, strategy building, and the organizational arrangement of public affairs 
activities. Confirming what management scholars have found in relation to corporate 
political strategy building - that firms tend to use different political strategies in 
different institutional contexts (Hillman and Hitt 1999) - the empirical analysis of this 
research found that, while firms in the UK and at EU level develop ‘integrated’ or 
‘outsourced’ lobbying strategies that are professional and are based on arm’s length 
exchanges, Eastern European large firms adapt to the ‘network-capitalist’ environment 
by developing ‘network-based’ or ‘inactive’ strategies.  
 
 The third question of the study focused on the impact of the domestic 
institutional environment on Europeanization: ‘In what respect does the domestic 
institutional environment impact managerial choice in relation to the development of 
lobbying capabilities and Europeanization?’ In the following sections I will show how 
the findings of the study allow us to answer this question. EU studies have investigated 
the impact of the domestic institutional environment on Europeanization mostly from a 
pluralist/corporatist perspective (Coen 1997; Schmidt 1999; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010) 
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and although some scholars found variation in the Europeanization patterns of 
organizations from different domestic backgrounds (Klüver 2010; Coen 1997; Coen 
1998), recent studies found that the domestic context may be less important than 
previously thought (Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Barron 2011).   
Answering to the call of Jackson and Deeg (2008: 541) in explaining “how firms 
deal strategically with institutions”, and how strategy is shaped by “institutionally 
available resource capabilities and governance structures”, in the thesis the impact of 
institutions is analysed with the help of the comparative capitalism framework. Findings 
of this dissertation suggest that recent research could not find variation in the 
Europeanization patterns of Western European organizations, because these studies 
limited their investigation to institutional contexts along the corporatist/pluralist divide, 
and have not conceptualised Eastern European capitalism, as being profoundly different 
from advanced capitalist societies. The most innovative contribution of the study is the 
inclusion of the Varieties of Capitalism theory (Hall and Soskice 2001) into the analysis 
of EU lobbying. By linking the comparative capitalism literature with scholarship on 
Europeanization and corporate political activities, this thesis addresses the ‘missing 
link’ in the EU lobbying literature. Following on from studies that investigate 
Europeanization at an institutional level (Schmidt 1999; Eising 2007; Coen 2009; 
Klüver 2010), this study explores the question of Europeanization from a comparative 
capitalist perspective at firm level. In this context, it is argued that managerial choice on 
lobbying strategy formation and Europeanization is influenced by the structural 
characteristics of the capitalist institutional environment. Following the assumption of 
the comparative capitalism literature that the institutional context influences the 
“identity and interests of economic actors, and hence the development of firm resources 
and capabilities” (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 549), it is argued that EU level engagement 
is influenced by the domestic institutional structure, not necessarily through the degree 
of access that actors have to domestic decision-making (Beyers 2002; Bouwen 2002; 
Eising 2007), but how firm managers are determined in their decisions whether to 
Europeanize or not, as a consequence of their domestic opportunity structures. Through 
the empirical analysis, the EU literature’s ‘degree of access’ theory was linked to the 
question of how the emerging capitalist system in Hungary impacts firms’ 
Europeanization choices. Evidence showed that the impact of domestic institutions does 
not necessarily become evident through the investigation of access patterns to decision-
making (Beyers 2002; Eising 2007; Klüver 2010) or the degree of ‘fit’ between 
domestic and EU level interest intermediation patterns (Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001) as 
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it was suggested in the literature, but rather through managerial choice. In the post-
socialist context, evidence raised the attention to the fact that the domestic institutional 
context has a twofold impact on managerial choice. First, as the institutional-level 
analysis showed, it determines firms’ decisions whether they Europeanize their 
lobbying activities or not, and secondly, as the firm level analysis revealed, the 
domestic environment impacts CEOs decision on how they design and construct their 
lobbying strategy.  
Besides, the influences of domestic contexts on managerial choice, the study’s 
dual-level approach – i.e. the investigation of firm level as well as institutional level 
determinants of managerial choice – has shown that domestic institutions impact the 
Europeanization of large firms on two crucial ways. First via environmental resource 
dependencies – through dependencies in relation to access to political decision-making 
and public funds – and second through the opportunity structures they create for 
business leaders. In relation to the first, it was argued that in the process of developing 
their lobbying strategies, firms adapt to their institutional environment due to their 
environmental resource dependencies. To manage the increased regulatory pressure and 
acquire access to policy-making, firms adapt to the local demands of the public sector. 
In institutional systems, where networks provide access they use networks, but once 
institutions open up towards the professional input of businesses, firms change their 
strategy and develop formalised, arm’s length lobbying strategies. Based on the 
theoretical reasoning of environmental resource dependencies (Beyers 2002; Bouwen 
2002; Beyers and Kerremans 2007), it was explored how corporate lobbying strategies 
differ in the western and emerging capitalist contexts. In the developed capitalist 
context large firms adapt to their institutional environment by systematically 
professionalizing and formalising their lobbying strategies and exchanging network-
based practices with arm’s length strategies. In developing capitalist contexts however, 
where access to decision-making is hindered and the public sector is less open to the 
official policy input of business stakeholders, corporations are forced to engage in 
network-based lobbying strategies. Following on from this reasoning, Bouwen’s theory 
of access was adapted to the investigation of corporate Europeanization (2002). It was 
posited that exchange relations differ in developed and emerging capitalist 
environments. While in the former, information and expertise provide access to 
decision-making procedures, in the post-socialist context networks provide access and 
firms ‘pay’ with cash, social favours or other material or in-kind contributions to 
decision-makers. Besides the access goods, the study’s ‘comparison of exchange 
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relations’ found that the routes of access, the place of exchange and the tools of the 
lobbying exchange are also different in the post-socialist context. While lobbying in the 
UK and at EU level predominantly takes place in the public administrator’s office, 
through formal contact, in Hungary mostly social places like tennis courts or restaurants 
constitute as places of exchange through informal contacts via interpersonal networks. 
Similarly the tools of exchange differ. In the EU /UK contexts, businesses communicate 
their interests to policy-makers through position papers, research reports or media 
campaigns, in contrast in the post-socialist environment, informal discussions are not 
always accompanied with written notes or a background political or policy analysis. In 
the light of the findings, in the post-socialist context, the categories of lobbying and 
corruption are not clearly distinguishable. Network-based lobbying may or may not 
include monetary exchange. It has to be acknowledged that in some instances purely 
professional exchange of information may take place between private and public actors. 
However, findings suggested that in most cases, network-based lobbying includes some 
kind of compensation (material or in-kind) to public officials or other non-transparent 
gains for party-related politicians. Consequently, instead of making a distinction 
between corruption and lobbying both material gains and social favours were viewed as 
‘exchange currencies’ that provide access to decision-making. By extending the theory 
of access to the post-socialist institutional context, the thesis addressed Bouwen’s call 
for future research that would “adapt the framework to the national or international 
level” and would investigate how it operates in different institutional settings (2002: 
359). 
 
The fourth research question went even further and explored how the 
characteristics of post-socialist capitalism affect the ways in which Eastern European 
firms develop their lobbying strategy and manage their Europeanization process? In 
relation to this topic, the state’s role was emphasised in the context of post-socialist 
capitalism. Institutional characteristics were explored through the analysis of the interest 
intermediation system, state-society and state-firm relations. Through the empirical 
analysis I found that the Europeanization decision of businesses in post-socialist 
contexts is determined by their domestic institutional constraints and opportunities for 
interest representation. As it was argued in chapter 5, firms in Hungary operate in an 
environment, which resembles the characteristics of ‘state corporatism’ and a 
‘predatory’ state. The institutional structure of Hungary was argued to directly affect the 
Europeanization decision of corporate leaders. The empirical analysis illustrated how 
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the domestic institutional constraints affect corporations’ “go / no go” decisions. 
Findings did not support the compensation thesis (Klüver 2010) since despite the weak 
domestic access to political decision-making, businesses in Hungary do not tend to 
‘bypass’ their national government, by increasing their political engagement at EU 
level. Firms rather choose to stay away from supranational lobbying entirely, in order to 
avoid domestic retaliation. The analysis supported the ‘positive persistence’ thesis or 
more specifically the ‘reversed positive persistence hypothesis’ (Beyers 2002: 594; 
Eising 2007), according to which limited domestic access to decision-making leads to 
limited European strategies. Firms in Hungary were found to have weak access at the 
domestic level and also weak access at EU level. However, this persistence was found 
not to be a consequence of the ‘degree of fit’ or in this case the degree of ‘misfit’ 
between domestic and EU level institutional structures, but more a consequence of 
direct institutional constraints at the domestic level that have a detrimental impact on 
managerial decisions concerning Europeanization. Hence the study also contributes to 
the debate on the ‘degree of fit’ between national and supranational institutional 
structures (Coen 1998; Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001; Eising 2004), by extending current 
knowledge the following way. Eastern corporations find it difficult to Europeanize, but 
not only because of the direct impact of the institutional ‘misfit’ of post-socialist and 
EU level institutional structures as suggested earlier in the literature, or because of the 
differences in the opportunity structures between the national and EU systems 
(Cianciara 2013), but more specifically, because the institutional characteristics of the 
‘network-capitalist’ environment (especially the crucial importance of informal 
networks and the strong economic influence of the state in the Eastern European 
context), constrain firms’ Europeanization decisions and hinder the development of 
professional ‘EU-compatible’ lobbying strategies. Consequently, the thesis confirms 
Beyers and Kerremans’ (2007) findings for interest groups that Europeanization is 
determined by the domestic institutional environment, and extends it to the area of 
direct firm lobbying. However, it is argued that the impact of domestic institutions 
materialises not only through resource dependence as Beyers and Kerremans suggested, 
but also through the ‘golden cage’ that the characteristics of the domestic capitalist 
coordination create for business lobbying.  
 
 In relation to Eastern European interest representation, the thesis provides novel 
insights into the characteristics of post-socialist corporate lobbying. Although many 
scholars have investigated Eastern European interest politics (Ilonszki 1998; Kalnins 
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2005; Borragán 2006; Evanson 2008; Hrebenar, McBeth et al. 2008; McGrath 2008; 
Fink-Hafner 2012) state-firm relations (Stark 1996; Schoenman 2005; Stark and Vedres 
2012) and economic coordination from the perspective of networks (Peng and Luo 
2000; Peng 2003; Puffer and McCarthy 2007), according to the knowledge of the 
researcher recent studies have not explored the characteristics of corporate lobbying so 
far. The thesis addressed this gap in the literature by comparing Eastern European 
lobbying to the ‘network capitalist’ model of China (Boisot and Child 1996) and Russia 
(Puffer and McCarthy 2007). These systems are similar to the Eastern European model 
in respect to how networks constitute important institutionalised channels for economic 
coordination. In the thesis it was argued that formal legislative decision-making is not 
accessible for business stakeholders, and hence managers can only lobby by personally 
meeting top-level politicians. The Hungarian institutional environment makes 
formalized lobbying strategies less effective, as the public sector is not open to 
professional input from economic actors and public consultations are limited and vague. 
Consequently, policy analysis and legislative monitoring seems often unnecessary or 
ineffective for economic actors, since legislation changes from one day to the other. 
Contributing to literature on post-socialist interest politics (Ilonszki 1998; Kalnins 2005; 
Borragán 2006; Evanson 2008; Hrebenar, McBeth et al. 2008; McGrath 2008; Stark 
1996; Schoenman 2005; Stark and Vedres 2012), the thesis explored the characteristics 
of post-socialist corporate lobbying and developed a typology of lobbying in the 
emerging capitalist context. The study identified five major characteristics of post-
communist lobbying that differentiate political engagement strategies of large Eastern 
firms from UK practices and limit their effectiveness at supranational level. First, it was 
found that lobbying at EE firms is managed exclusively by top-level management. The 
confinement of lobbying to top of the organizational hierarchy however was found to be 
the privilege as well as a burden of CEOs. It is a privilege since top managers get access 
to top-level political decision-makers and exclusively control lobbying practices. 
However this type of positioning was found to constitute a burden as well, since CEOs 
spend a large amount of their time – sometimes 30-40 percent – lobbying besides their 
everyday tasks. Besides its impact on corporate managers lives, this type of lobbying 
was also found to be ineffective due to the natural limits of CEOs’ capacities and 
personal networks and the fact that it hinder the professionalization of lobbying. The 
second characteristic of post-socialist lobbying was its network-based character, or 
more specifically that it is managed exclusively through informal inter-personal 
networks. Third, associations were found to be predominantly used for providing access 
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to decision-makers, instead of providing a reliable channel of influence for corporations. 
Findings showed that formal networks through associational and corporate board 
memberships and informal networks through interpersonal relationships supplement and 
strengthen each other. To become influential, business people have to engage in both. 
Fourth, as firm level political strategies are mostly non-existent; corporations have 
short-term political goals mostly as a response to actual threats and / or opportunities, 
and fifth EE firm do not tend to use outsourcing or external support for lobbying, but 
limit their capabilities to in-house resources, especially to the networks of CEOs.  
 
Finally, the fifth research question addressed the issue of organizational structure 
in relation to corporate lobbying: ‘How do the functional organizational units (or 
departments) of public affairs relate to the Europeanization of firms?’ Findings in 
relation to this issue helped the researcher to explore whether the organizational 
structure as a variable has any relevance in the process of Europeanization, or not. As it 
was discussed in chapter 2, institutional theory addresses the question of how 
organizational structures and processes become ‘institutionalised’ within firms (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987). Literature found that in the process of decision-making, 
managers are likely to rely on ‘institutionalised’ patterns of behaviour (Getz 1997), 
furthermore firms with existing CPA structures and experience in political engagement 
are more likely to engage in lobbying again (Getz 1997; Getz 2001). Some studies 
already called for the further investigation of internal organizational structures in 
interest group research, arguing that the internal structure of interest groups influences 
how organizations can provide information to decision-makers (Klüver 2012: 505). In 
contrast to studies that investigate the structure of public affairs departments (Baysinger 
and Woodman 1982; Post, Murray et al. 1982; Harris, Moss et al. 1998; Griffin and 
Dunn 2004; Moss, McGrath et al. 2012), or EU level lobbying activities of those firms 
that have formalised PA units (Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Barron 2011; Moss, McGrath et 
al. 2012; Schendelen 2012), in this study, corporate lobbying was viewed as a 
functional corporate activity. The empirical analysis in chapter 4 explored lobbying as a 
functional activity, in relation to firms’ organizational structure, applying the approach 
of management scholars, who claim that a firm’s willingness and ability to become 
political active depends on organizational characteristics (Schuler and Rehbein 1997).  
By exploring lobbying as an activity, rather than a formalised corporate unit, this 
thesis extended the scope of previous research by including those organizations into the 
analysis, which do not have functional public affairs or lobbying departments. It also 
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contributed to current knowledge on how lobbying may be organized and managed at 
firms in different institutional contexts. Findings suggest that firms build on their 
existing domestic level lobbying strategy and the existing organizational arrangement of 
lobbying capabilities, when they enter the supranational arena. Companies that rely on 
internal lobbying capabilities, by engaging in an ‘integrated strategy’ at the domestic 
level, were found to transpose these capabilities to the EU level and lobby either 
directly through their domestic in-house team in Brussels as well, or set up a dedicated 
EU office. A similar pattern was argued to occur at firms that manage lobbying through 
the ‘outsourced strategy’, since their EU level engagement is mostly managed through 
contracted agencies too. In contrast, those firms that did not functionalise and formalise 
their lobbying activities, but managed lobbying exclusively through interpersonal 
networking at the domestic level, were found to be handicapped in their 
Europeanization efforts. Firms that followed the ‘inactive’ strategy were argued not to 
engage at EU level either, however, the Europeanization of those firms that engaged in 
‘network-based’ strategies in Hungary, was argued to be hindered by the non-
transposable nature of their strategy.  
These findings confirm previous studies that suggested that firms build on their 
domestic political capabilities (Holburn and Zelner 2010) and existing CPA structures 
(Getz 1997; Getz 2001), and raise our attention to the fact that the organizational 
arrangement of lobbying is an important variable that needs to be considered, when 
researching the process of Europeanization.  
 
7.2 Conclusions about the research problem 
In the following paragraphs we will explore those key implications of the 
research that further our understanding of the research problem. These include 
qualitative findings directly in relation to the research problem, as well as insights that 
emerged during the project, but were not considered previously. In the thesis it was 
found that the Europeanization of Hungarian firms’ lobbying activities is hindered in 
two crucial ways. First, the top-level, network-based lobbying strategy - that leads to 
lobbying success at the domestic level – is non-transposable to the EU level; second the 
characteristics of the post-socialist network capitalist environment in Hungary hinder 
firms’ EU level engagement, by affecting the managerial choice on Europeanization 
negatively.  
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Concerning the first claim, my findings showed that the post-socialist network 
capitalist environment in Hungary ‘conditions’ firms to develop network-based 
lobbying strategies, and position this strategy to the top echelon of the organizational 
hierarchy. By doing so, firms limit the development of professional lobbying 
capabilities and their options to transpose their know-how to the supranational level. 
Hence, post-socialist network capitalism creates a ‘golden cage’ for domestic firms. 
When members of the internal networks try to transpose their lobbying strategy to the 
EU level, they find that their domestic practices do not work at the supranational 
context, and hence their strategy creates a ‘lock-in’ effect for them. Joining the debate 
of how the domestic institutional environment impacts Europeanization abilities 
(Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001; Coen 1998; Bouwen 2002; Beyers and Kerremans 2007; 
Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Eising 2004) in this thesis, it is argued that domestic 
institutions have a determining impact on how and whether firms Europeanize their 
lobbying activities, by affecting firm level strategy development as well as the 
organizational arrangement of lobbying. My findings contest recent studies that suggest 
the irrelevance of national modes of interest intermediation in affecting corporate 
lobbying in the EU (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009: 171).  
  
 Besides unpacking the original research problem, my findings also provide 
insights to existing body of knowledge on firm level strategy development and 
international business literature on MNCs (Hillman 2003; Peng 2003; Holburn and 
Zelner 2010; Nölke 2011). As the research investigated the Europeanization of large 
firms, the inclusion of multinational corporations into the research was evident and 
contributed to the study in two crucial ways: in relation to the determining impact of 
resources on Europeanization, and in relation to whether resources or domestic 
institutions have a more determinant role in the development of corporate lobbying 
strategies. In respect to resources, empirical findings in the post-socialist context did not 
support the compensation thesis - i. e. that very high resources “constitute a sufficient 
condition for Europeanization, whereas high resources would lead to Europeanization 
only if combined with embeddedness in the statist and centralised” institutional 
framework (Klüver 2010: 187). MNCs in Hungary are considered to have very high 
resources and operate in a centralised or even autocratic system, where the current 
government has a great influence on the economy. Yet, subsidiaries of multinationals in 
Hungary were found to behave similarly to large domestic firms. Although they would 
have interests to represent in Brussels, because many of the government’s interventions 
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affect them negatively, nevertheless they deliberately choose to stay away from EU 
level lobbying, as a result of domestic institutional pressures. Hence, findings of my 
study illustrate that firms in certain domestic environments, such as the current post-
socialist network capitalist context of Hungary, do not Europeanize, even if high or very 
high financial resources are available to them. This does not mean that multinationals 
do not lobby at EU level. Rather, that subsidiaries of multinationals, similarly to local 
firms, avoid EU level political engagement - even through associations - as a 
consequence of their ‘domestic’ environmental constraints.  
  
 In relation to lobbying strategies the study found that in Hungary, top-level 
network-based lobbying is accessible to subsidiaries of multinationals. The research 
revealed that at the stage of entering post-socialist markets, subsidiaries of 
multinationals pay mediators to “buy” access to local networks.165. Yet, once they are in 
the market, they on the one hand, appoint local CEOs, or on the other hand, if the CEO 
is an expatriate foreign person, then he/she gets supported by a senior government 
relations professional, whose task is to open the ‘doors’ for the executive by getting 
network-based access to decision-makers. Hence, MNCs were found to completely 
integrate into the local networking game and develop a localised lobbying mix by 
combining ‘network-based’ and ‘integrated’ strategies, supported by their available 
resources and professional lobbying know-how. I found that multinationals not only 
adapt to the local lobbying ‘style’ but even ‘professionalize’ their network-based 
practices, by systematically developing ‘webs of networks’ through the whole vertical 
spectrum of decision-making, and engaging in political interest representation at all 
levels of the policy-making hierarchy. In contrast to subsidiaries, domestic firms were 
argued to limit their lobbying scope to the top layers of political decision-makers, and 
not to engage systematically with lower level officials. Furthermore, I found that CEOs 
of multinationals are supported by a person or a team of public affairs professionals, by 
whom they extend their lobbying expertise beyond the strategic level. The study showed 
that these additional lobbying capabilities make multinationals able to engage in 
legislative monitoring, policy analysis or coalition building in Hungary as well. 
Therefore, in contrast to local firms, in those rare instances when policy-making goes 
through the formal legislative process, multinationals are able to provide policy-related 
input to decision-makers. It was also argued that MNCs base their lobbying strategy on 
clearly defined political objectives, whereas domestic firms make use of their top 
                                                 
165
 Based on interview with the executive director of Hungarian NGO 2, interviewed 16.11.2011 
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leaders interpersonal relationships, based on ad hoc, actual interests and long-term trust-
based exchanges, rather than a systematic policy-driven approach.  
Based on these findings it was argued that top-level network-based lobbying - 
instead of creating a ‘barrier of entry’ by excluding outsiders (Kali 1999, World Bank 
2001) creates a ‘golden cage’ or a ‘barrier to exit’ for insiders. First, because it forms a 
‘lock-in effect’ for members, since they cannot develop professional lobbying 
capabilities and engage at EU level and second by being penetrable to foreign 
companies; domestic firms become exposed to lobbying competition and lose their 
competitive advantages in their domestic environment. Findings in relation to MNCs 
may provide contribution to the international business literature as well. Studies of 
strategic management established that multinationals adapt to the institutional 
constraints of ‘transition’ economies (Peng 2003) by trying to engage in network-based 
exchanges in the early stages of the transition process. Extending this view, my findings 
show that MNCs develop their lobbying mix, on the one hand by ‘importing’ their 
western strategies that are based on arm’s length exchanges, while on the other hand 
they ‘learn’ and ‘master’ local network-based strategies. In this respect MNCs adapt to 
the local institutional environment. Hence applying Peng’s theory to the question of 
corporate lobbying, it becomes evident that similarly to how UK and EU level firms 
adapted to the ‘requirements’ of UK and EU institutions by professionalizing their 
lobbying strategies, in order to get access to the increasingly open and democratised 
decision-making system, MNCs intentionally ‘unprofessionalize’ their lobbying 
practices, in order to get access to ‘network-capitalist’ policy-making through 
interpersonal networks. These findings suggest that institutions determine lobbying 
strategies more than resources, and also extend our understanding of how institutions 
affect corporate lobbying strategy development (Peng 2003). Applying the same logic 
to domestic Hungarian firms, one would expect that if they want to Europeanize, they 
would simply adapt their network-based strategies to the requirements of EU lobbying 
style - similarly to how MNCs do when they enter post-socialist markets. However, my 
findings suggest that this process is not ‘reversible’. Firms that ‘socialised’ in network-
based environments will be constrained in their professionalization and hence their 
Europeanization process. First because of their domestic constraints, such as the 
dependence from the ‘goodwill’ of the autocratic state and second because the 
characteristics of their ‘network-based’ lobbying strategy – through their limited 
lobbying capabilities and exclusive, top-level organizational arrangement – limit the 
development of their professional lobbying skills, and know how. While professional 
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arm’s length strategies can be transposed to ‘network-capitalist’ systems – even though 
they might not be very effective without networks – network-based strategies are less 
‘exportable’ to developed capitalist policy-making structures. As it was noted earlier 
institutional studies have found that firms with existing organizational structures for 
corporate political action and experience in public affairs are more likely to engage in 
corporate political activities again (Getz 1997; Getz 2001). Findings of the thesis 
support this view in two respects. First, firms with ‘integrated’ and ‘outsourced’ 
strategies were found to engage in EU level lobbying more than firms with ‘network-
based’ strategies. Second, MNCs with experience and existing organizational structures 
for public affairs adapt their strategies to the institutional requirement of post-socialism 
much easier, than Hungarian firms to EU level lobbying, since they neither have 
experience in professional lobbying, nor transferable organizational capabilities for 
public affairs.  
 
An additional area, where the research problem revealed new insights to the 
topic of EU level corporate lobbying, is the filed of lobbying through specialised 
contract agencies. This field is relatively under-studied (for a few exceptions see: 
Bouwen 2002; Lahusen 2003; Coen 1998), since most EU studies either investigate 
collective action of interest groups or corporate lobbying. Besides, the few existing 
studies investigate lobbying through a third-party only in the Western European context. 
My empirical findings contribute to this literature, by extending the scope of the 
analysis to Eastern European contexts, by providing extensive insights into how in-
house and agency teams cooperate in their lobbying tasks, and exploring what 
challenges this cooperation presents. The study explored the questions of how and why 
large firms contract specialized agencies for representing themselves towards political 
decision-makers generally, and how Eastern European firms make use of public affairs 
agencies. Through the analysis of the interviews I found that, in the developed capitalist 
context, agencies are used much more extensively both by those firms that cannot afford 
to have a dedicated in-house team for lobbying and also by those that have ‘integrated’ 
in-house lobbying departments. Agencies were found to be contracted by in-house 
teams, with the aim to deliver additional resources and an independent, objective view. I 
also found that in-house teams rely on agencies to triangulate political positions towards 
public decision-makers on the one hand, and to push ‘sensitive’ messages through top 
management on the other hand. The analysis of cooperation patterns of in-house and 
agency teams revealed that managers need to consider many interrelated issues when 
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deciding to extend lobbying capabilities – for instance tensions and responsibilities 
between the two ‘competing’ teams. These insights confirmed previous studies, arguing 
that consultancies “should be seen as complementary to the political action of firms” 
(Coen 1997: 103) and provided useful additional insights to the understanding of 
cooperation patterns between in-house and external teams (Lahusen 2003).  
Compared to the findings described above, the study of agencies presented quite 
contrasting results in the Eastern European context. In contrast to UK firms, companies 
from Hungary were found to ‘avoid’ agencies both at the domestic and at EU level. The 
analysis revealed that the differences in preferences stem from domestic institutional 
characteristics. Firms in liberal democratic systems, where the formal rule of law 
provides ‘security’ for firms, tend to outsource the most strategic part of their political 
activities, whereas in the network-capitalist context – due to the weakness of formal 
institutions - managers can only rely on ‘trust’. It is argued that although limited 
resources might ‘encourage’ firms in Western European contexts to rely on the extended 
capabilities that agencies may provide (Bouwen 2002; Lahusen 2003), firms that come 
from Hungary refuse the use of agencies due to their domestic constraints and 
consequent negative experiences. Due to this domestic constraint, managerial choices in 
relation to the use of agencies become limited, since corporate leaders do not trust 
‘outsiders’ even in their own domestic environment.  
Although lobbying through agencies may flourish in liberal democratic systems, 
where the formal rule of law provides the feeling of ‘security’ for firms, in the emerging 
capitalist system the reliance on ‘trust’ and the lack or weakness of formal rule 
enforcement prevents this type of agency-based lobbying strategy to develop. Hence, 
even though resource-wise firms in Hungary would benefit from the use of contract 
agents, this option is not available for them as their managers cannot allow themselves 
to ‘trust’ Brussels-based agencies. Bouwen posited “in order to develop a successful 
lobbying strategy in conjunction with the consultant the client has to share his access 
goods with the consultant” (Bouwen 2002: 377). As it was explained earlier, access 
goods in post-socialist contexts differ substantially in nature from those that were 
identified at EU level. Due to the often ‘non-ethical’ nature of post-socialist access 
goods, firms in Hungary are constrained in their choices of option, when they develop 
their lobbying mix in Brussels. This is part of the reason why Hungarian business 
leaders keep domestic lobbying exclusively in their own hands, and prefer in-house 
representation to contracting at the supranational level too. The study revealed that 
senior management in Hungarian firms does not choose to contract agencies, and even if 
 246 
and when they do, they turn to their existing interpersonal contacts. This type of 
contracting however might not lead to efficient lobbying solutions at EU level. Even 
though firms in Hungary would probably benefit from contracting EU level agencies, to 
counterbalance their lack of expertise and multi-level know-how, managers prefer to set 
up in-house representations with ‘junior’ staff. Insights from the interviews suggest that 
on the one hand firm leaders’ awareness about the importance of professionalism and 
expertise of EU level lobbying is limited, and on the other hand, they are not prepared 
to share delicate lobbying information with their public affairs professionals, even if 
those are based in Brussels. A quick glance at other Eastern European countries 
revealed that firms in Slovakia and Poland also prefer in-house arrangements to 
agencies. These findings provide practical insights for industry, or even to agencies that 
want to extend their client base to Eastern European markets.  
 
7.3 Implications for theory  
The findings of the thesis have two crucial implications from a theoretical 
perspective. The first concerns the question of determinants of EU lobbying 
engagement, while the second relates to the Europeanization of Eastern European firms.  
Concerning the first issue, in the analysis of the literature in chapter 2, I argued 
that besides resources and the impact of domestic institutions, the influence of 
organizational structure of lobbying should be explored as a variable of EU level 
lobbying activities. I suggested that instead of exploring lobbying activities only 
through established public affairs units, if we approach lobbying as a functional 
corporate activity we may be able to explore how the organizational arrangement of 
lobbying affects EU level engagement patterns. Indeed, like for any organizational 
activity, firms need to develop organizational capabilities and allocate organizational 
resources to this activity in order to be able to successfully lobby. Firms that do that 
may find it easier to Europeanize their lobbying strategies. Findings in chapter 4 and 6 
suggested that indeed, firms rely on their domestic lobbying strategies in their 
Europeanization processes and even try to transpose their domestic organizational 
structure of lobbying to the EU level. Furthermore the empirical analysis revealed that 
firms with less formalised and professionalized lobbying structures find it more difficult 
to transpose their activities, while those firms that engage in professional lobbying 
activities through formalised structures will find it easier to engage at EU level, 
irrespective of whether they rely on internal or external capabilities or whether lobbying 
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is integrated within the organizational structure of the firm or whether it is managed 
externally. These findings suggest that the organizational arrangement of lobbying have 
a direct impact on firms’ ability to become politically active in direct EU level interest 
representation, by influencing how effectively companies can engage with EU 
institutions. As it was discussed earlier in chapter 2, EU scholars have noted how 
important it is for firms that want to lobby EU policy-making directly, to establish 
European credentials and creating a distinct and centralised government affairs 
department (Coen 2010: 297).  
Extending these claims I argue that it is not necessarily the existence of a 
dedicated PA department that makes a difference in EU level political engagement, but 
rather the professionalism of lobbying activities and the organizational arrangement of 
functional lobbying activities. Based on the findings of the empirical chapters, I argue 
that irrespective of whether lobbying is arranged inside or outside of the organizational 
structure, firms with professionalized and formalized activities are more able to engage 
with EU institutions, than those with unprofessional or less formalised structures. 
Extending what Klüver found in relation to interest groups, that the organizational 
structure influences how effectively organizations may supply information to EU 
institutions (Klüver 2012: 495), I argue that the position of lobbying in the 
organizational structure in large firms determines how effectively they can Europeanize 
their lobbying activities and engage with EU institutions. This new approach can 
provide a theoretical basis for testable hypotheses formation about variation in 
Europeanization.  
Besides the insights relating to EU level engagement, these findings also extend 
existing knowledge in relation to the impact of the domestic institutional structure on 
Europeanization (Coen 1998; Beyers 2002; Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; 
Klüver 2010). My interpretation suggests that the domestic environment directly affects 
firms EU level engagement ability by impacting the development of the organizational 
capabilities and structures that firms design for their lobbying activities. Consequently, 
those firms that originate from institutional contexts, where the domestic institutions 
supports or even encourages the professionalization of lobbying, will find it easier to 
Europeanize than those, which come from states where networks and informal 
relationships dominate interest representation. Hence, instead of investigating the 
domestic institutional environment in relation to how it provides access to decision-
making or how compatible it is with EU structures, further research needs to explore 
how domestic institutions affect the professionalization of business lobbying and 
 248 
consequently the development of capabilities and functional, formalised structures 
inside or outside the organizational hierarchy.  
 
 Besides the implications of the organizational arrangement of lobbying as a 
variable in Europeanization, the thesis contributed to theory by developing the concept 
of the ‘golden cage’. Answering the call of scholars to investigate the “incompatibility 
of opportunity structures between the national and European level” (Cianciara 2013), 
the thesis systematically explored how the characteristics of post-socialist capitalism in 
Hungary affected interest politics in general at the institutional level and lobbying 
strategies at the firm level. I argued that post-socialist network capitalism encourages 
businesses to develop a top-level network-based lobbying strategy that is not 
professionalized, neither inside nor outside the corporate structure. Investigating the 
process of how firms transpose their domestic lobbying strategies and structures to the 
EU level, I found that this type of lobbying is non-transposable, due to its serious 
limitations in professionalism and reach as a result of its reliance on personal 
relationships. Hence, it creates a ‘golden cage’ for domestic businesses. While it 
provides certain access to political decision-making at the national level, it prevents 
domestic firms from transposing their engagement strategies to the supranational level.  
 These findings provide new theoretical insights to existing knowledge first in 
relation to networks and second in relation to how domestic institutions affect 
Europeanization. In relation to the first, networks have been claimed to be 
‘exclusionary’ towards outsiders, because they create ‘barriers to entry’ (Peng 2003). 
However, findings showed that MNCs can penetrate the golden cage in Hungary, by 
adapting to the local environment and engaging in top-level network-based strategies. 
Yet, at the same time, the golden cage ‘locks in’ domestic businesses and creates thus a 
‘barrier to exit’ for insiders. Despite the domestic effectiveness of the Eastern European 
lobbying style, the network-based strategy has serious limitations in the formalized EU 
level institutional environment, where credibility, professionalism and expertise are key.  
In terms of the second area, the links between domestic institutions and 
Europeanization, I found two additional insights that extend current knowledge. First, 
the golden cage phenomenon of network capitalism hinders the professionalization 
process of lobbying, although this would be a prerequisite of successful EU level 
interest representation. Indeed, in the Hungarian context, the firms’ top managers 
concentrate their efforts and resources on establishing personal relationships with the 
relevant people from the governing party. This diverts organizational resources away 
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from establishing more professional lobbying strategies that are key to successfully 
engage at EU level. Secondly, the domestic constraints, emerging from the 
characteristics of Hungarian capitalism, hinder firms’ ability to bypass their national 
government and seek access to European institutions. These two claims have crucial 
implications for the future of EU level interest politics, since the golden cage may 
permanently hinder the representation of Eastern European business in EU policy-
making. The EU’s ‘elite pluralist’ (Coen 1997: 98; Coen 1998) institutional structure is 
often criticized for its ‘democratic deficit’ (Michalowitz 2004Michalowitz 2004; 
Saurugger 2008). My findings suggest that for firms in Hungary, the biggest challenge 
is not centred around the question, whether they can properly access policy-making or 
not (Bouwen 2004; Eising 2007), but rather that they are not even able to start getting 
engaged in Brussels. Hence, if and when scholars might want to address the issue of 
‘differential Europeanization’, it needs to be remembered that providing ‘more 
democratic’ conditions for access on the side of EU institutions, may not lead to much 
success, in terms of decreasing the east-west representational divide, because the roots 
of the problem are related to the differences in capitalist coordination and hence the 
golden cage phenomenon.   
 
7.4 Key findings of the empirical chapters 
Chapter 4 investigated the process of corporate Europeanization from a firm 
level perspective. The first part of the chapter explored the impact of the domestic 
institutional environment on lobbying strategies. Three different institutional 
environments have been explored in relation to firm’s lobbying practices: the UK, EU 
and Hungary. Applying the resource dependence model to lobbying, the analysis of 
empirical evidence revealed that the professionalization process of lobbying in the UK 
and at EU level was triggered by the ‘democratisation’ of the legislative decision-
making system and the growing acceptance of firms as political actors. In those 
jurisdictions where public institutions opened up for the analysis-based input and 
professional expertise of business interests, firms changed their network-based lobbying 
strategies to arm’s length approaches, in order to get access to political decision-
making. In the post-socialist environment of Hungary however, the policy-making 
process was found to be less open to social dialogue. It was argued that the lack of 
official formal access to decision-making, and the uncertainties of the institutional 
system encourage firms to develop network-based strategies, and engage in informal 
lobbying practices through interpersonal relationships.  
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Following on from these empirical findings, it was investigated how firms 
develop their domestic and EU level organizational structures for lobbying and what 
kind of capabilities they develop as a response to their environmental constraints. The 
study identified four ideal typical strategies in relation to firms’ corporate political 
capabilities. Two of the four ideal types were classified as being ‘professional’ – the 
integrated and the outsourced strategies – whereas the other two, the network-based and 
the inactive strategies were found to be ‘non-professional’. It was argued that firms that 
follow an ‘integrated strategy’ and hence integrate professional lobbying capabilities in 
their organizational structure, often extend their lobbying resources by contracting 
public affairs agencies for the support of the in-house team. The integrated strategy was 
argued to be followed mostly by large domestic and multinational UK firms that 
develop their own internal capabilities for lobbying by setting up an in-house team for 
managing public affairs. The analysis revealed that despite the comparable structural 
design of these firms, European level capabilities may differ due to the different impact 
of EU level environmental resource dependencies. Firms with an ‘integrated’ domestic 
level strategy may engage at EU level in two different ways. Either by setting up a 
dedicated EU office, or by managing EU level lobbying from the domestic in-house 
team. The ‘outsourced’ strategy was argued to be followed mostly by smaller UK firms 
that do not have an in-house team for political engagement. These firms acquire 
professional public affairs capabilities by contracting specialised agencies. Besides 
those companies that follow the ‘outsourced’ strategy, many firms with the ‘integrated’ 
strategy also extend their capabilities by contracting agencies. The study provided new 
applied insights to the understanding of the complexity of managerial decisions in 
relation to Europeanization. The third type of strategy is the network-based one that 
builds on networks as capabilities. This type of strategy is followed mostly in EE, where 
businesses have less formal access points to policy-making than their WE counterparts. 
The network-based strategy was argued to be based on personal connections. The 
‘inactive’ strategy characterises those firms that stay away from political engagement 
completely. These firms were argued to be mostly SMEs in relatively less regulated 
sectors.   
The chapter posited that Europeanization of large firms needs to be divided into 
two distinct stages. The first is when managers design and construct domestic lobbying 
capabilities and the second is when they decide upon EU level capability building. 
Besides the impact of domestic level lobbying capabilities, managerial choice on EU 
level engagement was argued to be influenced by financial resources and EU level 
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environmental resource dependencies. Once lobbying capabilities are constructed in a 
professional ‘integrated’ or ‘outsourced’ strategy, EU level resource dependencies 
create an internal demand for Europeanization. However when capabilities are arranged 
in a ‘network-based’ or an ‘inactive’ strategy, EU level resource dependencies may not 
reach corporate leaders, because the domestic constraints of the institutional 
environment supersede the importance of EU level environmental resource 
dependencies. This has crucial importance in the Europeanization process, since in the 
post-socialist, developing capitalist environment, firms adapt to the institutional 
constraints by developing a top-level, network-based lobbying strategy that is informal 
and depends on interpersonal relationships. In this context, EU level resource 
dependencies do not create internal demand for Europeanization, because national level 
institutional constraints overweight them in priority. Managers of large firms in 
Hungary choose to stay away from EU level lobbying, because their institutional 
environment creates direct economic and political pressures that hinders their 
Europeanization. Furthermore, their top-level network-based lobbying strategy limits 
the development of their lobbying capabilities. As in the Europeanization process, firms 
build on their existing, domestic level lobbying strategy, those that have professional 
capabilities – such as the integrated or the outsourced strategy – will transpose these 
structures easier to the supranational level, than those that lobby through the network-
based strategy or do not lobby at all. The conceptual theory of the Europeanization 
process therefore links domestic level public affairs strategies to the Europeanization 
process.  
Chapter 5 explored how the characteristics of the emerging post-socialist 
capitalism determine Eastern European firms’ Europeanization. In contrast to scholars 
who question the importance of domestic institutions in relation to Europeanization 
(Eising 2007; Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009), it was argued that the emerging domestic 
institutional structure in Hungary directly affects the lobbying decision of corporate 
managers and their willingness to enter the EU’s lobbying arena.  
The study have identified the causal mechanisms behind the non-
Europeanization of Hungarian firms and found that the fear from the state prevents 
companies from Europeanization of lobbying, even when resources are available. So 
instead of the constraining factor of financial resources or the limited access to EU 
institutions, I found that the nature of Hungarian capitalism prevents firms from EU 
level engagement.   
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It was found that although Hungarian businesses have very restricted access to 
domestic level policy-making, they choose not to bypass the domestic government by 
engaging in Brussels - as the compensation hypothesis would argue – but instead choose 
to stay away from EU level lobbying in order to avoid domestic ‘revenge’. Weak 
Europeanization however was not found to be the result of the ‘misfit’ between national 
modes of interest intermediation (Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001), but more a direct result 
of the domestic environmental constraints and firms’ dependence and economic 
vulnerability stemming from the characteristics of the emerging capitalist system. 
The chapter was split into two distinct periodical sections. The pre-2010 period 
up until the current Orbán government entered into power, and the post-2010 period of 
the Orbán administration. This distinction was necessary, due to the structural and 
conceptual differences that characterise Hungary’s institutional environment before and 
since the conservative majority. Based on the findings of this study the emerging 
corporatist environment in Hungary in the pre-2010 period, was compared to a ‘house 
of cards’, due to the fragility of the system. In contrast, since 2010 the ‘reformed’ 
interest intermediation system resembles more a ‘state corporatist’ system. The chapter 
showed how the new government first systematically took away the autonomy of the 
public sector, second disorganized civil society and emerging social bargaining 
structures and third arbitrarily selected politically supportive social partners in order to 
manage ‘shop window’ style social dialogue. It was argued that both the public sector 
and its policy-making structure have started to move away from the well-defined, 
coherent Weberian bureaucracy and Evans’s ‘state autonomy’. Instead of embeddedness 
and autonomy, the state’s institutions are increasingly compromised by the 
government’s efforts towards centralisation and control. The study revealed how in the 
new system, the government privileges some social partners for the expense of all 
others and creates a new interest reconciliation system by taking out all the 
counterbalancing powers that the previous structure had. In the emerging framework, 
both the legitimacy and the operations of associations was argued to get controlled by 
the state. The study found that this type of governance might lead to the evolution of a 
form of centralised corporatism, in which the state negotiates with only a few politically 
selected stakeholders and ignores well-established professional associations. The Orbán 
cabinet was found to demolish the emerging quasi-corporatist structures and pave the 
way towards a despotic, centralised and authoritarian system. The current political 
processes however hold the threat of a new type of interest representation system and 
point toward an authoritarian type of corporatism or no corporatism at all. Besides 
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interest politics, the post-2010 government was argued to have drastically changed the 
business environment too, first by restructuring markets, second by disadvantaging 
multinationals and third by creating new state monopolies for selected industries. In 
parallel the findings suggested that the state has colonised the economy by initiating 
forced buy-outs and using the state’s infrastructure for private interests. The analysis 
raised attention to the fact that all of these interventions were carried out by legislative 
changes based on and influenced by private interests and short-term political goals. By 
attacking multinationals, the cabinet has taken a new direction in its economic policy 
compared to all previous post-socialist governments. It was argued that the Fidesz 
government’s ‘new’ type or as it is locally called the ‘unorthodox’ (Bozoki 2011) 
economic policy paved the way for economic restructuring or more precisely the 
reallocation of private capital. Private interests behind the governing elite may use the 
infrastructure of the state in gaining unjustified economic advantages on the market. 
Based on the insights of the empirical investigation in the study it was argued that pre-
2010 governments in Hungary could be best characterised by ‘clientelism’, whereas 
today a more predatory-type of regime seems to rule. The top-down rent seeking 
together with the centralisation and overall politicization of the public sector has created 
a relatively coherent (although politicised) state, where hierarchy and centralised 
decision-making is prevalent. The study found that through the extensive changes in the 
legislative framework and economic power relations the state had acquired a strong 
influence over the economy and privileged groups close to the governing elite benefit at 
the expense of others. Due to these characteristics, the post-2010 government in 
Hungary was argued to resemble the characteristics of a predatory regime. Under this 
regime - due to the political and economic exposure of the business sector to the 
‘tyranny’ of the state - both foreign and domestic firms choose to stay away from EU 
level lobbying.  
Chapter 6 focused on how the above explained institutional environment impacts 
the development of firm level lobbying capabilities. Findings showed that network-
based capitalism contributes to the development of ‘network-based’ lobbying strategies, 
which is confined to the top of the organizational hierarchy and relies solely on informal 
relationships rather than professional PA know-how. In the network capitalist 
environment informal relationships give access to decision-making and the exchange 
currency in lobbying is money or social favours, instead of information. As the strategy 
is efficient at the domestic level, firms feel that they can arrange everything through 
their relationships and therefore do not need to develop their lobbying capabilities any 
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further. The confinement of lobbying to the top of the organizational hierarchy limits 
the reach of lobbying and creates a ‘golden cage’ for domestic businesses. Although it 
provides access at the domestic level it prevents firms from transposing their 
capabilities at the supranational level. Moreover the door of the ‘golden cage’ is open to 
outsiders and hence the phenomenon shows that instead of being ‘barriers to entry’, 
networks create a ‘barrier to exit’ the domestic interest intermediation structure.  
Firms in Hungary were grouped into three distinct categories, depending on 
what type of lobbying strategies they develop. Large domestic firms were found to 
engage only in ‘network-based’ strategies, local subsidiaries of multinationals were 
argued to develop a lobbying mix by managing the ‘integrated’ strategy in combination 
with the ‘network-based’ one, while the inactive strategy was found to be followed only 
by SMEs and a few export-oriented large firms. Findings suggested that MNCs are 
more ‘professional’ even in their networking strategies compared to local firms. While 
domestic firms rely exclusively on top-level engagement through CEOs interpersonal 
contacts, MNCs were found to target the whole vertical spectrum of legislative policy-
making and extend their web of relations over a wider circle of decision-makers. 
Furthermore, by importing their expertise and resources in developing analysis-based 
lobbying documents and channelling this information to lower level officials, 
multinationals ‘overtake’ domestic firms in those instances as well, when proposals go 
through the whole legislative process. By mapping the different ‘ingredients’ of 
lobbying used by multinationals and domestic firms and contrasting their different 
capabilities the chapter provides extensive insights into the domestic level differences of 
lobbying practices. It concludes that the domestic institutional environment have a 
determining impact not only on domestic firms’ strategy development, but also on how 
MNCs design their lobbying activities. By illustrating that multinationals extend their 
‘imported’ western lobbying know-how with local networking practices the analysis 
suggests that the determining role of domestic institutions in the process of firm level 
lobbying strategy development is more important than resources and professional 
lobbying capabilities. The chapter posits that despite the availability of large resources, 
MNCs develop their local strategy by combining ingredients from western as well as 
eastern lobbying practices.  
Investigating the use of internal and external capabilities at Eastern European 
firms, it was found that firms refuse external support in lobbying due to their domestic 
institutional constraints. In contrast to UK firms that outsource the most strategic parts 
of lobbying, EE firms find outsourcing difficult. As public institutions are weak and 
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sometimes corrupt, instead of relying on the rule of law, firms base their business 
choices on trust. The institutional environment of post-socialist Hungary therefore limits 
the choices that are available for the development of lobbying capabilities. 
Consequently, it was argued that the tenacity of firms to keep corporate lobbying in-
house is a direct consequence of the characteristics of the domestic institutional 
environment. Post-socialist network capitalism constrains the choices of firms and 
hence prevents professionalization. The chapter shows that domestic preferences spill 
over to the European level. Those firms that follow the ‘network-based’ strategy try to 
transpose their domestic strategies to EU level and similarly those that prefer internal 
capabilities to outsourcing will refuse external help in Brussels too. Hence, instead of 
adapting and integrating into the EU level institutional environment EE firms try to 
‘export’ their domestic practices. Yet, the ‘lock-in’ effect of the golden cage does not 
allow firms to transpose their know-how, since strategies that work in Hungary do not 
lead to success at EU level. Networks only provide access to officials, but does not lead 
to access to decision-making. Firms would need expertise, but the domestic institutional 
environment prevents firms from developing professional capabilities and limits their 
choices when acquiring external professional resources.  
 
7.5 Limitations and recommendation for future research  
Due to the relatively understudied nature of the research topic, the study has 
taken an interpretive case study approach. Post-socialist Hungary was used as the in-
depth case, whereas a developed capitalist EU member state, the UK was used as a 
shadow case. Empirical evidence was collected both at the domestic (UK, Hungary) and 
EU levels. The research was conducted in two distinct phases, in three locations. The 
first phase was conducted in 2009-2010 in London and Brussels, while the second was 
carried out in Budapest during 2011-2013. The study’s conceptual and theoretical 
findings were formed on the basis of semi-structured interviews and additional data 
analysis. Data analysis through newspaper articles and investigatory journalism was 
used partly to provide additional empirical information to the contextual analysis of 
post-socialist capitalism and partly to help the triangulation of the emerging findings. 
The study was conducted with the full approval of King’s College Education and 
Management Research Ethics Panel as a ‘not high risk’ project.  
Limitations may stem from narrow sampling and scope, given that only one 
post-socialist country has been investigated in-depth and one shadow case was used to 
provide benchmarking. The researcher has endeavoured to reduce potential 
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misinterpretation or other biases by triangulating emerging findings with other sources 
of information. It is acknowledged here that this possible bias cannot be completely 
removed, and hence the researcher may have relied much on the perceptions of those 
involved.  
Findings in relation to the ‘dual-level’ model on Europeanization are based on 
inductive theorizing and therefore need to be further tested in practice, through a 
quantitative perspective. More detailed research on the managerial choice in the context 
of Europeanization might be fruitful. The framework of antecedents of managerial 
choice in relation to Europeanization, integrates different aspects examined in previous 
studies in the field of EU lobbying and strategic management. It is possible that the 
antecedents that have been integrated into the framework of Europeanization may be 
extended with other variables, such as sector-specific determinants or institution-
specific criteria.  
Due to the research method, this study explored the process of the 
Europeanization of corporate lobbying from an organizational perspective, identifying 
the antecedents of managerial choice and describing the organizational structures, in 
light of the different lobbying strategies. Findings revealed that the organizational 
structure is an important variable that needs to be considered when investigating the 
determinants of EU level lobbying strategies. Further research should evaluate more in-
depth, how the organizational arrangement of lobbying as a functional activity – even if 
it is not formalised in a functional organizational unit – affects EU level capability 
design and corporate lobbying patterns.  
Theoretical findings in relation to the impacts of the institutional environment on 
supranational lobbying were tested only in the Hungarian context. The study of 
Hungarian capitalism in relation to firm’s Europeanization and strategy development 
provided insights based on a relatively narrow ‘snapshot’ of time. Further longitudinal 
studies could build on the findings of this research by investigating Europeanization 
from a more path-dependent perspective, exploring the Europeanization patterns of 
Eastern European corporations in relation to the length of EU membership. 
Longitudinal research projects could also measure, whether the golden cage of EE 
capitalism would ‘dissolve’ over time.  
Additionally, future research should test the findings in relation to the long-term 
impact of the second Orbán era on business lobbying. Elections in 2014 might change 
the current power relations in Hungarian politics. However the study’s insights in 
relation to the characteristics of the state being ‘predatory’ and moving towards a ‘state 
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corporatist’ system may be further investigated from a political science perspective. 
Instead of investigating the emerging system’s impact on corporate lobbying, further 
research may unpack the regime’s impact on interest politics in general. In the study, 
Hungary was argued to present a ‘critical case’ and hence future research should test the 
generalizability of the study’s findings in other post-socialist countries. Theoretical 
concepts - such as the ‘top-level network-based’ lobbying strategy, the typology of 
Eastern European lobbying or the golden cage phenomenon – may deserve further 
research in other institutional contexts, or in more comparative perspectives. Besides 
other post-socialist states, comparative research could test the applicability of these 
concepts in the contexts of other emerging economies beyond Europe as well.  
Similarly to the investigation of domestic businesses, the findings concerning 
multinationals’ lobbying strategies, and the insights on the interactions between in-
house and agency teams may need to be further tested in other developing capitalist 
countries.  
In addition, other variables may be examined that can affect corporate 
Europeanization or lobbying in other international contexts. It would be interesting to 
investigate whether the golden cage phenomenon could be applied for the 
Europeanization of other interest groups, such as associations or NGOs. Insights from 
the new theories might be useful for the analysis of business lobbying in other 
institutional contexts, especially in other Eastern European and emerging economies, 
where informal institutions have similar importance. In addition, the question of 
marginal Eastern European representation may be examined from an EU level 
perspective.  
The theoretical and practical findings of the study suggest that even if firms in 
Eastern Europe acquire more experience in EU lobbying, due to the increasing length of 
EU membership, their marginal representation may not change. Due to the strong 
impact of post-socialist network-capitalism on lobbying strategies and the process of 
Europeanization, the ‘golden cage’ would only open if the characteristics of the current 
post-socialist capitalist environment changed. As long as the nature of western and 
Eastern European capitalism remains so different, lobbying strategies will also be 
diverting. Hence, while the increase of EE interest representation in EU level decision-
making may remain a dream, the under-representation of post-socialist businesses may 
become a permanent reality. However, if half of the continent remains permanently 
outside of EU level policy-making, then policy-makers will have to face the problem of 
a possible ‘democratic deficit’ in decision-making and consider alternative ways to 
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support Eastern European stakeholders to participate in the shaping of the future of 
Europe. It should be explored how EU institutions may be able to overcome the 
potential ‘democratic deficit’ and how Eastern European states could be involved in this 
thinking process.  
The region may remain Europe's semi-periphery (Vliegenthart 2010: 242) if the 
trend that the core countries set the rules of the economic game become permanent, 
leading to the disadvantaged position of members states in the eastern part of the 
continent. The future competitiveness of the EU might depend on its internal 
cohesiveness. In furthering this process it would be crucial to find ways to include 
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Appendix C: Interview questions – for in-house 
lobbyists 
 
1. Introducing questions:  
How old are you? 
What is your position in the company? 
For how long have you been in this position? 
How many years experience do you have in lobbying? 
What are the main areas of your expertise? 
 
2. Questions relating to the organization:  
For how many years is your organization active in lobbying? 
Is your organization active in lobbying in nationally and in Brussels too? 
How many people work in your lobbying department? 
How many lobby related cases do you have in a year? 
What type of activities are you involved in? 
What kind of cases do you have?  
 
3. Experiences of corporate lobbying strategies 
What is the main difference for you between public affairs and lobbying? 
What strategies do you use? 
Do you know organizations that use different strategies?  
What kind of problems do you experience in your lobbying activity?  
 
4. Opinions about the reasons of involvement in interest representation 
Why did your organization set up this department? When? 
Why do organizations need lobbying nationally or in Brussels? 
What are the main factors that influence your company to get involved in lobbying? 
What does your company win if it gets involved in interest representation? 
Why did your company choose to build up an in-house department instead of using a 
consultancy? 
 
Questions only relevant in Brussels (5-7): 
Do you see any differences in lobbying strategy between different nations? 
Do you ever use a national strategy besides lobbying in Brussels? 
 
5. Opinions about the EU’s lobby market and corporate interest representation 
Do you feel any change on the market since the accession of the Eastern European 
block? 
Do you see any cross-sectoral trends concerning which nations are most dominant in the 
EU’s lobby market? 
Do you see any trends of national dominance in your domain? 
 
6. Opinions about the representation from Western and Eastern Europe 
What do you think about the participation of EE and WE organizations in the Brussels 
lobby market? 
Can you distinguish between Eastern and Western interests in a given case? 
Have you ever been cooperating in lobbying on a regional level eg. East-West? 
 
7. Experiences in how the EU policy-making and implementation affected Western 
and Eastern corporations in certain policy fields 
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Have you ever experienced a case when the EU policy-making process affected Western 
and Eastern corporations differently? 
Have you ever experienced a case when legislation affected Western and Eastern 
corporations differently? 
 
8. Opinions about the outcome of passive lobbying or non-participation 
In your opinion what are the factors that influence organizations not to get involved?  
What can companies loose if they do not get involved? 
Can you see a national or regional trend in cases where organizations were 
disadvantageously affected by a decision? 
 
9. Opinions about the outcome of lobbying 
What can be the outcomes of lobbying actions? 
 
10. Opinion about the relationship between lobbying and economic competitiveness 
Can you see a link between passive participation and economic disadvantages? 
Can you see a link between active participation and economic advantages? 
 
11. Other issues? 
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Appendix D: Interview questions for consultancies  
 
1. Introducing questions:  
Same as in questionnaire C. 
 
2. Questions relating to the organization:  
Q1-4 same as in questionnaire C. 
How many people work in your EU consultancy section/department? 
How many lobbyists are employed in your company? 
Is your organization specialized in any sectors or is it providing general consultancy? 
In which policy fields is your organization active? 
What kind of services does your organization provide? 
What type of activities are you involved in?  
Why do your clients choose to use a consultancy instead of doing the job themselves? 
 
3. Opinions about the reasons of involvement in interest representation 
Why do organizations need lobbying in Brussels? 
What are the main factors that influence your clients to get involved in lobbying? 
What do they win if they get involved? 
 
4. Opinions about the outcome of passive lobbying or non-participation 
In your opinion what might be the factors that influence organizations not to get 
involved 
What can companies loose if they do not get involved? 
What do you think would help passive organizations to get more active? 
 
5. Experiences of corporate lobbying strategies 
What strategies do you use when lobbying in legislative matters? 
Do you lobby in non-legislative matters?  
What kind of problems do you experience in your lobbying activity?  
 
6. Opinions about the representation from Western and Eastern Europe 
Do you feel any change on the market since the accession of EE states? 
Do you see any cross-sectoral trends concerning which nations are most dominant? 
What do you think about the participation of Eastern and Western European firms? 
Can you distinguish between Eastern and Western interests in a given case? 
 
7. Opinions about the outcome of lobbying 
What can be the outcomes of lobbying actions? 
Would your chances of winning in a given case change according to the nationality of 
the clients? 
 
8. Opinion about lobbying and competitiveness 
Can you see a link between passive participation and economic disadvantages? 
Can you see a link between active participation and economic advantages? 
 
9. Any other issues? 
Appendix E: Interview question in Hungary, 2011 
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1. Interest representation in Hungary 
1.1. How much does the actual government’s policy-making activity impact your 
company’s everyday operations? 
 
1.2. Do you consider it important for your company to engage in lobbying activities? 
 
1.3. What impacts whether your company formally engages in interest representation 
activities at a governmental level?  
 
1.4. What does your company win if it engages in interest representation? 
 
1.5. Does your company have a political strategy? 
 
1.6. Does your company have an employee or a team that specifically manage 
government affairs? 
 
1.7. What do you think, how open is the current government to engage in a social 
dialogue with companies? And in the last 10 years? 
 
2. Associations 
2.1. In which Hungarian or European associations does your company have 
membership? 
 
2.2. Can you count on associations in your domestic (and EU-level) interest 
representation activities? 
 
2.3. Which association helps you most in representing your interests in Brussels, if any? 
 
2.4. How would you describe the cooperation between your firm and the associations? 
 
2.5. Have you encountered any difficulties in your cooperation with associations? 
 
3. EU lobbying 
3.1. Do you consider it important to engage in EU-level decision-making? 
 
3.2. What would your company ’win’ by engaging in lobbying?  
 
3.3. What would your company lose if it would stay away from Brussels? 
 
3.4. What factors impact whether your company engages in EU-level interest 
representation or not?  
 
3.5. From where does your company get information about the actual issues on the EU 
agenda that may impact your company? 
 
3.6. Does your company have any employees, who deal specifically with EU issues? 
 
3.7. Have you ever had a case when you lobbied at EU level for something? 
 
3.8. If not, what do you think may be the reasons for this? 
 
4. In case the company does not lobby in Brussels: 
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4.1.What would the company need in order to get engaged in EU-level? 
4.2.What are the biggest obstacles? 
4.3.If financial resources would be available, could you engage? 
 
5. In case the company already lobbies in Brussels: 
5.1. How do you evaluate the cooperation between EU institutions and 
Hungarian firms? 
5.2. Are there any obstacles in building contacts? 
5.3. What kind of difficulties have you encountered so far? 
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Appendix F: Modified interview questions – Hungary, 
2012 
1. What do you think about corporate lobbying in Hungary? 
 
2. Whose responsibility it is at your company to keep contacts with the state? 
 
3. Do you see any difference between the approach of lobbying of Hungarian and 
multinational companies? 
 
4. Can you give me an example when informal contacts helped to sort out an issue, 
while professional lobbying techniques, would not have helped? 
 
5. People say that in Hungary lobbying is done through personal networks. What do you 
think of this? 
 
6. It is presumed that in Hungary, CEOs have the most important personal networks and 
they lobby for the interest of the company? What do you think of this statement? 
 
7. If the CEOs lobby, what do you think what are the advantages and disadvantages of 
this strategy? 
 
8. Do you think this strategy may change in the future? 
 
9. Does your company lobby in Brussels? 
 
10. Is there a person at your firm who monitors what is happening in Brussels? 
 
11. What kind of obstacles do you see in lobbying in Brussels? 
 
12. Do you think that your domestic environment impacts on whether your firm lobbies 
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